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This thesis studies the role and the capacity of the Chinese state in the 
development of China’s rare earth industry. The Chinese rare earth industry has rapidly 
developed since the late 1970s and has provided the global supply of this group of 
strategic minerals since the late 1990s. Through interviews, site visits and analysis of 
archival and secondary data, the study finds that the Chinese central state has long 
engaged in “reregulation” in industry liberalization and market development: the creation 
of new rules and reformulation of old ones to achieve the state’s own goals. From the 
onset of China’s economic reform in 1978, the Chinese rare earth industry has gone 
through three periods: the relaxation of central planning and industry development under 
state sponsorship (1978-1997), the expansion of domestic market and dominance in 
international trade accompanied with increased regulations (1998-2007), and the post-
economic-crisis industry expansion accompanied with stronger state policies to steer its 
development (2008-present). Across different periods Beijing’s development goals have 
not been static, but shifting objectives that sought to utilize and advance the strategic 
values of the rare earths relevant to the state. To achieve the industry development goals, 
Beijing has actively managed the industry’s development through consistently 
introducing and adjusting industry-specific rules and policies. Yet contrary to the 
conventional wisdom of characterizing the PRC as a “strong state”, the Chinese state 
capacity in reregulating this sector has in fact been limited. The author has found that 
both national-level and local-level independent variables have influenced the dependent 
variable, the state capacity to impose effective reregulation over the rare earth industry 
(the extent to which the industry’s performance corresponded with the state’s intended 
xx 
 
goals and the policies and regulatory changes implemented by the state). At the national 
level, independent variables influencing state capacity include the State Council’s 
bureaucratic authority systems over market actors, the local cadre management system, 
and the introduction and enforcement of specific property rights and criminal laws. 
Changes in these political and legal institutional variables have impacted the capacity of 
the state to impose effective reregulation campaigns across time. At the subnational level, 
local-level independent variables influencing the state capacity include the geographical 
concentration of local mineral deposits, the technology intensity of local mining 
production, and the local market concentration of mining licenses. Lower geographical 
concentration of local mineral deposits, lower technology intensity of local mining 
production, and lower concentration of mining licenses among local market actors lead to 
lower level of state capacity in South China compared to North China. The findings 
provide both theoretical and empirical contributions to scholarly debates regarding state-




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis examines the role of the Chinese state in the development of China’s 
rare earth sector. China’s rare earth industry has rapidly grown since the late 1970s and 
become the leading global producer since the late 1990s, producing non-renewable 
mineral resources vital to the development of manufacturing industries and national 
defense. In recent years since 2008 China has implemented a series of new policies 
tightening the control over the production and trade of rare earth elements (REEs). Such 
policies have not only gained significant attention within the industry and the media, but 
they have also become a source of contention in China’s trade relations with other major 
world powers. As the U.S. President Obama remarked1, manufacturers all over the world 
“need to have access to rare earth materials which China supplies”, and the threat that 
China’s policies posed to the manufacturing of REE-enabled products is “too important 
for us to stand by and do nothing.” (White House, 2012) Yet despite of the strategic and 
global significance of the rare earth sector both technically and policy wise, there has 
been very little research on the topic of the role of the Chinese state in the rare earth 
industry, even less from the political science perspective and through actual fieldwork. 
This interdisciplinary thesis fills this gap through analysis of in-depth stakeholder 
interviews, field site visits, and analysis of secondary data in China.  
The author finds that instread of viewing the state intervention as a relatively new 
phenomenon in the rare earth industry, the Chinese central state has long engaged in 
“reregulation” in industry liberalization and market development: the creation of new 
                                                 
1 The U.S. President Obama, On the WTO dispute jointly filed by the U.S., the E.U. and 
Japan against China over its rare earth trade practices, DS 431.  
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rules and reformulation of old ones to achieve the state’s own goals. From the onset of 
China’s economic reform in 1978, the Chinese rare earth industry has gone through three 
periods: the relaxation of central planning and the transition towards the market under 
state sponsorship (1978-1997), the expansion of domestic market and dominance in 
international trade accompanied with increased regulations (1998-2007), and the post-
economic-crisis industry expansion accompanied with stronger state policies to steer its 
development (2008-present). Across different periods Beijing’s development goals have 
not been static; shifting objectives in each period have sought to utilize and advance the 
strategic values of the rare earths relevant in the eyes of the Chinese state. To achieve the 
industry development goals, Beijing has actively “managed” the industry’s development 
through consistently introducing and recalibrating industry-specific policies that assert 
the state as a prominent actor in both the expansion and the control of the industry. 
However, contrary to the conventional wisdom of characterizing the PRC as a “strong 
state”, the Chinese state capacity of reregulation in this strategic industrial sector has in 
fact been limited. The author has found that both national-level and local-leval 
independent variables have influenced the dependent variable, the state capacity of 
reregulation (the extent to which the industry’s performance corresponded with the 
state’s intended goals and the policies implemented). At the national level, independent 
variables include the State Council’s bureaucratic authority systems over market actors, 
the local cadre management system, and the introduction and enforcement of specific 
property rights and criminal laws. Changes in these political and legal institutional 
variables have impacted the capacity of the state to impose effective reregulation 
campaigns across time. At the subnational level, Beijing’s reregulation has suffered more 
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pushback from South China compared to North China. Local-level independent variables, 
including the geographic concentration of local mineral deposits, the technology intensity 
of local mining production, and the local market concentration of mining licenses lead to 
different levels of state capacity to steer local industry development to fit the state’s goals 
in South China vs North China. The findings provide both theoretical and empirical 
contributions to scholarly debates regarding state-market relations and state capacity in 
China especially about its economic reform and globalization.  
This introduction chapter includes an overview of the major research puzzle and 
theoretical framework, an introduction of the subject of the study (rare earth elements), a 
brief overview of the industry’s development experience, the research design and 
research methodology, the policy significance of the study, and concludes with 
descriptions of each following chapter. 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
At the core, this thesis studies the role of the state in industry development and the 
state capacity in fostering economic development. Classical paradigms in comparative 
politics includes the rational choice theory, modernization and development theory, 
cultural theory, world systems theory, and institutionalism, each offering different 
theoretical approaches to research puzzles. This thesis follows the paradigm of historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalists belong to the larger institutionalism paradigm 
which posits that institutions (informal and formal rules, policies and regulations) shape 
actor behavior, but they do not take the simplistic view that actor behavior and 
institutional changes arise from just rational calculations of costs and benefits. They take 
a historical, path-dependent view of institutions, actor behavior, and policy change. They 
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build theories that emerge from “observed events or comparisons.” (Hall & Taylor, 1996; 
Thelen, 1999) 
1.1.1 Chinese State as the Reregulator in Industry Development 
Using the case of the rare earth industry, this study is situated within a broad 
theoretical debate among scholars of Chinese political economy: What is the role of the 
Chinese state in developing its industry and market expansion in the post-1978 economic 
reform? Competing theories exist in understanding the state-market relations in China’s 
post-1978 economic reform and marketization.2  The “state decentralization” scholars 
argue that the Chinese state has achieved development through proactive privatization 
and decentralization, voluntarily retreating from the market. (Shue, 1995; Montinola, 
1995; Oi, 1995; Qian, 1996; Qian, 1998; Oi, 1999; Blecher & Shue, 2001) The “state 
failure” scholars argue that the state has been a predatory state that has failed to 
effectively control the market actors and state bureaucrats. (Breslin, 1996; Yang & Wei, 
1996; Zweig, 2002; Bernstein & Lü, 2003; So, 2007) The “state resurgence” scholars 
argue that the state has never relinquished control over the market, only the mechanisms 
of state control have been recalibrated in a reformed market economy. (Feigenbaum, 
2003; Mertha, 2005; Zhang & Heller, 2007; Lin, 2008; Hsueh, 2011) The “state 
fragmentation” scholars argue that China’s economic development has been instigated by 
competing political factions implementing competing agendas for marketization. 
(Lieberthal, 1992)  
This study seeks to provide an empirical answer to the question. What is the role 
of the Chinese state in industry development and market expansion of the Chinese rare 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 2 for a detailed literature review of competing theoretical perspectives on 
state-market relations in China’s economic reform.  
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earth industry? This study argues that the Chinese state has engaged in the reregulation 
of its rare earth industry. To examine the role of the Chinese state, this study utilizes and 
expands the theoretical framework of “reregulation”. The traditional definition of 
reregulation in early literature as increasing regulatory legislations over the market after 
deregulation in the advanced western liberal economies (Weingast, 1981) does not apply 
here. This thesis adopts a more liberal interpretation of “reregulation” in recent literature: 
in market expansion and economic development the state actively constructs new 
institutions and reforms old institutions in order to achieve the state’s own political goals. 
(Vogel, 1996; Hsueh, 2011) In this regard, state reregulation in industry development 
may contain mechanisms which enhance market development and seemingly looked like 
“deregulation”, yet the state has never relinquished its control over the industry and 
market, only changed its method of control through introducing new rules and policies as 
well as adjusting existing rules and policies.  
This study shows that the Chinese state has actively managed the industry’s 
liberalization and development process through consistently introducing and changing 
policies, rules and regulations. Such finding is largely in line with the view of the “state 
resurgence” theorists in that in the transition from the planned to the market economy, 
instead of voluntarily withdrawing from the market, the Chinese state has implemented 
policies to promote development to achieve its own goals and repeatedly strived to assert 
its influence over new market actors.  
In arguing for the role of the state as the reregulator, this study examines both the 
state’s goals and policy changes in industry development. From the onset of China’s 
economic reform in 1978, the Chinese rare earth industry has gone through three periods 
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of development, the state-led marketization (1978-1997), the state reregulation amidst 
global dominance (1998-2007) and the strengthened state reregulation (2008-present). 
The three periods correspond to larger macroeconomic changes of the Chinese economy, 
the transition from the plan towards the market (1978-1997), the expansion of domestic 
market and international trade (1998-2007), and the post-crisis development of market 
economy (2008-present). (See Figure 1) Across the three periods Beijing has consistently 
maintained that rare earths are “strategic resources” that warrant policy intervention. In 
fact, as Chapter 5 of this thesis shows, since the 1950s top leaders in Beijing have 
recognized the rare earth minerals as strategic resources valuable to the state. Yet 
“strategic minerals” is an imprecise term without a definitive interpretation. (Haglund, 
1984) The “strategic” value of rare earths for China differs from the existing definitions 
of “strategic minerals” which largely focus on dependence on foreign import, 
substitutability/recyclability of minerals, and minerals’ importance to national defense3. 
This thesis examines the implied “strategic” value of the rare earth resources in the eyes 
of the Chinese state through studying the central leadership’s narratives and high-level 
objectives in each period. As Figure 1 shows, specific goals have guided the state in 
policy formulation in each period to utilize the maximize the strategic value of rare earths 
                                                 
3 The International Strategic Minerals Inventory, a cooperative program of governments 
of the U.S., Canada, Germany, South Africa, Australia and the U.K., defined the term as 
“generally refers to mineral ores and derivative products that come largely or entirely 
from foreign sources, that are difficult to replace or substitute, and that are important to a 
nation's economy, in particular to its defense industry. In general, the term relates to a 
nation's perception of vulnerability to supply disruptions and to its concern to safeguard 
its industries from the disruptions of a possible loss of supplies.” (Jackson & Christiansen, 
1993) The U.S. Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock Piling Act defines strategic and 
critical minerals as “those that (A) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and 
essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency, and (B) are not 
found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need.” 
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in the eyes of the Chinese state at the time. From 1978 to 1997, the state’s main goals 
were expanding rare earth production and export for obtaining foreign currency as well as 
advancing relationships with advanced western nations. From 1998 to 2007, the state’s 
main goals were shifted to be promoting sustainable development and promoting 
indeginious innovation and value-added production. In the current period of reregulation 
since 2008, the state’s main goals are promoting sustainable production, promoting 
technology upgrading to satisfy domestic demand, promoting technology upgrading to 
facilitate the development of downstream strategic and emerging industries, and breaking 
down the barrier to international market for domestic value-added production. These 
goals reflect a mix of political, economic and socioenvironmental concerns that together 
constitute the “strategic” value of rare earths in the eyes of the Chinese state. The study 
also examines the industry-specific policies and rules that the state has implemented and 
constantly adjusted in order to achieve its goals in each period. In each period the 
analysis includes industrial policies in several areas, including domestic production, 
export and foreign investment, technology upgrading, industry restructuring and 
environmental protection. 
This thesis rejects an alternative argument of policy goals that could be attributed 
to the Chinese government, to punish foreign consumers of rare earths and use China’s 
resource supply as leverage in international politics. Such a view was popularized after 
the extensive media coverage4 of the alleged Chinese rare earth export halt to Japan in 
2010 following the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island boat collision incident. Chapter 8 Section 4 
                                                 
4 For instance, see (Bradsher, 2010a) for the New York Times article reported from Hong 
Kong and Tokyo that China had halted its rare earth export to Japan citing industry 
sources, and linked the halt with the ongoing Diaoyu/Senkaku Island incident and Japan’s 
arrest of the Chinese captain.  
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specifically analyzes the allged embargo through studying the timeline of events related 
to Chinese export policies and Sino-Japan bilateral exchanges before, during and after the 
event, as well as analyzing the Japanese rare earth import statistics from China from the 
official Japanese Ministry of Commerce database. The author concludes that there is no 
concrete evidence for the alleged rare earth export embargo. Therefore, this alternative 








Figure 1 State Reregulation over Rare Earth Industry Development in Post-1978 Economic Reform
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1.1.2 Determinants of State Capacity of Reregulation 
How well has the Chinese state done in its reregulation of this strategic resource 
industry? The analysis in this thesis shows that compared with the state’s intended goals, 
the industry development result has shown a mix of successes and failures in each period. 
Along with positive outcomes such as the drastic expansion of the rare earth production 
and sustained global market dominance, the Chinese rare earth industry has also been 
long plagued with issues contrary to the state’s goals. Beijing’s campaign-style policies 
were limited in their capacity to achieve the state’s goals. Thus using the rare earth 
industry as the empirical case, this thesis also addresses the research question: What 
factors influence the Chinese state capacity of reregulation over the rare earth industry? 
This thesis finds that the Chinese state capacity in the reregulation of the rare 
earth industry is influenced by both national level independent variables (the State 
Council’s bureaucratic authority systems over market actors, the local cadre 
management system, and the introduction and enforcement of specific property rights and 
criminal laws) and subnational level independent variables (the geographical 
concentration of local mineral deposits, the technological intensity of local mining 
production, the local market concentration of mining licenses) (shown in Figure 2).  
The dependent variable is the Chinese state capacity in rare earth industry 
reregulation, meaning the ability of the Chinese central government to achieve its own 
goals in rare earth industry reregulation. This thesis follows the classical definition of 
state capacity as the ability to “implement official goals, especially over the actual or 
potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant 
socioeconomic circumstances.” (Skocpol, 1985) State capacity is analyzed as the extent 
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to which the rare earth industry development outcomes correspond with the state’s goals 
and policy targets in industry reregulation. The thesis assesses the development outcomes 
in four areas (industry production, international trade, market structure, and 
environmental and social impact) and compares the results with the state’s original goals 





Figure 2 National Level and Subnational Level Independent Variables Influencing the Chinese State Capacity of Reregulation 




Using process tracing and comparison across different time periods, the thesis 
identifies national-level independent variables influencing the state capacity of 
reregulation. The changes in these national level political institutions have impacted the 
industry outcomes relative to the state’s intended goals across time. 
The State Council’s bureaucratic authority systems over market actors refers to 
the the administrative institutions that Beijing has put in place to manage industry 
development and control the companies. The study analyzes the changes in the extent to 
which the central authority (the State Council) has administrative control over the state-
owned companies and assets, the mining rights, and local industry projects. The study 
finds that successive State Council reforms have resulted in administrative changes in 
administrative systems, leading to decreased central capacity to coordinate policy making, 
and decreased central bureaucratic authority over state-owned assets and companies over 
time in comparison with the local governments. This led to weakened state capacity to 
control the local market actors and enforce its policies in the local regions. Yet Beijing 
has also actively sought to make up its deficiencies, as the trend of weakening 
bureaucratic authority saw some reversal in the current period of reregulation campaign 
since 2008.  
The local cadre management system refers to Beijing’s administrative system of 
managing local government cadres. The study analyzes the changes in the institutional 
features of local cadre management system, including the mechanisms through which the 
Communist Party appoints and removes cadres, the incentive structure for cadre 
evaluation and promotion, and the auditing and discipline inspection institutions to 
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monitor and evaluate the performance of central ministries and local governments. The 
study finds that the lack of well-rounded criteria and the lack of sufficient independence 
from local influences in the local cadre management system have overall resulted in 
weakened state capacity to enforce its industrial policies. While Beijing has consistently 
introduced well-intended changes, more fundamental institutional changes would be 
necessary to reverse the incompetencies in the system that has weakened the state 
capacity to enforce its policies. From the 1980s until today, Beijing has introduced 
changes in the cadre management model, from “Two-Level Downward” model where the 
party authorities managed cadres at the next two lower levels, to “One Level Downward” 
model where the party authorities would only appoint and remove cadres at the next 
lower level, to “Dual Management” model that allows for dual control over the local 
cadres by both the local party committee and the higher-level ministry/bureau. The 
changes have resulted in zigzag shifts in the concentration of local cadres’ 
decisionmaking power over key areas of the industry development. In terms of incentive 
structure in local cadre promotion, overreliance on economic growth figures has led to 
local cadres fixated on industry expansion at the expense of the state’s other development 
goals such as sustainable production. In terms of the auditing and discipline inspection 
institutions which should serve as the last line of defense against local cadres’ 
noncompliance with central policies, these institutions have suffered from the lack of 
administrative independence and transparency from the local bureaucracy, rendering the 
monitoring and evaluation of cadres hostage to local special interests.  
The introduction and enforcement of specific property rights and criminal laws 
refers to the legal rules over property rights and prosecution of illegal activities. The 
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study analyzes the changes in the legal rules and enforcement mechanisms of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) law and criminal laws that impacted the rare earth industry. The 
study finds that legal changes have had mixed effects on the state capacity to reregulate 
the rare earth industry. The introduction of clauses promoting technology transfer and the 
relaxed enforcement of IPR rules have allowed Chinese companies to practically 
circumvent some patent barriers in production, and inadvently facilitated the state-led 
industry expansion process but also created disincentives for investment in high-tech 
innovation. The miniscule criminal charges and the inefficient prosecution procedures 
have boosted local artisanal mining, and have also increased cadres and businesses’ 
appetite for ignoring Beijing’s mandates over production and trade. 
While national level variables have directly impacted the state capacity to impose 
effective reregulation across time, local conditions have further contributed to how well 
Beijing’s reregulation has been enacted across different regions. Specifically, in 
comparison with South China, the mining region in North China has higher geographical 
concentration of mineral deposits, higher technological intensity of production, and 
higher concentration of mining licenses. These subnational-level independent variables 
contribute to higher state capacity in implementing reregulation in North China. 
Geographical Concentration of Local Mining Deposits refers to the extent to 
which the local mining deposits are concentrated geographically. In South China the local 
mineral deposits are spread out geographically in small-scale volume across many 
villages along the bordering regions of three provinces. In North China, the local mineral 
deposits are concentrated geographically in high volume within one mining district. The 
study finds that the lower geographical concentration of the mineral endowment  in South 
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China leads to greater geographical dispersion of active mining sites across lower-level 
jurisdictions and less effective access for inspections, leading to less effective monitoring 
of state reregulation policies on the ground5.  
Technological Intensity of Local Mining Production describes the intensity of 
local technologies which are involved in the mining and processing of REEs. The study 
finds that lower technological intensity required in local upstream production of rare 
earth products in South China leads to lower barrier for market entry and more 
participation in artisanal mining, leading to higher chances of rule-breaking and less 
adherence to state rules.  
Local Market Concentration of Mining Licenses concerns the structural 
characteristics of the local market in the control over mining licenses. China’s rare earth 
industry has not had an established national or international trade exchange. Instead, the 
market operates through negotiated long-term contracts between ore suppliers, smelters, 
and downstream consumers. Thus primary ore suppliers with mining licenses control 
upstream supply. This study finds that lower concentration of mining licenses among 
local market actors in South China leads to greater difficulty in the negotiation of 
corporate mergers and acquisitions (necessary for Beijing’s industry restructuring agenda 
to build conglomerates capable of abiding state mandates). This creates higher chances of 
local market actors in South China to protect their own market interests and ignore 
Beijing’s agenda. 
                                                 
5 This hypothesized relationship between geographical dispersion and power control is 
similar with existing literature concerning power projection in state building, such as 
Herbst (2000) which argued that sparsely settled population are great challenges to state 
power building. The difference is that this study is focusing on state capacity to control 
natural resources, whose geographical dispersion is to a significant degree determined by 
geological deposit conditions which cannot be changed by the state. 
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1.2 Research Design & Methodology 
This study uses the approach of sectoral analysis frequently used in industry 
studies to study state policy strategies in enhancing economic competitiveness6. Sectoral 
analysis focuses on the specifics of the industry sector to study the variables leading the 
process of market change. This thesis sorts out the causal mechanism that explains the 
rare earth industry and trade development through process tracing, analyzing the 
historical patterns of development and structured comparisons within the sector. A 
longitudinal approach is taken to analyze the patterns of state reregulation, the political 
and institutional changes, and the corresponding effects on industry development at the 
national level. In analyzing subnational level variation in the effectiveness of reregulation, 
the author follows J.S. Mill’s “Most Similar Systems Design” (Mill, 1843) using 
comparison between different geographical regions within the same sector under the 
same national policies, which allows for analysis of local variables leading to divergence 
in state capacity of reregulation. 
This thesis employs data collected through a year-long field research in China and 
the United States. Data collection methods include semi-structured interviews, direct 
observation of industry production sites, and analysis of secondary sources (local 
archives, journals, newspapers and magazines, firm reports, and personal 
correspondence). 
1.3 Rare Earth Elements as Critical Minerals 
                                                 
6 Kitschelt (1991) compared the two approaches in studying state policy strategies to 
enhance industrial innovation competitiveness, sectoral analysis and cross-national 
comparative analysis. Kitschelt argues that the “traditional” approach of comparative 
analysis with sweeping aggregate comparison between national patterns can hide the 
variance of policies, governance structures and industrial innovation strategies between 
different industrial sectors.  
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Rare earth elements (REEs) are non-renewable non-ferrous mineral resources, 
consisting of a group of 17 chemical elements in the periodic table. (APS & MRS, 2011) 
This thesis follows the definition of “rare earth elements”, “heavy rare earth elements” 
(HREEs) and “light rare earth elements” (LREEs) by the American Physics Society and 
the Materials Research Society, two prominent global professional associations in 
physics and material science. REEs are used to produce essential materials for many 
high-tech industries crucial to economic development and national defense7. Their wide 
range of applications includes the permanent magnets (used in many modern 
technological products such as wind turbines and smart phones), lighting and displays 
(for instance LED lights and laptop screens), industry catalysts, and military technology 
applications (such as solid state lasers)8.  
Because of the important role that the REEs play in manufacturing, their secure 
supply has been recognized by governments worldwide as critical minerals: 
1) United States: By 2011 the United States was “aside from a small amount of 
recycling 100% reliant on imports of REEs and highly dependent on many 
other minerals that support its economy”, according to U.S. Congressional 
Research Service specialist Marc Humphries9. (Humphries, 2011, p.2) Thus 
“in the case of REEs, the dominance of China as a single or dominant supplier 
of the raw material, downstream oxides, associated metals and alloys, may be 
a cause for concern because of China’s export restrictions and growing 
                                                 
7 See APS & MRS (2011) for detailed analysis of the functions and industrial 
applications of each rare earth element. 
8 For a detailed analysis of the current demand of REEs by sector, see Chapter 4. 
9 Humphries has been writing annual updates on the rare earth industry supply chain and 
the U.S. policy response to China’s rare earth industry regulations. 
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internal demand for its REEs.” (Humphries, 2011, p.2) The Department of 
Energy (2011) has determined five REEs (Dysprosium, Neodymium, Terbium, 
Europium and Yttrium) to be critical minerals for U.S. clean energy 
development and two other REEs (Cerium, Lanthanum) to be near-critical. 
2) Japan: Because of its advanced industrial manufacturing, Japan has been a 
world leading consumer of non-ferrous metals, including the REEs. Japan 
relies 100% on import to meet its REE demand, among which 90% comes 
from China. (Kawamoto, 2008) 
3) European Union: The European Commission published a list of 14 critical 
metals or groups of metals-with specific reference to the REEs- that are 
important for Europe’s economy. (European Commission, 2014) The E.U. has 
also made the creation of a low-carbon clean energy economy to be a top 
policy priority. Two REEs, Dysprosium and Neodymium have been identified 
to be at high risk for imminent and future supply disruption for the E.U. low-
carbon economy development. (Moss et al, 2011) 
4) South Korea: All REEs are determined as rare strategic elements by South 
Korea in its Rare Metals Strategy, according to Taek Soo Kim, Director of 
Korea Institute for Rare Metals. Specifically, REEs are critical in two of the 
three Korean core industries, transportation system and energy/environment. 
(Kim, 2012) 
China possesses the largest resource endowments of REEs in the world. The 
Baiyun-Ebo basternite deposit in Baotou, Inner Mongolia in North China is the world’s 
largest REE deposit and current production source, containing primarily LREEs. The ion-
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adsorption clay deposits in Gannan-Yuebei region bordering Guangdong Province, 
Jiangxi Province, and Fujian Province in South China is the second largest production 
source of REEs in terms of production amount, and the world’s only active HREE 
production source.  
1.4 A Primer on China’s Reregulation of Rare Earths 
China’s rare earth sector is among the few natural resource sectors in that country 
that has achieved an almost complete dominance in the global market. The sector is a 
“small industry with large impact”10. As a very small industry within China’s gigantic 
economy (it accounts for less than 1% of the national GDP11), the industry produces 
materials used in many downstream industries. From 2002 until 2013 China had been the 
only major producer in the global market, producing between 95%-97% of all REEs in 
the world (and more than 99% of the output for two of these elements, dysprosium and 
terbium, vital for a wide range of clean energy technologies). Due to modest progress in 
seeking alternative materials and engineering designs, as well as the expected strong 
growth in REE demand from the rapid growth of new industries such as clean energy12, 
                                                 
10 Remark by Hong Feng, former director of the State Rare Earth Office at the 2014 Rare 
Earth Expert Forum hosted by the Ruidow Metals in China. 
11 See Yang (2013) for an overview of China’s rare earth industry. Yang is the Director 
of the Industrial Resource and Environment Office at the Institute of Industrial 
Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
12 James Hedrick (2010), a former USGS analyst with specialization on rare metals, 
argued that U.S. supply of rare earths in the short term will come from China; growth in 
the demand of rare earths in the long term is expected to be substantial as new 
applications and discoveries are made. Hedrick also found that only a few rare earths 
applications will be substituted. Alonso et al. (2012) has found that without efficient 
reuse or recycling of rare earths, or the development of technologies reducing the use of 
Dysprosium and Neodymium, following a path consistent with stabilization of 
atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm may lead to an increase of more than 700% and 2600% for 
the two elements respectively over the next 25 years if the present REE needs in 
automotive and wind applications are representative of future needs. 
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China is expected to continue its dominance in the global supply chain for some time to 
come13.  
1.4.1 State-Sponsored Industry Development under the Planned Economy in 1950-
1997  
Rare earth deposits were first found in China in 1927, but exploration of deposits 
did not take place until the 1950s, after the Communist Party won the revolution and 
founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009) 
The strategic value of REEs was recognized by scientists and the Communist leaders in 
the newly founded People’s Republic China (PRC). Initial mining exploration and 
technology development began in the 1950s with support from the Soviet Union. (Zhang, 
2012) Chinese scientists and engineers petitioned the authority to begin exploration and 
extraction of rare earths in the Baiyun-Ebo region in Baotou, Inner Mongolia, despite of 
opposing opinions from the Soviet scientists who concluded that the rare earth deposit 
which coexisted with majority iron deposit was not worthy of exploration. (Yap, 2011) 
Mr. Nie Rongzhen, a senior leader in charge of China’s defense technology development, 
championed the development of indigenous rare earth production technologies. (Nie, 
1999) In accordance with the practice of establishing large-scale military-industrial 
programs for developing science and technology, the central government established 
research institutes and defense factories across China to develop China’s rare earth 
production chain.  
The state’s control over the industry and the science community was a double-
edge sword: anti-intelligentsia campaigns waged by the state, especially the Cultural 
                                                 
13 See Chapter 4 for extended analysis on the global rare earth supply. 
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Revolution (1966-1976) led to state’s estranged relationship with the science community 
and paralyzed the nation politically and economically14. While political turmoil displaced 
most of China’s institutions and industrial capacity in the Cultural Revolution era, the 
rare earth industry received state protection and priority allocation of resources as part of 
the military-industrial complex15. In 1975, an inter-ministry group called “National Rare 
Earth Applications Promotion Leadership Group” was established in Beijing and became 
the direct national administrative body overseeing the industry development.  
1.4.2 State-led Marketization of the Industry and Trade Growth in 1978-1997 
As China embarked on its economic transition from planned economy to market 
economy and global integration in 197816, its rare earth industry enjoyed significant 
growth. The rare earth industry was blessed with strong continuous support from the state, 
while the focus shifted from its defense utility in the Mao era to civilian applications in 
the reform era. In the earliest years of the reform, the central government saw the export 
of rare metals as both economically beneficial to finance China’s industrial 
modernization, and also “an important means of cementing China’s strategic ties with the 
West.” (Park, 1981) The Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping made the famous 
remark in 1992 that “There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China.”  
(Baotou Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone, n.d.) The central government 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 5 for detailed analysis of the influence of political campaigns on the 
science and technology development. 
15 See Chapter 5 for detailed analysis of the preferential state treatment for rare earth 
industry and the technical progress of the industry in the Cultural Revolution era. 
16 The Chinese Communist Party leader Mr. Deng Xiaoping began implementing the 
“Reform and Opening” policies in 1977, beginning the transition of Chinese economy 
from the plan to the market and the integration of the Chinese economy with the world. 
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narratives of development featured both marketization (promoting industry growth and 
market expansion) and regulation (keeping the industry development under state control).  
The state strived to achieve global dominance through policies promoting export 
and production expansion; at the same time, the state also vowed to keep the booming 
industry under state regulation through consistently introducing and changing rules, and 
not let the market play the invisible hand. In other words, the industry liberalization 
reform was accompanied not with the state voluntarily exiting the market with less rules, 
but with the state actively asserting itself in the market with more and changing rules. 
The State Rare Earth Leadership Group, an inter-agency group reporting to the State 
Council, oversaw the formulation and execution of national development strategy for rare 
earth industry. (Su, 2009) In promoting export, the state acted as a strong broker and 
supporter for firms trading with western consumers, and it maintained international 
competitiveness through providing export rebate and upgrading industrial technologies. 
The central government mandated in 1987 that rare earth products could only be exported 
by three state-owned trading groups, and in 1990 it introduced export control for ten 
categories of rare earth primary products. (PRC Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade 
& State Economic Commission, 1987; PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 
1990) In production, the state put the ion-adsorption rare earth deposits (mainly in South 
China containing high-valued heavy rare earth elements) “under state planning” and 
required mining and smelting licenses approved by the central government in 1991. (PRC 
State Council, 1991) The state banned foreign investment in mining ion-adsorption rare 
earth ores in 1990 (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group et al, 1990) and 
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limited foreign investment in rare earth smelting in 1995. (PRC State Planning 
Commission, 1995)  
Several national-level political and legal institutional factors in this period 
influenced the state capacity to implement its control measures, and they contributed to 
the rapid and increasingly localized growth of Chinese rare earth production and export. 
Firstly, changes in the national bureaucratic authority systems governing the market 
actors showed a stronger shift in administrative control from Beijing towards the local 
authorities. In enterprise management, the central state-owned enterprise groups that 
became major players of the rare earth industry showed a considerable degree of 
overlapping administrative control over day-to-day management between the central and 
local authorities. In decision making, the devolution of bureaucratic authority over 
economic affairs within the administrative hierarchy led to significant increase in new 
mining and smelting projects. Secondly, in terms of the bureaucratic system managing 
party cadres, successive changes weakened the center’s bureaucratic control over the 
local cadres. The cadre promotion system saw a delegation of authority as the state 
switched from “Two Level Downward” to “One Level Downward” model. The state later 
switched to “Dual Management” model to mitigate local corruption and nepotism, yet 
local cadre promotion in key areas of governance relevant to the rare earth industry still 
remained largely in the power of the local government. A GDP-fixated promotion system 
further prompted local cadre to promote rare earth businesses as a way to both support 
local economy and government revenues, and to gain political capital for personal career. 
The auditing and discipline inspection institutions were largely incapable of monitoring 
cadre behavior. Finally, in terms of laws and law enforcement over property rights, 
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China’s intellectual property rights law only introduced in 1985 and China’s 
subsequently relaxed enforcement allowed technologies to be transferred freely across 
regions and between companies and state-affiliated research institutes. Certain clauses in 
the intellectual property rights law also inadvendently allowed Chinese producers to 
bypass patent barrier from foreign competitors in the Chinese market. This led to low 
technology barrier for both market entry into the international and domestic market. 
The result of the state-led industry marketization was a rapid growth in rare earth 
production and export. China managed to overtake the other countries in the global 
market in less than two decades. From 198317 to 1988 the annual production of REE 
products in China grew tenfold in merely five years (from about 3000 tons in 1983 to 
30000 tons in 1988). By 1988, China had emerged as the world’s largest rare earth 
smelter after Japan; its output surpassed the U.S., the primary global producer before 
China’s rise in the global market. By 1997, Chinese companies dominated the global 
market for rare earth primary products. Yet rapid growth came with significant growing 
pain, including low value-added production and export, unhealthy competition between a 
large number of small-scale producers, and poor record of environmental protection. 
1.4.3 State Reregulation under Deepening Economic Reform in 1998-2007 
In the ten-year period between 1998 and 2007, the central government continued 
the economic reform, promoting the marketization of China’s SOEs and innovation from 
S&T institutions, as well as greatly expanding China’s participation in international trade. 
As China became the de facto global supplier of REEs, the state’s goals for reregulating 
the industry shifted away from primarily expanding industry production and market 
                                                 
17 China’s export and production of rare earths started occurring in large volumes in 1983. 
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growth towards creating higher value and sustainable return from the extraction and 
utilization of the strategic resource. In particular, two goals were evident: promoting 
sustainable development through curbing production capacity and environmental 
pollution, promoting industry upgrading through fostering indigenous innovation and 
value-added production. 
The central government, continuing its role as the reregulator to proactively guide 
and control industry development, enacted various policy changes to the industry. The 
state imposed production, trade and investment restrictions over low-end production and 
regulations favoring value-added production and export, and provided direct institutional 
support and financial grants for upgrading production and promoting indigenous 
innovation in domestic rare earth companies. In export, the state abolished export tax 
rebate in 2005 and began to introduce export tariff on various low-end rare earth 
products18. In foreign investment, the state banned foreign companies from investing in 
rare earth smelting in 2002. (PRC National Development and Planning Commission, 
2002) The state further banned all foreign-domestic joint investments from mining in 
2006. (PRC National Development and Planning Commission & Ministry of Commerce, 
2006) In mining production, the Ministry of Land and Resources temporarily withheld all 
mining license applications several times and started issuing mining quota for rare earth 
concentrates in 2006. (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2010) The state attempted 
to achieve direct control over the already localized industry growth through consolidating 
the entire industry into two state-owned conglomerates, but it gave up the plan by 2005. 
(PRC State Economic and Trade Commission et al, 2002; Dai, 2005)  
                                                 
18 See Chapter 5 Section 3 for changes in export tariffs between 2007 and 2015. 
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The result of state reregulation was influenced by broader changes in China’s 
political and legal institutions. Firstly, in terms of the State Council’s bureaucratic control 
over the market actors, successive bureaucratic reforms resulted in weakened central 
bureaucratic authority governing the companies in the rare earth industry. After two State 
Council reforms and subsequent bureaucratic infights, former central enterprise groups 
were split apart, resulting in the transfer of authority relations, state assets, and mining 
licenses to the local governments and local SOEs. Central SOEs were greatly weakened 
in their control over the market, and they understandably lost in their attempt to 
spearhead national consolidation. The bureaucratic changes also resulted in the 
devaluation of the State Rare Earth Office from an inter-ministry unit to an office below 
the ministry level, resulting in the lack of policy coordination between ministries over the 
industry and regulatory loopholes for producers to evade regulation. Secondly, in terms 
of the local cadre management system, the state implemented some well-intended 
changes emphasizing social responsibility, but it did not fundamentally change the 
primary emphasis on economic growth in cadre promotion. The small changes to the 
discipline inspection institutions also did not solve the inherent institutional conflict in 
monitoring and evaluating local cadres while inspectors could not gain independence 
from the administrative control of local governments. Thus the local cadres were still 
motivated to promote local rare earth businesses and pocket their own shares, not to 
promote development in an equitable or sustainable way. Thirdly, in terms of criminal 
law and law enforcement, prosecution of activities deemed illegal under the new laws and 
regulations were inefficient and suffered from the lack of cross-jurisdiction coordination, 
contributing to the lack of enforcement of central government policies in local regions.  
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The Chinese rare earth industry was sustaining its predominance in global market 
supply in this period. On the bright side, the industry achieved massive success in 
expanding its value-added production, upgrading itself from just providing upstream 
supply to more mid-stream products. Yet the industry was also fraught with problems 
contrary to the state reregulation goals and policy targets, including excessive mining and 
smelting production capacity, prevalent extra-quota mining production and illegal 
smuggling, poor industry profit margins, and worsening environmental degradation. 
1.4.4 Strengthened State Reregulation Tightening the Control over the Industry 
Since 2008 
The global financial crisis in 2008 left the global economy in deep distress, 
including the global rare earth market. The current state reregulation is driven by multiple 
goals that pertain to both the existing issues/problems in the rare earth industry and the 
new post-crisis economic environment. The state wanted to satisfy the growing domestic 
consumption demand under the post-crisis stimulus plan. The state wanted to further its 
technology upgrading and develop high-tech emerging and strategic industries in the 
further downstream. The state wanted to curb rampant environmental pollution and 
change the unsustainable model of development. The state wanted to secure greater 
advantage in the development of applications and downstream production and not be 
subject to patent constraints to international markets. 
The Chinese central government vowed to strengthen centralized control over the 
rare earth industry by implementing a series of policy initiatives. The central government 
has so far introduced rules and initiatives over export and production planning, market 
consolidation and market entry, anti-smuggling, industry upgrading, and pollution control. 
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1) Export restriction: The state reformed the export quota and tariff system, 
and continued control over primary ore production. Export quota issued by MOFCOM 
(Ministry of Commerce) significantly declined in 2010, and for the first time the export 
quota was not able to accommodate actual export volume19. The export quota authorized 
fewer exporters, separated between different categories of rare earth products with 
varying values, and made exporter licensing contingent upon meeting environmental 
standards. The tariff system was also reformed, with increased export tax on lower-end 
products and export rebates only on high-end products20. The export restrictions received 
strong international complaints. The WTO ruled against China’s restriction over rare 
earth export in 2014. China abolish its export quota in January 2015 (PRC Ministry of 
Commerce, 2014) and tariff in May 2015. Yet China immediately implemented a similar-
level new resource tax on both export and domestic production. (PRC Ministry of 
Finance, 2015; PRC Ministry of Finance & State Administration of Taxation, 2015)  
2) Mining and production restriction and taxation: The Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology started to issue quota for rare earth products in 2008. The 
Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) continued to issue “quota for mining rare earth 
ores” (稀土开采指标 ) to control the production, and put licensing of new mining 
projects on hiatus. (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2014) Immediately after China 
scraped its export quota and tariff to comply with WTO ruling, the State Administration 
of Taxation introduced gross-sales-based resource tax of 7.5%-11.5% on light rare earth 
ores and primary products and as much as 27% resource tax on the more valuable heavy 
                                                 
19 See Chapter 8 for calculation of previous years’ export quota and export volumes based 
on MOFCOM data. 




rare earth ores and primary products. (PRC Ministry of Finance & State Administration 
of Taxation, 2015) 
3) Promotion of industry upgrading: The state has introduced new initiatives 
promoting basic and applied research, increasing value-added production, and 
development of high-end applications. These measures include allocating funding 
totaling 350 million RMB for REE-related research projects in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015) (Li, 2011), allocating special funds for R&D and commercialization of high-
end REE application projects (PRC Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, 2012), and downsizing production capacity of firms using 
“backward” technologies. (PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2014)  
4) Industry consolidation into state-owned conglomerates: The state released 
again an ambitious plan of creating state-owned conglomerates amassing at least 80% of 
national production capacity by 2012. (PRC State Council, 2011) Yet amidst the intense 
bargaining and contentions between central government, local governments and 
producers, the consolidation has dragged far behind its original deadline. By 2015 the 
state selected 6 central-government-controlled and local-government controlled firms to 
establish major rare earth groups, and the MIIT began to directly issue production 
planning quota to each of the six firms. (PRC Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, 2015) Coupled with industry restructuring into state-owned conglomerates, 
the state implemented new policies eliminating small local producers. These regulations 
include prioritizing production and export quota for large firms, more stringent licensing 
and environmental compliance requirements for production and export (PRC Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, 2009), higher standard for licensing of new projects, and 
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higher market entry criterion based on production capacity and prior years’ production 
performance. (PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012) 
5) Campaign against smuggling and illegal mining: Beijing has also enacted 
new rules to curb smuggling and out-of-plan production. These include providing bonus 
to the public for reporting illegal activities21, implementing successive special inspections 
by inter-ministry working groups of the central government (PRC Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology et al, 2011; PRC Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology et al, 2013; PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology et al, 
2014), binding the tenure of local government officials with “no illegal activities within 
their jurisdictions”22, implementing special invoice system tracking rare earth product 
transactions (PRC State Administration of Taxation, 2012), and providing funding for 
local governments to install infrastructure necessary for survelliance and inspections. 
(PRC Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012) 
According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 55 illegal rare 
earth producers and 22 illegal mines were shut down between 2011 and 2015. (Chang & 
Hui, 2015) However, illegal production still permeates the industry. MIIT estimates that 
from September 2014 to May 2015 alone about 12,400 tons of rare earths were mined 
illegally in China. (Chang & Hui, 2015) 
6) Campaign for clean production and pollution treatment: Apart from 
regular environmental inspections, the central government has introduced special 
                                                 
21 The quasi-government industry association “Association of China Rare Earth Industry” 
(ACREI) provides one-time bonus of 50,000 RMB to the public for reporting illegal 
activities in the industry. See http://www.ac-rei.org.cn/portal.php?mod=view&aid=2003 
for the announcement of the bonus and the procedure for reporting illegal activities. 




initiatives including allocating special funds to firms for treating pollution and allocating 
bonus funds for firms compliant with environmental inspection (PRC Ministry of Finance 
& Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012), implementing industry-
specific emission guidelines (PRC Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2009) and 
standards of clean production (PRC National Development and Reform Commission et al, 
2015), and making environmental compliance the requirement for allocating production 
plans (PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012) and export quota. 
(PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2011) It would however take significant amount of money 
and many years to treat the existing environmental pollution that are consequences of 
decades of production23.  
Political institution factors at the national level still influence Beijing’s 
effectiveness in the current campaign over the industry. Firstly, in terms of the State 
Council’s bureaucratic authority over the market actors, the State Council has 
implemented some good changes increasing inter-ministry cooperation to increase its 
capacity to coordinate ministerial policies concerning the rare earth market. Secondly, in 
terms of local party cadre management, Beijing has introduced changes to cadre 
promotion and evaluation strengthening the power of discipline inspectors and the 
emphasis on non-economic targets for promotion. However, specific local agencies such 
as environmental protection bureaus have still been often unable to enforce central 
policies independent of the influence of local governments. Thirdly, in terms of law 
enforcement, Beijng has put forward new mechanisms of cross-jurisdiction government 
                                                 
23 Take the pollution in Ganzhou, a major mining region in South China as an example. 
According to a State Council report, treating more than 1.9 tons of solid waste would take 
70 years. (Liu & Liu, 2012) The Minister of MIIT estimates that treating existing 
pollution in Ganzhou would require total of 38 billion RMB funding. (Yang, 2012) 
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cooperation in enforcing laws and regulations concerning the rare earth industry. 
However, lack of effective legal clauses in the current Criminal Law to persecute 
noncompliant behavior, as well as the low legal penalty for breaking the rules still created 
great incentive for market actors to evade Beijing’s restrictions. Thus more institutional 
changes are still needed if Beijing wants to strengthen its capacity to implement the new 
rules. 
The current reregulation campaign shows a mix of successes and failures. In 
terms of industry production, Beijing’s efforts to control production volume through 
smelting production plan has been not so successful, as smelting production has been 
higher than the plan. Furthermore, instead of leading to a more stable market conducive 
to long-term growth, Beijing’s policy campaigns prompted drastic market price changes 
in 2010-2013, with domestic prices peaking in mid-2011 for the different kinds of rare 
earth oxides at prices roughly 7-20 times of pre-2010 levels. The price shock not only led 
to market speculation and instability, it also affected downstream production to the point 
of inducing bankruptcies. In terms of technology upgrading, China’s rare earth 
consumption by the new materials sectors has shown a strong increase compared to the 
relatively flat consumption by traditional sectors, showing a continued strong trend 
towards upgrading the value chain. In export, China’s export volume has stayed below its 
export quota since 2011, before it was required to scrap the quota and tariff restrictions to 
comply with WTO ruling in 2015. China’s export of higher-value rare earth products 
have continued to increase, yet many domestic permanent magnet producers have still 
been locked in a patent-induced market entry battle with Hitachi. METI’s export control 
on high-value permanent magnets also led to delays in planned Sino-Japan joint ventures 
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producing higher-value permanent magnets in China. In terms of the market structure, 
Beijing’s original plan to restructure the industry into 2-3 conglomerates in two years has 
dragged behind the timeline and suffered significant local pushback. The restructuring 
process has become a gruesome battle amongst central SOEs, local SOEs, and local 
private companies for survival and the chance to become Beijing’s pick. By 2015, two 
central SOEs and four local SOEs were selected into the MIIT’s tentative list of 
corporations allowed to receive production quota. In terms of environmental protection, 
Beijing’s funding schemes and institutional rewards have resulted in new and larger 
initiatives by companies and local governments to treat existing pollution and upgrading 
technologies of production. Yet the pollution legacy is so gigantic that it is impossible to 
achieve much progress in ecological restoration in the short term. 
1.5 Significance & Policy Relevance 
China’s reregulation on rare earth production and export has garnered significant 
worldwide attention. As a group of critical materials, REEs contribute to the development 
of high-tech consumer industries and defense technologies, critical to the technological 
and infrastructural base of global economies. The capacity of the Chinese state to impose 
its political objectives of reregulation of rare earth production and trade will influence the 
end users of manufacturing companies across the world. The 2012-14 WTO case 
launched by the U.S., E.U. and Japan against China over its rare earth practices is an 
example24. This study contributes empirically to the policy discussions on this particular 
strategic industry that has not been studied extensively before. 
                                                 
24 The U.S., Japan and the E.U. have jointly filed in 2012 and won the WTO lawsuit in 
2014 against China, which rules that China must change its restrictive practices in rare 
earth export. In response, China eliminated rare earth export quota and tariff in April 
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Besides the apparent practical significance of studying China’s rare earth policies 
and policy outcomes, this study also contributes to the broader discussion on the “rise of 
China” in the 21st century. In recent years, scholars have set out to explain the 
implications of the rise of China as an economic power for the international system. 
China’s de facto monopoly in producing this group of strategic minerals from the late 
1990s until 2013 was seen by many as evidence of China’s rise in global economy and 
using its economic advantage to advance its international power ranking. This study 
shows perhaps paradoxically, the not so rosy picture of domestic governance issues 
accompanying China’s rise: throughout the marketization and development process of a 
key industry that has achieved significant growth and trade expansion, Chinese central 
government has yet to achieve its desired extent of market control. At the national level, 
institutional factors impede effectiveness of the state reregulation. At the sub-national 
level, market, geographical and technological factors constrain the state’s capacity of 
imposing effective reregulation over the localities. How to turn its resource superiority 
into political power on the world stage, as this study shows, remains a mighty challenge 
to the Chinese government. 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
This thesis is organized into ten chapters. The following nine chapters are 
summarized as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the recent sets of literature relevant to this 
research, grounding this study in key theoretical debates. This literature review includes 
the literature on the state-market relations in industry development and in transitional 
                                                                                                                                                 
2015, but introduced a similar level of resource tax on both rare earth domestic 
production and export. See Chapter 8 for more details. 
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economies such as China, the literature on the state capacity to foster industry 
development, and the literature on China’s rare earth industry development.  
Chapter 3 delineates the research design and methodology of this study.  
Chapter 4 presents the analysis on the science and technology aspect of the rare 
earth industry production, market supply and demand, and the global rare earth industry 
value chain. This sets the stage for analysis of the rare earth industry in China in the 
following chapters.  
Chapter 5 analyzes the industry development under state planned economy from 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the late 1970s. Prior to the start 
of the economic reform in 1978, the state recognized the value of rare earths as critical 
minerals and built up the foundational capacity for rare earth industry development. This 
chapter serves as the background to explain the path of the rare earth industry 
development and the key state institutions involved in industry development preceding 
the start of China’s economic reform and global trade integration in 1978. 
Chapter 6 examines the state-led industry liberalization and trade development in 
1978-1997. The state’s objectives on rare earth industry development shifted from its 
defense utility to its economic utility as resources for export. In the process of industry 
liberalization, the state introduced more rules and made frequent adjustment to the new 
rules on industry production and trade. With strong state support, the rare earth industry 
achieved significant market and industry growth and was on track to dominate global 
production. National-level changes in political and legal institutions had mixed impacts 
on the outcome of the extent to which the state goals and policies were realized. 
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Chapter 7 examines the state reregulation over the rare earth industry in 1998-
2007. This ten-year period saw China undergoing deepening economic reform and 
privatization of the SOEs and S&T institutions. The state sought to maintain its global 
competitiveness in rare earth trade and production while maximizing the critical, long-
term value of rare earths. Motivated by changing development goals, the state introduced 
new industrial policies and made policy changes to actively control the trajectory of 
development. At the same time, national-level changes in political institutions affect the 
extent that the state was able to enact its new control measures. 
Chapter 8 studies the current reregulation campaign featuring more restrictive and 
forceful policies over the rare earth industry since 2008. China sought to advance its 
economy to sustain its global competitiveness after the financial crisis. The state 
introduced new development goals, industry-specific measures to wage a campaign for 
stronger governance. The state sought to make adjustments to the political and legal 
institutional features inhibiting policy implementation, yet the changes were not enough. 
The policy changes implemented in the style of drastic and swift campaigns also created 
inadvendently strong market uncertainties and created discontented losers in the market. 
Chapter 9 discusses the regional disparity in Beijing’s record enforcing the 
current post-2008 reregulation. This chapter examinines the geographical, technical and 
and market features of the two subnational mining regions that led to differences in the 
state capacity to effectively implement its policies to achieve the state’s goals. 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This case study on a strategic natural resource industry in China aspires to 
contribute theoretically to three strands of literature concerning the role and capacity of 
the state in developing the economy. The first strand of literature concerns the debate on 
state-market relations in economic development and market expansion. Particularly 
concerning literature on the state-market relations in China’s post-1978 economic reform 
and marketization, this thesis empirically tests competing theories on the role of the state: 
whether as an active proponent of privatization and decentralization, or as an involuntary 
failure of imposing control, or as an active defender of control over the market actors, or 
as a fragmented bureaucracy with competing marketization agendas. The second strand 
of literature concerns the broad notion of state capacity, the state capacity specifically in 
fostering economic development, and the determinants of the state capacity in 
implementing state goals. The third strand of literature concerns empirical research on the 
rare earth sector in China, and this thesis provides empirical contribution to this growing 
body of literature. This thesis found that the Chinese state has engaged in active 
“reregulation”, leading market expansion and liberalization while implementing new 
rules and institutions to serve its changing political goals that were concerned with 
preserving and utilizing the strategic value of the rare earths in differen time periods. 
However, the Chinese central government faces significant challenges to achieve the 
desired control over the market. This thesis further suggests that the state capacity to 
assert its political objectives over the rare earth industry is influenced by institutional 
factors at the national level and local contextual factors at the sub-national level. 
39 
 
   
2.1 Literature on State-market Relations  
 Scholars studying economic development have now increasingly paid great 
attention to the complex relationships and linkages between the state, the market actors 
and the social structure in a given country. Such trend can be attributed to the growing 
pressure for the states now to engage in both domestic economic reform and global 
economic engagement as a result of the increasingly globalized industrial production. 
This section provides a review of literature on the debate concerning state-market 
relations in market development, and on the contrasting theoretical lenses of studying the 
state-market relations in the development of China’s transitional economy. 
2.1.1 Debate on State-Market Relations  
 Debates on the state-market relations in economic development can be traced 
back to competing assessments in classical theoretical approaches to political economy. 
On the one hand, scholars of mercantilism, a dominating economic ideology in the 
western European economic theories and policies from the 16th to the late 18th century, 
argued that the states ought to implement interventionist policies to protect the interests 
of the merchants and producers in international trade and to ultimately empower the 
states themselves25 . As Anderson (1976, p.36) states, “Mercantilism was precisely a 
theory of the coherent intervention of the political state into the workings of the economy, 
                                                 
25 It should be emphasized that mercantilist scholars argue that this approach is not a 
theory of how the market economy is supposed to operate, but a pragmatic adaptation of 
the reality of economic practice. The idea that the state uses its authority to aid the 
development of capitalist is central to the mercantilism approach. For an overview of the 
approach of mercantilism and its relevance to the development of modern European 
states, see Heckscher, 1934. According to Woo-Cumings et al. (1999), the intellectual 




in the joint interests of the prosperity of the one and the power of the other.” On the other 
hand, scholars of classical liberalism26 argue that Laissez faire is the better economic 
approach, and any government intervention in market expansion and industrial 
development is harmful. The intellectual roots can be traced back to Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations (1887), which argues that the pursuit of self-interest which is 
inherently human nature drives the maximization of wealth. The market acts as an 
“invisible hand” directing the actions of individuals and firms to maximize their own 
gains and allocating the resources and opportunities most efficiently.  
2.1.1.1 The East Asian Developmental State Model  
For scholars of East Asia, the discussion on state-market relations has been heavily 
influenced by the model of the “developmental state”, which posits that the state manages 
and leads economic growth and social change 27 . Johnson (1982), one of the most 
prominent scholars of East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) is often credited 
as the developer of the “developmental state” model. Johnson argues that the Japanese 
economic bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) has been instrumental in forming the “plan-rational state”. Through rational 
planning, MITI created interests in the Japanese economy which favors resource 
allocation in its target industries. Scholars employing the developmental state model 
generally argue that developmental states place industrial policy as the highest policy 
priority. The state facilitates and even directly guides economic development relying on 
its professional public servants. The ideal state needs to have an efficient, loyal, rational 
                                                 
26 Classical liberalism emerged in the late 18th century and achieved prominence in the 
19th and early 20th centuries. For an overview of the classical liberalism’s view on state-
market relations in market and industry development, see Sally (2002).  
27 For an overview of the developmental state model, see Woo-Cumings, 1999.  
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Weberian bureaucracy28 that is committed to implementing policies formulated by the 
political elite and prioritizes long-term development goals over short-term economic 
gains.  
Thus a central feature of the “developmental state” is a high degree of state 
capacity29: to extract resources and appropriate resources in ways determined by the 
political elites, to regulate the relationship between market and social actors, and to resist 
demand from market actors or social groups from getting in the way of state policies. 
With respect to formulating and implementing economic policies, in order to uphold a 
high level of state capacity in economic development, scholars following the 
developmental state model have argued that the state needs to have a certain degree of 
autonomy to resist pressure from particularistic interests.  
2.1.1.2 From State-Centric to State-Market/Society Framework 
Recent scholars have departed from this early characterization of the developmental 
state as merely autonomous state with professional meritocratic bureaucrats imposing 
policies on the industries and preventing demand of social groups from thwarting policies 
formulated by the political elite. These scholars see the original developmental state 
model as too simple, state-centric and over-generalizing the process of policy formulation 
and implementation. For instance, Wade (1990) challenged claims both of neoliberalists, 
who saw the East Asian economic development as a vindication of free-market growth, 
and of the hard-core state-centric theorists, who attribute the growth only to strong state 
                                                 
28 For instance, Rauch and Evans (2000) found that “Weberian” state bureaucratic 
structures lead to increased economic growth. 
29 The “developmental state” school’s understanding of strong capacity is in line with 
Migdal (1988), who argues that a state with high capacity must be able to complete four 
tasks: to penetrate society, to regulate social relationships, to extract resources, and to 
appropriate resources in determined ways. 
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intervention. While he still largely agreed with Johnson’s interpretation of East Asian 
success as state-led growth, Wade argues that the way allocation decisions were divided 
between the market actors and the bureaucracy and the synergy between the state and the 
market were critical to explain the state’s capability to foster economic growth.  
More recent scholars studying industrial growth have called for analyzing the 
“embeddedness” as well as the “autonomy” of the state. Contrary to traditional views of 
the developmental state model which sees lobbying and other forms of informal state-
market interactions as diminishing the “strong” state, an in-depth analysis of state-market 
and state-society interactions is viewed necessary to determining the state capacity in 
producing certain policy outcomes. For instance, Evans (1995) coined the term 
“embedded autonomy” that the rationality of the Weberian bureaucracy is enhanced by 
the state’s linkages and interactions with the surrounding society30. Weiss (1998) argues 
that the informal linkages connecting the state with the society and the market play an 
important role in determining the state’s capacity to transform economies in the 
increasingly globalized world. This departure from the traditional “strong-state”, “state-
centric” developmental state model points to the necessity to study not just the state itself, 
but also the interests of the non-state actors, the process of market development and the 
state-market interactions. 
2.1.1.3 “Reregulation” as a Framework to Analyze Market Development 
This thesis employs the theoretical framework of “reregulation” to examine the 
development of the rare earth sector in China. The term “reregulation” was used first in 
                                                 
30 According to Evans, these linkages were “the key to the developmental state’s 
effectiveness . . . combining Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense connection to 
the surrounding social structure.” (Evans, 1995, p. 50) 
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the early 1980s, primarily in literature studying the regulatory reforms in the U.S. and 
other advanced economies31. The traditional Developmental State model focuses on the 
state’s role as rationally “cherry-picking” target industries to allocate resources and 
interests. On the contrary, early literature of “reregulation” focused on the political 
process of devising and implementing regulatory legislations in liberal economies, and 
the specific regulatory changes which in turn shaped industrial development. 
Steve Vogel (1996) was one of the earliest scholars to employ and expand the 
concept of “reregulation” to explain the process of market expansion and liberalization 
driven by the state. Vogel studied the reforms in the telecommunications and financial 
services industries in advanced industrialized countries of the U.K. and Japan in the 
1980s. He argues that despite of the widely perceived results of industrial deregulation 
and market expansion on the surface, the national governments in these countries had in 
fact reformulated old rules and created more new rules over the market actors. In Vogel’s 
words, “the deregulation revolution of the 1980s and 1990s never happened. The 
advanced industrial countries moved toward liberalization or freer markets at the same 
time that they imposed reregulation or more rules”. (Vogel, 1996) Vogel emphasizes both 
the intentions (goals) of the state in implementing the regulatory reforms, and the 
organization of the state institutions. These two factors, he argues, determine the pattern 
of regulatory reform each state goes through in market liberalization. On the international 
level, contrary to the widely perceived notion of globalization eroding the state capacity 
to regulate markets, Vogel argues that the process of “reregulation” does not necessarily 
lead to complete integration of the national market.  
                                                 
31 For an example of the early use of the term “reregulation”, see Weingast (1981). 
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Over time, the concept of “reregulation” has evolved considerably to take on a 
broader interpretation: the process of the state creating new rules to control industrial 
development, and ultimately achieve its intended goals32. This conceptualization is more 
distant from the interpretation of the term in early literature, espcially by developmental 
state theorists (who see the state in the early reregulation literature as a “referee” that 
does not interfere in the market beyond enforcing regulations). “Reregulation” as a 
concept has been applied to characterize the industrial development and market 
liberalization process in not only the western advanced economies, but also less-
developed and authoritarian countries, including Latin American 33  and East Asian 
countries34. This thesis employs the concept of “reregulation” in its latest manner. 
2.1.2 Contrasting Views on China’s State-Market Relations 
 The theoretical debate on state-market relations in market economy development 
is particularly relevant to the case of the transitional economy of China, an emerging 
economy that has been undergoing incremental economic reform with remarkable 
development of trade, growth and industrialization. At the time of the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949, the Communist Party followed the Soviet Union model of socialist 
industrialization, relying on state command of the production plans and emphasizing 
collective interests rather than personal interests and individual property rights. The 3rd 
                                                 
32 For instance, see Hsueh (2012).  
33 For instance, Snyder (2001) studies the politics of reregulation in Mexico’s coffee 
sector, which has been regarded as a textbook example of successful liberalization reform. 
34 For instance, Hsueh (2011) investigates China's FDI regulations to study China’s 
integration into the international economy and the role and capacity of the state. Hsueh 
argues that the Chinese government engages in a liberalization two-step; it combines the 
liberalization of foreign investment at the economy-wide level with selective 
“reregulation” at the sectoral level. According to Hsueh, the Chinese government 
exercises a bifurcated strategy, which reinforces control in strategic sectors and 
relinquishes control in less strategic sectors. 
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Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in 
Beijing on December 18-22, 1978 marked the beginning of the “Reform and Opening” 
policy and China’s transition from the planned economy to the market economy. During 
this meeting, Deng Xiaoping, who has been now widely regarded as the founding father 
of China’s economic reform policy, became the paramount leader of the Communist 
Party. Since then, the Chinese state has been aiming at building a “socialist market 
economy”, gradually shifting from administrative command of the economy to fiscal, 
regulatory and monetary measures of control. The state promotes the development of the 
private sector, foreign trade and foreign direct investment35, but the public (state-owned) 
sector remains the foundation and the major part of the economy36.  
 The seemingly contradictory image of China’s economy today warrants additional 
evidence-based research of the Chinese central government’s relationship with local 
governments and market actors, and the context under which varying patterns of state-
market relationships have emerged. On the one hand, the Chinese government as a 
single-party authoritarian regime steers national economy on a grand scale through the 
                                                 
35 This is a major feature of China’s development, compared to the “developmental states” 
like Japan and South Korea which relies on domestic investment in developing the target 
industries. 
36 After undergoing the shareholding reform of state-owned firms in the 1990s, the 
Chinese economy now is characterized by a mix of firm ownership structures with the 
state maintaining public ownership as the dominate type. The state sector in China 
consists of three components. The first component includes state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
that is fully owned by the state through the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council, or by the SASACs of local 
provincial, prefecture, township, and county governments. The second component 
includes enterprises which have an SOE as the majority shareholder. The third 
component includes enterprises which are indirectly controlled by SOE subsidiaries. 
Altogether the SOEs and their subsidiaries accounts for over 40% of China’s non-
agricultural GDP. The urban collective enterprises as well as public township village 
enterprises are not considered SOEs.  (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011) 
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implementation of top-down industrial policy and development initiatives. The central 
government also directly supervises the operations of 112 central-government-controlled 
enterprises37, which dominate even monopolize many strategic industries38. On the other 
hand, issues abound in China’s marketization, leading to frequent portrayal of the state as 
unable to maintain order, penetrate society and market, and enforce the political 
objectives. There are rampant government official corruption scandals, illegal corporate 
practices, opportunistic local cadres (who exercise discretion in implementing central 
mandates), and prevalent industrialization-related environmental and social injustice in 
China today. Is the central government strong and strategic in guiding the development of 
market and industries? Or is the central government less capable of achieving its strategic 
visions than it appears to be, with its power to control market and industry no longer 
centralized and prone to failure? What are the underlying factors influencing state 
capacity to control market actors and achieve the state’s political goals? 
 Past studies have presented contrasting arguments and empirical evidence on 
state-market relations in China’s transitional economy. As summarized below, existing 
literature show arguments for state voluntary retreat/decentralization, state failure, state 
resurgence, and state fragmentation. This thesis provides an empirical test between these 
competing views on Chinese state-market relations. 
2.1.2.1 State Voluntary Retreat/Decentralization 
                                                 
37 See the list of central-government-owned companies on the SASAC website 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/ 
38 Besides the state’s control of firms through ownership, particularly relevant to mining 
is the state’s ownership of land and minerals. See Chapter 5 Section 3 for analysis of 
government control of mining rights. 
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 A prominent scholarly approach, which emerged in the 1990s, sees the Chinese 
central government having decreased and decentralized control over the market in the 
process of economic reform. The post-Mao reform era saw the privatization of many 
state-owned enterprises in urban areas, and the emergence of the township-village 
enterprises (TVEs), mostly collectively or quasi-privately owned by township and village 
communities39 in rural areas in China. The spectacular growth of the TVEs has been 
hailed by many as a pillar of China’s economic reform, prompting a series of county-
level studies on privatization and county-level governance. Scholars have drawn from the 
concept of East Asian developmental state and introduced new terms to characterize the 
role of the Chinese state, including “entrepreneurial”40, “regulatory”41, “corporatist” or 
“decentralized developmental state”42. According to these scholars emphasizing power 
decentralization and market privatization, the state-led decentralization of political 
                                                 
39 China has five levels of government. Below the central government are 31 provincial 
level units (42 million population on average), 331 prefecture level units (3.7 million 
people on average), 2109 counties (580,000 people on average), and 44,741 townships 
(27,000 people on average). Furthermore, there are about 730000 villages in rural areas 
below the township level that are self-governed and do not belong to the formal Chinese 
government structure (World Bank, 2002). 
40 Blecher and Shue (1996) coined the concept of the “entrepreneurial state” in their study 
of the Guanghan county government in China. Compared with the traditional 
developmental state model, the entrepreneurial state does not dis-attach itself from the 
market by only creating an enabling environment for independent economic enterprises. 
The entrepreneurial state itself engages in industrial production and creation of new firms, 
and engages in finance and competition for businesses. For a similar characterization of 
the Chinese state as the “entrepreneurial state” but at the city level, see the work of 
Duckett (1998) on the role of the Tianjin city government in management of local real 
estate and urban commerce. 
41 See Shue (1995) and Blecher and Shue (2001). 
42 For instance, Oi (1999) argues that China’s fiscal reform in the 1990s decentralized the 
central power to manage and extract resources to the local township and village level, and 
thus provided incentives to local officials to pursue “local corporatist state” and stimulate 
economic growth through policy, leading to rising output of the private sector. Oi 
advances the notion of the “local corporatist state” as a type of “decentralized 
developmental state.” (Oi, 1995) 
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authority from the center to the local governments resulted in the voluntary retreat of 
central level bureaucratic influence from the economy. Scholars indicate various reasons 
for the retreat of the central government, including endogenous state institutional changes 
delegating central fiscal authority to the local governments43, ideological shifts favoring 
the market 44 and macroeconomic environment favoring marketization. Power 
decentralization is viewed positively as contributing to the success of China’s economic 
growth. Decentralization incentivized as well as enabled local cadres to facilitate local 
market development: county-level and prefecture-level governments not only provide 
policy incentives stimulating industrial production and creation of new firms within their 
own jurisdictions, but also become responsible for and take initiatives in obtaining 
finance and other favorable resources for private businesses45.  
2.1.2.2 State Failure 
 Another group of scholars who agree with the broad notion of the Chinese state 
retreating from the market and the social domains have refrained from singing the praise 
for “decentralization” as a recipe for market growth. Instead, they focus on the 
                                                 
43 Montinola (1995) and Qian (1996, 1998) assert that the delegation of fiscal and 
administrative authority from the center to the local governments resulted in the “Chinese 
style” of “market-preserving federalism”. 
44 Montinola et al. argue that broader ideological shifts from anti-market Maoism to 
pragmatic, market-oriented Deng ideology in China contributed to the emergence of the 
“Chinese style” of “market-preserving federalism” (Montinola, Qian & Weingast, 1995, 
p.48) 
45 For examples of the “local developmental state” where local governments engage in 
competition for favorable resources for market positions between the localities and 
mobilize their political authority to promote local development and to develop policy 
incentives, see Solinger, 1991; Shirk, 1993; Wang, 1994; Nolan, 1995; Oi, 1995; Unger 
and Chan, 1995; Wong et al., 1995; Huang, 1996. 
49 
 
institutional ineffectuality of the state to impose centralized policy agendas46, to penalize 
rent-seeking and cadre corruption, and to maintain coherent redistribution of resources 
across social groups and across regions 47 . They argue that the central state has 
involuntarily reduced its administrative control over the market and local governments, 
due to its lack of capability to build administrative capacities of governance in the post-
Mao era48. This involuntary withdrawal of the state control contributed politically to the 
transition from state socialism to market-oriented economy, yet with grave political and 
social consequences. With respect to the success of the TVEs that “decentralization” 
scholars employ as evidence, scholars such as Bernstein and Lü (2003) contend that it 
relies on favorable local conditions – “market access, availability of skills, proximity to 
large cities, availability of overseas Chinese investors” 49  which are found in the 
“industrial rural China” in eastern coastal provinces but absent in vast rural areas in the 
middle and western provinces in China; thus it does not present a full picture of China’s 
economic transition.  
One of the most prominent scholars of the “state failure” camp, Minxin Pei 
frankly labels China as a “local mafia state” (Pei, 2008) and a “parasitic state.” (Pei, 2006) 
According to Pei, the Chinese central state has lost the battle to enforce its goals in 
                                                 
46 For examples of studies on the central government’s failure to impose centralized 
economic development directives over the localities, see Bernstein and Lü, 2003; Breslin, 
1996; Yang and Wei, 1996; Zweig, 2002.  
47 For examples of studies on the central government’s failure of redistributing resources, 
see Baum and Shevchenko, 1999; Park et al., 1996. 
48 For instance, Lü(2000) argues that the Communist Party of China as a revolutionary 
party is incapable of maintaining centralized enforcement over the party members; under 
a more relaxed macroeconomic environment provided by the market-oriented reform, the 
central control over its local government officials has been entrenched, and the party’s 
ability to combat corruption and illegal behavior of its members has been further reduced. 
49 See Bernstein and Lü (2003), p. 8.  
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critical areas of governance such as the rule of law; local Communist Party officials have 
been able to use their positions of authority to engage in rent-seeking, alliance with 
criminal groups, and enhancement of their own welfare at the expense of the regime. 
 If we use the continuum developed by Evans (1989) on which a state is placed 
between the two extreme poles of the “klepto-patrimonial” predatory Zairian state and the 
“embedded autonomy” of the East Asian developmental state, then this group of scholars 
will put the Chinese state at the intermediate position with both developmental and 
predatory features, but further towards the end of the predatory state50, compared to the 
“decentralization” scholars who would lean towards the other direction (since much of 
their analysis at the township level resonates with the developmental state model).  
2.1.2.3 State Resurgence 
 Montinola, a major proponent of the “market-preserving federalism” model in the 
“state decentralization” camp, warned in 1995 about the danger of China’s reversal from 
decentralization51, that “problems from a central government that is too strong, and this is 
the danger of recentralization per se. Without further institutional constraints, a 
financially independent central government would pose potential dangers to the reform’s 
progress over the past fifteen years, especially if run by leaders far less favorable to the 
reforms than Deng Xiaoping.” (Montinola, 1995, p. 81) According to one growing body 
of literature, recentralization and state enpowerment had in fact already occurred and had 
been central to the marketization process of the Chinese economy.  
                                                 
50 For instance, see So (2007) for the analysis of Chinese state as the “local predatory 
state”. 
51 It is necessary to take this assessment into context: 1995 was the height of the fiscal 
decentralization in China, as the central government passed a taxation reform in 1994 




 According to scholars who emphasize the recentralization of the state in leading 
the marketization process52, the Chinese state capacity to assert influence over market has 
been reconfigured, rather than simply reduced. The process of market expansion is the 
process of the central state’s first relinquishing its institutional plan of command over 
resources to develop the local market economy, and then its re-building capability to 
intervene in local economies and break local barriers to centralized control. Scholars have 
indicated various factors enabling the recentralization of the state, including the 2003 
bureaucratic reform that recentralizes state power53, the macroeconomic imbalance and 
industry supply-demand imbalance which reduces local bargaining power54, and specific 
industry/sector features which warrant the state control55. One commonality across these 
views is their focus on certain industries: these scholars argue that the Chinese central 
government has managed to retain or regain a centralized, hierarchical control within the 
specific industry sector.  
 There is disagreement however among the scholars over the extent to which the 
authority over resources has shifted between the state and the market, and between the 
different levels of government.  Zhang and Heller (2004) argue that in the electricity 
industry, while the central government allowed the local governments and foreign 
investors to build a decentralized periphery of plants, the state never relinquished its 
                                                 
52 See for instance Feigenbaum (2003) for the study of the military’s powerful role in the 
development of China’s industries; Mertha (2005) for the study of the development of 
China’s intellectual property protection; Zhang and Heller (2004) for the study of the 
marketization of China’s electricity industry; Lin (2008) for the study of the reform of 
China’s oil and petrochemical industries; Hsueh (2011) for the study of the reform of 
China’s telecommunication industry.  
53 See for instance Mertha (2005).  
54 See for instance Lin (2008); He (2014). 
55 See for instance Hsueh (2011).  
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structural control through business management of key state-controlled enterprises who 
continued to exercise state interests through policy favors and market monopolistic 
advantages. Mertha (2005) argues that the reform of a few key bureaucracies from being 
under control of local superiors to under control of central administrative superiors led to 
“soft centralization”, which shifted bargaining power from sub-provincial to the 
provincial level yet provided little benefits to central state authority (contrary to what 
Beijing expected). Lin (2008) in studying the reform of the petroleum and petrochemical 
industries argue that macroeconomic surplus, industry supply-demand imbalance and 
restricted access to financial credit created opportunities for the central government to 
implement the shareholding reform and impose a centralized hierarchical corporate 
structure over the industries. Hsueh (2011) argues that the Chinese state has imposed 
selectively strategic control based on sectoral specifics; in industries critical to strategic 
state interests, the central government has selectively imposed reregulation and tightened 
control. 
2.1.2.4 State Fragmentation 
 Finally, a group of scholars whose work relates to the issue of state-market 
relations in China focus less on the relations between the central state and the local 
markets, but on the chain of command and fragmentation within the Chinese bureaucracy. 
Power struggle is not new to Chinese government, as its leaders emerged out of intense 
power struggle within the communist party in the revolutionary era and in the Mao era of 
constant political campaigns. These scholars argue that the administrative control of the 
Chinese government over market has been decentralized in the economic reform since the 
1970s, but no changes have effectively limited the rule of the highest central leaders in 
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power. In other words, the fragmentation of the central state power has contributed to 
marketization and economic development, but has not led to decrease in the state power 
of governing the market. Horizontal factions within the central government56 and vertical 
connections between central factions and their respective local agents have given central 
leaders the leverage to implement development strategies that they would like to adopt. 
The pro-market faction and the conservative pro-state-planning faction in Beijing 
compete with each other through different personnel networks, industry and local 
connections, leading to different local initiatives and temporal shifts in power balance 
between the factions57. Kenneth Lieberthal (1992, 1995) highlighted the issue of state 
fragmentation by coining the term “fragmented authoritarianism”, capturing the 
competition between the horizontal (kuai) and vertical (tiao) lines of authority within the 
bureaucracy. The fragmented authority below the very powerful center leads to cleavages 
between bureaucratic units below the central government, and creates “policy 
communities” for certain economic strategies and projects58.  
2.1.3 Contribution to the Debate 
The four groups of scholars have contrasting views on the state-market relationships 
in China’s marketization and development process. Assessment of the state’s relations 
with the market has ranged from developmental to parasitic. Similarly, assessment of 
center’s control over the localities has ranged from complete structural enhancement of 
                                                 
56 Horizontal factions refer to the power struggle between pro-market and conservative 
central leaders, and between central leaders with different kinds of marketization policy 
agendas. For instance, Fewsmith (1994) attributed China’s transition to market economy 
in the 1980s to the success of power competition of pro-market leader Deng Xiaoping 
over conservative leaders including Hua Guofeng and Chen Yun within the central 
leadership. 
57 See for instance Cai and Treisman (2006). 
58 Also see Lieberthal and Lampton (1992). 
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control to lack of control to the point of federalism59. Yet these views are not mutually 
exclusive, allowing for a synthesizing, holistic view of the existing theoretical lenses in 
studying China’s market expansion and industrial development.  
One way to look at possible co-existence of the different theoretical lenses is that the 
Chinese state has been constantly modifying itself in the reform process, in order to have 
economic growth and at the same time maintain its political authority. “For better and for 
worse, government keep trying throughout the reform era to development investment 
policy, restructure enterprise incentives, and devise new and appropriate institutions.” 
(Naughton, 1996, p. 95) The institutional legacies of Mao’s command economy still 
lingers and exerts great influence on state policies, while at the same time, new 
organizational, market and social interests have arisen and created demands that the state 
must respond to. Thus, studies conducted at different times in China’s reform process 
would yield results that are reflective of the state’s priority concerns at the time.  
Another possible way to employ the different views together in perspective is that 
the scholars of different viewpoints tend to focus on the state’s interaction with different 
parts of the Chinese economy, which is huge and highly complex in itself. “State 
decentralization” scholars, “state failure” scholars and to a certain extent “state 
fragmentation” scholars tend to focus on the rural economy which has been largely 
driven by local pro-market cadres. On the other hand “state reregulation” scholars tend to 
focus on the development of industries which had already built institutional foundations 
                                                 
59 See for instance Zheng (2007) which argues that with deepening reform and openness 
China's central-local relations is increasingly functioning on federalist principles. 
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under strong central control60 before the reform, and in which the state-owned enterprises 
continue to receive political favors from the state in the reform era61.  
This thesis, therefore attempts to use the empirical case of China’s rare earth 
industry development to test the validity of these competing but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive theoretical explanations. The author argues that the Chinese state has been 
ferociously attempting to recalibrate its control over the rare earth industry production 
and market development. However, even with recognition of rare earths as strategic 
resources, the state’s capability of imposing control over the market actors has been less 
than satisfactory and limited by broader political institutional factors not specific to the 
industry. Below the national level, Beijng’s policy reach to the localities was further 
reduced in regions with specific market, geological and technical features. Thus this case 
study is largely in line with the view of the “state resurgence” theorists in that instead of 
voluntarily withdrawing from the market, the Chinese state has implemented strategies to 
maintain influence over the market actors. Furthermore, this study extends the “state 
resurgence” observation through applying the “state involuntary failure” argument to 
look at why Beijing’s policies did not work as well as it intended at national and 
subnational levels.  
2.2 Literature on State Capacity 
At the most fundamental level, this study of the role of the Chinese state in the 
development of the rare earth industry addresses the Chinese state capacity amid the 
                                                 
60 As Fewsmith (1994) argued the rural reform is generally viewed as a result of the 
bottom-up process, while the enterprise reform is viewed as a result of the top-down 
process. 
61 See Yasheng Huang(2008)’s analysis of the pecking order of firms in redistribution of 
market resources in favor of SOEs. 
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bimodal pressures of domestic reform and global economic engagement. This section 
reviews existing literature on the definition of state capacity, state capacity to guide 
economic development, and variation of state capacity.  
2.2.1 Definition of State Capacity 
State capacity is a complex and critical concept commonly used in political science 
to denote the ability and quality of governance. There is no clear consensus on how to 
define or measure “state capacity”. Historical and comparative institutionalist research 
has shown that “possibilities for state interventions of given types cannot be derived from 
some overall level of generalized capacity or ‘state strength.’” (Evans et al., 1985a, p. 
353) Theda Skocpol wrote a widely used definition of state capacity, as the ability to 
“implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful 
social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.” (Skocpol, 1985, 
p.9) The term “state capacity” is often used in relative comparative scenarios. For 
instance, states with high state capacity are able to provide public goods such as human 
security, medical and health care, and the social and physical infrastructure that promote 
development. (Rotberg, 2003, pp. 2-4) States with low state capacity are limited in their 
ability to provide these goods, leading to low levels of economic development or even 
state failure. (Rotberg, 2004; Skocpol, 1979) McAdam et al. similarly characterized state 
capacity as the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and 
resources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction.” (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 
2001, p. 78) 
Among existing literature defining the state capacity of the Chinese state, 
Shaoguang Wang wrote one of the earliest works on Chinese state capacity and defined 
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state capacity of China in four dimensions: “the capacity to mobilize financial resources 
from the society to pursue what the central policy-makers perceive as the "national 
interest" (extractive capacity); the capacity to guide national socioeconomic development 
(steering capacity); the capacity to dominate by using symbols and creating consensus 
(legitimation capacity); and the capacity to dominate by the use or threat of force 
(coercive capacity).” (Wang, 1995, p.91)  
Existing works on state capacity have attempted to analyze state capacity by 
conceptualizing it in several dimensions encompassing fiscal, military and socioeconomic 
power relations62. The different dimensions of state capacity are interrelated, thus past 
studies all tend to isolate and just study the variables in one preferable dimension. This 
thesis employs the same approach and focuses on analyzing one dimension of state 
capacity, the capacity of the state to use its authority to reallocate resources and facilitate 
economic development. 
As Weingast argues, “a government strong enough to protect property rights and 
enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” (Weingast, 
1995, p.1) The centrality of the role of state capacity in fostering industrial and economic 
development has long been recognized by many scholars studying development in a wide 
range of regions employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. For instance, 
Polanyi 63  and Tilly 64  pioneered the research on the formation and expansion of the 
                                                 
62 Although state capacity contains several dimensions, it should be not interpreted as 
simply the sum of the state’s economic, human and military resources together. For the 
various concepts of “state capacity”, see Weiss, 1998, pp. 14–40. 
63 Polanyi (1944) first argued for the decisive role of the nation state’s capability to 
provide social institutions in developing the market economy. Polanyi studied the 
industrialization of Western Europe and argued that the development of the modern state 
went hand in hand with the development of modern market economies and that these two 
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capitalist democracies in the western advanced economies: state institutions and the 
contentions between state intervention and market forces result in violent social process 
accompanying liberalization. Gerschenkron65, another early pioneer of the “static model 
of industrialization”, argued that other major theories in political economy, the 
modernization theory and the Marxist/Dependency theory, all fail to explain the process 
of industrialization in the “later-comers” developing countries, in which the state 
institutions play a decisive role in the industrialization process.  
2.2.2 Variation of State Capacity 
2.2.2.1 Determinants of State Capacity 
Scholars have identified a variety of variables which explain the variations of state 
capacity in formulating and implementing specific policies across countries or across 
sectors. Institutionalists employ a broad definition of institutions that includes “both 
formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” (Thelen & 
Steinmo, 1992, p. 2), not limited to state regulations and structures. Using this definition, 
majority of the research on determinants of state capacity can be attributed to institutional 
factors encompassing both political and economic variables (see e.g. Zysman, 1983, 
Evans et al., 1985a, Hall, 1986, Steinmo et al., 1992, Weaver and Rockman, 1993, Hall 
                                                                                                                                                 
changes were inexorably linked in history. Polanyi critiqued the liberal economic theory 
that the market is a natural form of economic organization of society; instead “laissez-
faire was planned”. Polanyi argued against self -regulating markets, because unregulated 
markets would “subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” 
(p.71).  
64 Tilly (1975; 1985) analyzed the nation building process of Western Europe and 
focused on the contention between the state and the social groups. 
65 While the scholars who followed Gerschenkron’s “static model of industrialization” 
predominantly study the newly industrialized countries such as Latin American or East 
Asian countries, Gershenkron’s analysis emphasized that for both early industrializers 
and late industrializers the strength and the central organization of the state matter 
fundamentally to economic development (Gourevitch, 1978, p.885). 
59 
 
and Taylor, 1996, Weiss, 1998). Political institution variables include the rules of the 
bureaucratic recruitment, the existence and the rules of electoral competition, the 
structure of party systems, the organization of government, and the relations between 
government organizations of different levels. For instance, “extractive” political 
institutions in which only a “small” group of individuals have concentrated power can 
breed rent-seeking activities (the patronage by the rich government-corporate elites who 
avoid giving up rents and derive higher rents when the rich are in power) and lead to low 
state capacity to foster development. (Acemoglu et al, 2012) Economic/sectoral 
institution variables also help determine state capacity in governing industry and markets, 
including sectoral-specific policy networks linking bureaucracy and social actors 
(Atkinson & Coleman, 1989), and participation in regional or international economic 
institutions66. Geographical factors, including population density and spatial topography67 
are also found to be of influence to the state capacity to regulate the regions.  
Existing work on the state capacity of the Chinese government in the development 
of commodities industries68 presents several institutional variables influencing the state 
capacity. Sun (2006) examined the development of China’s steel industry and argued that 
“fragmented and uncoordinated Chinese bureaucracy contributes significantly to the 
inefficacy of policy implementation”. Wright (2012) examined the development of 
                                                 
66 For instance, Grande (2001) has argued that Germany’s integration with the larger E.U. 
economy and economic governance institutions, in other words the “Europeanization” of 
its innovation policies resulted in declined state capacity to foster innovation in the 
information technology industry. 
67 For instance see Herbst (2010) for the relationship between population density and 
topography and state-building success/failures across sub-Sahara African countries.  
68 Since there is no existing work on the Chinese state capacity in steering the 
development of the rare earth industry, the literature reviewed here concerns existing 
work that analyzes the Chinese state capacity in steering the development of similar 
industries that produce and trade primary products instead of manufactured products.  
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China’s coal industry and argued that the relationships between the different levels of 
government, shown as the relative independence of the lower level of government from 
the central and provincial governments in the hierarchy, impact the capacity of the central 
government to achieve its objectives in the coal industry. Alpamann (2010) studied 
China’s cotton industry and argued that the state capacity to achieve its objectives in the 
cotton industry is “mediated by specific patterns of state-economy interactions at the 
local level…the orientation of local states towards the economy is introduced as the 
major explanatory variable.” (p.18)  
This thesis offers both empirical and theoretical contributions. A review of the 
existing literature on Chinese state capacity in commodities industries has not found any 
research that addresses the Chinese state capacity in the development of the industries 
producing non-ferrous metals (which include rare earth elements) 69 . Thus existing 
research does not offer explanation on the state capacity in a whole group of industry 
sectors that produce important natural resources for the Chinese economy and share 
similar and distinctive administrative patterns in the Chinese bureaucracy70. This study 
offers analysis of the specific institutional variables influencing the state capacity that can 
be applied to this group of sectors absent in the current literature. Existing studies also 
focus primarily on the political or economic relationships between the center and the 
local governments. This study identifies the local deposit geography or production 
                                                 
69 Non-ferrous metals are metals that do not contain iron in appreciable amounts. Apart 
from rare earth elements, other notable non-ferrous metals include precious metals such 
as gold and silver, more common metals such as aluminum, copper and lead, as well as 
rare metals such as tungsten and cobalt.  
70 In the history of the PRC, because of its over-emphasis on iron and steel production in 
Maoist era, non-ferrous metals industries have been treated differently from ferrous 
metals in state administrations. 
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technology to be variables influencing state capacity, thus adding technical concerns to 
the existing discussions focusing on political and economic variables. 
2.2.2.2 Subnational Variation of State Capacity 
Past research of state capacity to steer economic development have mostly focused 
on variables either at a national-systemic level (studying state capacity variations across 
countries) or a sectoral level (studying state capacity variation across industry sectors). 
Research on the sub-national provincial/regional comparison of the state capacity to steer 
industry development, and the local drivers for such disparity in governance across 
different regions in a single country71 remains few in number.  
The study of development in a huge country such as China calls for an in-depth 
understanding of regional political economy of economic growth and industry 
development72. Rithmire (2014) reviewed recent works on regional analysis in Chinese 
political economy and found that the "new regionalists" in Chinese studies “seek to 
identify and explain meaningful heterogeneity in the Chinese polity and economy”; but 
“they go further than simply using subnational cases to generate or test theories about 
Chinese politics; instead, they propose that subnational political economies in China are a 
function of endogenous change rather than a reaction to national priorities.” Thus 
                                                 
71 For instance, Sinha (2003) has studied the subnational variation of state capacity in 
India, and argues that regional elites’ strategic choices towards central rules and 
subnational institutional variations lead to differences in economic performance across 
provinces in India.  
72 According to Wang and Hu (1999), although no province has been excluded from the 
national development plan in China and every one of China’s 31 provinces experienced 
strong growth since 1978, performance has varied markedly across regions leading to 
“uneven development”. Wang and Hu examined political, historical, and geographic 
factors causing increasing disparity of economic performance across regions and warned 




contexts specific to the local region deserve greater scrutiny. Studies of subnational 
political economies in China have more focused on the income disparities between 
provinces as well as preferential policies received by the coastal provinces, and less on 
the comparisons of industrial governance between several less-developed inland regions. 
This thesis aspires to advance in this much desired research direction, by analyzing the 
factors contributing to subnational variation of state capacity across two less-developed 
inland regions in reregulating the rare earth industry. A comparison of the state capacity 
in different regions can yield fruitful analysis of state-market dynamics which are not 
ideologically or culturally specific to China. The findings of such analysis may also be 
generalized to inform and help similar works on other regions in other countries and thus 
make potential contributions to the study of variation of state capacity in general. 
2.3 Literature on China’s Rare Earth Industry 
English-language literature that covers China’s rare earth industry have primarily 
consisted of technical and market analysis of the industry that was largely outside the 
domain of political science. For instance, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) publishes 
annual report on global rare earth industry, which includes a section on China’s rare earth 
industry, mostly statistics of production and exports and key regulatory changes (quoted 
from the publications of the Chinese Society of Rare Earths). The Rare-earth Information 
Center (RIC) at the Iowa State University 73  provided “scientific and technical 
                                                 
73 RIC was established at the Ames Laboratory by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's 
Division of Technical Information in January of 1966 to service the scientific and 
technological communities by collecting, storing, evaluating, and disseminating rare-
earth information from various sources. In 1968, the support of RIC was transferred to 
Iowa State University's Institute for Physical Research and Technology through grants 
from the worldwide rare earth industry. The RIC published two newsletters during its 
operation, the RIC News and the RIC Insight. According to its description on the archive, 
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information concerning the rare earths to industry, government, universities, and 
individuals” from 1966 to 2002, including technical and commercial aspects of China’s 
rare earth mines. A few industry insiders74 followed China’s development as part of 
global industry analysis, focusing on market supply, technical advance and industry 
growth and much less on the politics involved.  
With the Sino-Japan Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and the alleged halt of China’s 
rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, there has been growing interest in the scholarly and 
policy communities on China’s rare earth industry since 2010. Notably, several U.S. 
government offices have produced overviews of China’s rare earth industry development 
and summarized state policy interventions75. The general consensus in literature is the 
“criticality” and the “strategic value” of the rare earths. Authors agree that the strategic 
aspect not only stems from the technical importance of the minerals as raw materials for 
manufacturing high-tech products76, but also geopolitical implications of the dominance 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The RIC News was a quarterly newsletter containing items of current interest 
concerning the science and technology of rare earths. RIC News was free. The RIC 
Insight a monthly newsletter, contained more editorial comments, provocative opinions 
on the future directions of rare earths, later breaking news than the RIC News, and was 
slanted toward the technological and commercial aspects of the rare earth field”. For 
more information and the RIC database, see https://www.ameslab.gov/dmse/rem/archive. 
74 The “industry insiders” include industry consultants, industry journalists, and scientists 
and engineers in universities, research labs and firms producing downstream applications. 
The majority of them do not produce scholarly publications focused on China. For 
instance, Jack Lifton and Gareth Hatch at the consulting firm Technology Metals 
Research (TMR) have both worked in high tech industry and followed the rare earth 
industry development in China in their consulting work. 
75 For instance, see the work of Hurst (2010) at the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies 
Office; Levkowitz & Beauchamp-Mustafaga (2010) at the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (USCC); Morrison & Tang (2011) at Congressional 
Research Office. 
76 See Seaman (2010) for the analysis of the criticality of rare earths and its importance to 
the growth of clean energy industry in Europe. Also see Mancheri et al. (2013) for 
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of a single supplier in global production and the effect of China’s regulations on the 
global market 77 . Scholars have expressed concerns that China’s de-facto resource 
monopoly can lead to conflicts in interstate relations with consumer countries78. The 
other general consensus is the decline of not just the mining of rare earths but also the 
entire upstream production in the West. Scholars agree that apart from Chinese policies 
which propelled industry development, Western governments’ negligence of their 
domestic mining industry and the broader global shift of manufacturing capacity to 
China79 also enabled China’s fast growth.  
Compared to English-language literature, Chinese-language literature has provided 
considerably richer detail on the nuances of state control and domestic issues plaguing 
the rare earth industry in China. The general consensus is that despite of strong growth 
and dominance in global supply so far, the industry suffers from long-term issues 
including supply-demand imbalance (which leads to chronic production capacity surplus 
and depressed prices), environmental degradation, illegal production and smuggling, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis on China’s intention and policies on upgrading domestic industry value-added 
production to make better use of REEs. 
77 See Abraham (2012)’s analysis from Japan’s perspective on the geopolitical 
repercussions of shifting reliance on traditional fossil fuels to an undefined mix of 
alternative energy sources and the implications of rare earth metal supply for green 
technology development.  
78 See Nakano (2011) for Japan’s response to China’s regulations over rare earth export 
and alleged halt of rare earth export to Japan in fall 2010. Nakano argues that the halt of 
Japan-bound export in 2010 was a turning point that signified the starting point of a new 
phase in clean energy competition and transformed Sino-Japan trade relations into a 
prosperous rivalry with an undertone of mistrust. Also see Ting & Seaman (2013)’s study 
on the international implications of China’s regulations, which argue that dispute over 
rare earth trade can lead to greater inter-state tension. 
79 See Gschneidner (2011), director of the U.S. DOE-funded Ames Research Lab, who 
remarked about the decline of the U.S. workforce in rare earth mining and processing. 
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political contentions between the center and the local regions over industry 
consolidation80.  
The Chinese state rhetoric focuses on the necessity to curb environmental damage 
and to effectively protect and rationally utilize rare earth resources. (PRC Information 
Office, 2012) The PRC State Council published a whitepaper on the state-led 
development of China’s rare earth industry, entitled Situation and Policies of China’s 
Rare Earth Industry. (PRC Information Office, 2012) This authoritative overview focuses 
on the domestic issues regarding China’s rare earth industry development which warrant 
state intervention in production and justify state restrictions of export. These issues 
include over-supply of primary products (relative to global demand), over-capacity of 
processing facilities, low price relative to the strategic value, illegal mining and 
smuggling, and rampant environmental degradation. The whitepaper denies the 
speculation that the Chinese government has been using natural resources as weapons in 
global competition over high-tech manufacturing or in gaining leverage in inter-state 
political or territorial disputes. Another authoritative account from Miao Wei (Miao, 
2009), current Minister and then Deputy Minister of the MIIT, explains that the MIIT 
would implement a series of policies to increase the “proper use” and regulation in 2009 
of rare earths. Miao highlighted several issues that warranted immediate action: low 
efficiency in resource use, environmental pollution, lack of indigenous innovation, export 
                                                 
80 For instance, see Su (2009), Ma (2012) and Chen (2012), for first-hand accounts of 
China’s rare earth industry development. Su is the Deputy Director of the Office of Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region in Beijing, and formerly the Director of the Baotou Rare-
Earth Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone. Ma is former President of Baotou Rare 
Earth Research Institute. Chen is the Director of the Academic Department of the 
Association of China Rare Earth Industry.  
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primarily of low-value-added products, and lack of regulatory control over mining and 
illegal production.  
Current literature points to several interesting points of debates and gaps. First of all, 
there is still a lack of systematic and empirical analysis on the role of the state along the 
trajectory of development and the effect of state reregulation on industry production 
through fieldwork. Chinese scholars have reported extensively on the state’s intervention 
in the market prior to 2008, and the focus tends to be specific industrial policies and 
regulatory changes. This study enriches the understanding on the role of the state, by 
systematically analyzing both industry-specific goals and policies as well as broader 
political institutional changes imposed by the state. In analyzing the current state 
intervention, scholars mostly analyze secondary sources of information such as state 
bureaucrats’ speeches, government reports and media reports; therefore they miss the 
empirical evidence one could only gather from primary fieldwork about the policy 
implementation. This study also fills the gap. 
Secondly, existing literature contains varying arguments about the motivations of 
the Chinese state in implementing restrictive or more controlling policies over the 
industry. Scholars have a general consensus on rare earths viewed as “strategic metals” in 
the eyes of the Chinese state. Scholars generally agree on the concerns over 
environmental degradation and resource depletion as claimed by the Chinese government 
whitepaper. But different narratives on why the industry warrants central policy 
intervention (i.e. what strategic value is there for the state to intervene) have also 
emerged. For instance, Mancheri et al (2013) focuses on the state’s goal to build a 
national innovation production chain. Biedermann (2014) sees the state policies as tools 
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to incentivize foreign corporations to invest in China with possible high technology 
transfer. Ting & Seaman (2013) argues that Beijing aims to reap economic and 
geopolitical benefit from its monopolistic position in global production. Wang (2011) 
argues that Beijing needs to protect China’s national security from being compromised by 
excessive Western purchase of its strategic resources. Wuebbeke (2013) examined the 
different narratives, and argued that the “environment narrative” - concerns for depletion 
of non-renewable resources and environmental degradation, and the “development 
narrative” - the desire to develop the downstream industries, together outweigh the 
“geopolitical narrative” - using resources as weapons in political disputes. Hao and Liu 
(2011), and Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013) similar argue for the importance of domestic 
stakeholder interests in China’s regulation over the rare earth industry, as well as 
socioeconomic and environmental concerns of industry production, rather than 
accusations of resource nationalism. This thesis takes a historical view and analyzes the 
goal of the state in sponsoring the industry development across four decades since the 
start of its economic reform and opening up. A mix of interrelated political, economic 
and socio-environmental concerns that grew out of the industry’s development 
experience drive the state rationale for industry reregulation. These concerns together 
reflect the “strategic” value of rare earths in the eyes of the Chinese state. 
Thirdly, there has been little subnational level of analysis about policy formulation, 
policy implementation, market structure and firm behavior in the rare earth industry in 
China. Existing studies tend to focus on state regulatory changes and their influence on 
production and trade at the national level, or on the influence of national policies on trade 
and political relations between China and the West. Local production regions are treated 
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either as black boxes, or as a single case without structured comparison with other 
regions. This thesis fills this gap by analyzing comparatively the political economy of 
rare earth industry in North China’s Baiyun-Ebo region, and in South China’s Gannan-
Yuebei region. The subnational level analysis of the barriers to state reregulation yield 





CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter outlines the research design and the data collection process. The 
author presents evidence through process tracing, within-case comparison across regions, 
and framing the research hypothesis in the broad theme of state capacity in economic 
transition. The data employed are mainly collected from in-depth interviews, field visits 
and secondary sources during field work in China.  
 
3.1 Research Design  
3.1.1 Sectoral Analysis 
This thesis follows the sectoral analysis81 approach to study the role of the state in 
industry development. This study of China’s reregulation of a single industry of rare 
earths constitutes a “crucial case study” 82  that advances theory testing and theory 
development. The case study also has intrinsic practical value to help remedy the 
understudied rare earth sector in China that produces monopolistically some of the most 
                                                 
81 Sectoral analysis approach is commonly used in industry studies and establishes a set 
of causal and measurable relationships between market structure, firm conduct and 
industrial performance. In contrast to firm level research, sectoral analysis researches the 
industry as a whole and emphasizes the history and evolution of the industry. See 
Kitschelt (1991). 
82 The crucial-case method, first proposed by Harry Eckstein (1975), is a method that 
utilizes one single crucial case that “must closely fit with a theory if one is to have 
confidence in the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well any rule 
contrary to that proposed” (p. 118). Since Eckstein’s influential essay, the crucial-case 
approach has been used in a multitude of studies across several social science disciplines 
and has come to be recognized as a staple of the case study method (George & Bennett, 




critical natural resources in the world yet has not been well understood in existing 
literature. 
3.1.2 Process Tracing 
This study takes a chronological approach to examine the trajectory of the state 
involvement in the production and trade of rare earths in China. Process tracing is 
considered as a fundamental qualitative analysis tool, “the systematic examination of 
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the investigator.” (Collier, 2011, p. 823) The author identifies the causal 
mechanisms embedded in the sequence of events in the marketization and development 
process through comparison of the state reregulation efforts and outcomes in three 
periods. 
3.1.3 Within-Case Subnational Comparison 
The regional comparison allows this single-industry study to incorporate the Most 
Similar Systems Design, a research design commonly used in the study of comparative 
politics to test hypothesis83. The study compares two sub-national regions with similar 
cultural, institutional and structural national features: the mining regions in North China 
and South China that have different outcomes under the same state-led reregulation. This 
within-case comparison allows the author to identify empirically what factors lead to 
differences in state capacity of control, shaping different regional models of industry 
development. 
 
                                                 
83 Based on J.S. Mill’s System of Logic (1843), the Most Similar Systems Design method 
examines cases that are as similar as possible, except on the outcome (the dependent 




3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
This study primarily employs data collected during 9 months of field research in 
China. Because of the political sensitivity surrounding rare earths as strategic minerals as 
well as the ongoing nature of central government policies, the majority of the 
interviewees and the firms that I visited requested not to be directly quoted or to be 
quoted without naming their specific affiliations. Thus, the study used a combination of 
primary evidence (expert interviews, field trips) and secondary evidence (supporting the 
primary evidence) to support the findings. 
3.2.1 Fieldwork in Beijing (December 2012-February 2012; June 2013) 
As the capital of China, Beijing is home to the PRC central government and the 
Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), which have overseen 
the development of the rare earth industry since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Beijing 
is also home to headquarters of major state-owned mining companies (such as China 
Minmetals Corporation, CHINALCO, China Nonferrous Metals Mining), major industry 
associations and consulting firms, top national research institutes and universities, and 
state-owned news agencies. The author conducted in-depth semi-structured expert 
interviews with 15 representatives of stakeholders of the rare earth industry, including 
government officials, state-owned firm managers, staff members of the Association of 
China Rare Earth Industry, academics in universities and national research institutes, 
industry consultants, and industry journalists. These interviewees had relatively closer 
ties to the central government compared to interviewees in the local regions and could be 
seen as key informants. Interviews focused on the history of state involvement in industry 
development, factors leading to past regulatory failures, formulation process of current 
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central policies, policy implementation results and their personal experience of 
interacting with other central and local industry stakeholders. Specifically, interviewees 
were asked to identify the key factors which they believe motivated the state to control 
the industry and to identify the factors influencing the central government power to 
enforce control over the local regions and the market.  
In order to understand the historical trajectory of market development and state 
policies, the author also studied secondary materials hosted at the State Archives 
Administration, the National Library of China and the Peking University Library in 
Beijing84. Secondary sources include relevant historical policy documents, newspaper 
articles, trade reports and scholarly analyses which are largely unavailable to scholars in 
the U.S. The author also collected qualitative newsletters, booklets, commentaries and 
scholarly reports published by industry experts and consulting groups in Beijing.  
For quantitative data, the author collected data from several official sources 
published by the central government or government-affiliated institutions in China that 
produce fact-based reviews, industry analysis and science and technology analysis. Key 
datasets include production volumes and quotas, export volumes and quotas, market 
demand structure and volumes, industry capacity and merger and acquisition activities 
within the industry. The State Rare Earth Office publishes Annual Review of China’s 
Rare Earth Industry (《中国稀土年评》 ), which reports on industry and market 
statistics and key events in the rare earth industry each year. The State Rare Earth Office 
also sponsor a peer-reviewed journal Rare Earth Information (《稀土信息》) jointly 
with the Baotou Research Institute for Rare Earths. The official journal publishes 
                                                 
84 Peking University College of Chemistry hosts the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth 
Materials Chemistry and Applications. 
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information, events, news, expert opinion and market analysis of the industry. The 
Chinese Society of Rare Earths (CSRE) publishes the Chinese Society of Rare Earths 
Yearbook (《中国稀土学会年鉴》) which summarizes chronologically key industry 
events each year and provides annual industry statistics. CSRE also publishes the China 
Rare Earth Information, an English newsletter to overseas subscribers reporting on 
industry news, statistics, technical applications and government policies. CSRE also 
publishes two peer-reviewed scientific journals reporting on the cutting-edge technology 
progress, Journal of the Chinese Society of Rare Earths and Rare Earths. Not specific to 
the rare earth industry, the Ministry of Land and Resources publishes China Nonferrous 
Metals Mining Industry Yearbook (《中国有色矿业年鉴》) which provides annual 
overviews of industry development and government policies concerning nonferrous 
metals, China Land and Resources Statistics Yearbook (《中国国土资源统计年鉴》) 
which provides overview on China’s land and natural resources. The author obtained data 
from these publications hosted at the National Library of China.  
3.2.2 Fieldwork in Five Local Provinces related to China’s Rare Earth Supply Chain 
(Feb. 2013- May 2013; July 2013-August 2013) 
My field research in local sites involves four provinces and one autonomous 
region85 with advanced rare earth supply and material production capabilities. (See Figure 
3 for the geographical locations of all five provincial units) In Northern China I 
conducted fieldwork in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, home to the prefecture-
level city of Baotou known as China’s “Rare Earth Capital of the North” and the Baiyun-
                                                 
85 An autonomous region is a region which is populated and governed by ethnic 
minorities and has the same status with provinces in the Chinese political system. The 




ebo Mine, the largest rare earth mine in the world. In Southern China I conducted 
fieldwork in four provinces, specifically: 1) Jiangxi Province, home to the prefecture-
level city of Ganzhou known as the “Rare Earth Capital of the South”, containing major 
ion-adsorption rare earth mines in South China; 2) Guangdong Province, which has rare 
earth mines along the border with Jiangxi Province, as well as clusters of downstream 
companies; 3) Anhui Province, which has the largest rare earth alloy production cluster in 
China; 4) Zhejiang Province, which has the largest cluster of REE-enabled permanent 
magnet production in China. Despite the difference in locations, data collection in each 





Figure 3 Fieldwork Regions86 
 
3.2.2.1 In-depth Interviews 
In each province, the author conducted 5-10 semi-structured expert interviews 
with representatives of local rare earth industry stakeholders. The stakeholders included 
local government officials, corporate managers of local rare earth firms, small business 
owners, staff members of local industry associations, industry experts, consultants and 
local academics. The interview questions were open-ended and tailored based upon the 
interviewees’ experience in the rare earth industry and their interaction with other 
stakeholders (including the central government, the local government or other market 
                                                 
86 The regions circled in blue circles represent the capital of Beijing, as well as the five 
local provinces and autonomous regions where I conducted fieldwork. 
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actors). The questions focused on the interviewees’ perceptions of the central government 
regulation, their understanding of the mechanism of control the central government has 
imposed on local markets and governments, as well as the outcome of local industry 
development. The sampling of interviewees followed mainly the snowballing method: the 
author obtained access to interviewees through mostly personal referrals and sometimes 
cold calling. The author also attended the Shenzhen International Rare Earth Materials & 
Applications Industry Exhibition held in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province in June 2013, as 
well as the 5th Baotou Rare Earth Industry Forum held in Baotou, Inner Mongolia in 
August 2013. The author conducted interviews with some participants at both forums. 
The possible sample bias in selecting the expert interviewees is mitigated by a 
triangulation of interview data with interviewees’ published talks and other public 
documents, as well as a triangulation of interview data with data from secondary sources. 
3.2.2.2 Field Observation  
The author visited seventeen prominent production sites in the rare earth industry 
production chain in five local provinces. The sampling of mines and factories to visit 
followed the snowballing method; however, the author purposefully sampled to have as 
much variation in terms of firm ownership (local subsidiaries of central state-controlled 
firms, local-government-controlled firms and private firms) and the firm’s position in the 
rare earth industry production chain (mining, smelting, midstream products, downstream 
applications). The author collected information about production history, firm ownership 
and corporate structure, major markets and major products, production methods, 
environmental protection measures, environmental consequences of production, 
relationship with the local community, and major government policies that have 
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influenced company operation. The author conducted direct observation of production 
process as well as informal conversations with local managers and workers when allowed.  
3.2.2.3 Data Collection from Secondary Sources 
The author also collected data from archives and secondary sources in the 
production regions. The author visited the Baotou City Archive Bureau, the Baotou City 
Library, the Ganzhou City Archive Bureau, the Ganzhou City Library and the Guangzhou 
City Library. The author collected declassified local government documents and reports, 
local newspaper articles, local chronologies, yearbooks and industry publications. In 
Hong Kong the Universities Services Centre for Chinese Studies in the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong also kindly allowed the author to use their “insider collections 
room” to view their historical collection of “Jingji Yaocan”. The insider publication 
published by the Development Research Center of the PRC State Council contained 
expert comments to the central government on economic affairs, including on China’s 
rare earth industry. The author coded the qualitative data from these secondary sources by 
themes emerging from the materials, including production and export, government 
policies and initiatives, industry consolidation, industry upgrading and downstream 
market demand, environmental pollution and community response, technology transfer 
and intellectual property rights protection. The author also collected quantitative data 
about local industry production, trade statistics, market fluctuations, and environmental 
costs. The secondary data supplements expert interviews and field observation to help 
analyze the local development trajectories and the differences in the central government’s 
capacity of control over the local governments and local market actors.   
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CHAPTER 4 RARE EARTH INDUSTRY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
 
This chapter explores the influence that China’s state intervention in the rare earth 
industry may have on global markets and downstream industries, through analyzing the 
global supply and demand of the rare earths and China’s position in the global production 
chain. The first section provides an overview of the rare earths, a group of non-renewable 
minerals as raw materials with many high-tech applications. REEs differ from other 
natural resources due to its criticality of supply on multiple dimensions (geographical 
concentration of deposit, demand structures, substitutability/recyclability, technology 
intensity of production). The second section outlines the global REE deposits and 
production by country. The third section outlines China’s REE deposits and two major 
production regions this thesis studies, Baiyun-Ebo region producing primarily light rare 
earth elements and Gannan-Yuebei region producing primarily heavy rare earth elements. 
The fourth section analyzes current non-China junior 87  mining projects. The author 
predicts that non-China junior projects face financial, technical, regulatory and socio-
environmental hurdles to commercialize their operations, and thus they are unlikely to 
replace China’s leading position in global supply. The fifth section analyzes the global 
REE market demand by sector and by country. The sixth section outlines the rare earth 
                                                 
87 “Junior” is a term frequently used by investors in the mining industry. A junior 
exploration company targets mineral deposits that are believed to have significant 
potential for future supply, and becomes the critical player to develop newly found 
deposits into final production (which has a time lag of several years to decades). A junior 
mining company, also referred to as “junior miner” or just “junior”, is typically small in 
size and carries high risk associated with commercialization of new deposits. For 




industry production chain using the examples of the production chain running from 
mining primary ores until downstream production in new energy industries. The final 
section analyzes China’s position in the upstream, midstream and downstream of the 
global production chain. Using the examples of wind energy and electric vehicle 
industries, the author shows that China has technical and market dominance in upstream 
rare earth mining, smelting, alloy making and low-end component production, whereas 
advanced industrialized countries dominate high-end manufacturing in downstream 
industries. Such mutual dependence across the production chain means that China’s 
reregulation has profound influence across industries and national borders. This also 
forms the basis of the technical rationale for the state to enhance its control over the 
industry, in order to preserve the strategic value of rare earths.  
4.1 Criticality of REEs  
Rare earths, or more commonly referred to in the abbreviated version as REEs 
(rare earth elements) (shown in Figure 4) are among the most critical raw materials for 
modern technologies. Rare earth elements (REEs) include 17 elements in the periodic 
table, namely scandium (Sc), yttrium (Y), lanthanum (La), cerium (Ce), praseodymium 
(Pr), neodymium (Nd), promethium (Pm), samarium (Sm), europium (Eu), gadolinium 
(Gd), terbium (Tb), dysprosium (Dy), holmium (Ho), erbium (Er), thulium (Tm), 
ytterbium (Yb), lutetium (Lu). Y plus Tb-Lu form the group commonly called heavy rare 
earth elements (HREEs); Sc, La, plus Ce-Gd form the group of light rare earth elements 
(LREEs). HREEs are generally less abundant than LREEs88.  
 
                                                 
88 See APS & MRS (2011) for a technical review of the REEs as critical metals for the 




Figure 4 REEs in Periodic Table 
 
REEs have attracted particularly significant attention as the “critical mineral”89. 
What made REEs so special, in comparison with other important types of natural 
resources90, such as Lithium and other minerals used in developing new technologies91, 
or energy resources such as crude oil and natural gas? The REEs have specific properties 
in high concentration of market supply, technical demand structure, lack of 
substitutability and recyclability, as well as complex production chain, thus their 
“criticality” has multiple aspects, making it hard to mitigate the risk of supply. 
4.1.1 Resource Supply Concentration 
                                                 
89 In U.S. DOE’s Critical Minerals Strategy (DOE, 2010; DOE, 2011), REEs are featured 
prominently as critical minerals, with five elements (Dysprosium, Neodymium, Terbium, 
Europium and Yttrium) identified as critical in both short-term and long-term. 
90 Natural resources are, by definition, “stocks of materials that exist in the natural 
environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, 
either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing” (WTO, 2010, p. 5). 
91 Lithium has been used in producing lithium-ion batteries, a relatively new and rapidly 
growing battery technology to store energy in electronics products. 
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In terms of resource supply concentration, currently the global REE supply is 
primarily concentrated within the single country of China. Unlike other industry metals, 
the market for rare earths is highly localized, opaque and fragmented. Within China, 
purchase of rare earth products are mostly completed through professional trading 
companies, direct contracts with state-granted suppliers, or the local “black market” 
where pricing can be substantially lower than the open-market government-set price. 
There has not been a fully functional international exchange for the rare earth products. 
Government-sponsored metals exchanges trading rare earths have sprung up since 2011, 
including Baotou Rare Earth Exchange (in Inner Mongolia) which started in 2013, 
Jiangxi Ganzhou Rare Metals Exchange (in Jiangxi Province) which started in 2011, 
South Rare Precious Metals Exchange (in Hunan Province) which started in 2012, and 
the existing Bohai Commodity Exchange (in Tianjin) which started trading rare earth 
products in 2014. Participation by domestic mining firms in these exchanges has been 
highly localized as well. The author observed during field work that firms in Jiangxi 
Province largely refrained from participating in the Baotou Rare Earth Exchange 
sponsored by Baotou Iron & Steel Company. A private metal exchange, Fanya Metals 
Exchange, was in operation since 2011 and partnered with metal companies and banks 
and allowed for trading of rare metals between metal companies and traders. The 
exchange then sold a derivative product “Ri Jin Bao” through commercial banks to 
ordinary Chinese investors whose funds were used as loans to traders. Fanya was exposed 
for questionable practices of only buying and holding metal stocks and shadow financing 
practices using metals as collateral for multiple loans, and its operation was discontinued 
in April 2015. (Hornby, 2015) 
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4.1.2 Resource Demand Structure 
In terms of resource demand, unlike crude oil or natural gas, REEs have been 
nicknamed the “vitamin” of modern manufacturing. Just like the vitamins essential to the 
human health that are not required in large quantities, the demand for these elements in 
most end products are not large in quantity, yet crucial for proper and superior technical 
performance. The demand can change overtime due to both new technology development 
and REE availability. REEs often co-exist with each other in the earth’s crust; thus the 
demand for one specific rare earth element may not only increase its own supply, but also 
the supply of other co-existing rare earth elements, decreasing their production costs and 
increasing availability for consumption. 
4.1.3 Resource Substitutability and Recyclability 
In terms of REE substitutability and recyclability, there has been a lack of 
industry awareness and investment in substitution and recycling compared to other types 
of natural resources. Because China supplied comparably low-priced REEs to the rest of 
the world for almost three decades, the market price for rare earth products has been low 
enough for downstream firms to justify not spending considerable resources on 
developing substitution and recycling.  
From an industrial ecology perspective, the recycling of REE is a more appealing 
choice because: 1) Recycling ensures a secure while small supply for the end users from 
the product stock92; 2) Recycling mitigates the supply-demand imbalance inherent in the 
                                                 
92 The National Institute for Materials Science of Japan says that used electronics in 
Japan hold an estimated 300,000 tons of rare earths. (Tabuchi, 2010) Although the 
amount is small compared to the amount of rare earth consumption by Japanese firms, it 
could help alleviate supply risks for these critical REEs if successfully recovered. 
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rare earth market93; 3) Recycling will not yield radioactive or environmental hazards 
common in the mining and smelting processes in rare earth production. Yet until 2009 no 
indications of any post-consumer recycling of rare earth containing products could be 
found. (Schuler et al, 2011) After China tightened control on production and export, there 
has been significant amount of research on recycling and probable extraction processes94. 
In April 2012, Honda became the first company to announce a plan of massive recycling, 
to recycle REEs from electric vehicle batteries which contains lanthanum (one of the 
most abundant REEs and also one of the largest in demand volume) 95. By 2013 still less 
than 1% of REEs are being recycled. (Binnemans, 2013) With respect to the REEs in 
critical demand defined by the U.S. Department of Energy (Dysprosium, Neodymium, 
Terbium, Europium and Yttrium), there has been no evidence of sustained commercial 
recycling. There are not only technological difficulties involved in developing massive 
recycling of comparable quality, but also practical issues in implementing them on a large 
scale, such as the inefficient collection of recyclable materials and the lack of economic 
incentives for most firms to participate. According to Rademaker et al. (2013), with 
current recycling technology and infrastructure, waste flow from end product of 
permanent magnets would remain small relative to the global REE demand, meaning that 
recycling alone is unlikely to significantly contribute to global supply. 
                                                 
93 REEs occur in different ratios in ores and co-exist with each other, so the mining for 
one particular element will generate large amounts of other elements that need to be sold. 
Recycling can mitigate the demand for particular elements and thus reduce the need to 
mine more primary ores. 
94 The Japanese government has invested $38 million in research related to rare earth 
recycling (Gschneidner, 2011b). 
95 See the Honda news release http://www.hondanews.info/news/ja/corporate/c120417. 
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Substitutions of the REEs are available for many applications, yet they are 
unlikely to be adequately effective and there is no substitute for one chemical element 
that is suitable for all its major uses. (Graedel et al, 2013) For instance, substitution of the 
REE-enabled NdFeB permanent magnets has been undertaken by some downstream 
producers, yet such substitution sacrifices the high performance that NdFeB permanent 
magnets have compared to substitutes (such as Sm-Co, ferrite and Alnico magnets). In 
some cases of REE end products, product designs can be changed to reduce the overall 
amount of REE-enabled materials required and thus to decrease the amount of REEs 
required. For instance in electric vehicle production, Tesla Motors has developed an 
induction motor for its all-electric Roadster which uses electromagnets, but it is larger 
and heavier than motors that use REE-enabled permanent magnets. Researchers in the 
U.S.96 , the E.U.97 and Japan98 are currently working on finding low-cost and abundant 
replacement materials, and the results are highly preliminary. (Piesing, 2013)  
4.1.4 Technology Intensity of Production 
                                                 
96 U.S. DOE’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) REACT program, 
short for "Rare Earth Alternatives in Critical Technologies", is responsible for finding 
low-cost and abundant material alternatives.    
97 The Ad-Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials, a subgroup to the 
Raw Materials Supply Group (an expert group of the European Commission) publishes 
criticality analysis of raw materials every three years. In 2010, the first criticality analysis 
of raw materials was published which included analysis of 14 critical raw materials 
including both LREEs and HREEs. In May 2014, the European Commission published a 
Communication on the updated critical raw materials list and the implementation of the 
Raw Materials Initiative.  
98 The Minerals and Natural Resource Division under the Agency for Natural Resources 
and Energy, a subunit of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry released 
Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies of Rare Metals in 2009. The Strategy identified 
recycling and development of alternative materials as two of the four focus approaches to 
mitigate supply risk. (METI, 2009) 
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REEs are different from other types of industrial raw materials, for instance, crude 
oil which has a standardized production chain from deposit extraction to pipeline 
transportation, refining and processing. The production of rare earth products need to 
undergo complex processes of mining, sorting, smelting, purifying and further processing 
in order to be manufactured as compounds suitable for downstream consumption. Thus 
one cannot simply take the production technologies from one deposit and use them on 
another deposit to obtain rare earth products. Without necessary technical and 
infrastructural support, it is impossible to build up a complete REE supply chain within a 
country in a short time. While production in general requires a level of technology 
sophistication hard to attain in a short time, not all types of REEs or all REE deposits are 
created equal. Contingent upon the geological conditions of the deposit and the element 
(each has a unique production chain from the ore to the final product), the techniques of 
mining and smelting can vary greatly. This creates differences in market entry, in both 
technical barriers (some ores are closer to the surface99  or geologically easier to be 
extracted than others) as well as financial barriers (more expensive technologies of 
production prompts higher cost estimation and lower investor interests in mining).  
 
4.2 Global Supply of REEs 
Despite of the name of “rare”, the rare earth elements as a whole have a fairly large 
and dispersed deposit around the world (see Figure 5 for a breakdown of estimated 
reserves by country and region). According to the estimates of global reserves by the 
USGS in 2014, major countries with large rare earth deposits are China (about 40%), 
                                                 
99 An example would be the ion-adsorption clay deposit in Jiangxi province in South 
China. The deposits are located very close to the ground surface. 
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Brazil (about 16%), the U.S. (about 10%), India (about 2%) and Australia (about 2%). 
The Soviet Union before its collapse was also a major rare earth producer. The estimated 
rare earth deposits in the Commonwealth of Independent States (including a current 
producer Russia) by the USGS in 2012 was 19 million tons in REO equivalent unit, about 
17% of the global reserve estimate. (USGS, 2012) It should be noted that the USGS only 
estimates reserves that can be economically extracted or produced with existing 
technology. In addition, USGS does not require reporting compliance with technology 
standards used by companies listed on specific international stock exchanges. Thus these 
figures can have significant differences from an estimate of all reserves available in the 
earth crust, or an estimate which requires compliance with a specific reporting standard. 
The three most common forms of rare earth deposits in the world are bastnasite, 
monazite and xenotime100. Bastnasite deposits are flurocarbonates which usually contain 
abundant LREEs and fairly low HREEs, and which tend to have high levels of Cerium, 
Lanthanum, Yttrium and Neodymium. Production from bastnasite deposits currently 
accounts for about 94% of global rare earth production in volume, including major 
deposits in Mountain Pass mine in California in the U.S. and deposits in Baiyun-ebo mine 
(which also includes monazite deposits) in Inner Mongolia in China. Monazite deposits 
constitute the second largest type of deposits, and they are found in in Australia, Brazil, 
China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. 
Monazites are rare earth phosphates which may contain a variety of REEs, usually 
including higher levels of LREEs (such as Cerium, Lanthanum) than HREEs. Xenotime 
deposits are rare earth phosphates which are similar to monazite deposits, but they 
                                                 




typically contain higher levels of Yttrium and HREEs including Dysprosium, Ytterbium, 
Erbium, and Gadolinium. Besides these three major forms of deposits, the ion-adsorption 
clay deposits in South China are unique deposits rich in Yttrium, Dysprosium, Terbium 
and Samarium, as well as high concentration of Neodymium and Praseodymium in some 
areas. 
Since the 1980s global rare earth production has migrated to China, resulting in a 
peak of over 97% of global production from China in the 2000s (See Figure 6 for the 
historical shift of location of production of rare earth oxides). As China has blocked 
foreign firms from investing in rare earth mining or smelting in China since the late 
1980s, foreign firms either import rare earth products from Chinese firms and traders, or 
set up local joint ventures with Chinese firms to get access to the smelting products. Due 
to China’s tightened control over production and export since 2008, countries such as the 
U.S., Canada, Australia and South Africa have restarted rare earth production or started 
supporting mining exploration. As a result, according to the USGS statistics, in 2013 




Figure 5 Global Rare Earth Reserves by Country/Region101 
(Unit: metric tons of rare-earth oxide (REO) equivalent) 
 
                                                 
101 The reserves are defined as part of the reserve base that could be economically 
extracted or produced with existing technology. Other countries include two producing 
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Figure 6 Global Rare Earth Mine Production Trend (1960-2010) 
 (Public domain image from USGS102) 
                                                 





Figure 7 Global Rare Earth Mine Production by Country/Region in 2013103 
(Unit: metric tons of rare-earth oxide (REO) equivalent) 
 
4.3 China’s REE Deposits and Major Mining Regions 
REE deposits are found in 17 provinces in China (see   
                                                 
103 Data Source: (USGS, 2014). The USGS figure for China’s rare earth mine production 
(100000 metric tons of REO equivalent) is larger than the official Chinese MLR figure 
for rare earth mine production (80423 metric tons of REO equivalent). It is unclear why 
there is a discrepancy between the two figures. To keep the same data source for 
comparison, this graph uses all figures from the USGS. 
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Table 1 for a breakdown of estimated amount of various types of deposits by 
provinces).  The Baiyun-Ebo deposit in Baotou, Inner Mongolia in North China is the 
world’s largest REE deposit and currently the largest source in terms of production 
volume. The ion-adsorption clay deposits in Gannan-Yuebei region bordering 
Guangdong Province, Jiangxi Province and Fujian Province in South China is the world’s 
second largest production source of REEs in terms of production volume, and currently 
the world’s only active HREE production site. There are also concentrated LREE 
deposits in other provinces, notably the Liangshanzhou deposit in Sichuan Province and 
the Weishan deposit in Shandong Province, but their amount of deposit and production is 




Table 1 REE Deposit Information by Province in China104 
Province 




REOs xenotime REOs mixed REOs monazite 
Inner Mongolia 8234.04       8234.04   
Guizhou 144.6       144.6   
Hubei 126.04 3   121.51   1.53 
Sichuan 103.1 0.03   103.07     
Guangdong 64.64 18.69 3.08 31.89   10.98 
Jiangxi 39.55 16.49 1.06 21.18   0.82 
Hunan 36.61   0.04 10.56   26.01 
Qinghai 34.61     34.61     
Shaanxi 26.78       26.78   
Guangxi 22.78   3.56 14.25   4.97 
Shandong 9.91     9.91     
Yunnan 3.74   0.29 1.18   2.27 
Henan 3.3     3.3     
Gansu 2.3       2.3   
Fujian 2.07 0.14 0.03 1.59   0.31 
Hainan 1.21         1.21 
Jilin 0.23   0.01     0.22 
Total 8855.51 38.35 8.07 353.05 8407.72 48.32 
 
 
                                                 
104 Data Source: (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2000a). Provinces with active 
mining production are highlighted. 
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There has been debate among industry experts regarding the estimation of REE 
reserves in China. Liu Yujiu, Former Chief of the PRC State Council Rare Earths Expert 
Team (国务院稀土专家组), estimated in 2007 that based on the rate of extraction and 
usage data in 2002, the three major types of deposits in China could last only 
approximately 20-40 years (see Table 2). (Liu, 2007) Yet according to Meng Qingjiang, 
Vice Secretary of Jiangxi Rare Earth Research Society, the current official deposit 
statistics are from the Mining Deposit Survey conducted by then Ministry of Land and 
Minerals in 1985, and there has not been any updated national-level geological survey of 
rare earth mineral deposits despite of improvements in ore extraction technologies or 
economic feasibility of mining in China. (Guan, 2011) The Association of Rare Earth 
Industry of Jiangxi Province conducted preliminary survey of the ion-adsorption deposits 
in South China. The survey found significant amounts of reserves in Guangdong 
Province and Guangxi Province, but the actual amount of all reserves or proven 
reserves105 could not be obtained without further exploration. (Guan, 2011) 
  
                                                 
105 Proven reserves, also known as “proved reserves”, is a metric used in mining sectors 
to refer to the amount of resources that can be recovered from the deposit with a 
reasonable level of certainty. It is often quoted by companies to demonstrate the amount 
of deposits available for extraction in short-term and medium-term projects. 
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Table 2 Utilization Ratio and Service Lifetime of REE deposits in 2002 




Baiyun-ebo deposit in Baotou 8-10% <37 years 
Ion-adsorption deposits in South China 27.6-75% <17 years 
Liangshanzhou deposits in Sichuan Province 33-42% <27 years 
 
This thesis focuses on the two primary mining regions; the Baiyun-Ebo region in 
North China and the Gannan-Yuebei region in South China (see Figure 8). These two 
regions have a long history of production since the 1960s and the 1970s. They differ in 
types of resources and local geographical conditions. 
 
 





The Baiyun-Ebo （白云鄂博） region in North China is located approximately 
149 kilometers south of the center of Baotou (包头 ), Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region (内蒙古自治区) in North China. The prefecture-level city Baotou is nicknamed 
“Rare Earth Capital of the North”. The Baiyun-Ebo mine produces primarily iron ores, 
and REEs are produced as by-products from iron ore extraction. The REE deposits are 
bastnasite and monazite deposits (coexisting in the ratio of 6:4) with high concentration 
of light rare earth elements (LREEs). The relative distribution of REEs in the ore is 
about 48% Cerium Oxide, 27% Lanthanum Oxide, 17% Neodymium Oxide and about 9% 
of other rare earth oxides106. The mining region is located on the Ulanqab Prairie. 
The Gannan-Yuebei （赣南粤北） region in South China is located along the 
borders of Jiangxi Province (江西省 ), Guangdong Province (广东省 ) and Fujian 
Province (福建省 ) in South China. The prefecture-level city Ganzhou, a mining 
prefecture in Jiangxi Province, is nicknamed “Rare Earth Capital of the South”. In 
comparison to the LREE-rich Baiyun-Ebo mine, the Gannan-Yuebei region has ion-
adsorption-clay deposits rich in heavy rare earth elements (HREEs). For instance, the 
relative distribution of REEs in the ore from Longnan County, Ganzhou is about 64% 
Yttrium Oxide, about 7% Dysprosium Oxide, about 6% Gadolinium Oxide, about 4% 
Erbium Oxide, about 3% Neodymium Oxide, about 3% Ytterbium Oxide, about 2% 
Samarium Oxide, about 2% Lanthanum Oxide and about 1% Samarium Oxide. The 
relative distribution of REEs in the ore from another major mining county, Xunwu 
                                                 
106 Data Source: China Rare Earth Net (http://www.cre.net). China Rare Earth Net is the 
official online database for rare earth industry sponsored by the State Rare Earth Office 
and the Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths. 
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County, Ganzhou is about 30% Neodymium Oxide, about 30% Lanthanum Oxide, about 
10% Yttrium Oxide, about 7% Cerium Oxide, about 7% Praseodymium Oxide, about 6% 
Samarium Oxide and about 2% Dysprosium Oxide107. Ion-adsorption rare earth deposits 
(离子吸附型稀土矿) occur in a weathered profile; therefore, these deposits can be easily 
mined by open pit methods, and thus they can be processed more easily. Unlike Baiyun-
Ebo region which is part of a prairie, deposits are spread out in the mountainous areas 
belonging to seven prefecture-level cities along the provincial borders. 
4.4 Non-Chinese Supply of REEs 
This section analyzes non-Chinese REE projects and the barriers to develop a non-
China supply chain.  Because of the considerable capital costs, technological intensity, 
expensive and extensive regulatory hurdles, strong technical workforce requirement, 
environmental concerns and possible community/social backlash over mining, these non-
Chinese projects can take a long time from deposit discovery to full commercialization. 
Existing non-Chinese junior mining projects have a low probability of replacing China’s 
dominance in the global market in the near future. 
4.4.1 Overview of Existing Non-Chinese REE Projects 
By July 2014 there were 51 REE projects beyond the initial exploration stage in 16 
different countries (Table 3 presents relevant deposit information for non-Chinese REE 
projects).  This number of junior REE projects is unlikely to grow and could be massively 
reduced in the next few years. Investor interests in junior mining projects have 
significantly declined after the skyrocketing REE prices returned to prior-2010 levels in 
2013, leading to diminished availability of capital. The lack of REE processing capacity 
                                                 
107 Data Source: China Rare Earth Net (http://www.cre.net). 
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(hence lack of immediate demand for upstream mining products) outside of China also 
makes it difficult for junior projects to find long-term non-Chinese buyers. (Castilloux, 
2013)  
As the current largest producer of both LREEs and HREEs in the world, China is 
very likely to retain its dominating position in the near future. Major non-Chinese mining 
companies such as Molycorp in the U.S.108 and Lynas in Australia/Malaysia109 are now 
facing financial hurdles to continue production. Even if they can remain financially afloat, 
they will still mainly supply Lanthanum, Cerium and Neodymium. The relative 
distribution of REEs in ore from the Mountain Pass mine in the U.S. is about 50% 
Cerium Oxide, about 32% Lanthanum Oxide, about 12% Neodymium Oxide and about 6% 
other rare earth oxides110. The relative distribution of REEs in ore from Mount Weld 
mine in western Australia is about 46% Cerium Oxide, about 24% Lanthanum Oxide, 
about 17% Neodymium Oxide, about 5% Praseodymium Oxide and about 8% other rare 
earth oxides111. Therefore, they will not substantially help to alleviate the potential risk of 
supply of Yttrium and HREEs such as Terbium or Dysprosium. Non-Chinese HREE 
junior miners are mostly in exploration stage and face significant hurdles (see the next 
                                                 
108 U.S.-based Molycorp began production at its Mountain Pass mine in California in 
2013 and anticipates production at full capacity (19,050 metric tons) in 2014. Molycorp 
also operates a separation plant at Mountain Pass, CA, and sells rare earth concentrates 
and refined products from newly mined and previously mined above-ground stocks. As 
of August 2015 Molycorp has filed for bankruptcy and is likely to discontinue its 
production. 
109 Lynas controls the Mount Weld mine in Western Australia, and a processing plant in 
Malaysia to process the ores from the Mount Weld mine. Lynas struggled with weak 
financial footing and announced in August 2015 that it is open to a takeover offer. 
(Roddan, 2015) 
110 Data Source: China Rare Earth Net (http://www.cre.net). 
111 Data Source: China Rare Earth Net (http://www.cre.net). 
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sub-section) in commercialization. A secure supply of the less-abundant, more-critical 




Table 3 Advanced REE Projects in the World (excluding China and India) 112 
Project Country Owner Company Major Element Estimated First 
Production Year 
Aksu Diamas Turkey AMR Minerals Metal Inc. La, Ce N/A 
Araxá Brazil MBAC Fertilizer Corp. La, Ce N/A 
Ashram Main Canada Commerce Resources Corp. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Ashram MHREO Canada Commerce Resources Corp. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Bear Lodge (Bull Hill 
Zone) 
US Rare Element Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd 2016 
Bokan (Dotson / I & L 
Zones) 
US Ucore Rare Metals Inc La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Browns Range Australia Northern Minerals Limited Y N/A 
Buckton Canada DNI Metals Inc. Ce N/A 
                                                 
112 Data source: TMR Advanced Rare-Earth Project Index (http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/metrics-indices/tmr-advanced-rare-
earth-projects-index/) which publishes a complete list of non-China REE projects. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Buckton South Canada DNI Metals Inc. Ce N/A 
Charley Creek (J.V.) Australia Crossland Strategic Metals Ltd. & 
Pancontinental Uranium Corporation 
Ce N/A 
Clay-Howells Canada Rare Earth Metals Inc. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Cummins Range Australia Navigator Resources Limited & 
Kimberley Rare Earths Limited 
La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Dubbo Zirconia Project Australia Alkane Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Eco Ridge Canada Pele Mountain Resources Inc. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Elliott Lake Teasdale  Canada Appia Energy Corp. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Foxtrot Canada Search Minerals Inc. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Glenover (J.V.) South Africa Galileo Resources PLC & Fer-Min-Ore 
(Pty) Ltd. 
La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Grande-Vallee Canada Orbite Aluminae Inc. Ce N/A 
Hastings Australia Hastings Rare Metals Limited Y N/A 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Hoidas Lake Canada Great Western Minerals Group Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Kangankunde Malawi Lynas Corporation Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Kipawa (J.V.) Canada Matamec Explorations Inc. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Kutessay II Kyrgyzstan Stans Energy Corp. La, Ce, Y N/A 
Kvanefjeld Greenland Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
La Paz US Australian American Mining 
Corporation Ltd. 
La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Laverge-Springer Canada Canada Rare Earth Corp. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Lofdal Namibia Namibia Rare Earths Inc. La, Ce N/A 
Milo Australia GBM Resources Ltd. La, Ce N/A 
Montviel (Core Zone) Canada Geomega Resources Inc. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Mount Weld CLD Australia Lynas Corporation Ltd. La, Ce, Nd 2012 
Mount Weld Duncan 
Deposit 
Australia Lynas Corporation Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Mountain Pass US Molycorp Inc. La, Ce, Nd 2012 
Mrima Hill High Grade Kenya Pacific Wildcat Resources Corp. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Mrima Hill Main Kenya Pacific Wildcat Resources Corp. La, Ce N/A 
Nechalacho Basal Canada Avalon Rare Metals Inc. La, Ce, Nd 2016 
Nechalacho Upper Canada Avalon Rare Metals Inc. La, Ce, Nd 2016 
Ngualla Tanzania Peak Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Niobec Canada IAMGOLD Corporation La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Nolans Australia Arafura Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Norra Karr Sweden Tasman Metals Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Olserum Sweden Tasman Metals Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Round Top USA Texas Rare Earth Resources Corp. Y N/A 
Sarfartoq (ST1 Zone) Greenland Hudson Resources Inc. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Serra Verde Brazil Mining Ventures Brasil Ltda. La, Ce, Y N/A 
Songwe Malawi Mkango Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Sorensen Greenland Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Steenkampskraal South Africa Great Western Minerals Group Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Storkwitz Germany Seltenerden Storkwitz AG La, Ce N/A 
Strange Lake Enriched Canada Quest Rare Minerals Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Strange Lake Granite Canada Quest Rare Minerals Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
TANBREEZ Greenland Rimbal Pty Ltd. La, Ce, Y N/A 
Tantalus Madagascar Tantalus Rare Earths AG La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
Two Tom Canada Rare Earth Metals Inc. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Wigu Hill Twiga Tanzania Montero Mining and Exploration Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Xiluvo Mozambique Southern Crown Resources Ltd. La, Ce, Nd N/A 
Zandkopsdrift (J.V.) South Africa Frontier Rare Earths Ltd. & 
Korea Resources Corp. 
La, Ce, Nd 2016 
Zone 3 Greenland Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd. La, Ce, Nd, Y N/A 
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4.4.2 Barriers to Project Success 
4.4.2.1 Resource Endowment 
One of the most commonly cited reasons for the inherent risk of natural resources 
supply is their nature of scarcity and uneven distribution amongst countries. REEs as a 
whole are not “rare”, even though a specific rare earth element may concentrate within 
specific regions rather than spread out evenly across the world. For instance, Dysprosium, 
considered to be the most critical element in the short term by the U.S. DOE (2010, 
2011a), has a disproportionately large deposit in Southeast China (Hoenderdaal, 2013) in 
the global deposit estimates. 
A related issue in assessing the resource endowment of junior miners is the lack of a 
single accepted global standard for estimating resource reserves and identifying the 
potential value of supply for investors. (Hatch, 2012) Existing standards for mining 
companies to use for reporting mineral reserves include NI 43-101 standard (Canada)113, 
the JORC code (Australia)114, the SEC Guide 7 standard (U.S.)115 and the SAMREC code 
(South Africa)116. The NI 43-101 Standard is an information disclosure code developed 
by the Canadian Securities Authorities; companies trading on the Toronto Stock 
                                                 
113 Details of the NI 43-101 standard can be found at 
http://www.cim.org/committees/NI_43-101_Dec_30.pdf (accessed August 8, 2014). 
Some companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange use the NI 43-101 Standard to 
provide more detailed technical information regarding their resources. The National 
Instrument 43-101 (NI 43-101) requires substantially more technical disclosure to 
investors than JORC Code. 
114 Details of the JORC code can be found at http://www.jorc.org/. 
115 The SEC Guide 7 Standards have been criticized as less informative in classifying 
mineral resource potential for investors to assess deposit values (Hatch, 2012). Details of 
the standards can be found at 
http://www.cim.org/standards/documents/Block474_Doc32.pdf.  




Exchange are required to use the NI 43-101 standards when publishing their results.  The 
JORC code is released by the Australian Joint Reserves Committee (JORC); companies 
trading on the Australian Stock Exchange use the JORC code when releasing information. 
The SEC Guide 7 Standards are developed by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and contain basic principles in mining disclosure policy. The 
SAMREC code (South African Code for the Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral 
Resources and Mineral Reserves) are developed by the South African Mineral Resource 
Committee Working Group and set out minimum standards, recommendations and 
guidelines for Public Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral 
Reserves in South Africa. Different standards have different classification techniques for 
reporting mining reserves, therefore they require different level of technical information 
disclosure in releasing project information. If one uses mining deposit information 
derived from different standards, incorrect comparison of the resource endowment would 
occur.  
4.4.2.2 Fiscal Constraints 
Nascent projects of REE mining are very likely to fail without significant financial 
backing from private investors or government support. (Long et al, 2010) Rare earth 
mining projects are capital intensive, with average capital costs projected to be greater 
than $40 per kilogram of annual capacity. (Kingsnorth, 2010) The discovery of a rare 
earth deposit must be proved by extensive trenching, drilling and sampling, leading to 
huge front capital cost that must be paid by the mining firm and the investors. (Long et al, 
2010) The concentration of rare earth elements in the deposits is often low, thus 
exploration will often only proceed on the basis of favorable results. This significant front 
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capital cost can sometimes be reduced depending on the properties of the specific deposit. 
When the rare earth elements co-exist with other valuable metals, mine operators can 
extract rare earths as by-products from producing major valuable metals from the same 
deposit. For instance, the Baotou Steel Rare Earth (Group) Hi Tech Co. in Inner 
Mongolia, China, the world’s largest rare earth producer, produces primarily iron ores 
and rare earth elements as by-products117. 
4.4.2.3 Regulatory Barrier 
Mining projects in general require extensive, expensive and time-consuming 
processes of governmental approval that increases project uncertainty and deters 
investors. For instance, approval of mining permits in the U.S. typically requires “an 
approved plan of operations, a positive environmental impact study, and some kind of 
final permission by a government agency. If external financing is required, an 
independent due diligence study will verify the results of the feasibility study.” (Long et 
al, 2010) Even after financial and regulatory approvals are granted, detailed engineering 
design of construction and testing of mining operation needs to be conducted within a 
ramp-up period, until full commercial production at the planned output rate is achieved. 
Therefore, a mining company will have to spend significant amounts of money to finance 
operation during the time lag before there is any revenue from mineral sales. Regulatory 
barriers remain fairly high for junior miners in most countries.  Long et al (2010) found 
that on average a mining company in major non-Chinese mineral supplier countries needs 
to go through one or two decades of exploration and application for approval before 
                                                 
117 The steel produced from the mined iron were first found to be “contaminated” with 
rare earth elements, and then Baotou Steel started the rare earth exploration, and the 




beginning commercial operation. MIT Energy Initiative (2010) estimates that for a junior 
rare earth project specifically, it takes about 10-15 years to go into full commercial 
operation from discovery. This rather long time lag of profit return makes profit further 
unpredictable at the time of discovery and deters investors from investing in junior 
projects.  
4.4.2.4 Technology Barrier 
The operation of a successful rare earth mining project relies on skilled technical 
workforce, which is largely absent outside of China. There has been a steady decrease in 
the number and the education level of non-Chinese trained scientists and engineers 
qualified to work in rare earth mining and manufacturing industries (for instance, see 
Figure 9 for the decline of the U.S. workforce in the rare earth industry in the last three 
decades118). The former CEO of the American mining company Molycorp, Mark Smith 
once remarked that he has “17 engineers and scientists competing with over 6,000 
scientists in China.” (Jacoby and Jiang, 2010) In comparison, China has the world’s 
largest number of research scientists with rare-earth expertise in its top research labs119. 
The lack of a strong non-Chinese technical workforce is not only found in REE 
mining but also smelting and further processing. Up till now no other country except 
China has large-scale processing facilities capable of processing commercial amount of 
HREEs. Even as non-China REE mines produce REE products, the primary products 
would mostly still need to be shipped to China to be further processed into intermediate 
products. A case to illustrate this concerns Molycorp’s acquisition of Neo Materials in 
                                                 
118 Data Source: Gschneidner (2011) 
119 For instance, Baotou Rare Earth Institute in Inner Mongolia is now the world’s largest 
rare earth research organization. 
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2012. In order to build up the supply chain of “mine to magnets”, U.S. mining company 
Molycorp acquired Neo Materials Technologies, parent company of Magnequench which 
has processing plants in Tianjin to gain access to processing and magnet producing 
capabilities currently located in China. (Areddy, 2012)  
 
 
Figure 9 Decline of the U.S. Workforce in the Rare Earth Industry 
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A significant source of risk for developing new REE supply is the environmental 
consequences of mining and the associated costs of treatments. Rare earth mining and 
smelting can produce significant amount of waste residue, polluted air and waste water. 
Depending on the deposit, significant amount of radioactive waste that can create 
irreversible damage to humans and ecological environment. The foremost environmental 
issue for mining projects concerns the ores themselves, which may contain radioactive 
materials posing great risk for exploration and production. Both monazite 120  and 
xenotime deposits can contain highly radioactive minerals such as uranium and thorium 
that needs to be properly treated 121 . Failure of radioactivity treatment can lead to 
irreversible contamination of the environment and forced suspension of operation. For 
instance, prior to 1988 xenotime from Malaysia was the largest source of yttrium in the 
world. Yet because xenotime in the Malaysian placer deposits contains strong radioactive 
minerals (on average 2% uranium and 0.7% thorium), the strong radioactivity led to 
environmental casualties, the failure of processing plants and the downturn of the 
Malaysian rare earth industry. (Yusoff & Latifah, 2002) Environmental danger is also 
present in smelting and further processing. Solutions concentrated in REEs are treated 
with solutions containing strong acid or strong base for separation and purification, 
producing toxic waste water, waste gas and solid waste concentrated with radioactive 
elements. 
Concerns about radioactive and toxic wastes have effectively delayed or halted the 
progress of mining in a number of regions. For instance, upon hearing the news that a 
                                                 
120 Because thorium is able to substitute for the REE in the monazite structure, 
radioactive byproducts including thorium and its daughter product uranium is a challenge 
to projects of monazite deposits. 
121 See Akademi Sains Malaysia (2011). 
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rare earth processing plant was to be built in Malaysia by Lynas, more than five thousand 
people joined a local rally against the project in fear of radioactive contamination in 
February 2012122.  While Lynas Australia has started its operation since 2013, local 
protests persisted, which recently resulted in the arrest of several protestors123. 
4.4.2.6 Social Concerns 
The environmental risks of mining and smelting often lead to protests from the local 
communities that wish the projects are “not in my backyard”. Ineffective government 
regulation or communication can make the public suspicious about the operation of 
projects and the potential long-term consequences for the community. Labor rights abuse, 
lack of transparency in project operation, lack of oversight from company executives and 
corrupt local officials commonly found in developing countries further exacerbate public 
resentment and even cause closure of plants. For instance, a rare earth refinery in 
northern Perak state in Malaysia operated by the Mitsubishi of Japan was closed in 1992 
after strong local protest which claimed that radioactive pollution from the plant caused 
birth defects and leukemia among residents. The now defunct plant has become one of 
the largest radioactive waste sites in Asia. (Bradsher, 2011) 
Mining projects, by their nature of extracting raw materials, can also spark 
accusation of resource exploitation by the local indigenous community. If no downstream 
industries are present in the same mining region, primary products from mining are 
shipped outside for further processing instead of benefiting the local economy. This 
resentment is often more pronounced when the investors of rare earth projects are 
multinational corporations shipping the primary products for offshore manufacturing and 
                                                 
122 See AFP (2012). 
123  See Harvey (2014). 
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selling high-priced end products back into the region. Local communities are quick to 
accuse the mining projects as new forms of “colonialism” or “Western imperialism”. 
Recent remarks by Chinese critics in opposition to export of primary products124 and 
remarks by Malaysian protestors in opposition to the Lynas project125 have both echoed 
such accusations.  
4.5 Global REE Demand  
This section provides a brief overview of major applications of REEs and the trend 
of global demand. Table 4 presents an overview of the specific applications of the rare 
earth elements. The common applications include rechargeable batteries and permanent 
magnets (used in most modern technical applications), lighting (used in such applications 
as LED lights and CFL lights), flat screen displays (used in such application as color 
television screens, cellphone and laptop displays), industry catalysts (used in such 
procedures as petroleum refining and automobile emission reduction) and numerous 
medical applications. There are also important national security applications enabled by 
technologies utilizing REEs, such as solid-state lasers, jet fighter engines, antimissile 
defense, space-based satellites and communication systems. Figure 10 and Figure 11 
present the share of global REE demand in different category of applications by volume 
and by value. As can be seen from both figures, magnets account for the largest demand 
for REEs both by volume and by value.  
                                                 
124 See for instance Wang (2012), a popular book in China that claims western countries 
exploit China’s rare earth resources for their own benefit of developing high-tech 
consumer products and offensive weapons. Also see Chen (2012), an editorial published 
by the China Daily accusing western countries of hypocrisy of using China’s cheap 
resources. 
125 See Lam (2012). 
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Future industry demand for the REEs may change depending on the advent of new 
technologies and the fluctuation of demand for current products. As more and more 
countries embark on the transition to alternative energy, there will be an estimated 
increase of more than 700% for Neodymium demand and more than 2600% for 
Dysprosium demand over the next 25 years if the present needs are representative of 
future needs. (Alonso et al, 2012) Specifically the U.S. Department of Energy (2011a) 
has identified Neodymium, Europium, Yttrium, Terbium and Dysprosium as elements in 
critical risk of short-term and medium-term supply necessary for the development of 
alternative energy technologies. The global REE demand is projected to rise to at least 
160,000 tons annually by 2016126.  
Besides being the largest producer of REEs, China has also grown to be the major 
consumer of REEs in the world due to its dominance in producing rare earth smelting 
products such as rare earth alloys and magnets. China’s demand now accounts for more 
than 60% of the world’s REE demand, and it is expected to continue as such in global 
demand in the near future (see Figure 12). 
                                                 
126 Source: IMCOA, from Long (2011).  
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Table 4 Key Applications of Rare Earth Elements127 
 
 
                                                 
127 Source: Data compiled and expanded from APS & MRS (2011), Resnick Institute (2011), and U.S. Department of Energy 
(2011). Elements shaded in the green in the table are rare earth elements deemed in critical supply in both short term (0-5 years) 









Figure 11 Major REE Demand in Applications by Value129 
                                                 
128 Source: Industrial Minerals Company of Australia Pty Ltd. (IMCOA), from Long 
(2011). 






































Figure 12 Global and Chinese REE Demand in 2011 and 2016 (estimate)130 
 
4.6 Global REE Production Chain 
This section focuses on the REE-enabled production chain in modern technologies, 
through analyzing examples of two alternative energy technologies that have important 
policy relevance and projected high future growth: wind power and electric/hybrid 
vehicles. In general, an REE-enabled production chain starts with REE deposits as raw 
materials and includes processes of mining, smelting, further chemical processing and 
compound manufacturing to become part of the final product. Take the production of 
most common applications in the rare earth industry, permanent magnets and metal alloys 
as an example. Primary ores (原矿 ) containing the REEs are mined (采矿 ) from 
underground. The ores then go through mineral dressing (选矿) process to become rare 
                                                 
130 Source: IMCOA, from Humphries (2013). 
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earth concentrates (稀土精矿), which contain much higher purity of REEs than primary 
ores. The rare earth concentrates then go through unique, extensive smelting and 
separation (冶炼分离) processes to become basic products such as rare earth chlorides, or 
be further processed to achieve the ideal purity as intermediate rare earth products, 
including mixed rare earth metals, mixed rare earth oxides (REOs), individual REOs, rare 
earth metal alloys, etc. The rare earth products are then manufactured into specific REE-
enabled components, such as NdFeB permanent magnets, Europium doped Yttrium 
Oxide phosphors, or Cerium Oxide polishing powder. The components are finally 
manufactured as parts into the final downstream products, such as headphones, 
automobiles, wind turbines, color TVs and Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanners. 
Figure 13 presents an illustration of the major industrial processes involving rare earth 
alloys as intermediate products. Usually the final downstream manufacturing process is 
not included as part of the rare earth industry. Downstream products at the end of the 
production chain are much more highly valued than upstream products at the start of the 
production chain. The market demand for these downstream products together constitute 
the demand for the upstream products. 
Both wind power and electric/hybrid vehicles primarily employ permanent magnets 
(PM) containing REEs.  Currently there are two types of rare earth magnet in production, 
Rare Earth Cobalt magnet and Rare Earth Iron Alloy magnet. The section focuses on the 
latter which is widely used. The Rare Earth Iron Alloy magnet is made of alloy with a 
composition ratio of two REE atoms, fourteen iron atoms and one boron atom. This is the 
most widely used type of rare earth magnet, and it has considerably strong magnetic 
properties (BHmax =200-400 kJ/m
3).  The most widely used type of rare earth magnet is 
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Neodymium Iron Boron Alloy (NdFeB) magnet. NdFeB magnet contains primarily 
Neodymium, as well as small amounts of Dysprosium, Praseodymium and Terbium to 
adjust the magnetic functions under specific temperatures. There are two types of NdFeB 
magnets, sintered NdFeB magnets and bonded NdFeB magnets (industrial categorization 
is based on different production techniques).  The former, Rare Earth Cobalt magnet is 
made of alloys with the approximate ratio of one rare earth atom with 5 Cobalt atoms. 
The REE is most commonly Samarium, but can also be other LREEs such as 
Praseodymium, Cerium, Neodymium, or a combination of them. This type of REE-Co 
(e.g. SmCo) magnet has the advantage of maintaining magnetic properties under very 
high temperatures (Tc=700-800°C), yet it has weaker magnetic power than Rare Earth 
Iron Alloy magnet and is much higher priced (usually priced over 60 times higher than 
Rare Earth Iron Alloy Magnet due to the high price of rare metals including Cobalt). Rare 
earth Cobalt magnet is found usually in applications which require extremely high 





Figure 13 Example of a Production Chain Involving Rare Earth Metal Alloys131 
 
4.6.1 REE Production Chain in Wind Power 
Wind power produces consistent electricity with no fuel consumption and no air 
pollutant emission. It has been recognized as a key contributor to global renewable 
energy development in both short-term and long-term. (REN21, 2013) The total 
cumulative installed capacity of wind power worldwide has been steadily increasing at 
about 15% annually and has already reached 318 GW by 2013. (GWEC, 2014)  
REE-enabled wind turbines have superior performance compared to other generator 
designs used in wind turbine production. Among the different kinds of generator systems 
used in wind turbines, direct-drive synchronous generators produce electricity currents at 
a relatively lower rotation speed, require lower maintenance and have consistently higher 
performance (see Figure 14). Among the direct-drive generator designs, direct-drive 
permanent magnet generators (DDPMG) have the highest energy yield. (Polinder et al., 
2006)  
                                                 
131 Source: (GAO, 2010) 
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REEs are manufactured into sintered NdFeB magnets and then into wind turbines 
through a series of technical processes (shown in Figure 15). Sintered NdFeB magnets 
containing Neodymium, Praseodymium and small amounts of Dysprosium are usually 
used in the production of DDPMG; this is because wind turbines operate under rough 
external conditions, and sintered NdFeB magnets have higher resistance to corrosion than 
bonded NdFeB magnets. For a typical DDPMG, roughly 600 kilograms of permanent 




Figure 14 Rare Earth Materials in Wind Turbines132 
 
                                                 
132 Public domain image available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind_how.html 




Figure 15 REE Material Flow in Wind Turbine Production 
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4.6.2 REE Production Chain in electric/hybrid vehicles 
REEs are indispensable to the production of both conventionally powered vehicles 
and alternative energy vehicles. The use of REE-enabled permanent magnets allows 
greater performance to be obtained from a smaller, lighter motor. As the public demands 
lighter, more efficient cars, the use of micro-drive motors containing REE permanent 
magnets in vehicles has become prevalent. For instance, a conventional vehicle contains 
in various parts (including glass, motor, car seats, cooling fan, etc.) 20-100 micro-drive 
motors which utilize NdFeB magnets. A conventional vehicle contains REEs of 
approximately 0.44 kilograms. (Ford Motor Company, 2014) 
Compared to conventional vehicles, electric/hybrid vehicles produce zero to low 
emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) and air pollutants and very low noise, making 
them ideal choices to improving environment protection and energy conservation in 
transportation in modern metropolitan areas. Specifically electric vehicles are expected to 
rise significantly in adoption in the next few years: government targets around the world 
altogether call for an estimated 20 million electric vehicles in operation by 2020, a 
significant increase from the approximately 40,000 vehicles in use by the end of 2012. 
(IEA 2013a) 
REE-enabled technologies are critical for electric/hybrid vehicles (See Figure 17 for 
an illustration of the rare earth material flow in the electric vehicle production). Figure 16 
shows various REE-enabled applications used in producing the Toyota Prius, a model of 
hybrid electric vehicle currently on the market. More electrified vehicles need higher 
amounts of REEs. A typical HEV with a nickel-metal-hydride battery uses approximately 
4.5 kg of REEs. A typical HEV with lithium-ion batteries contain approximately 1 kg of 
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REEs. (Ford Motor Company, 2014) The production of the electric motor-generator for 
one hybrid/electric alone needs about 1-3 kilograms of NdFeB magnets. Among them, 
the electric motor in an electric/hybrid vehicle is used to convert electricity into 
mechanical motion to propel the vehicle, as well as to convert energy from the engine or 
wheel rotation into electricity to be stored in the battery. To ensure stable and strong 
performance, the motor needs to be light-weight and energy efficient. Therefore, REE-






















Figure 16 Rare Earth Materials in the Toyota Prius133 
                                                 




Figure 17 REE Material Flow in Electric Vehicle Production 
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4.6.3 How REE Market Conditions Affect the REE Production Chain 
The fluctuation of the price of primary rare earth products in the past few years has 
led to strong fluctuation in the permanent magnet market. When the prices of REOs are 
sufficiently high to justify the switch to less effective technologies, the end users would 
sacrifice performance for better price. Reregulation policy changes led by the Chinese 
central government since 2009 led to artificial changes in supply, speculative buying and 
price fluctuations on the REO market in 2009-2013 (see Figure 18 and Figure 19 for the 
price fluctuation of Praseodymium-Neodymium Oxide and Dysprosium Oxide, primarily 
used for the production of permanent magnets). Average REO prices reached record high 
in 2011 amid speculations of supply shortage, but then dropped to pre-2010 level in 2013. 
Ferrite permanent magnet, the widely used magnetic technology before the adoption of 
REE permanent magnets, is now mainly used in applications which do not require light 
weight134 or compact size135. The price of the REE-enabled permanent magnets became 
much higher than the less suitable alternative, ferrite permanent magnets in 2011. As a 
result, the REE-enabled permanent magnets suffered a large decline in purchase, and less 
than 60% of the Chinese NdFeB permanent magnet producers were in full operation in 
2011 and 2012. (Zhou, 2013) 
                                                 
134 Ferrite magnet weighs on the order of 6 times larger than REE magnets with same 
magnetic functions. 
135 Ferrite magnet’s size is on the order of 10 times larger than the REE magnet with 




Figure 18 Chinese Domestic Pr-Nd Oxide Price Fluctuation in 2009-2013136 
 
 
Figure 19 Chinese Domestic Dysprosium Oxide Price Fluctuation in 2009-2013137 
 
                                                 
136 Data Source: InvestorIntel (http://investorintel.com/) 




































































































For REE-enabled end products, the effect of REE price fluctuation can vary, and it 
may lead to adoption of suboptimal technology if REE-enabled technologies account for 
a significant fraction of total production cost. Take the wind turbine production vs. 
electric/hybrid vehicle production as an example. Costs for NdFeB permanent magnet 
account for about 20% of the production cost of the PM-enabled wind turbine. Because 
of the big price increase of the REE permanent magnet, wind turbine producers have 
been hit, and many chose to switch the magnets (at least in the short term) to cheaper 
alternatives. For producers of 1.5MW wind turbine direct drive PMG (priced at 8-10 
million RMB), a four times price increase of permanent magnet materials (1.5 million 
RMB to 7.5 million RMB) in the first half of 2011 meant that if they could not raise the 
wind turbine price, they would have to choose substitutive magnets or else lose profit. On 
the other hand, the costs of NdFeB permanent magnets only account for about 1% of the 
total production cost of a typical EV or HEV. Thus there has not been significant change 
to the adoption of REE permanent magnet in automobile production despite of drastic 
price fluctuations of the REEs and permanent magnets. 
4.7 China’s Position in the Global Production Chain 
This section analyzes China’s position in the global production chain of REE-
enabled technologies. The author finds that while China dominates global production in 
mining, processing, alloys, and increasingly permanent magnets, China lags behind the 
U.S. and Japan in high-value-added magnet production and end product manufacturing.  
4.7.1 Dominating Mining, Smelting and Intermediate Production 
China has a complete dominance in the production volume and technologies in the 
rare earth mining, smelting and further processing. Besides producing 90% of the global 
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supply of REOs, China is also the only country that can provide commercial quantities of 
REOs of all grades and specifications. Specifically, China currently produces more than 
97% of global output of Praseodymium and Neodymium Oxides, as well as more than 99% 
of global output of Dysprosium and Terbium. China produces about 90% of the global 
output of rare earth metal alloys.  
4.7.2 Catching Up in Value-Added Magnet Production 
China has also grown to be the largest producer of REE permanent magnets in 
quantity. In 2013, China's NdFeB permanent magnet output was 94 kilo-tons, accounting 
for 91.0% of the global output. (ResearchInChina, 2014) This is the result of both rapid 
expansion of permanent magnet industries within China and the closure of western 
production capacity. General Motors created the Magnequench Division in 1986 to 
produce NdFeB magnets. In 1995 GM divested itself of Magnequench, and a consortium 
of companies (including two Chinese state-controlled firms China National Non-ferrous 
Metals Export & Import Group and Zhongke San Huan) acquired Magnequench. In 2001 
Magnequench closed U.S. production and consolidated all its production to China.  
In terms of quality of production, however, China primarily produces relatively low-
valued permanent magnets, compared to the other major producer Japan which produces 
and exports high-priced high-performance permanent magnet. In 2013, China's high-
performance NdFeB PM output was merely 22 kilo-tons, sharing 54% of the global total. 
(ResearchInChina, 2014) Three Japanese corporations, Hitachi Metals 138 , Shin-Etsu 
Chemical and TDK (including their foreign subsidiaries) on the other hand have 48% of 
the world's high-performance NdFeB PM market. (ResearchInChina, 2014) To satisfy the 
                                                 
138 Hitachi Metals holds 615 patents as the world's largest manufacturer of high-
performance NdFeB permanent magnets. 
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demand from China’s downstream manufacturing industries, China still needs to import 
significant amount of these high-end REE permanent magnets from abroad (the imported 
REE permanent magnets are much higher valued per unit than exports, as shown in 
Figure 20 and Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 20 China's REE Permanent Magnet Import & Export Volume in 2012139 
 
                                                 
139 Data Source: 2012 Annual Review of the Rare Earth Industry, published by MIIT 
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Figure 21 China's REE Permanent Magnet Import & Export Values in 2012140 
 
4.7.3 Lagging Behind in End Product Manufacturing 
China lags behind the OECD countries in both production and innovation of the 
downstream products. As Table 5 shows, while Chinese companies dominate the 
upstream production, companies in Japan, the U.S. and Europe are the major market 
players in high-performance permanent magnets and end products including wind 
turbines and EVs. Although China has been called the world’s “turbine making hub”, 
Chinese manufacturers of wind turbines in fact have minority share of global market 
revenues. Chinese producers account for about 25% of the global market share (Figure 24 
shows the ten largest suppliers in the global wind turbine market). China is also still far 
away from becoming a major global player in electric vehicle (EV) production. The EV 
                                                 
140 Data Source: 2012 Annual Review of the Rare Earth Industry, published by MIIT 
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market is a fairly small but growing market within the automobile sector, with more than 
180,000 vehicles in stock representing 0.02% of total passenger cars. (IEA, 2013b) In EV 
and HEV production (except mild hybrids), permanent magnet motor production is 
integrated within the manufacturing process, therefore vehicle manufacturers produce 
their own drive motors and there is no outside individual vendor141. Currently major 
producers of EVs are Japanese and American firms (see Table 5), whereas China has not 
started producing them in large quantity.  
On the other hand, rising energy consumption and serious environmental issue make 
China a strong market for alternative energy products. China has a rapidly growing wind 
energy market (see Figure 22) that has overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest 
wind market in the past six years. (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2015) While the 
electricity generated by wind power accounted for just 2.6% of the national total in 2013 
(GWEC, 2014), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has set the 
target of 200GW installed wind energy capacity by 2020, which would account for 30% 
of China’s electricity generation. (NDRC, 2014) Similarly, China is also a rapidly 
growing market for electric vehicles (see Figure 23). By mid-2013, China had only about 
40,000 electric/hybrid vehicles on the road, of which roughly 80% were public fleet 
vehicles such as buses and sanitation vehicles. (Howell et al., 2014) In the “12th Five-
Year Plan for Electric Vehicles Technology Development” released by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, the Chinese central government has made the target of 
deploying 500,000 electric/hybrid vehicles by 2015. (MOST, 2012) 
                                                 
141 For instance, Toyota (Japan), Mitsubishi (Japan), Nissan (Japan) all manufacturer 




Figure 22 China's Wind Energy Installed Capacity in 2001-2013142 
 
 
Figure 23 China's Electric Vehicle Market Growth in 2003-2013143 
 
                                                 
142 Source: (GWEC, 2014) 




Figure 24 Global Wind Turbine Suppliers Market Share in 2014144 
 
 
                                                 
144 Data Source: (Navigant Research, 2015) 
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Table 5 Major Companies in China, Japan, India, North America and Europe in REE-enabled Production Chain 
 REE Permanent Magnets (PM) PM Generators & 
Wind Turbines145 
PM Motors & EVs146 
China Baotou Steel; 





Beijing Zhongke San Huan Hi-Tech;  














Japan  Shin-Etsu Chemicals; 
Hitachi Metals; 
TDK; 





                                                 
145 The suppliers of permanent magnet (PM) generators used for wind turbines are highly integrated with the manufacturers of the 
wind turbines, so our analysis groups the analysis for their market share together. 
146 Permanent magnet motor production is integrated within the manufacturing process, therefore vehicle manufacturers produce their 
own drive motors and there is no outside individual vendor. Toyota (Japan), Mitsubishi (Japan), Nissan (Japan) all manufacturer 
motors within their own production lines. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
India   Suzlon  
North America  Arnold Magnetic Technologies; 
OM Group (supplies German 
automobile company) 
General Electric General Motors; 
Ford; 
Tesla 











There is, therefore, a mutual dependence between China and the West (U.S., 
Europe and Japan) within the rare earth production chain (see Figure 25 for illustration). 
This means that China’s reregulation has profound influence on downstream industries 
and markets across national borders. China enjoys some technical advantage and 
especially production and market predominance in upstream mining and smelting. Such 
dominance is unlikely to change in the near future. China has also become the major rare 
earths market in the world, due to its production and market predominance in the 
intermediate production (such as alloy making) and low-end components (permanent 
magnets) production. On the other hand, Japan, the U.S. and Europe have technical 
advantage and market dominance in producing high-value-added components (permanent 
magnets) and end products (for instance electric vehicles). China is becoming a 
significant market for these Western-produced high-value end products due to the 
country’s transition to low-carbon economy. Such mutual dependence of technologies, 
production and markets makes it highly difficult for Western countries to build up a 
completely non-Chinese production chain even if non-Chinese junior miners can survive 
their financial challenges. While China’s technological capability is evidently superior in 
upstream and midstream, it still lags behind the advanced economies in downstream 
production and aspires to import high-value downstream products. This also forms a 
technical rationale for the Chinese state to enhance its control over the industry, in order 







Figure 25 Mutual Dependence between China and the West across the Rare Earth 
























CHAPTER 5 STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT UNDER PLANNED 
ECONOMY (1949-1977)  
 
This chapter analyzes the development of the rare earth industry in China under 
the planned economy from the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the late 1970s. In this 
period preceding state reregulation of the industry in the economic reform and 
marketization era (1978-present), the state built up the foundational capacity for industry 
development, though the overriding emphasis was on its utility for national defense and 
heavy industries. The importance of REEs as critical minerals were well recognized by 
senior Chinese government officials. Due to western embargo and later Sino-Soviet split, 
importing advanced technologies and industrial products was difficult for the young 
regime. Developing the world’s largest REE deposits and producing applications 
including materials for advanced weapons, steel products, lighting and displays147 were 
appealing to the state. As the most important actor in the planned economy, the state 
championed industry development through prioritizing resources allocation, establishing 
research institutions and state-owned companies, and setting targets for industry output 
and technology breakthroughs. Such institutional support allowed the industry to bypass 
fiscal and technical constraints typical in junior mining project development within a 
short period of time. In this planned economy era, the state’s overshadowing both the 
economic and the science and technology (S&T) institutions proved to be not just a 
blessing, but also a curse. Successive political campaigns including the Cultural 
                                                 
147 REE permanent magnets were not invented until 1982, thus the major applications 
then differed greatly from the major applications of REE today. 
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Revolution led to delays in science and technology development and hampered overall 
economic development. Fortunately, the rare earth industry as part of the military-
industry complex received comparably better protection from the state planning. By the 
end of the Cultural Revolution era, emerging good relations with the Western countries 
and more stable domestic political environment resulted in new state institutions and 
faster progress in rare earth industry development. 
5.1 Pre-PRC Rare Earth Deposit Discovery 
The earliest discovery of geological deposits containing rare earths in China was 
the discovery of Baiyun-Ebo iron deposit by a Chinese geologist Ding Daoheng on a joint 
exploration led by Peking University professor Xu Xusheng and Swedish geographer 
Sven Anders Hedin in 1927. (Du, 1993) Rare earth elements were confirmed from 
analysis of the deposit by acclaimed Chinese geologist Ho Tsolin in 1935. (Zhang et al, 
1985) From the 1920s until 1949 China was plagued by civil wars between military 
forces loyal to the Nationalist Party (then ruling party of the Republic of China) and 
forces loyal to Communist Party of China (now ruling party of the People’s Republic of 
China). The country also suffered severe devastation because of the Japanese invasion in 
the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). There was ongoing scholarly research on 
geological deposits in the region, but no active mining projects existed before the 
Communist Party takeover and founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
(Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009) 
5.2 Developing the Rare Earth Industry for National Defense 
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After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese state nationalized all lands 
and natural resources and all industries148 in the 1950s. A centralized, top-down planning 
system for research and industry development was established following the Soviet 
model. With regard to mineral resources, the central government became the sole owner 
of resources and had total control over production and product allocation. Companies 
were all state-owned, functioning as extensions of government bureaus; company 
managers were appointed by the government as well. Mining activities were conducted 
according to central government’s planning, with no resource tax levied on extraction or 
for environmental protection. 149 Thus state priority and allocation of resources were 
crucial for industry development.  
The central government restarted geological exploration of the Baiyun-ebo region. 
A preliminary mining project to extract iron, the primary mineral of the deposit for steel 
production was officially started in 1953. 150 The Ministry of Heavy Industries151 (重工业
部) reported to the State Planning Commission152  (SPC, 国家计划委员会) that the 
Baiyun-ebo deposits in Inner Mongolia, a major iron ore deposit, also contained various 
                                                 
148 Private firms, which were common in the Republic of China era, were eliminated and 
replaced by so called “joint-ownership firms” (公私合营企业) which were in fact 
wholly-state-operated entities. The former factory owners became state employees, and 
could not exercise real managerial duties. (Perry, 1994) 
149 For an overview of the evolvement of property rights concerning China’s mineral 
resources, see Jiang (2012). Jiang Xinmin is the Vice Director of the Energy Economics 
and Development Strategy Research Institute within the Energy Research Institute of the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
150 See the iron mine website at http://www.byebtk.com/bytk/Main.asp 
151 Ministry of Heavy Industries was abolished in 1956 to form three new separate 
ministries, Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, Ministry of Chemical Industry and 
Ministry of Building Materials Industry. (Xinhua, 2013) 
152 The State Planning Commission was the leading macroeconomic management agency 
which oversaw China’s centrally planned economy. In 1998 it was changed into National 
Development Planning Commission, and in 2003 it was merged into the newly formed 
National Development and Reform Commission. (Xinhua, 2013) 
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kinds of rare earth elements, and “how to extract and refine this specific resource is a 
significant issue.” (PRC Ministry of Heavy Industries, 1953) At this time, China received 
technical assistance for developing industries from the Soviet Union through the 
Agreement on Joint Development and the U.S.S.R. assistance to China in Prominent 
Science and Technology Research (<<关于共同进行和苏联帮助中国进行重大科学技
术的协定 >>) signed in 1958. With technical assistance from scientists from the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) conducted 
exploration of the Baiyun-Ebo deposit region, concluding that the estimated reserves 
volume would make Baiyun-ebo the world’s largest known REE deposit. Yet with the 
gradually worsening of the Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet Union withdrew its assistance in 
July 1960 and all experts previously dispatched by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR 
to China were summoned to leave China. (Zhang, 2012) The withdrawal of Soviet 
support, coupled with existing security threats and economic sanctions by the Western 
bloc prompted Chinese leaders to advocate for “self-reliance” (自力更生) of military 
technologies and industrial production.153 The development of industrial materials and 
indigenous technologies for national defense became priority on the state development 
agenda.  
A central political figure in elevating the importance of the rare earth industry was 
Vice-President of the Central Military Commission, Marshall Nie Rongzhen. As one of 
the ten supreme marshalls of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Nie oversaw China’s 
defense and civilian technology development as the chair of both the State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC, 国家科委 ) and the National Defense Science and 
                                                 




Technology Commission (NDSTC, 国防科委) 154. In 1960 Nie spoke on the importance 
of REEs to China’s national defense and military autonomy, saying that “many countries 
rely on their domestic resources to produce alloyed steel for industries and defense, and 
we have not achieved that…now the use of rare earth alloys in steel is a historical 
progress. China has large rare earth deposits that can be utilized, and we could do 
whatever we can to promote their use comprehensively.” (Nie, 1999) In a report to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China about the Baiyun-ebo region, Nie 
wrote that “such abundant deposits of REEs and rare metals are rare even around the 
world”, and “such large deposits with strategic significance at the heart of China’s inland 
must be studied with all efforts, and used comprehensively.” (Nie, 1960) Deng Xiaoping, 
then Vice President of the State Council issued similar remarks about the importance of 
developing the Baiyun-ebo deposit in 1964 after visiting Baotou, “Baiyun-ebo mine is a 
precious resource that we need to make good use of. We need to produce both steels and 
REEs and make comprehensive use of the precious mineral resources.” (Sun, 2001) 
In accordance with then common practice of establishing state-owned military-
industrial programs for developing science and technology, the state established research 
institutes and military-affiliated factories across China to develop REE mining and 
smelting capability in the early 1960s. In 1962 the SPC, the SSTC, the NDSTC and the 
                                                 
154 The SSTC and the NDSTC were established in 1958 to consolidate civilian and 
military science and technology research institutions, after the PRC central government 
released its first long-term plan to develop its science and technology in 1956, 1956-1967 
Science and Technology Development Long-term Plan [1956 年至 1967 年科学技术发
展远景规划]. The SSTC was renamed the current Ministry of Science and Technology 
in 1998. The NDSTC was merged into the Commission for Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) in 1982, and most of its defense procurement 
functions were merged into the State Administration for Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) under the current Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) in 2008.  (CAS, 2009a) 
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Ministry of Metallurgical Industry jointly formed “Baotou Steel Rare Earth Temporary 
Working Group” (包头稀土临时协调小组), an inter-ministry group in the State Council 
to oversee national research and development on the Baiyun-Ebo deposit. (Ma, 2012) In 
1963 Marshall Nie Rongzhen directed the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 155  to 
establish Baotou Metallurgical Research Institute（冶金工业部包头冶金研究所） and 
assign more than 300 scientists from around the country to work on REE extraction and 
processing156. (Ma, 2012) In 1963 and 1965 Nie Rongzhen directed the SSTC, CAS and 
the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry to host two national conferences about Baotou’s 
deposit and its rare earth applications (包头矿综合利用和稀土应用工作会议)157. In 
mid-1960s Baotou Steel Factory, the state-owned factory producing steel from the 
Baiyun-ebo deposit under the control of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, started 
producing rare earth ore concentrates with the grade of about 30% REO (rare earth 
oxides). (Zhang et al, 1982) General Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals (GRINM, 
有色金属研究总院)158 a central-government-controlled research institute responsible for 
                                                 
155 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry oversaw all major metal companies, research 
institutes and local bureaus of metallurgical industry. It was abolished in the 1998 State 
Council bureaucratic reform. (Xinhua, 2013) 
156 Baotou Metallurgical Research Institute is the predecessor of Baotou Research 
Institute of Rare Earths (BRIRE, 包头稀土研究院), now the largest research institute 
devoted to REE research in the world.  For more information, see the institute website at 
www.brire.com. 
157 These two conferences, later referred to as “415 conferences” by popular media as 
they were held on April 15th, were instrumental in finalizing China’s approach to 
developing the Baiyun-ebo deposit. Based on conference discussions, the leadership 
made the decision to develop both iron mining and processing technologies, as well as 
REE mining and processing. (Zhang, 1965) 
158 GRINM is now under the direct supervision of State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission. It hosts National Rare Earth Materials Engineering 
Research Center, and is the major shareholder of Grirem Advanced Materials, a major 
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developing technologies in non-ferrous metals and materials in Beijing, began to produce 
individual oxides in 1962. Shanghai Yaolong Chemical Plant159 (上海跃龙化工厂), one 
of the earliest rare earth smelting and application company in China, started processing 
monazites containing REEs in 1964. Several other smelting and processing plants were 
established in South China, including Guangdong 661 Factory160 in Guangdong Province 
and Jiangxi 801 Factory161 in Jiangxi Province. 
5.3 Political Campaigns Hampered Development 
The state’s control over the industry and the science community was a double-
edge sword: state planning of economic output, combined with nationalization of 
resources and mining rights guaranteed the resources and demand to develop research 
capacity and production capacity within a short period of time, bypassing the fiscal and 
technical constraints commonly found in junior mining projects in market economies. On 
the other hand, state campaigns driven primarily by political ideologies seriously 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chinese advanced rare earth materials producer which has a production capacity of about 
10000 ton/year. For more information, see the GRINM website at http://www.grinm.com. 
159 Shanghai Yaolong Chemical Plant is the predecessor of Shanghai Yuelong Rare 
Earths New Materials Company, now one of the largest rare earth processing and 
fabrication companies in China. It now specializes in producing rare earth phosphors for 
lighting, individual REOs, and LED powders. For more information, see the company 
website at http://www.newyuelong.com. 
160 Guangdong 661 Factory is the predecessor of Guangzhou Zhujiang Rare Earth 
Company, currently a major rare earth oxide producer in China. Chinese central-
government-controlled firm China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Group now owns majority 
share of the company. For more information, see the company website at 
http://www.gdzjre.com/ 
161 Jiangxi 801 Factory is the predecessor of Nanchang Cemented Carbide Ltd., now the 
largest producer of tungsten oxide in China. Chinese central-government-controlled firm 
China Minmetals now owns majority share of the company. In 1984 Jiangxi 801 
Factory’s rare earth production line and workforce were separated from the factory to 
become part of the newly created Jiangxi Rare Earths Company, the predecessor of the 
current Jiangxi Rare Earth And Rare Metals Tungsten Group Corporation (major natural 
resource firm controlled by Jiangxi Province government).  For more information, see the 
company website at http://www.jxtc.com.cn/ 
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hindered the science community’s freedom of inquiry and severely hampered the state’s 
development efforts.  
The state’s ambivalent treatment towards highly-educated intellectuals stemmed 
from conflicting ideologies regarding the position of intellectuals in the new socialist 
state. On the one hand, communist leaders recognized that intellectuals were 
indispensable to the development of the socialist economy and national defense for China. 
On the other hand, Chairman Mao Zedong emphasized “class struggle between the 
proletariat and the capitalists” as the primary political issue for the Chinese Communist 
Party in post-revolutionary China. (Mao, 1957) Highly-educated intellectuals should be 
subject to close scrutiny and should not be trusted as true communists. (Mao, 1925) Thus 
freedom of intellectual pursuit and criticism could be sacrificed for political correctness. 
A case to illustrate this concerns the “Great Leap Forward” campaign: Mao proclaimed 
that “China would overtake Britain in production of steel and other products within 15 
years”, and people who did not agree with the proposed radical plan of steel production 
were persecuted. (Yang, 1996)  
Thus not surprisingly, the state in the Mao era had conflicting and often reversed 
policies towards researchers and research projects based on the political campaigns of 
that time, leading to many setbacks in development. During the Sino-Soviet cooperation 
era in the early 1950s, researchers who criticized Soviet-style education and Soviet expert 
opinions were punished. In the case of the REE mining, Soviet experts proposed mining 
the Baiyun-Ebo deposit primarily for iron and steel production instead of developing 
technologies for both iron and rare earth production. Some Chinese scientists opposing 
the Soviet recommendation were regarded as “anti-Soviets” and were required to write 
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self-criticism testifying their allegiance to the Communist leadership. (Yap, 2011) The 
Hundred-Flowers Campaign (百花运动) in 1956 was a brief state campaign to encourage 
highly-educated intellectuals to be more vocal in opinions and criticisms about party 
policies. Yet the immediate Anti-Rightist Campaign (反右运动) of late 1957-1958 saw 
the prosecution of intellectuals across the country alleged to be “rightists who harbor 
anti-communist thoughts”. 162  Fortunately, then CAS Party Secretary Zhang Jingfu 
successfully persuaded Mao to exclude scientists working at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences from the Anti-Rightist Campaign, including scientists at the Institute of Process 
Engineering who worked on mining and smelting technologies. (Yang, 2009)  
After the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960, the 
state sought to restore its damaged relations with the science and engineering community. 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi recognized scientists as “people’s 
scientists, socialist scientists and proletariat scientists” at the “Guangzhou Conference” in 
1962 to remove the intellectuals’ political sin as “capitalists”. (Liao, 2002) Such 
recognition inspired great enthusiasm from the science community to participate in 
national research agendas. Yet progress was short-lived.  
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had “long and devastating” effect on 
“China’s scientific enterprise and scientists”. (Cao, 2013) Political struggles within the 
Party leadership resulted in the dominance of radicals, and the purge of senior leaders 
including Nie Rongzhen and other key leaders of the SSTC and the CAS from positions 
of power. (Cao, 2013) Highly educated intellectuals were regarded as the “stinking ninth 
                                                 
162 For a detailed account of the persecution of intellectuals during the Anti-Rightist 
Movement, see Shapiro (2001). 
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category”163, the lowest of the low to be persecuted. Millions of scholars, managers, 
technicians, and government officials were purged from their positions, executed based 
on unfounded charges, suffered public torture, or sent to labor camps. (Macfarquar & 
Schoenals, 2006) A prominent example for the rare earth industry is Chu-Phay Yap, 
director of Chemical Engineering and Metallurgical Research Institute at CAS. Prof. Yap, 
a prominent scientist and returnee from the U.S., was first labeled as “anti-Soviet” for 
proposing to develop REE mining for the Baiyun-Ebo deposit in the 1950s. Yap was then 
detained in 1966 for unfounded spying charges and died in 1971. (Yap, 2011) The 
Cultural Revolution left most of China’s science and education institutions paralyzed. It 
also damaged the national economy, and by early 1970s the economy worsened to the 
brink of collapse164. 
5.4 Industry Growth despite Political Turbulences 
While the Cultural Revolution seriously hampered China’s science institutions 
and economic development, the rare earth industry still had some progress in the 
development of separation and purification technologies and new geological exploration. 
Overall military technology research programs enjoyed some protection from radical 
political campaigns in the Cultural Revolution due to their importance to national security. 
(Brock, 2009) Because of the close ties with national defense, rare earth projects were 
                                                 
163 Campaigns in the Culture Revolution aimed to purge “Five Black Categories” 
(landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists), traitors, 
foreign agents, “capitalist-roaders” (cadres) and “reactionary academics” (teachers and 
other intellectuals). Thus academics were regarded as the “stinking ninth category.”  
164 For an official account of the damage of the Cultural Revolution, see then President of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Hua Kuo-feng’s report to the 5th 
National Congress in 1978. (Hua, 1978) According to Hua, between 1974 and 1976 the 
Cultural Revolution had caused losses worth 100 billion Yuan in state revenue, and “The 
national economy was on the brink of collapse.”  
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also given relatively better priority and protection than purely civilian research. Take the 
“Separation of Nd-Pr Concentrates” project as an example. Neodymium (Nd) was the 
most common material used in solid-state lasers for military purposes; yet by 1971, China 
was only able to produce rare earth concentrates that contained several coexisting 
REEs 165 , which then had to be sold to the French company Rhone Poulenc for 
separation166. The Bureau of Metallurgy within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
made it a priority to develop indigenous technology to separate the coexisting REEs and 
produce highly enriched Neodymium, which could then be used to produce laser 
weapons. Researchers were grouped together in Beijing to work on the project. Among 
them was Mr. Xu Guangxian167, a chemist who was called back to Peking University 
from detention in a labor camp in Jiangxi Province. (Jia & Di, 2009) Mr. Xu, now 
regarded as “Father of China’s Rare Earth Industry”, developed the “Countercurrent 
Extraction Theory” （串级萃取理论） , the theoretical foundation for extraction 
technologies separating and producing highly purified, individual rare earth oxides from 
ores in China. (Xu et al, 1985) In 1975, highly enriched rare earth concentrate (REO > 
60%, compared to just 30% in mid-1960s) was successfully produced from bastnasite 
deposit in Prof. Huang Guoping’s lab in Guangzhou Non-ferrous Metals Research 
                                                 
165 Take the Baiyun-Ebo bastnasite deposit as an example. The deposit contains the oxide 
form of several REEs, including Ce (roughly 50%), La (roughly 25%), and Nd-Pr 
Concentrates (roughly 25%) containing more than 10 chemical elements. Existing 
technology by 1971 could only separate Ce and La from the Baiyun-Ebo ores. 
166 Rhone Poulenc is the predecessor of French producer Rhodia, now acquired by Solvay. 
Rhone Poulenc was the only European producer of all purified rare earth oxides before 
the 1970s. In 1964 France and the People’s Republic of China established ambassadorial 
level diplomatic relations. China still faced embargo from the U.S. and most of its allies, 
thus Rhone Poulenc was the primary producer processing China’s rare earth concentrates. 
167 In English-language scientific publications Prof. Xu also published under the name of 
Hsu Kwang Hsien. 
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Institute. (Huang et al, 2006) Some other important technological breakthroughs during 
the Cultural Revolution included producing purified yttrium oxide in 1970, producing 
purified lutetium oxide in 1971, producing rare earth chloride in 1972, producing purified 
scandium oxide in 1972, and producing Samarium Cobalt permanent magnets in 1974. 
(Office of Shanghai Chronicles, 1999) In the Gannan-Yuebei region in South China, ion-
adsorption clay deposit was discovered in 1968, and Jiangxi Non-ferrous Metallurgical 
Research Institute conducted research in 1970-1975 regarding the deposit’s geological 
formation, extraction and separation methods. (Huang et al, 2006) The deposit would 
prove to be China’s largest source of the HREEs after the Cultural Revolution. 
More favorable international and domestic political environment at the end of the 
Cultural Revolution era led to new state initiatives in rare earth industry development. 
Internationally, China began to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S.168 and Japan169 
in 1972, leading to substantial trade opportunities of exporting raw materials to the 
international market of the U.S. and its allies. In 1974, Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
directed Baotou Steel, the parent company in charge of the Baiyun-Ebo deposit, to set up 
capacity to produce sizable amount of rare earth oxides for export. (Shen & Zhao, 2012) 
Domestically, the brief resurgence of pro-economic-development leader Deng 
                                                 
168 After U.S. President Nixon’s visit to China and the release of the Shanghai 
Communiqué in 1972, U.S. and People’s Republic of China began to restore diplomatic 
relations and trade relations, although ambassador-level diplomatic relations did not fully 
resume until 1979 under the Carter Administration. For a timeline of important events in 
U.S.-China relations, see http://www.cfr.org/china/us-relations-china-1949---present/. 
169 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited China in 1972, and the two countries 
established diplomatic relations on September 29, 1972. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Japan & Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1972) 
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Xiaoping170 in the central power struggle in 1974-1975 led to a temporary state emphasis 
on economic development over ideological campaigns.  
Specifically the establishment of an inter-ministry working group within the 
central government at the end of the Cultural Revolution era would have significant 
impact in industry development in the decades to follow. In 1975 an inter-ministry 
working group called “National Rare Earth Applications Promotion Leadership Group” 
(全国稀土推广应用领导小组) was established in Beijing, composed of senior officials 
from the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. Despite of several name changes, the group remained to 
be the direct national administrative body overseeing the industry development until the 
early 2000s. (Su, 2009, p. 269) From 1975 to 1977, the group led initiatives promoting 
industrial applications and science outreach, including hosting the “National Rare Earth 
Applications Exhibition” (全国稀土推广应用展览会) which held nation-wide exhibition 
tours and 283 public lectures and seminars around the country. Such public outreach and 
                                                 
170 As an influential army leader, Deng Xiaoping championed China’s economic 
reconstruction in the early 1960s with other pro-development leaders after the economic 
failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) instigated by Mao. Deng was purged from 
the central leadership at the start of the Cultural Revolution on “capitalist” charges. From 
1974 to 1975, Deng briefly returned to the party central leadership in charge of economic 
affairs, as a successor appointed by then Premier Zhou Enlai. Deng worked to restore 
major economic and governing institutions. However, Deng was purged again by Mao 
and his close associates the “Gang of Four” in February 1976, until Mao’s death and the 
end of the Cultural Revolution. Deng emerged as the de facto leader of the party after 
Mao and launched China’s market-oriented economic reform in 1978.  For more 
information, see Deng’s daughter’s memoir My Father Deng Xiaoping: Cultural 
Revolution Years (Deng, 2000) 
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education initiatives gave the rare earth industry nation-wide visibility, which laid the 
foundation for widespread industrial production and market expansion in the 1980s. 171 
  
                                                 
171 See Dou (2012). Dou Xuehong is a retired rare earth expert and the former director of 
the Rare Earth Information Center at Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths. 
152 
 
CHAPTER 6 STATE-LED RAPID MARKETIZATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1978-1997) 
 
This chapter studies the rapid development of the rare earth industry and the 
state’s role in its ascendance to global production dominance in just two decades in the 
post-Mao economic reform era. As the analysis demonstrates, industry liberalization and 
marketization is part of the state overall reregulation over the industry development. This 
chapter first analyzes the macroeconomic environment for the industry development. 
Under the leadership of pro-market “Second-Generation Leaders”, particularly the core 
leader Deng Xiaoping, China started a state-led transition from the planned to the market 
economy. The chapter then analyzes the state goals and narratives in guiding the rare 
earth industry development in the reform era. Developing the rare earth industry served 
both strong economic interests of export growth and strategic interests strengthening ties 
with major global powers. The development narratives of the central government featured 
both marketization (promoting the development of international markets, industrial 
production and private sector) as well as regulation (keeping the industry boom under 
regulatory control). The chapter then examines specific state policies on industry 
development. Consistent with the dual narratives of liberalization and control, the central 
government championed the rapid development of the market economy, but never 
retreated from the market: it utilized existing planning institutions and introduced new 
rules and institutions to control rare earth mining, export and industry development. The 
chapter then analyzes changes in political institutions which resulted in the rapid 
expansion of the industry within China and the rise of local governments as strong 
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political agents of development. The chapter concludes with analysis of the industry 
development results as outcomes of state reregulation. This chapter shows that the 
industry’s rapid marketization and growth was achieved not despite of, but because of the 
Chinese state’s direct involvement in market expansion, industry development and 
institution building for its own interests.  
6.1 Macro-level Economic Change: Transition towards the Market Economy  
The economic reform, known as “Reform and Opening” campaign, started in 
1978 and transformed China from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy with 
high-speed export-led growth. This section summarizes major changes in China’s 
macroeconomic reform from 1978 to 1997. 
6.1.1 Incremental Reform to Build Market Economy  
The macroeconomic environment after the Cultural Revolution for China was a 
shortage economy in desperate need of basic supplies and industrial production. Prior to 
1978, production prices and quantity targets were set by the government, leaving little 
incentive for state-owned producers to produce more than the planned quota. Deng and 
the other reform leaders began to implement pro-market policies aimed to increase 
industrial output and export. The state introduced incremental reform measures to build a 
market economy alongside the existing planned economy.  
The central government established a “dual-track system” in the early 1980s 
allowing companies to sell their surplus output at higher prices on the open market while 
still selling their planned quota production to the state plan at state-set prices. (China 
Internet Information Center, 2009b) Such a system incorporating both the “market” and 
the “plan” was applied not only to the price of raw materials and outputs, but also to other 
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areas of economy including interest rates, exchange rates and labor. (Lin et al, 2003) 
Under the dual-track system, the market outside the planned system rapidly expanded, 
resulting in the rise of the private sector and the gradual transition from state-determined 
supply and demand to market-determined supply and demand. The state legally 
acknowledged its role in 1988 through constitutional amendment declaring that “the 
government protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, 
and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy”, 
and “the right to the use of land may be transferred according to the law.” (China Internet 
Information Center, 2009a) By 1996, 81% of total sales volume of production was priced 
by the market, instead of the state plan. (Lin et al, 2003)  
6.1.2 Reforming Science and Technology (S&T) Institutions for Economic 
Development 
The state sought to repair its relationship with the science community damaged by 
the Cultural Revolution. At the National Science Congress in 1978, Deng made the 
famous remark that “intellectuals are part of the working class” (Deng, 1978), 
recognizing scientists and engineers as part of the new economic system under reform. 
The state re-established the SSTC in 1977, signifying a reversal of Cultural Revolution 
anti-intellectual policies. The state re-introduced National Higher Education Entrance 
Examination in 1977 and set up a system cultivating future S&T leaders, including 
projects such as the Hundred Talents Program (中科院百人计划)172 and the Million 
                                                 
172 The CAS implemented the Hundred Talents Program in 1994 which funded over 100 
young scientists. The Hundred Talents Program of CAS was the first science talent 
recruiting and training program in China with “high aims, high standards and high level 
of support”, and has been the backbone program for attracting and training academic and 
technological leaders. See http://www.cas.ac.cn/ggzy/rcpy/brjh/ for call for applications. 
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Talent Project (百千万人才工程)173 funding young talents from both home and abroad 
and promoting them to key positions.  
The state prioritized science and technology (S&T) research and development that 
could contribute to economic growth. According to Deng, China’s development goals are 
“the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology” 
(known as “four modernizations”), and among them “science and technology 
modernization is the key to four modernizations.” (Deng, 1978) Law of the PRC on 
Progress of Science and Technology (introduced in 1993) legislated that the state would 
be “basing economic construction and social development on science and technology and 
orienting science and technology undertakings to economic construction and social 
development.” The post-Cultural-Revolution SSTC (the predecessor of the current 
Ministry of Science and Technology) gradually became the leading state agency 
formulating national S&T development plans and policies, taking on the role of 
technology development and investment that had previously belonged to the NDSTC174. 
(Feigenbaum, 2003) Military technology R&D shifted from state plans to contracts, 
opening doors to civilian research institutes and firms. Military-affiliated research 
                                                 
173 The Ministry of Personnel started implementing the Millions Talent Project with the 
mission of developing world-class science and technology experts and young talents in 
1994, which was later joined by six other ministries. The Million Talents Project selected 
young talents in “disciplines with great importance to national economy and social 
development in natural science and social sciences” from home and abroad, and provided 
funding support, research program support, and professional development opportunities 
such as international exchange. For more information, see the implementation plan at the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security website at 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/zyjsrygls/ZYJSRYGLSzhengcewenjian/201301/t20130115_8
2418.htm. 
174 NDSTC evolved into the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for 
National Defense (COSTIND) in 1982, and COSTIND was merged into the MIIT as the 
State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND) in 2008. (CAS, 2009a) 
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institutes and firms also went through the process of “transition of military technology 
for civilian use” (军工技术向民用转移) which channeled existing R&D capabilities 
towards development of high-tech civilian products and collaboration with civilian 
institutes.  (PRC COSTIND, 1988; PRC COSTIND, 1997) 
In accordance with the macroeconomic transition from the plan to the market, the 
state reformed the S&T development system from central planning to market-oriented 
institutions. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1985) Starting with 
the release of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Decision on 
Science and Technology Development Reform in 1985, the state implemented reform 
policies resulting in several major institutional changes. Firstly, the funding mechanism 
of S&T research shifted from central state planned funding to a combination of central 
government, local government and private funding through competitive funding contracts; 
the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) was founded in 1986 to award and 
manage competitive state research grants. (PRC State Council, 1988) Secondly, there was 
a gradual shift of R&D responsibility from state bureaucracy to enterprises (both state-
owned and private), as well as spin-off firms of state research institutes. The state 
encouraged scientists and engineers to commercialize their research through 
entrepreneurship, contracting technologies, or providing technical assistance for local-
government-controlled or private firms. (PRC State Council, 1996) Finally, the state 
began to set up “National High-tech Industrial Development Zones” (国家高新技术产业
开发区) in select cities in order to boost foreign investment in high-tech production, 
technology transfer and commercialization. From 1988 to 2001 54 National High-tech 
Industrial Development Zones were established. (PRC MOST, 2011) 
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6.1.3 Dismantling State Planning in Rural Areas 
From 1979 to 1983, the “household responsibility system” was adopted across 
China, dismantling the collective farming under the planned economic system. (China 
Internet Information Center, 2009c) While the state remains the legal owner of land, the 
household responsibility system allows rural households to contract land from the state 
and keep surplus production above quotas to be sold on the market. (Lin, 1988) The 
adoption of the household responsibility system, combined with the relaxation of control 
over labor migration from farming to township enterprises and urban factories, provided 
labor for the development of rural cooperative companies and urban industries. (Yang & 
Zhou, 2007) 
6.1.4 Reforming State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Along with developing the private sector, the state gradually downsized the state-
owned economy and recalibrated its control mechanism from direct planning of 
production and distribution to more indirect intervention through industry-specific 
regulations, quasi-government industry associations175 , personnel appointments176  and 
                                                 
175 An example in the mining industry is the China Iron and Steel Association, which was 
established in 1998 after the abolishment of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry. The 
Association shares the same physical address with the former ministry. As a national 
level industry association, China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) have continued to 
exercise some functions of the abolished ministry. For instance, CISA represented 
Chinese steelmakers in talks with global miners on iron ore prices. The Chinese Society 
of Rare Earths (CSRE), the national level academic society specifically for the rare earth 
industry, has been receiving direct instructions and personnel management from the 
CISA. For more information, see the association website 
http://121.42.137.177/rareearth/learnintroduce/introduction/ for more information. 
176 Based on author’s observation in China, the Department of Organization of the 
Communist Party of China determines party personnel appointments, promotions and 
dismissals in SOEs. Party committees and party secretaries in SOEs often also double as 
firm chairman or CEOs. Thus the party still in effect controls personnel appointment of 
the leadership of the SOEs. 
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loans from state-owned banks 177 . At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 12th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1984, central leaders announced the SOE 
reform to “allow the enterprises to become relatively independent economic entities, 
socialist producers which have independence in operation and profit-loss.” (Zhou & Xia, 
2008) From 1978 to 1992, the share of industrial output by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) fell from 78% to 48%, no longer claiming the majority share of the national 
output. (Naughton, 1994) In 1995 the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China identified the strategy of “grasping the large and letting go of the small.” (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1995) The state began to give up its control 
of small-sized SOEs through selling, leasing, downsizing, contracting out, merging with 
other firms, or allowing them to go bankrupt. Large and middle-sized SOEs started 
lengthy reform processes from wholly-state-owned firms to shareholding firms in which 
the state controlled complete or majority share. (Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, 1999)  
6.1.5 Promoting Export-led Growth and Foreign Direct Investment 
The macroeconomic reform also featured policies incentivizing export-led growth 
and foreign direct investment. Starting in the early 1980s the state created dozens of 
“special economic zones” (SEZ) that enjoyed preferential trade and investment 
environment in China’s coastal provinces. The SEZs enjoyed reduced or eliminated 
tariffs, favorable policies regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology 
transfer, as well as flexible economic measures to promote export-oriented manufacturing. 
(China Internet Information Center, 2009d) The state introduced export tax rebate 
                                                 
177 Wei & Wang (1997) found that Chinese state-owned banks lending is biased in favor 
of the SOEs. 
159 
 
policy178 in 1985 providing rebate money to exporting enterprises for the indirect tax they 
pay in the production and distribution process. (PRC Ministry of Finance, 1985) From 
1991 to 1997 export tax rebate consumed about 20%-38% of the central government's 
annual total expenditure. (Cui, 2003) Such favorable trade policies, combined with strong 
growth in foreign investment and domestic manufacturing, resulted in Chinese exports 
rising on average 5.7% in the 1980s and 12.4% in the 1990s. (IMF, 2006) In financial 
markets, the state allowed limited trade of stocks and bonds in the late 1980s and 
formally established the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 
1990 and 1991, although foreign investment in stocks has still been controlled through 
currency control. (China Internet Information Center, 2009e) The state incrementally 
reformed its foreign exchange system and made the Chinese currency RMB convertible 
on the current account in 1996. (China Internet Information Center, 2009f)  
6.2 Goals and Narratives of the State 
This section studies the state’s goals and narratives in developing the rare earth 
industry, narrowing the focus from China’s larger macroeconomic transition to the rare 
earth industry itself. In this period in the post-Mao economic reform era, the rare earth 
industry was blessed with continuous strong state support, while the emphasis shifted 
from its defense utility to civilian use for economic development. Developing the 
industry served the state’s economic and strategic interests, and the state set ambitious 
goals of global dominance in production, application and export. The central government 
                                                 
178 Export tax rebate policy is commonly practiced in international trade in order to avoid 
double taxation on export goods (which are subject to import tax at the same tax rate as 
its domestically-produced counterparts by importing countries).  
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narratives of development featured both marketization (promoting industry growth and 
market expansion) and regulation (keeping the industry development under state control). 
6.2.1 State’s Development Motives 
From a macroeconomic perspective, developing the rare earth industry would 
enable the Chinese state to get foreign currency that it desperately needed in the early 
years of the economic reform. According to Hong Feng, a retired government official in 
the State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group and later the director of the State Rare 
Earth Office under the State Planning Commission, “in the early years of the economic 
reform, there was a significant shortage of foreign currency, as the annual trade volume 
was less than 100 billion dollars; there were almost no industrial products that China 
could export in exchange for foreign currency…China mostly relied on exporting 
agricultural products and raw materials that foreign countries had a shortage for. 
Although China produced large quantities of steel, aluminum, magnesium and zinc, they 
were not enough for China’s own consumption, let alone export. Thus rare earths were 
given the mission of bringing in hard currency, as the mining was fairly easy and 
involved low investment, and the domestic consumption was fairly small.” (Cui, 2011) 
As the previous subsection shows, by the late 1970s China’s rare earth industry had 
already acquired national visibility, a top-notch technical workforce, and the technology 
and the capacity to produce various kinds of mixed and purified rare earth products for 
the global market. At the same time, in the 1980s global demand of REEs shifted away 
from mixed rare-earths products to higher value individual high-purity products179. The 
invention of NdFeB permanent magnet in the early 1980s and its subsequent wide 
                                                 




adoption in consumer electronics in the 1980s and 1990s led to great increase in market 
demand for REEs in western countries. (Constantinides, 2009) Thus China’s abundant 
supply of LREEs from Baiyun-Ebo mine (already known globally as the world’s largest 
REE deposit) as well as supply of high-value HREEs from HREE-rich ion-adsorption 
clay deposits in South China provided a cheap and stable alternative source of raw 
materials to foreign companies. In return, China was able to attract foreign investment 
and bring in foreign currency in order to build manufacturing capabilities and a vibrant 
market economy. 
From a more strategic perspective, trading with the major western powers could 
also “cement China’s strategic ties with the West” (Parks, 1981), as China sought to 
advance its relations with the major western powers. This was aptly illustrated by the 
reform leader Deng Xiaoping’s speech in 1991, “There is oil in the Middle East, there is 
rare earth in China; China’s reserves account for 80% of global known reserves, thus it 
has extremely important strategic significance comparable to oil in the Middle East. We 
must develop the rare earth industry well so that we can unleash our rare earth 
superiority.” (“中东有石油，中国有稀土, 中国的稀资源占世界已知储量的百分之八
十，其地位可与中东石油相比具有极其重要的战略意义。一定要把稀土的事情办好，
把我国稀土优势发挥出来 ”) (Baotou National Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Industrial 
Development Zone, n.d.) 
6.2.2 State Development Narratives: Marketization with Regulation 
The central government’s development narrative focused on promoting rare earth 
industry production and marketization in order to advance its rank in global production. 
A key central political figure in the early years of the industry development was Vice 
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President of the State Council Fang Yi, Deng’s close reform ally. Fang was in charge of 
overseeing China’s science and technology development and conducted extensive 
research over the rare earth industry. From 1978 to 1986 Fang made personal visits to the 
Baiyun-Ebo mine and Baotou Steel and Rare Earth Company seven times. (Ma, 2000) 
Under his directive, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry concluded that “developing 
and utilizing the rare earth resources in Baotou would very likely lead to China’s rare 
earths products dominating the global market.” (PRC Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, 
1978) Fang set the long-term vision for the industry development as “three first-ranked in 
the world, including the first in rare earth production, the first in rare earth application 
and the first in rare earth export.” (Cui, 2011) Fang also set the state strategy for the rare 
earth industry as “selling high volume at low cost, promoting application, increasing 
export, and enhancing production” (薄利多销、推广应用、扩大出口、促进生产). The 
narrative of state-led marketization for development was echoed in the top party 
leadership as well. In 1987 Wen Jiabao, then Director of the General Office of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, gave the party directive to “take a 
comprehensive view of rare earth industry development, application and export combined 
with China’s overall S&T development strategy and economic development strategy; 
draft clear resource policies, industrial policies, S&T policies and trade policies which 
work together to help the industry contribute to fast economic and S&T development” 
(一定要把稀土资源的开发、利用、出口战略同科学技术发展战略、经济发展战略
结合起来考虑，制定明确的资源政策、产业政策、科技政策和外贸政策，使之并行
不悖地促进我国经济和科技的迅速发展). (Wen, 1987) This directive determined that 
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under the party leadership, the rare earth industry would follow the larger macroeconomic 
and S&T transition towards the market economy.  
Yet the state would not let the market alone play the invisible hand. Along with 
the theme of developing the market economy, the state narrative of development also 
featured prominently the state as the regulator over the rare earth industry in the transition 
towards the market economy. The inter-ministry Rare Earth Leadership Group reporting 
to the State Council continued to be the major bureaucratic body overseeing the rare earth 
industry development. In drafting the rare earth industry development plan of the 7th 
Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) in 1984, Xu Chi, then Vice Minister of Metallurgical 
Industry remarked that “the reserves of China’s rare earth resources can definitely meet 
industry needs, but currently rare earth mining lacks a high-level plan and strict scientific 
guidance, which would likely lead to unregulated mining, resource waste and 
environmental pollution.” (Xu, 1984) Within a year of Wen Jiabao’s 1987 party directive, 
the State Council announced the overarching strategy for rare earth industry development 
as “Enhancing Regulation, Protecting Resources, Developing Scientifically, and Aligning 
together in International Market” (强化管理，保护资源，科学开发，联合对外). (PRC 
State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group Office, 1988) At the 2nd National Rare Earth 
Industry Conference in 1989, Ye Qing, then Vice Commissioner of the State Planning 
Commission and Director of the State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group 180 
highlighted the issues of “blind development and repeated projects” (盲目发展、重复建
设）and “multiple exporters benefiting the foreign buyers” (多头出口，废水外流)  in 
                                                 
180 In 1988 the “National Rare Earth Applications Promotion Leadership Group” was 
changed to be directly supervised by the State Council as the “State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group” (国务院稀土领导小组). 
164 
 
the industry. (Ye, 1989) Ye also identified five core missions for the state leadership in 
developing the rare earth industry in the 8th Five-Year Period (1991-1995) as “improve 
and reinforce national macro-level regulatory system, unify regulations and policies, 
strictly enforce laws”; “decrease and control investment in fixed assets, make adjustments 
to industry structure (revitalizing large-scale and middle-scale enterprises, while 
consolidating small-sized and township and village enterprises)”; “conduct state planning 
on rare earth production”; “enhance governance on rare earth production and technology 
export, ensure stable and healthy expansion of export”; and “enhance governance on 
resources of mining sites and protect ecological environment”. (Ye, 1989) 
After Deng Xiaoping’s famous speech in 1992 remarking “Middle East has oil 
while China has rare earths”, there was further emphasis from official state narratives in 
regulating the industry as well as ensuring the thriving market and export dominance. At 
the Working Meeting of the State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group in 1992, Ye 
Qing made the directive that “in industry governance, it is necessary to both govern well 
and let the market grow, to govern by the principle of combining industry planning with 
market regulations, and to change method of intervention from bureaucratic mechanisms 
to non-governmental mechanisms including industry associations.” (PRC State Council 
Rare Earth Leadership Group Office, 1992) In 1994, Bai Jie, then Director of the State 
Rare Earth Office under the State Planning Commission (formerly the State Council Rare 
Earth Leadership Group), emphasized that the office would “change its functions and 
utilize primarily economic measures to regulate industry according to new market 
economic conditions; draft long-term plans, industrial policies, priorities in industry 
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development, priorities in research and development of rare earth applications.” (Sui, 
1994)  
6.3 Industry-Specific Regulatory and Policy Changes 
In accordance with the dual narratives of marketization and regulation, the state 
enacted a series of policies to promote as well as regulate the development of the rare 
earth market, industry production and trade. This section surveys major government 
policies, regulations and initiatives from 1978 to 1997 on production, trade and foreign 
investment and industry upgrading. 
6.3.1 Production Promotion and Regulation 
6.3.1.1 Promoting Industry Production 
In order to achieve the long-term goal of global dominance in production, 
applications and export that Fang Yi envisioned, the state enacted ambitious high-level 
plans of increasing industry production capacity and product competitiveness. At the start 
of the economic reform in 1978, the production capacity of Chinese rare earth industry 
had already reached 4370 tons (in REO unit), ranking the fourth in the world. However, 
the industry was producing primarily low-grade products at higher costs and lower 
recovery rate181 compared to foreign producers. (Xu, 1984) The state released the 1979-
1981 Rare Earth Application Promotion Plan in 1979 and subsequently the 1983-1985 
Rare Earth Industry Development Plan in 1983. (PRC State Economic Commission et al, 
1979; PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1983) Based on these two plans, 
from 1978 to 1985 the State Economic Commission and the State Science and 
                                                 
181 The rare earth refinement/smelting process typically yields only a small percentage of 
the desirable elements contained in the ore, a percentage referred to as "recovery rate". A 
higher recovery rate in the refinement/smelting process can lead to increase in the 
capacity of production and less wasted rare earth elements from the process. 
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Technology Commission allocated more than 70 million RMB funding to upgrade rare 
earth mining and production technologies in major rare earth companies and to increase 
funding support for research in lowering production costs and increasing industry 
applications. (Zhou, 1985) By 1984, the Chinese rare earth industry reached production 
capacity of 12000 tons (ranking the second in the world behind the U.S.) and was able to 
produce both large quantities of mixed rare earth products for export as well as highly-
purified rare earth oxides at costs comparable to foreign producers. (Xu, 1984) The state 
then set the goal of increasing the production capacity to 20000 tons and production 
volume to 16000-18000 tons, larger than those of the United States (then the major global 
producer) in the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). (PRC State Economic Commission et al, 
1985) This goal was achieved ahead of the deadline: in 1988 China’s rare earth 
concentrate production volume reached 29640 tons (in REO unit), overtaking the U.S. as 
the largest global producer. (Ye, 1989)  
6.3.1.2 Regulating Industry Production 
The state introduced regulations on production from ion-adsorption deposits in 
South China. In September 1987 the State Economic Commission and the Ministry of 
Geology and Mineral Resources mandated that ion-adsorption rare earth deposits in 
South China were subject to regulation as “special resources”. New mining projects 
would require approval from the provincial-level government. Without government 
approval, “non-PRC-citizens are forbidden to enter the mining area or access the 
geological and mining data”. (PRC State Economic Commission & Ministry of Geology 
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and Mineral Resources182, 1987)  In January 1991 the State Council further mandated that 
ion-adsorption rare earth deposits would be subject to “protective mining” consisting of 
the following measures: 1. The State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group would 
conduct mid-term and long-term planning of mineral resource and mining project 
development; 2. Joint venture and international collaboration in ion-adsorption rare earth 
mining would be prohibited; 3. New ion-adsorption rare earth mining and refining 
projects would be approved only by the State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 
while existing projects would go through consolidation; 4. The State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group would release production plans of ion-adsorption rare earth products to 
each province/autonomous region, and private enterprises would be banned from ion-
adsorption rare earth mining; 5. non-state companies (including local collective 
enterprises, township and village enterprises, joint ventures with foreign firms, and 
private enterprise) would no longer be allowed to conduct ion-adsorption rare earth 
smelting, and existing collectively owned and private smelters would be closed; 6. The 
State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group would assume primary responsibility in 
regulating the domestic market pricing and trade of ion-adsorption rare earth products, 
and individual market transactions would be prohibited. (PRC State Council, 1991)  
Besides restrictions on mining the ion-adsorption deposits in South China, the 
state also introduced restrictions on production of major rare earth primary products. 
Starting in 1990, production of three major primary products, Baiyun-Ebo rare earth 
                                                 
182 Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources was merged into the current Ministry of 
Land and Resources in 1998. 
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concentrates, ion-adsorption rare earth oxides, and rare earth chlorides183 were subject to 
production planning and volume control to promote both export and domestic industry 
growth. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1989)  
6.3.1.3 Shifting Regulatory Duties to Non-governmental Entities 
With deepening economic reform in the 1990s, the state experimented with using 
non-governmental corporate alliances to help coordinate industry production among 
major rare earth firms. In the 1993 State Council Reform, the State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group was abolished and its regulatory and planning functions were 
transferred to the State Planning Commission (SPC). The Leadership Group staff 
members joined the newly established Rare Earth Office under the State Planning 
Commission（国家计委稀土办公室）. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership 
Group, 1993) In 1994, the Association of China Rare Earth Industry (中国稀土行业协
会), spearheaded by Shanghai Yaolong Non-ferrous Metals Company, was established as 
a national-level social organization (社会团体）. As a non-government organization 
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, ACREI was set up to coordinate production 
and export volumes and pricing of its 45 corporate members. (Rare Earth Office of the 
State Planning Commission, 1994) The Association held annual meetings attended by 
representatives of corporate members as well as officials of the Rare Earth Office of the 
State Planning Commission, until it was abolished in 2001 for failing to complete 
required annual review for social organizations. (Hu, 2012) 
6.3.2 Trade Promotion and Regulation 
                                                 
183 Rare earth chlorides are hydrates which contain mixed rare earth elements, and are 
used primarily as low-cost source material from which highly enriched mixed REOs or 
highly purified single REOs can be extracted. 
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6.3.2.1 Trade Promotion 
With the launch of the Reform and Opening campaign, the state acted as a strong 
broker for trade deals between domestic suppliers and foreign buyers. In order to promote 
Chinese export, government officials organized trade missions, researched foreign 
markets and industrial policies, attended trade fairs, accompanied domestic producers on 
promotional tours in foreign companies. Notable state-led initiatives to open up the 
international markets are as follows. 
 West Germany: In 1979, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry organized a 
delegation of Chinese nonferrous metal experts to visit West Germany to 
study the local rare earth research institutes, production plants and 
manufacturing companies in the rare earth industry. (PRC Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry, 1979)  
 Japan: In 1980, Jiangxi Tungsten and Rare Earth Trading Delegation, headed 
by Liu Kai, then Vice Director General of the Department of Metallurgical 
Industry of the Jiangxi Province Government, visited Japan to promote metal 
products including the ion-adsorption rare earth products. It was the first time 
that China’s ion-adsorption rare earth products were showcased to the 
international market. (Liu & Guo, 1993) 
 U.S.: To open up the U.S. market, Baotou Steel Rare Earth Company attended 
an international trade fair in April 1983 held in Houston at the invitation of the 
U.S. Marine Technology Communication Center and presented 270 pieces of 
rare earth ores, alloys, compounds and other primary products during the 
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exhibition. It was the first time that Chinese rare earth products were 
showcased on an international exhibition. (BRIRE, 1983)  
 Britain, France, U.S. and Japan: In April 1985 the Ministry of Metallurgical 
Industry selected a group of 13 officials to conduct research visits in Britain, 
France, the U.S. and Japan and study rare earth industry development in these 
countries. This “Chinese Rare Earth Industry Technology and Trade Research 
Visit Group” (中国稀土工业技贸考察团 ) visited in total 36 rare earth 
companies, research institutes, universities, downstream companies and 
trading companies in the four countries. (PRC Ministry of Metallurgical 
Industry, 1985)  
 European region: In 1988 in order to promote Chinese export in the European 
market, the State Council Rare Earth Office and China Minmetals184 selected 
a group of experts to visit Netherlands on a trade mission sponsored by the 
Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries, 
commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The 
experts visited Philips and other large companies in downstream industries, 
bringing English-language video materials and sample products from Chinese 
producers, “begging the others to buy our rare earth products.” (Cui, 2011)   
                                                 
184 China Minmetals is a state-owned enterprise that was established in 1950 by the State 
Council to be in charge of metals import and export in the planned economy era. It 
continued to expand its trading business in the economic reform era, and is now directly 
controlled by the central government through the supervision by SASAC. China 
Minmetals was ranked as No. 192 in Fortune 500 Companies in 2013. For more 
information, see company website at http://www.minmetals.com.cn/wkjj/fzjs/ 
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Besides these state initiatives promoting trade, the introduction of full export tax 
rebate policy in 1985 for all export goods (PRC Ministry of Finance, 1985) also increased 
the overall competitiveness of Chinese exports in the late 1980s and the 1990s. 
6.3.2.2 Export Regulation 
While state initiatives and tax rebate policy helped drastically increase rare earth 
export, the state also quickly introduced regulations on eligibility of export, technology 
transfer, foreign investment, export volume and pricing starting in the late 1980s. 
 Export through three state-owned trading groups: 
In July 1987 The State Economic and Trade Commission mandated that rare earth 
products would only be exported through three trading companies controlled by the 
central government, including China Minmetals Import & Export Company (中国五金矿
产进出口总公司), China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company (中国有色金
属进出口总公司） and China Metallurgical Import & Export Company （中国冶金进
出口总公司）185. (PRC Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade186 & State Economic 
Commission, 1987) These three trading groups all had local subsidiaries, and export 
transactions with local producers were managed by their local subsidiaries in each 
province. In March 1989 the State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group announced that 
a 3-person coordination team consisting of one representative from each of the three 
                                                 
185 See the next subsection for the history and the company structure of the three 
companies. 
186 Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade was established in 1982 to be in charge of 
foreign trade. It was reshaped into the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation in 1993, and the latter was transferred to become part of the newly created 
Ministry of Commerce in the 2003 State Council reform. 
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trading groups would coordinate export prices of rare earth products. (PRC State Council 
Rare Earth Leadership Group & Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade, 1989)  
 Restrictions on foreign investment and joint ventures: 
Starting in July 1990 further regulations on rare earth export and foreign 
investment were implemented: 1. Any REE-related projects involving foreign investment 
would require the approval from both the State Council Rare Earth Leadership and the 
Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade; 2. Joint venture and foreign investment in ion-
adsorption rare earth mining would be prohibited; 3. Export of rare earth mining and 
element separation technologies would be prohibited; 4. Joint ventures and foreign 
investment in rare earth smelting (separation and purification) projects must have import 
of advanced technology and machinery from abroad, and they must be approved only by 
the State Council. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group et al, 1990) These 
regulations in effect shielded the industry upstream from possible foreign competition. 
 Export price and quota control on specific products: 
Starting in the late 1980s, the state also gradually introduced export pricing and 
quota control on specific rare earth products. The trend of increasing regulation was more 
apparent after 1989. This could be due to two reasons. Firstly, to enforce existing 
regulations on rare earth mining and production of specific rare earth products since the 
late 1980s, corresponding regulations on rare earth export would be necessary and cost-
effective for the state to implement, as most rare earth products with production 
restrictions in China were produced for export, and the eligibility of export were 
controlled by state-owned trading companies. Secondly, after the Tiananmen Square 
incident in June 1989, the U.S. and its allies enacted economic sanctions against China, 
173 
 
making it more difficult for Chinese companies to export their products to these 
countries. As a result, Chinese rare earth producers, particularly producers of ion-
adsorption rare earth products in South China who relied primarily on export sales, sold 
overstocked products to foreign buyers at exceedingly low prices. (PRC State Council 
Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1989; Ma, 1995) The lackluster export demand and low 
export prices lasting from 1989 to 1993 provided an impetus for the state to enact control 
over rare earth export. Major restrictions on specific rare earth product exports were as 
follows. 
1) Since March 1989 three types of rare earth products (Europium-rich mixed 
REOs187, Yttrium-rich mixed REOs188 and xenotime ores189) were subject to 
                                                 
187 Europium was in consistently high market demand to produce Europium-doped 
phosphors throughout the 1980s. Yttrium orthovanadate doped with Europium 
(YVO4:Eu
3+) was discovered in the 1960s to emit red light and has since become the red 
phosphor in cathode ray tubes in color TVs. Europium-doped phosphor (Y2O3:Eu
3+) was 
used as component of the fluorescent light developed in the 1970s and later the CFLs 
which dominated the efficient indoor lighting market. The Mountain Pass rare earth mine 
in California used to be the major producer of Europium before the 1980s, but the 
Baiyun-Ebo mine gradually grabbed global market share as the Baiyun-Ebo deposit had 
richer Europium content in its ores than the Mountain Pass deposit. For more information 
about Europium-doped phosphors, see Yen et al. (2007).  
188 Yttrium-rich REO had been used chiefly to produce phosphor in color TVs before the 
mid-1980s, but its market value had a significant spike in the late 1980s after the 
discovery of YBCO (Yttrium barium copper oxide) in 1987. YBCO was the first material 
ever discovered to become superconducting above the boiling point of liquid nitrogen (77 
K) at 93K. This made superconductive materials possible for mass consumption, as liquid 
nitrogen was a lot cheaper than liquid helium which was used prior for preparing 
superconductive materials. See the Encyclopedia Britannia entry for more information: 
http://www.britannica.com/science/yttrium-barium-copper-oxide. 
189 Xenotime’s major component is Yttrium orthophosphate, which was used primarily as 
the source material for extracting high-valued Yttrium, and also used as sources of 
extracting the less abundant, high-valued HREEs including Dysprosium (used in 
permanent magnets), Erbium (used as colorant for glass), and Gadolinium (used in 
medical imaging and in making green phosphors in color TVs). 
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export control. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group & Ministry 
of Foreign Economy and Trade, 1989) 
2) Starting in October 1991 ion-adsorption rare earth product (containing high-
valued HREEs) were subject to export control: the State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group would be responsible for drafting the export plan; the State 
Planning Commission would be responsible for implementing production 
plans to companies; China Minmetals Import & Export Company would be 
responsible for managing export contracts. (PRC State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group & State Planning Commission, 1991)  
3) Starting in April 1992, rare earth chlorides were subject to export control: the 
State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group would be responsible for the 
export plan; the State Planning Commission would be responsible for 
implementing corresponding production plans; the China Chamber of 
Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (中国五
矿化工进出口商会，CCMMC)190  would be responsible for coordinating 
minimum export FOB (Free on Board) price with the three major state-owned 
trading companies and two local independent trading subsidiaries in 
production regions (Gansu Minmetals Import & Export Company and Harbin 
Minmetals Import & Export Company which were granted independent export 
licenses). (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group Office, 1992)  
                                                 
190 China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & 
Exporters (CCMMC) was founded in 1988 as a quasi-governmental industry association 
for companies from the metals, mining, petrochemical, hardware and building materials 




4) In April 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade published further 
regulations for all rare earth products under export control. The measures were 
as follows: 1. export deals would be made through the three state-owned 
trading groups and transactions would be managed by their local subsidiaries; 
2. Minimum export FOB price would be managed by the CCMMC in 
coordination with the three trading groups; 3. export plans would be released 
by the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade, in consultation with the State 
Council Rare Earth Leadership Group; 4. Existing foreign-invested companies 
producing controlled rare earth products would need to apply to the Ministry 
of Foreign Economy and Trade for export licenses to export their own 
products. (PRC Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade, 1992)  
5) After the founding of the Association of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(ACREI), the CCMMC established the CCMMC Rare Earth Export 
Coordination Group (中国五矿化工进出口商会稀土出口协调小组) in 1997 
to coordinate export minimum prices of export-controlled products with the 
ACREI on behalf of ACREI’s corporate members. (Hong, 2001) 
6.3.3 Support for Research and Industry Upgrading 
The state high-level plans for the industry development followed early reform 
leader Fang Yi’s long-term vision of not only first rank globally in mining production and 
export, but also first rank in applications. The 7th National Five-Year Plan for Rare Earth 
Industry (1986-1990) made it a priority to “develop research and production of advanced 
rare earth applications and new materials (including phosphors, permanent magnets and 
lasers) for domestic consumption and export”. The plan set targets for major rare earth 
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applications, including annual production capacity of 200,000-250,000 tons for rare earth 
alloyed steel products, 20,000 tons for rare earth alloyed aluminum products, 20,000 tons 
for REE-enabled petrochemical catalysts, 500 tons for rare earth polishing powder, 200-
300 tons for REE-enabled permanent magnets, 30 tons for REE-enabled red phosphor 
powder and 50 tons for REE-enabled lighting powder. The plan also set the target of 200 
million USD in total revenue from export of rare earth applications. (PRC State 
Economic Commission et al, 1985)  
Besides high-level five-year planning, the central government provided robust 
institutional and funding support to develop both basic research capabilities and 
commercialization of REE-enabled advanced technologies. The Chinese Society of Rare 
Earths (CSRE) was established by the Chinese Association for Science and Technology 
in 1979 as a national-level research society for scientists and engineers working on REE-
related projects 191 . The 1979-1981 Rare Earth Application Promotion Plan and 
subsequently the 1983-1985 Rare Earth Industry Development Plan provided more than 
70 million RMB funding support for technology upgrading as well as basic research. By 
1985 over 300 research institutes and university research centers in China were involved 
in research projects on REE mining, smelting and applications, including 23 research 
institutes within the CAS. (Zhou, 1985)  In 1994 the State Planning Commission 
arranged a 3-million-dollar World Bank loan to be directed to the GRINM to establish the 
National Engineering Research Center for Rare Earth Materials192. In line with the reform 
of China’s S&T development system towards market-oriented institutions, research 
                                                 
191 For more information, see the introduction of the history of the CSRE at the CSRE 
website at http://www.cs-re.org.cn/rareearth/learnintroduce/introduction/. 




institutes across China started going through marketization reform to become or join for-
profit companies in the 1990s. In 1992 Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths, the 
largest rare earth research institute in China, was disintegrated from the Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry and became part of Baotou Iron & Steel Group.  
The rare earth industry also received support in technology upgrading through key 
national high-tech R&D programs spearheaded by the SSTC. The 863 Program has been 
China’s primary national high-tech R&D program from 1986 to develop and 
commercialize cutting-edge technologies of strategic importance193. REE-enabled NdFeB 
permanent magnets as well as REE-enabled NiMH batteries were selected among key 
projects under the “new materials” category in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1995-2000) of the 
863 Program. (He, 1997) Similarly, the China Torch Program, another national initiative 
implemented by the SSTC to promote technology commercialization since 1988, includes 
the development of national and provincial High-tech Industrial Development Zones as 
local high-tech industry clusters194. Among them, Baotou Rare Earth High-tech Industrial 
Development Zone was established as a national-level high-tech zone specifically to 
develop downstream high-tech applications utilizing rare earth resources from the nearby 
Baiyun-Ebo region.  
                                                 
193 The 863 Program was started in March 1986 with personal approval from the reforme 
leader Deng Xiaoping, and was implemented through three successive Five-Year Plans 
from 1986 to 2000. It was granted a 10 year renewal by the State Council from 2001 to 
2010. For more information about the 863 Program, see the program website at 
http://www.863.gov.cn. 
194 For more information about the China Torch Program, see the website of the current 
Torch High Technology Industry Development Center under the MOST at 
http://www.ctp.gov.cn/ and the website of the National High-tech Industrial Development 
Zones at http://www.ctp.gov.cn/gxq/index.shtml. 
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It should be noted that while the central government policies provided favorable 
policies and funding support for industry upgrading, specific projects were often initiated 
by the local governments. Take the founding of the Baotou Rare Earth High-tech 
Industrial Development Zone as an example. On October 30, 1989 Science and 
Technology Daily, a state newspaper jointly sponsored by the SSTC, COSTIND, CAS 
and CAST, published an article by a material science researcher J. Ping Liu195 entitled 
“Rare Earth Valley – High-tech Industry Sector of the 21st Century” . Liu argued that “in 
the near future, development and production of new REE-enabled materials would 
become a high-tech industry in the next several decades with huge growth prospect like 
the Silicon Valley in the U.S., and China should strive to use our resource advantage to 
develop cutting edge technologies and become the home of this revolutionary 
technological development, and avoid the old trap of exporting raw material to advanced 
countries and depending on advanced countries for imports of high-tech products.” (Liu, 
1989) Liu’s article generated significant interest in the Science and Technology 
Commission of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Commission officials copied 
the article to nearly a hundred government officials of Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region government and Baotou prefecture-level government, and officials held 
discussions on the prospect of building a “rare earth valley”. (Liu, 2014) Immediately 
Baotou Rare Earth High-tech Development Zone was established in 1990 and was 
granted the status of “National-level High-Tech Industrial Development Zone” in 1992. 
(PRC State Council, 1992)  
                                                 
195 J. Ping Liu is now Distinguished Professor in Department of Physics, University of 
Texas at Arlington, and is also an adjunct professor at Ningbo Institute of Materials 
Technology and Engineering of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
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The export and foreign investment control measures enacted by the state from late 
1980s also contributed to the state’s goal of moving up the value chain. As the previous 
subsection states, since 1990 all REE-related projects involving foreign investment would 
need to be approved by the State Council. The state banned foreign investment and joint 
venture in rare earth mining; yet the state allowed foreign investment in rare earth 
smelting with import of advanced technologies and machinery and encouraged foreign 
investment and joint venture in producing downstream applications. (Ye, 1989) Thus 
after 1990 foreign companies could only set up local subsidiaries or joint ventures to 
produce advanced products in the mid- and down-stream of the industry supply chain. 
This incentivized domestic companies to set up joint ventures in downstream industries 
and also protected domestic upstream mining companies from international competition 
in resources. (Hong, 2001) 
6.4 National-level Institutional Changes 
While the state introduced industry-specific policies, high-level plans and 
regulations to oversee the development of the rare earth industry, political institutional 
changes in this period also contributed to the strong growth of Chinese rare earth industry 
and influenced the effectiveness of Beijing’s new rules and regulations. This section 
analyzes the key changes in state political institutions and their influence on industry and 
market development in this period.  
6.4.1 State Council’s Bureaucratic Authority over Market Actors 




This subsection analyzes the bureaucratic institutions governing the SOEs in the 
rare earth industry. In this period of 1978 to 1997, major state-owned companies in the 
rare earth industry were subject to the authority of one of the following four “bureaucratic 
management systems” (行政管理体系 ) as detailed below. As the analysis shows, 
although the SOEs were in principle controlled by the central government, there was in 
practice a considerable degree of overlapping administrative control over enterprise 
management between central and local authorities. 
 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry (冶金工业部):  
The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry oversaw the development of China’s 
metallurgical industry in both the planned economy era and the economic reform era 
before it was abolished in the 1998 State Council Reform. Its industry focus in the 
planned economy era was steel production, known as “以钢为纲”. In the rare earth 
industry, the Ministry directly supervised Baotou Steel Rare Earth Company (包钢稀土), 
the mining company extracting REEs ad producing rare earth products from the Baiyun-
ebo Mine, through supervising its parent company Baotou Steel (包钢公司 ). The 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry also supervised leading national research institutes in 
metals and materials, including Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths (BRIRE) and 
General Research Institute for Non-ferrous Metals (GRINM).  
With the gradual liberalization of trade in China’s economic reform, the Ministry 
of Metallurgical Industry also established China Metallurgical Import & Export Company 
(中国冶金进出口总公司) as a separate state-owned “trading company for the industry” 
(工贸企业) to manage trade business for the SOEs under its control from 1980 until 
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1995196. China Metallurgical Import & Export Company was one of the three trading 
groups eligible to export rare earth products. In actual operation, while its head office 
（总公司）was directly supervised by the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, each local 
import & export subsidiary (进出口分公司) were run by the staff at the export division 
of the metallurgical company established by each provincial government, essentially “one 
company with two names” (一套机构二块牌子)197 . Thus although the head office 
directed the trade business of local subsidiaries, the bureaucratic supervision over local 
subsidiaries were shared between the head office and the local Bureaus of Metallurgical 
Industry ( 冶金工业局 ) officials in the provincial government who had primary 
supervisory power over the provincial-government metallurgical company. 
 China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation (中国有色金属工业总公
司)198:  
                                                 
196 In 1995 CMIEC was merged into Sinosteel Trading Group (中钢贸易), a subsidiary 
of Sino Steel Corporation (中钢集团). Sino Steel Corporation was controlled by the 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry before 1998 and its successor State Bureau of 
Metallurgical Industry before 1999. Since 1999 Sino Steel has been an SOE directly 
supervised by the central government.  For more information, see its website at 
http://www.sinosteel.com/ 
197 For example, see the description in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Chronicles-
Foreign Trade Chronicle (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Chronicle 
Editorial Commission Office, 1996) about the establishment of the Guangxi Subsidiary of 
the China Metallurgical Import & Export Company in 1981 along with the establishment 
of the Guangxi Province Bureau of Metallurgical Industry Materials Company as “one 
company, two names”. Also see the description in Guangdong Province Chronicles-
Metallurgical Industry Chronicle (Guangdong Province Local Chronical Editorial 
Commission Office, 1996) about the establishment of the Guangdong Province 
Subsidiary of the China Metallurgical Import & Export Company in 1980 along with the 
establishment of the Guangdong Province Metallurgical Industry Import & Export 
Company as “one company, two names”. 
198 For an authoritative overview of the development of the China National Non-ferrous 
Metals Industry Corporation in the 1980s, see Fei (1990). Fei Ziwen was the Chief 
Manager General of the China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation. 
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Due to overriding emphasis on iron and steel production, the Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry transferred the supervision of almost all non-ferrous metal (metals 
excluding iron, chromium and manganese) mining and smelting plants to the local 
governments in the 1960s. (Fei, 1990, p.5) Thus at the onset of the economic reform, the 
central government found itself without direct control of production plants in the non-
ferrous metal industries. In 1983 the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry requested the 
State Council to establish China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation as the 
overarching SOE consisting of all local production entities in non-ferrous metals 
production.  
Though not a political entity, China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry 
Corporation as a national SOE had the same bureaucratic rank with the State Council 
ministries and was directly responsible for managing the non-ferrous metals industry for 
the State Council. (Fei, 1990, p.8) In each province the company set up a local subsidiary 
supervising all local non-ferrous metals companies. Such a centralized bureaucratic 
system known to industry professionals as “Non-ferrous Metals Industry System” (有色
金属工业系统) was in place, until it was abolished in 1998 State Council Reform. In 
accordance with the development strategy of “industry combined with trade” (工贸结合) ，
China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation also established a second-tier 
company, China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company (中国有色金属进出口
总公司) in 1984. China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company covered non-
ferrous metal trade of the “Non-ferrous Metals Industry System”. Each local subsidiary 
of the China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company managed the import and 
export business for the local subsidiary of the China National Non-ferrous Metals 
183 
 
Industry Corporation in each province. (China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export 
Company, 1992) China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company was one of the 
three eligible state-owned trading groups to export rare earth products after 1987. 
For the rare earth industry, in principle almost all mining and smelting business 
outside of Baotou Steel and its subsidiaries should be controlled by the China National 
Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation. In actual local operation however, the local 
subsidiaries did not have control over all local non-ferrous metals companies. For 
instance, the Nanchang Subsidiary Company 199  supposedly should oversee all non-
ferrous metal companies in Jiangxi Province (major province in South China producing 
HREEs), but only had control over major state-owned tungsten, tantalum and niobium 
companies200.  
 Ministry of Nuclear Engineering Industry (核工业部) & China National Nuclear 
Company (CNNC,中国核工业总公司):  
The third bureaucratic system that oversaw part of rare earth production and 
research projects in China was controlled by the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering 
Industry and later China National Nuclear Company. China’s rare earth industry had 
close relationship with the nuclear industry due to two reasons. Firstly, from a technical 
perspective, rare earth ores in China are classified as “Minerals Associated with 
Radionuclides” ( 伴生放射性矿 ). The rare earth concentrates contain radioactive 
                                                 
199 Nanchang is the capital of Jiangxi Province. 
200 For more information, see the history of the Nanchang Company of the China 
National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation at the website of Jiangxi Rare Metals 
& Tungsten Corporation at 
http://www.jxtc.com.cn/jituangaikuang/bainianjiangwu(dashiji).  Jiangxi Rare Metals & 
Tungsten Corporation was formed as a provincial-government-owned SOE after the 
China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation was abolished in 1998 and its 
offices transferred to local governments. 
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elements including Thorium (Th) and Uranium (U) at levels higher than natural 
background radiation. The rare earth concentrates from the Baiyun-ebo deposit contain as 
much as 0.18-0.30% ThO2. (Wang, 2008) Thus REE mining and smelting, as well as the 
production of highly-enriched REE products require the expertise of nuclear industry 
professionals to handle radioactivity. Secondly, from a historical perspective, the 
Ministry of Nuclear Engineering Industry’s predecessor, the Second Ministry of Machine 
Building (第二机械工业部 ), supported the development of REE-enabled defense 
weapon technologies in the planned economy era. The Second Ministry of Machine 
Building oversaw China’s nuclear sector from 1958 to 1982 and worked closely with the 
PLA and the NDSTC in supervising military-affiliated nuclear industry plants and 
military research programs. 
China National Nuclear Company grew out of the split of the Ministry of Nuclear 
Engineering Industry in the State Council reform in 1988. Ministry of Nuclear 
Engineering Industry oversaw China’s nuclear industry development from 1982 until it 
was abolished in 1988. After the abolishment of the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering 
Industry in 1998, its administrative functions of supervising the nuclear market were 
absorbed by the State Planning Commission, though on the surface the administrative 
duty was transferred to the short-lived Ministry of Energy (能源部) in 1988-1993. 201 The 
industrial plants controlled by the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering were transformed into 
                                                 
201 The Ministry of Energy was established in the 1988 State Council Reform to merge 
the administrative functions of four energy-related ministries, Ministry of Nuclear 
Industry, Ministry of Petroleum Industry, Ministry of Hydro Power, and Ministry of Coal 
Industry. It was abolished in 1993 due to the lack of administrative power, as it had no 
authority over the SOE spin-offs from the previous four ministries independently 
controlled by the State Council, as well as no control over industry pricing and 
investment which were then still governed by the State Planning Commission. (Lin, 2012)  
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one SOE, China National Nuclear Corporation (中国核工业总公司) in 1988. As an SOE 
directly supervised by the central government, China National Nuclear Company enjoyed 
ministry-level rank in the political system202.  
The China National Nuclear Corporation had supervisory power over a few 
production plants with REE separation and production lines as well as military research 
institutes with rare earth research programs. (Rare Earth Office of the China National 
Nuclear Company, 1995) Notably one nuclear plant, Baotou 202 Plant (包头 202 厂) 
started producing rare earth metals, phosphors and permanent magnets from the Baiyun-
ebo rare earth concentrates since 1988. In the 8th Five-Year (1990-1995) period, China 
National Nuclear Corporation devoted 13.8 million RMB to rare earth research programs 
and 14 million RMB to technology upgrading of rare earth production facilities. (Rare 
Earth Office of the China National Nuclear Company, 1995)  
 China Minmetals Import & Export Company (中国五金矿产进出口总公司):  
Though not a rare earth production company, China Minmetals deserves 
independent analysis as an important SOE in China’s rare earth industry. China 
Minmetals Import & Export Company (中国五金矿产进出口总公司) was established 
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade (对外贸易部) in 1950 as an SOE monopolizing the 
import and export of metal products. Technically speaking, China Minerals was an 
independent SOE directly reporting to the State Council. In actual business operations 
and bureaucratic appointments, China Minmetals was part of the monopolistic foreign 
trade system maintained by the Ministry of Foreign and Economy and Trade in the 
                                                 
202 For more information about the history of the nuclear industry development and 
CNNC in China, see the review of 60 years of nuclear industry development at the China 
National Nuclear Corporation website at http://www.cnnc.com.cn/tabid/910/Default.aspx 
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planned economy era and since 1982 its successor Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (对外经济贸易合作部).  
China Minmetal’s trading business significantly declined in the 1980s. The 
central government gradually scraped the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade 
Cooperation’s monopolistic power over import and export rights. China Minmetals faced 
strong competition from new metal trading groups backed by two other bureaucratic 
systems with ties to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, China Non-ferrous 
Metallurgical Industry Company and China Metallurgical Import & Export Company. 203  
The 1988 “Reform of the Foreign Trade Institution” (外贸体制改革) further 
forced all local subsidiaries of the SOEs belonging to the foreign trade system of the 
planned economy era to become independent local trading companies with no ties to the 
head office. (PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 1988) Thus 
China Minmetals Import & Export Company lost supervisory power of all its local 
trading subsidiaries to the local governments. China Minmetals was able to retain its staff 
at head office. China Minmetals established a group of second-tier companies with staff 
members from each bureau of the head office and started acquiring metal production 
companies to complement its trading business. (Zhou, 2005)  
6.4.1.2 Devolution of Bureaucratic Authority on Local Economic Affairs 
Besides the overlapping of bureaucratic control between central and local 
authorities over SOE management in the rare earth industry, another important factor 
within state political institutions influencing the state-industry relationship in this period 
                                                 
203 For more information about the history of the development of the China Minmetals 
Import & Export Company in the economic reform, see a review of the company’s 60 




concerned the devolution of bureaucratic authority on local economic affairs. This 
subsection analyzes the devolution of bureaucratic authority on economic matters and its 
influence on industry development in local regions. 
With the gradual dismantling of the central planning in the Reform and Opening 
Campaign, local governments were granted the authority of reviewing and approving new 
local industrial projects and supervising local companies except those that were directly 
controlled by the central government. (Huang, 1996, p.656) The devolution of authority 
over project approval granted the local government significant leeway in developing rare 
earth mining and smelting projects in their own regions. In China the state owns the 
minerals and the government grants mining project to specific companies or 
individuals204. The PRC Constitution Article 9 states that “mineral resources, waters, 
forests, mountains, grasslands, bare lands, wetlands and other natural resources are all 
owned by the state.” The PRC Constitution Article 10 states that “land is owned either by 
the state or by public collectives.” Yet in actual practice, as marketization began to take 
shape in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s, mining was conducted not only by 
state-owned mining enterprises (国营矿山), but also by local rural mining cooperatives 
(集体联办矿山) and individual mining persons (个人采矿者) who then sold the ores to 
state-owned non-ferrous metal companies or directly to local smelting companies. In 
addition, in the early and mid-1980s then central Party leader Hu Yaobang205 waged a 
policy campaign of developing mining to alleviate poverty in poor regions, with slogans 
                                                 
204 This is different from the U.S. where the owner of the surface land also owns the right 
to extract minerals from underneath the land. 
205 Hu Yaobang was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1982 
to 1987. Hu was a liberal-leaning leader and was credited with implementing many 
market reform policies in the 1980s.  
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of “Larger Production at Big Mines, More Open Production at Small Mines, Swifter 
Extraction of Available Resources” (大矿大开，小矿放开，有水快流) and “State, 
Cooperatives and Individuals All In” (国家、集体、个人一起上). (Li, 1984) Thus 
before investment and production regulations on the rare earth industry were introduced 
starting in the late 1980s, local governments could add new mining, smelting and 
applications projects quickly, facilitating the expansion of local industry capacity. Under 
Hu’s campaign, local companies all rushed into mining and smelting for quick profits, 
often even without appropriate project reviews and approvals as long as local 
governments allowed their projects to operate. (Hu et al, 2010) 
The introduction of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1986 established the institution of mining rights (矿业权) in China and closed the legal 
loophole for unlicensed mining. The Mineral Resources Law legislated that “state 
ownership of mineral resources, either near the earth's surface or underground, shall not 
change with the alteration of ownership or right to the use of the land which the mineral 
resources are attached to”206. The Mineral Resources Law required the mining companies 
to acquire mining rights in the form of mining licenses from the state, including both 
exploration rights (探矿权) and extraction rights (采矿权)207. Rural cooperatives and 
individual mining persons also had to acquire mining licenses (采矿许可证) from the 
state to conduct mining activities in compliance with the law. Before rare earth mining 
                                                 
206 See the fulltext of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34342.htm 
207 These mining companies constitute the primary tier market (初级市场）for mining 
rights, and were not allowed to trade mining rights with other companies legally before 
1996. The 1996 Amendment allows limited transfer of mining rights to other companies, 
which now constitute a second tier market (二级市场) for mining rights. 
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were subject to state control, local companies could obtain mining licenses from the local 
Bureaus of Geology and Mineral Resources at local governments. After state control over 
mining ion-adsorption deposits in South China was introduced in 1991, local companies 
mining such deposits had to seek approval from the Rare Earth Leadership Group under 
the State Council (prior to 1993) /State Economic Commission (after 1993) and obtain 
mining licenses from the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources. 
Besides the devolution of authority over project approval and company 
supervision, the devolution of authority over tax and budget from 1978 until the “Tax 
Sharing Reform” (分税制改革) in 1994 also incentivized local governments to expand 
local industry production and trade. In the planned economy era the central government 
set spending priorities and approved local budgets. Taxation was primarily levied on 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with no personal or corporate income tax or resource tax. 
A revenue sharing system allowed the central government to redistribute collected 
revenues to fund local expenditures of less developed regions. In the reform era, the 
revenue sharing system gradually broke down with dwindling central government 
revenues due to the decline of the state sector in the economy. Local governments had 
primary authority over local budgets, and they increasingly had to bear the primary 
burden of financing the budget with local revenues. (Wong, 2000, p.5) At the same time, 
lagging tax administration allowed businesses of many rapidly growing non-state entities 
to be untaxed or undertaxed by the central government, including exports, foreign direct 
investment and extraction of natural resources. (Wong, 2000, p.6) The 1996 Amendment 
to the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China legislated that mining 
companies must provide compensation to the state through resource tax (资源税) and 
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resource compensation fee (资源补偿费). Before this amendment was enacted, mining 
companies did not have to pay resource tax or compensation to the central government. 
Given no resource compensation to the central government and the acute need to generate 
revenue to cover local expenditures, rare earth mining and smelting usually became the 
foremost options of developing the local economy for local cadres in regions with the 
resources. (Su, 2009) Combined with strong state support for the rare earth industry 
development and low market entry barrier, such institutional changes provided authority 
as well as incentive for local governments to rapidly expand the local rare earth industry 
capacity. 
6.4.2 Changes in Local Cadre Management System 
Internal institutional changes in China’s cadre management system also had 
indirect influence on state-industry relationship and contributed to the rapid expansion of 
rare earth industry. The Department of Organization (DOO) under the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (中共中央组织部) is the primary agency in charge of 
managing cadres and party members in China. Before 1983 the DOO followed a “two-
level downward” (管理下两级机构) model where the party authorities managed cadres 
at the next two lower levels. (Department of Organization of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China, 1980) Thus the Central Committee not only directly 
appointed central ministry-level and bureau-level cadres and chief management personnel 
of SOEs, but also directly appointed local party leaders and cadres at both provincial (省、
市、自治区）and prefecture (市、州、盟）  levels. Such a system was crucial to 
administrative centralization in the planned economy era. (Xin, 1984)  
6.4.2.1 “One-level Downward” Cadre Management 
191 
 
Since 1983, the DOO has switched to a “one-level Downward” (下管一级) model 
where the party authorities would only appoint and remove cadres at the next lower level. 
(Department of Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
1983) For local authorities, the central party committee would only appoint provincial-
level cadres; local party committee of each administrative level would appoint cadres at 
the immediate lower level. This change in cadre management system was designed to 
increase efficiency in administrative appointments and decision making. In practice 
greater local authority in personnel management led excessive nepotism and 
concentration of decision making within local governments. (Manion, 1985)  
To curb localism and nepotism in cadre promotion, the DOO has implemented 
“dual management” (双重管理) since 1991 complementing the “one-level downward” 
model. (Department of Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, 1991) Central bureaus in key areas of governance would manage the local bureaus 
personnel jointly with the local party committee of the corresponding level. According to 
He (2013), customs (海关）, quarantine inspection (检疫） and national taxation（国税） 
have been under “vertical management” ( 垂 直 管 理 ) ， meaning the central 
ministries/bureaus have primary power of managing personnel at all local bureaus. 
Security (安全）and local taxation (地税）have been under “vertical management below 
the provincial level”, meaning that the provincial-level local bureaus directly manage 
personnel of local lower-level bureaus. Most other governance areas, including major 
ones critical to industry development, such as construction (建设）, finance (财政）, 
industry and commerce (工商), land and natural resources (国土), party organization (组
织), supervision (监察) and auditing (审计) have been under “Kuai Kuai (Horizontal) 
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Management” (块块管理). The local party committee has major power over personnel 
management in local government bureaus of these areas; the ministry/bureau of the 
immediate higher level in the administrative hierarchy has supplemental power in 
personnel management. In personnel appointment of local bureaus, Local party 
committee need to consult with the corresponding higher-level ministry/bureau. (He, 
2013) In actual practice in the 1990s, “dual management” of personnel in these “Kuai 
Kuai Management” bureaus were less than successful. In some regions it became 
practically just local-level personnel management, because higher-level bureaus were not 
informed of appointment decisions, or were reluctant to carry on the burdening of 
reviewing local personnel performance and appointments; In some other regions it 
became two separate rounds of personnel reviews by the higher-level bureaus and the 
local party committees rather than joint decision making. (Yang, 1996) In Fujian 
Province for instance, as much as 30% of local industry and commerce bureau cadre 
appointments did not involve the higher-level industry and commerce bureaus. (Yang, 
1996) Therefore under “dual management” local party committees/governments still had 
considerable power in cadre management in areas of governance that were critical to 
industry development.  
6.4.2.2 Cadre Evaluation Biased towards Local Economic Performance 
The criteria for cadre performance evaluation and promotion is an important 
factor in cadre management. In the 1980s and the 1990s the performance evaluation in 
annual local cadre reviews208 and in cadre promotion decisions relied heavily on local 
                                                 
208 DOO started imposing regular review of cadres in 1979, and formalized the scheme of 
annual reviews of local cadres by local governments in 1988. (Department of 
Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1988) 
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economic growth statistics. Strong figures such as high local GDP and revenues, strong 
investments and high employment became the fast track to get promoted, whereas other 
aspects of development such as project success rate, public infrastructure and 
environmental record were less emphasized. (Jiang, 2003) Competition between cadres of 
different regions resembling a “promotion tournament” (晋升锦标赛）could determine 
the promotion or termination of a cadre’s tenure; therefore local cadres were in fierce 
competition to bring as much industry projects and investment to their own regions as 
possible. (Hu, 1997; Quan, 2003; Zhou, 2007)  
It should be noted though that such bias in cadre review and promotion was 
consistent with the overall emphasis of the state on high-speed economic development. In 
the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), the State Council led by then Premier Zhao Ziyang 
put 44% GNP growth and 35% trade value growth in five years as the primary goal in 
economic development. (Xinhua, 2005a) In the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), the State 
Council led by then Premier Li Peng put 6% annual GNP growth as the primary goal (Li, 
1991). In the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and the 2010 Vision Plan, the State Council 
led by Li Peng declared the goal of “doubling the GNP level of Year 1980 by Year 2000” 
and “doubling the GNP level of Year 2000 by Year 2010.” (Xinhua, 2005b) In 
accordance with the central five-year plans, many local governments at provincial and 
prefecture levels put GDP/GNP growth (usually double digit annual growth) as the 
primary target in local five-year plans.  
This institutional handling of career rewards and punishments based on economic 
output and investments created additional incentive for local cadres to expand local 
industry production, investment and export. As cadre promotion was usually a zero-sum 
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game between local cadres of the lower level, it also led to widespread protectionism in 
order to guarantee profits of local companies, duplication of investment and industry 
projects across regions, as well as underselling of land and resources in order to attract 
investment. (Quan, 2003; Zhou, 2004) When central authorities imposed regulations on 
industry output and investment, local government cadres in some regions intentionally 
created fraudulent local industry statistics to satisfy regulations, while still extending 
protection to non-compliant practices in the local industry in order to maintain high 
economic growth and local employment. (Chen, 1994) 
6.4.2.3 Cadre Monitoring and Evaluation 
The central government established auditing and discipline inspection institutions 
to monitor and evaluate the performance of central ministries and local governments, yet 
their effectiveness was still constrained by issues in “dual management” cadre system. 
The State Council established the State Auditing Administration (审计署) in 1983 to 
audit and supervise state finances, including finances of all other ministries. Local 
auditing offices were also established to audit and supervise finances of local 
governments. (Yi, 2002) The State Council also re-established the Ministry of 
Supervision (MOS, 监察部）in 1987 to monitor the conduct of cadres and discipline 
cadres with illegal conduct. Since 1993 the Ministry of Supervision and all local bureaus 
of MOS have had joint office (合署办公）  with the CPC Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (中共中央纪律检查委员会）and all its local discipline inspection 
commissions as one single political entity for discipline inspection and inspection209. The 
                                                 
209 For more information, see the website of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection – State Council Ministry of Supervision at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/. 
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Discipline Inspection and Supervision Institution (纪检监察体制）included the central 
committee, local bureaus of supervision/commissions of discipline inspection at each 
local level of bureaucracy, as well as offices of discipline inspection in SOEs, public 
institutions and social organizations.  
Because the auditing and supervision departments were subject to “Kuai Kuai 
Management” in dual management, local cadre supervision and finance auditing were 
unlikely to be highly effective. The local inspecting and auditing personnel were 
primarily managed by the local party committees, resulting in the conflict of monitoring 
the performance of local cadre who would manage their own personnel appointment, thus 
an inherent incapability of good monitoring. (Dong, 1998) In addition, the administrative 
expenditures of performing cadre inspections and financial audits were borne by the local 
government. The inspectors and auditors were made hostage to dwindling local 
government expenditures in poor regions, and they often lacked support from the local 
government if unfavorable results were presented to the higher level. (Yi, 2002) 
Therefore, non-compliance of central policies and regulation was hard to be detected. 
6.4.3 Intellectual Property Rights Laws Promoting Technology Transfer 
Finally, a key political institution that influenced development in the rare earth 
industry in China was the unique intellectual property rights (IPR) institution in China in 
the 1980s and the 1990s. When the economic reform started in 1978, there were no 
institutions in China protecting the IPR, as the state claimed rights to all technology 
resources and the notion of private property did not exist.  
The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China was introduced in 1984 and 
implemented in 1985. (PRC National People’s Congress, 1984) This 1985 Patent Law 
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differed from patent regulations adopted in western countries in several aspects discussed 
below.  
1) The patent law was designed by the state to not only “protect the legitimate 
rights of the patentee and encourage creations and innovations”, but also 
“advance the application of inventions and creations, enhance innovation 
capability and promote the progress of science and technology and the 
development of economy and society” 210 . This Article remains to be the 
Article 1 of the current PRC Patent Law. Thus the fundamental goal of the 
state in implementing IPR protection was not to build and reward a privileged 
group of inventors and set up a high bar for market entry, but to promote the 
adoption of new technologies for economic development.  
2) Unlike most western countries in which patents strictly belong to an 
individual or one enterprise, the 1985 Patent Law stipulated in Article 14 that 
“Where any patent for invention, belonging to any state-owned enterprise or 
institution, is of great significance to the interest of the State or to the public 
interest, the competent departments concerned under the State Council and the 
people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities 
directly under the central government may, after approval by the State Council, 
decide that the patented invention be spread and applied within the approved 
limits, and allow designated entities to exploit that invention. The exploiting 
entity shall, according to the regulations of the State, pay a fee for exploitation 
to the patentee. Where any patent for invention, belonging to any cooperative 
                                                 
210 Excerpts of Article 1 of the PRC Patent Law of 1985.  
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enterprises and individuals, is of great significance to the interest of the State 
or to the public interest, the same rule applies after request by relevant State 
Council ministries and approval by the State Council. ” 211  This article 
essentially created legal space for state-owned companies, state-affiliated 
research institutes, cooperative enterprises and individuals to share patented 
technologies with each other for a usage fee. According to then Head of the 
PRC Patent Bureau Huang Kunyi, this article in practice also banned the state-
owned companies and research institutes from withholding transfer of 
technologies to other state-affiliated entities in industries considered to be of 
significance to the state. (Huang, 1983) This Article was only amended in 
2008 to remove the clause concerning cooperative enterprises and individuals. 
(PRC National People’s Congress, 2008) It was not fully removed until the 
2010 Amendment to the PRC Patent law. (PRC State Council, 2010a) 
3) The 1985 Patent Law did not give patent right holders the right to ban other 
companies or individuals to import patented technologies or products made 
with patented technologies. This was only granted in Article 11 of the 1992 
Amendment to the Patent Law. (PRC National People’s Congress, 1992) The 
absence of the right to exclude imports of a patented product in the 1985 
Patent Law allowed parallel imports for Chinese companies and thus 
promoted the adoption of advanced foreign technologies in China. It also 
prevented the possibility of one single Chinese company or one single foreign 
company subsidiary from monopolizing imported technologies.  
                                                 
211 Excerpts of Article 14 of the PRC Patent Law of 1985.  
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4) The 1985 Patent Law ruled that the time limit of protection of invention 
patents in China is 15 years, and for product design patents the time limit is 5 
years with a 3-year extension available pending application212. This was less 
than the 20-year limit common in most western countries. The 1992 
amendment changed the limit to 20 years for invention patents and 10 years 
for design patents. It should be noted though that in drafting their first patent 
laws, most less-developed countries adopted time limits of patent protection 
shorter than the time limits allowed by patent laws in advanced western 
countries, thus China was following the norm. (Zheng, 1984) 
These legal differences promoting domestic transfer among state-affiliated market 
actors and the import of advanced foreign technologies were vital to the expansion of rare 
earth production in China. In addition, the relaxed enforcement of IPR in China failed to 
assign rights where they were necessary. There was little awareness of IPR among 
Chinese scientists and engineers, and infringement of intellectual property was not 
strictly persecuted. This resulted in almost free transfer of advanced rare earth 
technologies across the industry. As Prof. Xu Guangxian illustrated, “in the 1980s and the 
1990s, scientists thought that since our funding for research came from the state, our 
R&D products would also be provided free of charge to state-owned companies. The plan 
at that time was to only promote our rare earth separation technology in the three state-
owned rare earth companies, Baotou Steel & Rare Earth Company, Shanghai Yaolong 
Chemical and Guangdong Zhujiang Rare Earth Processing Plant. Because of the cost of 
entry for rare earth industry at that time was very low, and the profit margin was very 
                                                 
212 Excerpts from Article 45 of the Patent Law of 1985. 
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high, many local-government-controlled companies and private companies also started 
operation. The state-owned companies had low wages, whereas local companies and 
private companies offered very high wages, and some senior engineers were hired by 
these companies. They took all the technologies with them.” (Ouyang, 2009) This almost 
free flow of advanced technologies provided huge cost advantage to the rare earth 
industry in the early period of development. Yet on the other hand, the lack of strong 
institutional protection of IPR hindered the shift of R&D responsibility towards the 
corporate sector, part of the state-driven marketization process of China’s S&T 
institutions. According to a report by the Bureau of Intellectual Property of the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region Government, most domestic rare earth companies were 
reluctant to contribute significant revenues to investment in cutting-edge R&D, as new 
technologies were quick to be copied by other companies. (Li, 2005) 
Aside from these broad institutional differences affecting industry production, one 
specific difference in China’s IPR law compared to the IPR laws of Japan and the U.S. 
unexpectedly changed the market dynamic for rare earth permanent magnets in China. 
The PRC Patent Law stipulates that the “right of priority” (优先权) for patent filing for 
technologies which are already published or awarded patents outside of China would 
extend to one year in maximum, even when the filers are the same 
institution/individuals213. This no exemption rule was designed to follow the European 
Patent Convention, instead of the rules in U.S. and Japan which allowed exemption from 
the rule for the same institutional/individual patent filer. (Sundial Intellectual Property 
Law Firm, 2014) This difference, when applied to the rare earth permanent magnets, led 
                                                 
213 See Article 22 of the PRC Patent Law.  
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to foreign companies unable to capture the rapidly growing Chinese market exclusively. 
The Japanese company Sumitomo Special Metals Corporation (SSMC) and the U.S. 
company Magnequench (MQ) independently invented the techniques of producing 
sintered NdFeB magnetic powder in 1982. The two companies filed patents to produce 
and sell sintered NdFeB magnets in the U.S., Japan and Europe in 1983, and they reached 
a cross-licensing agreement on patent rights. When the Patent Law started to be 
implemented in China in 1985, both SSMC and MQ applied for patents for the NdFeB 
magnetic powder in China. Yet because 1985 was already two years after 1983, the 
patent applications from both SSMC and MQ were rejected on the ground of no right of 
priority. (He & Wang, 2007) This coincidental time lag prevented SSMC or MQ to claim 
exclusive rights over the production or sales of NdFeB magnets in China. As a result, 
Chinese companies were able to produce or sell NdFeB magnets within China, although 
they were prohibited from selling their products to Japan, Europe or the U.S. without 
paying licensing fees to the patent holders.  
6.5 Industry Development Outcomes 
The previous sections analyze the macroeconomic environment and the various 
components of state reregulation in industry and market development, including 
reregulation goals and narratives, industry-specific policies and regulations, as well as 
political institutional changes from 1978 to 1997. This section analyzes the outcomes of 
state reregulation in comparison with the state’s goals and policy targets. Industry 
development outcomes are assessed in four areas: industry production, international trade, 
market structure and environmental and social impact. 
6.5.1 Industry Production  
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6.5.1.1 Mine Production 
China’s rare earth mining output has advanced to a dominant position in global 
production in the merely twenty years from 1978 to 1997. According to then Vice 
Director of the State Planning Commission Ye Qing, China’s rare earth mining 
production increased from 66 tons in 1980 to 8500 tons in 1988, an increase of 127 times 
in merely 8 years. (Ye, 1989) Figure 26 presents China’s output of rare earth 
concentrates214 (稀土精矿) relative to the U.S. (previously the major producer in the 
world) and the rest of the world from 1987215 to 1997216. China’s production volume of 
                                                 
214 Production volume of rare earth concentrates in the metric of REO tons is usually used 
by geologists as a metric for rare earth mining production, as the statistic measures the 
output of ores that have gone through refinement process which removed other coexisting 
metals and impurities, but have not been smelted or processed into rare earth products. 
Using the REO unit allows the calculation to be consistent in the chemical forms across 
different kinds of rare earth concentrates, making the calculation standardized for 
comparison across products and countries. In official calculation by the State Council 
Rare Earth Leadership Group, rare earth concentrates include ores from the Baotou 
Baiyun ebo Mine (包头精矿), ionic-adsorption REOs in South China (离子型混合稀土
氧化物), bastnasite deposit in Shandong Province (山东氟碳铈矿), as well as monazite 
deposits (独居石), xenotime deposits (磷钇矿)and REE-rich tailings (稀土富渣). 
Production volume of rare earth concentrates is also sometimes referred to in Chinese as 
“production volume of rare earth ore products” (稀土矿产品产量). It is necessary to 
differentiate it from another commonly used statistic, production volume of rare earth 
products (稀土商品产量/稀土产品产量), which measures the volume of rare earth 
products in commercial forms (in REO ton units or in short ton units). The latter is often 
used by industry analysts to determine the amount of rare earths available on the market 
for immediate consumption or stockpiling. 
215 There was no official statistics of production volume of rare earth concentrates before 
1987. The National Rare Earth Leadership Group was established in 1986, when its 
predecessor, National Rare Earth Application Promotion Leadership Group was 
disintegrated from the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and became affiliated with the 
Bureau of Heavy Industries under the State Economic Commission. The Group started 
reporting production volume of rare earth concentrates in the Annual Reviews of Chinese 
Rare Earth Industry (中国稀土年评) in 1987. Some industry publications have 
mistakenly used another statistic, production volume of rare earth products (published 
annually in relevant ministry/official publications since 1978) as the statistic for rare 
earth concentrates.  
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rare earth concentrates was already larger than the U.S. in 1987. In 1988 China’s 
production volume of rare earth concentrates (29,640 tons in REO unit) accounted for 66% 
of global rare earth concentrate output, surpassing the highest annual production volume 
of the U.S. in history (25,314 tons in REO unit in 1984). Although China’s mining output 
stagnated in 1989-1992, after 1994 China’s output grew to encompass over 60% of global 
production volume of rare earth concentrates. In 1997 China’s rare earth concentrate 




                                                                                                                                                 
216 Chemical processing at the Mountain Pass Mine, major U.S. rare earth mine was 
stopped in 1998 after wastewater leaks. Thus after 1998, there was no new production of 
rare earth concentrates in the U.S. 
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Figure 26 Production Volume of Rare Earth Concentrates by China, U.S. and the 
Rest of the World (ROW) in 1987-1997217 
 
6.5.1.2 Smelting Production 
China has also become the world’s leading producer of rare earth smelting 
products. Figure 27 shows China’s production volume of rare earth smelting products218 
(稀土冶炼分离产品, also often referred to simply as “rare earth products”), rising from 
merely 1000 tons in 1978 to 46500 tons (excluding permanent magnets and fluorescent 
materials) in 1997. Besides China, other countries with sizable rare earth smelting 
production included Japan, France and the U.S. A comparison can be made between 
China and another major rare earth smelter, Japan. As Figure 28 shows, China’s 
production volume increased at a much faster rate than Japan; by 1997, China’s 
production volume was almost 10 times of Japan’s production volume. It is difficult to 
estimate the global production volume of rare earth smelting products, as the U.S. and 
France do not publish their national production statistics. 
                                                 
217 China statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评) published by the Rare Earth Leadership Group in the central 
government (the exact name of the group went through several changes due to affiliation 
with different ministries/commissions over time) from 1987 to 1997. U.S. rare earth 
concentrate production statistics are extracted from the Minerals Yearbooks published 
every year by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, and later by the U.S. Geological Survey after the 
closure of U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1996. Rest of the World rare earth concentrate 
production statistics are calculated by subtracting the volume of China’s production and 
U.S. production from total global production volume of rare earth concentrates. The total 
global rare earth concentrate production volume statistics are extracted from the Minerals 
Yearbooks published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines/U.S. Geological Survey. 
218 This statistic is also referred to as “production volume of rare earth products” (稀土产
品产量) or “production volume of rare earth smelting and processing products” (稀土冶
炼分离产品产量) in the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry. This statistic is 
often used to measure the production volume of the rare earth industry in a country, as it 
measures the production volume of products that can be used in industrial processes to 








                                                 
219 China statistics are extracted from the China Society of Rare Earths Yearbook 2007 
(中国稀土学会年鉴 2007) and the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中
国稀土年评) from 1986 to 1996. Before 1996 China’s calculation of production volume 
of rare earth smelting products included Samarium Cobalt rare earth permanent magnets 
and rare earth fluorescent materials. After 1996 rare earth permanent magnets and rare 









6.5.1.3 Production of Higher-value Products 
Overall speaking, although the majority of rare earth smelting products produced 
by China were still primary products with fairly low market value, the production of 
higher-value products was growing rapidly. In rare earth smelting products, China had 
rapidly growing production of higher-value separated rare earth products including 
individual rare earth oxides and individual rare earth metals. In the 1980s, the production 
volume of individual REE products increased dramatically from only 20 tons in 1980 to 
1160 tons in 1988 (in REO equivalent) (Ye, 1989), while it was still small compared to 
the overall smelting products production volume of 18600 tons (in REO equivalent). As 
                                                 
220 China statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评) from 1990 to 1996. Japan statistics are extracted from Su (2009, p.90), 
which was originally from the China Rare Earth Net database based on data reported by 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan. 
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Figure 29 shows, by the late 1990s the production volume of individual REE products 
had grown to account for almost half of the total production volume of rare earth 
smelting products.  
China’s production of REE permanent magnets (including Sm-Co PM and NdFeB 
PM) was also rapidly growing. As Figure 30 shows, China’s total production volume of 
rare earth permanent magnets grew from merely 28 tons in 1986 to 3150 tons in 1997, an 
increase of over 100 times in just a decade. Among different kinds of permanent magnets, 
NdFeB permanent magnet had a rapidly growing global market in the 1990s, yet only a 
few Chinese producers were able to pay exorbitant licensing fees to the patent holders 
MQ and SSMC/Hitachi221 to produce the product for export to the global market (see 
Figure 31 for the comparison of Chinese and Japanese production volume of sintered 
NdFeB permanent magnets). To increase the export market of NdFeB magnets, Beijing 
Zhongke San Huan High-tech Company, a spin-off company of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, joined forces in 1995 with the China Nonferrous Metals Import & Export 
Company to acquire 100% ownership of MQ (Magnequench), the U.S. firm with cross-
license patent agreement with Hitachi222. The acquisition of MQ from its parent company 
General Motors was the first overseas acquisition by a Chinese rare earth company. The 
acquisition allowed Zhongke San Huan to access the global market for sintered NdFeB 
magnets. (Rare Earth Office of the State Planning Commission, 1995) 
                                                 
221 SSMC (Sumitomo Special Metals Co.) known as NEOMAX is now part of Hitachi 
Metals.  
222 SSMC and MQ (Magnequench) independently invented the techniques of producing 
sintered NdFeB powder in 1982. The two companies have filed patent in different 




Figure 29 China's Production Volume of Individual REE Products in Comparison 
with Total Production Volume of Rare Earth Smelting Products (1986-2000)223 
 
 
                                                 
223 Statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中国
稀土年评). After 2000, the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry stopped 
reporting the production volume of individual REE products. Thus this graph only 








Figure 31 Production Volume of Sintered NdFeB magnets in China and Japan 
(1988-1993)225 
                                                 
224 Statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中国
稀土年评). Before 1996, the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry reported 
production volume of rare earth permanent magnets (including Samarium Cobalt 
permanent magnets) in both real tons unit and metric ton in REO equivalent unit. After 
1996, the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry calculates production volume 
of rare earth permanent magnets only in unit of real tons. Thus for easier comparison 





6.5.1.4 Domestic Consumption Trailing behind Export  
Although domestic consumption of rare earth products were growing rapidly, the 
majority of China’s rare earth smelting products were produced for export in this period. 
As Figure 32 shows, from 1984 to 1997 export of rare earth products exceeded domestic 
consumption of rare earth products every year. By 1997, the volume of rare earth product 
export and stockpiling (31430 tons in REO equivalent) was about twice the volume of 
domestic consumption (15070 tons in REO equivalent), meaning that over 67% of 
China’s rare earth products were produced for export. 
 
 
Figure 32 China's Consumption vs. Export/Stockpiling Volume of Rare Earth 
Products (1983-1997)226 
                                                                                                                                                 
225 Data source: (Zhong, 1994). Zhong Junhui was a researcher at the GRINM. 
226 Statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中国
稀土年评) from 1986 to 1997. The figures for year 1983 to 1986 were reported in the 




6.5.2 International Trade 
6.5.2.1 Export Volume and Export Value 
Along with production, China’s export of rare earth products grew significantly in 
this period. Figure 33 and Figure 34 show China’s export of rare earth products in 
volume and in value (earned foreign currency). Prior to the economic reform, China only 
exported 184 tons (in REO equivalent unit) of rare earth products from 1973 to 1978, 
earning 0.29 million USD in foreign currency. (Zhou, 1985) In the ten years from 1978 to 
1988, China’s rare earth export volume grew at an average annual rate of 50%, with a 
total increase of 54 times from 1978 level; export revenue in terms of acquired foreign 
currency in US dollars grew at an average annual rate of 67%, with a total increase of 170 
times from 1978 level. (Ye, 1989) In 1988 China’s rare earth export was 8320 tons, 
already accounting for 35% of global rare earth trade volume. (Ye, 1989) The major 
destination countries of China’s rare earth export were advanced western economies, 
including Japan, the U.S. and France. 
                                                                                                                                                 
stopped reporting the amount of domestic consumption and the amount of total export in 
unit of metric tons of REO equivalent, instead using real tons. Because the units are not 
standardized after 1997, one cannot just directly compare the pre-1997 and post-1997 




Figure 33 China's Rare Earth Product Export Volume (1979-1997)227 
 
 
Figure 34 China's Rare Earth Product Export Value (1979-1997)228 
                                                 
227 Export volume data are extracted from the China Society of Rare Earths Yearbook 
2007 (中国稀土学会年鉴 2007) and the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评). The export volume data included export volume of rare earth 
permanent magnets, rare earth mischmetal, fluorescent lights and other advanced 
products.  
228 Export value data are extracted from the China Society of Rare Earths Yearbook 2007 























































































































































































































































The significant drop in export in 1990-1992 was due to several reasons. Firstly, 
China’s export market took a brief hit in the second half of 1989 due to economic 
sanctions imposed by western countries after the June 4th incident. The export market was 
again depressed by the selling of the Soviet rare earth stockpiles after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991. Secondly, there was already huge existing stockpiles of 
non-separated rare earth primary products by 1989, due to massively increased local 
production capacity in China in the 1980s. This made companies more desperate to sell 
off existing stockpiles at low prices, leading to price wars between producers and export 
revenue loss. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1989) Thirdly, 1989 was 
the first year that the three state-owned trading groups eligible for rare earth export 
coordinate export pricing and export volume control. Due to lack of knowledge of the 
foreign markets and lack of experience dealing with foreign traders, the three state-owned 
trading groups priced the separated rare earth products (more valuable than non-separated 
products) at below-market low prices (about 1/3-1/2 of the global market price for these 
products in 1988) (see Figure 35). This led to huge revenue loss on the export of 
separated rare earth products as well. The end result was not only a huge blow to China’s 
export, but also a significant financial blow to major rare earth producers in other 
countries as well. Molycorp, the major U.S. producer was close to bankruptcy and up for 
sale in 1992. (Falconnet, 1992) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
国稀土年评). The export value data included export value of rare earth permanent 




Figure 35 Rare Earth Product Export Price (1986-1991)229 
 
 
China’s export market turned better in the mid-1990s for several reasons. Firstly, 
the global demand for rare earth products grew substantially due to demand increase for 
REE-enabled permanent magnets and industry catalysts. Secondly, in terms of global 
supply, the Soviet stockpiles were close to be sold out on the global market. (Ma, 1995) 
Thirdly, the successive export control and production control measures enacted by the 
central government in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped correct the market price 
slump of the previous few years. (Rare Earth Office of the State Planning Commission, 
1994) Finally, the French company Rhone-Poulenc, a major global rare earth processor in 
terms of production revenue, made the switch of sourcing from Australia to sourcing 
from China for its rare earth raw materials in 1992 and by 1996 Rhone-Poulenc was 
importing rare earth products worth about 20 million USD annually from China. (Liu, 
                                                 
229 This graph was extracted from page 81 of the Rare Earth Industry Update written by 




1992; Rhone-Poulenc, 1996) Thus by 1997 China’s annual export volume had grown to 
about 31,000 tons, with export revenue of 320 million USD. This was an increase of over 
100 times in export revenue, achieved in less than two decades from 1979. 
China’s trade growth led to its increasingly important position in global rare earth 
product trade. Take the import market of Japan as an example. Japan has always relied on 
import for rare earth supply as it does not have any domestic rare earth deposit. China’s 
export of rare earth products (including both ore concentrates and processed products) to 
Japan grew significantly in the early 1980s (see Figure 36). Mitsui Group, one of the 
largest corporate groups in Japan with about 25% share in Japan’s rare earth consumption, 
signed a long-term deal in 1984 with China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export 
Company and Jiangxi Metal Import & Export Company to import annually at least 200 
tons of refined ores from South China’s ion-adsorption clay deposits from 1985 to 1989. 
The rare earth concentrates would be processed in Mitsui’s factories in Japan to provide 
raw materials for electronics and materials industries in Japan. (Shi, 1985) In 1985 (the 
year when China started export rebate policy) China surpassed France to become Japan’s 
largest source of rare earth imports by value. (Liu, 1987) In the 1990s, Japan’s rare earth 
production gradually shifted from processing of rare earth concentrates to production of 
value-added products such as abrasives, permanent magnets and hydrogen storage 
materials (NiMH batteries for instance), requiring the import of high-grade rare earth 
metals or metal alloys. (Roskill, 1997) China continued to be the major supplier as its 
own production of rare earth metals and separated rare earth products developed rapidly. 
As Figure 37 shows, in 1994 rare earth product imports from China accounted for 52% of 
Japan’s total import in value, the first time that import from China surpassed import from 
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all the other countries. In 1997 rare earth product imports from China rose to account for 
67% of Japan’s total import in value, and the ratio remained stable around 70% by 2002. 
It should be noted though that Japan’s reliance on China’s rare earth mine production 
across the production chain was larger than these figures would suggest, as Japan’s major 
non-China supplier, the primary French producer Rhone Poulenc sourced most of its raw 
materials from China as well. 
 
 
Figure 36 Japan's Rare Earth Import Value by Import Country (1981-1985) 230 
                                                 









6.5.2.2 Export of Higher-value Products 
Although the majority of China’s rare earth export were still low-value primary 
products (ore concentrates, unseparated rare earth products) in this period, the export of 
separated rare earth products (individual rare earth metals, individual rare earth oxides) 
and advanced products (permanent magnets etc.) was rapidly growing relative to the total 
export. Figure 38 and Figure 39 show China’s export of higher-value rare earth products 
(including both separated REE products and advanced products) in volume and in value 
(earned foreign currency) in comparison with the total export from 1981 until 1998. As 
                                                 
231 Import statistics from 1980 to 1984 was extracted from Liu (1987). Import statistics 
from 1984 to 1994 was extracted from Takaki (1995, p.37). Takaki Junki was the 
Chairman of the Japan Society of Newer Metals, an affiliate organization of the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry of Japan. Import statistics after 1994 was extracted 
from Aoyama (2003, p. 24). Aoyama Ichizuo was the Head of the Nonferrous Metals 
Division in the Bureau of Manufacturing Industries in the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry of Japan. 
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can be seen from both figures, export of higher-value rare earth products grew 
substantially, at an average annual rate of 66% in volume and 60% in value. In terms of 
the ratio in total export, in 1991 China’s export value of higher-value products grew to 
account for more than half of the total export value for the first time. The rapid expansion 
in the export of primary products (for instance rare earth chlorides) in 1992-1994 due to 
major western companies shifting raw materials sources to China drove down the ratio of 
higher-value product export in total export. (Rare Earth Office of the State Planning 
Commission, 1993; Rare Earth Office of the State Planning Commission, 1994) Yet by 
1997, China’s annual export of higher-value products had climbed back to account for 40% 






Figure 38 China's Export Volume of Higher-value Rare Earth Products in 
Comparison with Total Export Volume (1981-1998)232 
                                                 
232 Export volume data are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 
Industry (中国稀土年评). After 1998, the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 
Industry stopped separate reporting on the export of individual REE products, instead 
focusing on separate reporting on the export of permanent magnets and other different 
kinds of advanced products. Thus to allow for accurate comparison, this graph only 




Figure 39 China's Export Value of Higher-value Rare Earth Products in 
Comparison with Total Export Value (1981-1998)233 
 
 
6.5.3 Market Structure 
The market structure in the Chinese rare earth industry in this period was highly 
competitive. The institutional factors discussed in the previous subsection resulted in the 
localization of industry production as well as the low barrier to market entry, creating a 
large and rapidly growing number of local market actors. By 1985 within China there 
were 21 rare earth mining and ore sorting companies, 16 companies producing rare earth 
primary products and 15 companies producing rare earth alloys. In terms of rare earth 
applications, by 1985 there were 30 companies producing REE-enabled metal products, 
                                                 
233 Export volume data are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 




113 companies producing REE-enabled steel products, 12 companies producing REE-
enabled magnets, 11 companies producing REE-enabled electronic and lighting products, 
7 companies producing REE-enabled petrochemical products, 30 companies producing 
REE-enabled glass and ceramic products, 34 companies producing REE-enabled textile 
products and 2 farms using REEs in fertilizers234. In the 7th Five-Year period (1986-1990), 
along with rapid increases in production and export, the competition in the market 
increased substantially. By the late 1980s the industry had grown to a point where there 
were more than two thousand small and median-scale production units competing against 
each other, producing overlapping ore and primary products using similar technologies. 
(PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1988; PRC State Council Rare Earth 
Leadership Group, 1989) This excessive production capacity resulted in the oversupply 
of rare earth products, price wars among producers and worsening profit margins across 
the industry during the period of weak market demand in 1989-1992. Combined with the 
restrictive industrial policies on production and export enacted by the central government, 
the depressed market further prompted the closure of a large number of local companies. 
(Ma, 1995) Yet following the recovery and strong growth of market demand, by 1996 the 
number of Chinese producers had again increased substantially, and the problems of over 
production, severe price competition and worsening profit margins re-emerged. (Roskill, 
1997)  
The market competition was particularly acute in the Gannan-Yuebei region in 
South China, where HREEs were produced using rudimentary techniques and sold 
                                                 
234 The numbers are all calculated from the companies listed in the Overview of Chinese 
Rare Earth Industry (中国稀土工业便览), edited by Zeng Xinglan et al. and published 
by the National Rare Earth Applications Promotion Leadership Group Office.  
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primarily for export. In Jiangxi Province alone, there were more than a thousand mining 
sites in operation in 1988, including more than 200 mining sites in Xunwu County and 
more than 400 mining sites in Xinfeng County, two major counties producing and 
exporting ion-adsorption ores. (Ma, 1995) Along with the proliferation of mining sites 
was the proliferation of local smelting projects. By 1989 there were more than 30 rare 
earth smelting companies in Jiangxi Province and Guangdong Province. (Ma, 1995) 
Although the weak market in 1989-1992 prompted the closure of a large number of local 
mining sites and rare earth companies, by the mid-1990s there was again a proliferation 
of local production units. A survey conducted in Pingyuan County in Guangdong 
Province in 1995 concluded there were more than 200 private illegal mining sites in this 
county alone. (Xu et al, 1999) In contrast, rare earth mining in Inner Mongolia in North 
China was conducted by the single company, Baotou Steel Rare Earths in Baiyun-ebo, 
making it a quasi-monopolistic supplier for rare earth smelting and application companies 
in the local market. As a result, LREE production from North China was “in chronic 
under-supply” and the majority of its production was consumed by domestic producers 
instead of export. (PRC State Council Rare Earth Leadership Group, 1989) 
6.5.4 Environmental and Social Impact 
The overriding emphasis on industry output and export in this period meant that 
environmental protection had low priority on the government and corporate agendas. In 
general, projects often could get by with minimal environmental treatment measures. In 
Baotou for instance, the lack of local regulation allowed local companies to build small-
size factories directly on the upstream of local rivers, near local resident communities and 
even in farming districts. New projects could start production even before approval was 
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granted from the local environmental protection bureaus, and appeals from local residents 
to close polluting plants were often ignored. (Ma et al, 2001) As a result, while the rare 
earth industry enjoyed strong growth in production and export, it had long-term 
detrimental effect on the local environment, the health of the local community and in 
some cases incurred social problems for the local government.  
6.5.4.1 Environmental and Social Impact in North China 
In North China, the primary environmental consequence of rare earth industry 
was waste water, waste gas and radioactive waste from the mining and processing of 
Baiyun-ebo ores which contained radioactive Thorium and Fluoride. In terms of waste 
water and radioactive waste residues, Baotou Steel Rare Earths, the primary mining 
company, began dumping the waste from processing of ores into an open area close to its 
smelting plants in the 1950s, and over time a “tailings dam” (尾矿坝) was formed to 
store the waste. By 1998 the tailings dam had grown to encompass an area of 11 square 
kilometers in size, and the dam was receiving about 800 tons of waste containing 
radioactive elements annually. (Bai et al, 1999) Its direct exposure to the local 
environment without any treatment resulted in high radioactive exposure, polluted ground 
soil, as well as polluted water seeping down to aquifers and contaminating groundwater 
as far as 2 kilometers downstream. Such grave environmental consequences proved to be 
detrimental for the local community: a study conducted by the Bureau of Radioactive 
Environment Management of the Baotou City government on the deaths of local residents 
in Baiyun-ebo District between 1995 and 1997 concluded that cancer was the No. 1 cause 
of death for local citizens, and the death rate from cancer (188.62/100,000) was double 
the national average (94.36/100,000). (Zhang et al, 2000) Environmental treatment was 
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barely existent for rare earth smelting and applications production as well. By 1998 only 
two rare earth companies in Baotou had waste water treatment facilities, namely the 202 
Factory controlled by the Ministry of Nuclear Industry/ China National Nuclear 
Corporation, and the Baotou Luxi-Rhone RE Company, a joint venture of Rhone Poulenc. 
All the other local rare earth companies directly dumped on average about six hundred 
thousand tons of waste water into the local rivers flowing into the larger Yellow River235 
annually. The polluted local rivers contained 4800% higher than the compliance level of 
ammonia and nitrogen, 630% higher for fluoride, and 1060% higher for radioactivity. As 
a result, the portion of the Yellow River in this area was unsafe even for utilization by 
local power plants, let alone for drinking. (Bai et al, 1999) In terms of waste gas, by 1998 
49% of the local companies producing rare earth chlorides (a major rare earth primary 
product), primarily small-sized companies, had no treatment facilities to treat the roughly 
3800 tons of chlorine gas discharged into the air annually. (Bai et al, 1999) Local 
companies producing other rare earth products directly discharged in total waste gas 
containing roughly 464 tons of fluoride, 2223 tons of sulfur oxide, 1364 tons of sulfuric 
acid vapor and 407 tons of dust into the air in 1997. (Bai et al, 1999) Such pollution 
posed detrimental long-term environmental and health hazards to the local community. It 
also strained the relations of the local government and companies with the local minority 
group (Mongol), who primarily depended on farming for living and were thus highly 
affected by the pollution. Local Mongol farmers repeatedly petitioned to the higher 
authority to close the polluting companies, and when the requests were not fulfilled, they 
                                                 
235 The Yellow River is the major river in North China passing through nine provinces 
and autonomous regions, including the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It is the 
primary source of drinking and industrial use water in North China. 
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further clashed with the local government through refusing to pay taxes. (Bai et al, 1999; 
Cai et al, 2002)  
6.5.4.2 Environmental and Social Impact in South China 
In the Gannan-Yuebei region in South China, the major environmental 
consequences of mining and processing ion-adsorption rare earth ores were the loss of 
ground layer of vegetation, soil erosion and degradation. (Xu et al, 1999) Until the late 
1990s the ores were mined primarily by open-pit tank leaching (露采-池浸). Tank 
leaching is a hydrometallurgical method of extraction that could cause direct damage to 
the ground layer of vegetation and significant amount of waste residue difficult to treat 
(see Figure 40 for the procedures). As a result, after the mineral extraction the entire 
mountains were “stripped” the surface with only bare rocks and waste left. (Yuan, 2009) 
A survey conducted by the Ganzhou Nonferrous Metallurgy Research Institute found that 
extraction of REEs by tank leaching in the Gannan region led to the loss of 1.6 square 
kilometers of vegetation, the desertification of 2.13 square kilometers of land, as well as 
the dumping of 160 million tons of waste on open ground (usually arable farm land) 
annually. (Du, 2002) The waste discharge containing oxalic acid, when not treated 
properly, could pollute the local water and result in additional health hazards for the local 
community. The consequences for the local ecological environment were detrimental and 
irreversible. For instance, Southern Weekly reported that the Zoutao Village in Xingning 
Prefecture in Guangdong Province had a history of rare earth mining from 1984; because 
of the decade of waste dumping and pollution of oxalic acid to the local water system, 
local farmers had to abandon farm lands and fish ponds and leave the village to find work; 
those unable to work outside the village had to get water from nearby mountain areas. As 
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a result, residents petitioned that the local government officials should pay for relocation 
expenses; yet local governments could not fulfill their requests due to budget constraints. 
(Southern Weekly, 2005) 
 
 




As this chapter shows, the Chinese state governance over the rare earth industry 
from 1978 to 1997 was driven by the goals of developing export for economic and 
strategic benefits, as well as achieving global dominance in production and trade through 
transitioning towards and regulating a market economy in the sector. Though the state 
role in this period featured the relaxation of the previous planned economy towards the 
market, the state only recalibrated but never relinquished its active control over the 
industry. The state introduced industry-specific policies, regulations, initiatives and 
enterprises to promote as well as regulate the process of marketization and industry 
development. The measures included export promotion and tax rebate, production 
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promotion and regulation through high-level state plans, restrictions on foreign 
investment in mining and smelting, production and export control on specific primary 
products, and support for basic research and high-tech development zones. At the same 
time, there were larger political institutions and institutional changes, including 
overlapping bureaucratic control among central and local authorities over central SOEs, 
devolution of authority on local economic affairs, “one-level downward” local cadre 
management system with emphasis on economic output, and unique IPR institutions 
promoting technology transfer. Though not specific to the rare earth industry, these 
institutional changes had considerable influence on shifting central-local dynamics in the 
authority over industry and substantially lowering the barrier to market entry. This 
resulted in the explosive expansion of industry production capacity and the expansion of 
the non-state sector (cooperatives and private enterprises) in mining and smelting. It also 
led to diluted enforcement of the central government policies and regulations at local 
levels.  
The combined effect on the industry, as can be seen from the last section on 
development outcomes, was two decades of spectacular market growth as production and 
export soared in both volume and in value (earned foreign currency). By 1997 China’s 
rare earth industry was close to global dominance in rare earth production and export, 
having successfully convinced major western consumer companies to source materials 
from China for the long term. Although the industry primarily produced low-value 
products, its production and trade of higher-value products grew rapidly and was about to 
take the lead in total production and export by the late 1990s. Thus what the early reform 
leaders envisioned as China becoming “first rank in production, first rank in export” was 
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largely achieved. While the state consistently crafted policy changes in this period to 
achieve its reregulation goals, the results were not highly satisfactory; several important 
issues of concern emerged. The production and export of advanced products and 
applications, which would bring higher value returns for the extraction of minerals 
belonging to the state, remained still quite small. The market structure was highly 
decentralized despite of the central government attempts to curb local production, leading 
to over supply compared to market demand and poor industry profit margins, particularly 
in South China. Poor environmental record and its detrimental impact on the local 
communities were also widely present, casting dark clouds on the industry’s long-term 





CHAPTER 7 STATE REREGULATION UNDER DEEPENING 
ECONOMIC REFORM (1998-2007) 
 
This chapter studies the Chinese state reregulation over the rare earth industry and 
market from 1998 to 2007, a period when the industry enjoyed complete dominance in 
global production and trade. This chapter first outlines the macroeconomic environment 
for the industry development in this period. The Chinese state continued the 
marketization of the Chinese economy and greatly expanded China’s integration with the 
world economy. The chapter then analyzes the state goals and narratives in guiding the 
rare earth industry development in this period. The state development narratives featured 
prominently regulation through market mechanisms in order to achieve long-term 
sustainable development and sustain global dominance in the post-WTO-accession era. 
The chapter then outlines industry-specific policies in this period. The central 
government implemented new policies and changed existing policies in order to control 
rare earth mining and export and centralize the market structure. The chapter then 
analyzes larger political institutional changes in state bureaucracy, which collectively 
resulted in the weakening of the central government’s capacity to impose industrial 
policies in the local regions. The chapter concludes with analysis of the industry in 
production, trade, market structure and socio-environmental impact, as the outcomes of 
state reregulation.  




After the de facto reform leader Deng Xiaoping died in February 1997236, the two 
successive central government administrations overseeing the national economy were the 
President Jiang Zemin/Premier Zhu Rongji administration (1998-2003) and President Hu 
Jingtao/Premier Wen Jiabao administration (2003-2013) 237 . The central government 
continued the marketization reform and greatly expanded China’s participation in 
international trade. This section summarizes major macroeconomic reform policies which 
pertain to the rare earth industry from 1998 to 2007. 
7.1.1 Marketization Reform of the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Chinese state-owned enterprises underwent significant institutional reform under 
the State Council headed by Zhu Rongji in 1998-2003. After two decades of economic 
reform in China, the SOEs suffered from high non-performing loans, high inefficiency 
and chronic under-performance compared to the private sector. The 15th National Party 
Congress in 1997 stated that the SOE reform to be undertaken in the next three years 
would be the most important task facing the nation’s economy. (Zhou & Xia, 2008)  
The SOE reform followed the “Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (“Control the Big, Let Go of 
the Small”) strategy decided at the 5th Plenum of the 14th National Congress of the CPC 
                                                 
236 Deng remained the de facto paramount leader of China until his death, although he 
retired from official leadership position in the Communist Party in 1987. The state 
administration from 1987 to 1998 was headed by President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li 
Peng.  
237 The Chinese President presides over the PRC government and is the paramount 
political leader. The Chinese Premier heads the State Council, which serves as the 
administrator and regulator of day-to-day government functions. Though all Chinese laws 
need to be ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Premier and the State 
Council has the most significant influence over the national economy, as the NPC largely 
functions as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the central authority. Here the time 
period of 5 years corresponds to each 5-year tenure of the State Council. After the first 
term of 2003-2008, the Hu Jingtao/Wen Jiabao administration ruled China for a second 
term from 2008 to 2013. 
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in 1995. The government ordered the large SOEs to undertake shareholding reform (股份
制改革）  to become modern shareholding companies. There were various kinds of 
restructuring (重组改制）, resulting in complicated ownership structures238. For the 
largest SOEs in strategic sectors (such as energy, telecommunications, transportation), 
the state became the largest shareholder, and the SOE’s managers and employees were 
allowed to purchase shares. For relatively smaller SOEs, corporate managers and 
employees were allowed to purchase and own the majority of the share, making them 
effectively employee-owned co-op companies. Some selected SOEs were allowed by the 
state to become stock companies (上市公司） trading on domestic or international stock 
exchanges to attract additional capital from individual or institutional investors. (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1999) This additional capital influx 
compensated for the declining loans available to the SOEs from state-owned banks, as the 
state-owned banks were also going through reforms to clear away old debts and were 
wary of lending new credits to the SOEs. (Lardy, 1998) Yet the state usually remained 
the largest shareholder of these stock companies, and limited amounts of shares were 
allowed to be traded openly on the exchange. For some large SOE conglomerates with 
high debts, more profitable assets were divested to become private spin-offs allowed to 
be listed on the stock market and to develop more rapidly with the access to additional 
capital, while the parent SOE (wholly or partially owned by the state) became a 
shareholder of these spin-offs and received dividends to help turn around the under-
                                                 
238 For an authoritative overview of central government policies in the SOE reform, see 
The Decision of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of China on Major 
Issues Concerning The Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises adopted at 




performing assets. Local non-production units (such as schools, hospitals, daycare centers 
and dining companies) of the SOEs, which used to provide low-cost services as an 
extension of the state welfare to the SOE employees and were likely to incur debts rather 
than profits, were disintegrated from the mother company (主辅分离） and became 
private independent entities or transferred to become non-profit entities supervised by 
local governments. (PRC State Economic and Trade Commission, 2002a) In addition, a 
few selected under-performing large SOEs were allowed by the state to go through “debt-
equity swap” (债转股): the Ministry of Finance instructed the four state-owned national 
banks to establish asset management companies; these asset management companies 
acquired bad bank loans given to the SOEs, and in return these companies became 
shareholder of the in-debt SOEs and could receive dividends or sell their share back to 
the SOEs once the SOEs became profitable. (PRC State Economic and Trade 
Commission, 2000a; PRC State Economic and Trade Commission et al, 2003) The “debt-
equity swap” in effect cleared a large portion of the debt of these large SOEs, as the debt 
was temporarily shifted from the SOEs to the asset management companies at each bank 
underwritten by the Ministry of Finance. Thus although the number of large SOEs wholly 
owned by the state were drastically reduced through the shareholding reform, the state in 
the end still retained majority or partial control of most of the largest reformed SOEs, and 
in some other cases the state received dividends through owning equity of the more 
profitable non-state spin-offs of under-performing large SOEs. On the other contrary, 
medium and small-sized SOEs were much less likely to go through shareholding reform. 
They were more likely to be given up by the state to the private hands through auctioning, 
leasing, mergers, joint-operations, or were allowed to go bankrupt. (Si, 1998)  
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After 5 years of drastic reform under the Zhu Rongji administration, the post-
2003 State Council headed by Wen Jiabao continued the corporate restructuring of the 
SOEs, yet with a new focus on the consolidation and expansion of the state-owned assets. 
In the 2003 State Council Reform239, the State Economic and Trade Commission was 
abolished; replacing its leadership in the SOE reform was the new State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). As a supervisory agency, 
SASAC not only directly supervises state-owned enterprises owned by the central 
government (then 161 in total number), but also directly manages state-owned capital 
(then about seven trillion RMB) as an investor on behalf of the state.240. SASAC has 
continued leading the corporate restructuring of the SOEs into shareholding companies 
and stock companies. In 2006, SASAC announced that one major goal of the SOE reform 
was “promoting the concentration of state-owned capital on major industries and key 
fields, enhancing the controlling power of state-owned economy, and bringing its leading 
role into play”. (PRC SASAC, 2006) In particular, the SOEs in industries “concerning 
national security, major infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries that 
provide essential public goods and services, as well as the key enterprises in pillar 
industries and high-tech industries” were instructed by the SASAC to be consolidated to 
form supersized “alliance groups” (集团) that could compete in the global market. (PRC 
SASAC, 2006) In Xinhua New Agency’s interview of Li Rongrong, then Director of 
                                                 
239 Corresponding to the 5 year tenure of State Council leadership, there have been major 
changes to the agencies comprising the State Council every 5 years. Since China started 
its economic reform, the State Council has implemented major reforms in the years of 
1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013. 
240 For more information about the functions of SASAC, see its website at 
www.sasac.gov.cn. The local SASAC at provincial and prefectural levels of government 
are responsible for managing the SOEs and state-owned capital within their jurisdictions 
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SASAC in 2006, Li said that SASAC would consolidate the 161 large SOEs under its 
direct supervision into 80-100 large SOEs by 2010, among which 30-50 SOEs should be 
supersized alliance groups of large SOEs capable of competing in the global market. 
(Xinhua, 2006a) However, SASAC fell behind its own schedule: by 2008 the number of 
SOEs under the supervision of SASAC was still 150, far above its goal of 80-100 by 
2010. (Liu, 2008) 
7.1.2 Marketization of the S&T Institutions and Focus on Technology Innovation 
Sharing Deng’s vision of the S&T development as the driving force for China’s 
economic development, the post-Deng administration prioritized the marketization of 
China’s S&T research institutions and started establishing a National Innovation System 
(国家创新体系). In 1995, then President Jiang Zemin identified the national strategy of 
“Invigorating China through Science and Education” (科教兴国). In the 1998 State 
Council Reform, the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) was renamed as 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). As the new supreme agency for S&T 
administration and policy, MOST oversaw continued marketization of China’s S&T 
system. In August 1999 the State Council released Decision on Increasing Technology 
Innovation, Developing High-tech Industries and Achieving Commercialization. This 
landmark policy document stressed that technology innovation would drive economic 
development in China, and that the enterprises rather than the government would be the 
vehicle of high-tech innovation. (PRC State Council, 1999a) Starting in 1999 the science 
and technology research institutes under the supervision of central government agencies 
went through major marketization reform. The research organizations and groups 
involved in applied research were gradually privatized into independent shareholding 
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companies, or became subsidiaries of the major SOEs in the corresponding industries. 
(PRC State Council, 2000a) The basic research institutes or research groups remained 
non-profits primarily funded by the central government, but were also encouraged to 
provide paid services to the private sector through contracts. (PRC State Council, 2000a) 
The National Technological Innovation Project (技术创新工程), a major policy initiative 
starting in 1996, was implemented to strengthen the innovation capability of large and 
medium-scale Chinese companies. The National Technology Innovation Project was 
started by the State Science and Technology Commission and the State Economic and 
Trade Commission in 1996, with six firms picked as national technological innovation 
pilot firms. (PRC State Science and Technology Commission, 1997) The firms chosen to 
participate in the project were encouraged to set up in-firm technology innovation centers, 
to develop the R&D, technology management and technology marketing workforce, and 
to collaborate with research institutes and universities to create and commercialize 
internationally competitive proprietary technologies. (PRC Ministry of Science and 
Technology, 1998; PRC State Economic and Trade Commission, 2000b) By 2003 
national-level innovation firm centers had grown to 302, and local innovation firm 
centers had grown to over 2000. (Wang, 2003) 
The following Hu Jingtao/Wen Jiabao administration prioritized “indigenous 
innovation” (自主创新) as the central task for China’s S&T institutions. Specifically, in a 
speech at the Inaugural Chinese Science and Technology National Congress, President 
Hu identified China’s S&T development goal as “Innovation-oriented Country” (创新型
国家), focusing on “key areas promoting economic development and promoting future 
development”. (Hu, 2006) The administration sought to expand the National Innovation 
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System into five sub-systems: a firm-centric technology innovation system linking 
production, research and development; a knowledge innovation system encompassing 
both S&T research and higher education teaching; a national defense technology 
innovation system linking defense S&T with civilian S&T; a regional innovation system 
promoting local innovation and economic development; a socialized network of science 
and technology mediator services. (PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, 2006) 
Policies shifted from the direct provision of funding to the creation of service networks 
and cluster incentives such as development zones for firms to development R&D 
capabilities. (Forster, 2006) The State Council subsequently released another landmark 
S&T policy document, the Medium and Long-term Plan for China’s Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) (abbreviated as MLP). (PRC Ministry of Science 
and Technology, 2006) The MLP made the goal that by 2020 China’s dependence on 
foreign technology would reduce to under 30%, and China would advance to the top 5 
globally in the annual number of new patents granted and the number of citations in 
international science and technology journals. The MLP identified 62 “important areas of 
research” (重点领域) to receive state support, including “sustainable and efficient use of 
mineral resources” (矿产资源高效开发利用) as well as “comprehensive treatment of 
pollution and recycling and reuse of waste” (综合治污与废弃物循环利用). In addition, 
the Ministry of Finance created a platform of policies in 2006-2007 to encourage 
domestic technology innovation, by granting domestic products bearing the recognition 
of “indigenous innovation” the priority in government procurement. (PRC Ministry of 
Finance, 2006a) Similarly, in order to sponsor local high-tech industry development, 
many provincial and prefectural-level governments exclusively procured from companies 
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bearing the recognition of “indigenous innovation” within their own jurisdictions. (Bai & 
Xu, 2012) The rules gave Chinese technology companies, particularly those in clean 
energy and information technology, significant advantage in securing government 
contracts. Due to international pressure alleging that the policy discriminated against the 
U.S. and European manufacturers, the exclusive government procurement of domestic 
ingenious innovation products was later halted in 2011. (PRC Ministry of Finance, 2011) 
7.1.3 WTO Entry and International Economic Expansion 
China’s economic growth and integration into the global economy was greatly 
enhanced in this period after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001. The previous two decades of reform and opening policy campaigns had led to 
significant and consistent high growth in export (see Figure 41). Even in the midst of the 
Asian Financial Crisis which devastated many Asian economies in 1997-1999, China did 
not devalue its currency and the Chinese economy grew at about 8% yearly rate. (See 
Figure 42) The membership in the WTO since 2001 has allowed China to attain rapid 
export-led economic growth and to emerge as a major global trading hub. Between 2001 
and 2007 (before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), China’s export grew at an impressive 
average rate of 21.9%, and its GDP growth continued a growth streak averaging 10.8% 
per year. (See Figure 41 and Figure 42) The consistent high GDP growth was still 
primarily driven by investments and export growth instead of domestic consumption: 
exports of goods and services accounted for about 30% of China’s GDP (see Figure 43). 
The membership in the WTO has also allowed China to ramp up its import of raw 
materials needed to support its rapidly expanding manufacturing and service sectors. In 
less than a decade China moved from being the world’s fourth-largest trading nation to 
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the second in both exports and imports. China also became the largest destination of 
exports from the Less-developed Countries (LDCs) and the largest developing country in 




Figure 41 China's Annual Growth Rate in Exports of Goods and Services (1981-
2014)241 
 
                                                 




Figure 42 China's Annual GDP Growth Rate (1981-2014)242 
 
 
Figure 43 China's Export as Percentage of GDP (1981-2014)243 
 
 
7.2 Goals and Narratives of the State  
Narrowing down the focus from the national economic reform to the rare earth 
industry, this section studies the Chinese state’s goals and narratives in industry 
                                                 
242 Data source: World Bank. 
243 Data source: World Bank. 
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reregulation in the period of 1998-2007. As China became the de facto global rare earth 
producer and major exporter of rare earth products, the state’s goals for reregulating the 
industry shifted away from primarily expanding industry production and market growth 
towards creating higher value and sustainable return from the extraction and utilization of 
the strategic resource. In particular, two goals were evident: promoting sustainable 
development through curbing production capacity and environmental pollution; and 
promoting industry upgrading through fostering indigenous innovation and value-added 
production. The central government development strategies continued to feature both 
marketization (promoting industry growth and market expansion) and regulation (keeping 
the industry development under state control). 
7.2.1 Goals of State Reregulation: Sustainable Development 
In contrast with the emphasis on fast export growth and production expansion in 
the previous two decades, sustainable development became an important goal of the state 
reregulation in this period. As China attained global predominance in rare earth 
production and export after fast growth for two decades, the central administrations 
realized that it would only be a matter of time before China would run out of this non-
renewable resource. Thus the state’s emphasis on sustainable development had several 
reasons: economically, the state wanted to maintain production control and ensure long-
term market competitiveness; environmentally, the state wanted to curb the already 
rampant pollution and resource waste, and decrease resultant environmental casualties 
and social unrests; from a more long-term perspective, the state wished to preserve 
China’s advantages in the endowment as well as the utilization of the rare earth resources 
as raw materials for important civilian and defense applications for future generations.  
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The state goal of fostering sustainable development was aptly illustrated by a 
speech given by Liu Tie’nan244 at the 2002 National Conference of Rare Earth Office 
Directors245. Liu was then the Director of the Department of Industry Development at the 
State Development Planning Commission246 , the most powerful agency in economic 
planning and governance over the energy and raw materials industries within the State 
Council. According to Liu, “rare earths are non-renewable resources, therefore they need 
to be protected and developed in a sustainable manner in order to maximize the strategic 
value. Rare earths are among the very few resources that China has an advantage in, and 
our generation needs to first protect the resource and then utilize the resource. The rare 
earth industry has problems including inefficient and extensive production, excessive and 
illegal mining, and inappropriate utilization and resource waste. We should change our 
strategies to protectively mine and use the rare earth resources, and to no longer just 
                                                 
244 Liu Tie’nan was a senior official in the State Development Planning Commission and 
the NDRC (reaching the post of Vice Chairman in 2008), working his way up from the 
Bureau of Raw Materials Industry in the State Planning Commission. Liu had 
considerable influence over the energy and raw materials industries in China, before he 
was investigated for corruption and sentenced to life in prison in 2013. 
245 The National Conference of Rare Earth Office Directors in 2002 convened directors of 
all rare earth offices within China’s local governments after the 16th Party Congress of 
the Communist Party of China. Thus it served as a venue for the central party leadership 
to broadcast the development strategy defined by the Party to the local bureaucrats 
governing the rare earth sector in local regions. 
246 In the 1998 State Council reform spearheaded by Zhu Rongji, the State Planning 
Commission, formally the supreme agency responsible for economic planning and 
policymaking, was reorganized into the State Development Planning Commission, 
concentrating its administrative duties on macroeconomic policy making and market 
regulation. In the 2003 State Council reform spearheaded by Wen Jiabao, the National 
Development and Planning Commission was further reorganized into the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) through a merging with the State 
Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System and the State Economic and 
Trade Commission. NDRC gradually became the most powerful agency in the Wen-led 
State Council, in charge of formulating and implementing macroeconomic policies, 
setting prices for key commodity resources, and approving large-scale industry projects 
and investments. (U.S. China Business Council, 2014) 
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follow the old Swifter Extraction of Available Resources. We need to find a good place 





准它的位置，真正体现它的战略价值。) (Liu, 2002)  
The state goal of sustainable development to maximize and preserve the rare earth 
resources’ strategic value gained more momentum under the “Scientific Outlook on 
Development” (科学发展观) ideology of the Hu Jingtao/Wen Jiabao administration. In 
forming party ideologies, the Communist Party of China have traditionally extended 
orthodox Marxism-Leninism with the ideologies of China’s own generations of party 
leadership, including the Mao Zedong Thought, the Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang 
Zemin’s “Three Represents” 247 . Similarly, the “Scientific Outlook on Development” 
(SOD) ideology was introduced as an extension of party ideology by the Hu Jingtao/Wen 
Jiabao administration in 2003, the first year of its tenure. The “Scientific Outlook on 
Development” emphasized “a people-first approach, as well as an ideology of economic 
development that it should be well-rounded, sustainable and coordinated to ensure both 
                                                 
247 Jiang Zemin, as China’s post-Deng leader, was credited by the Communist Party as 
the contributor of the ideology of the “Three Represents”. Jiang’s speech at the 80th 
Anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in 2000 stated that “our 
Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced 
productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental 
interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. These are the inexorable 
requirements for maintaining and developing socialism, and the logical conclusion our 




the quality and the speed of development (以人为本，全面、协调、可持续的发展观). 
(Xinhua, 2004) The Hu Jingtao/Wen Jiabao administration vowed to overturn the fixation 
on GDP-based economic growth, and to prioritize issues such as environmental and 
resource protection, social welfare and social equality along with economic development. 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2005)  
This party ideology spilled over to the state narrative on rare earth industry 
governance. Specifically at the 2004 National Conference of Rare Earth Office Directors, 
Xiong Bilin 248  , then Vice Director of the Department of Industry at the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 249, gave a speech entitled “Upholding 
and Implementing the Scientific Outlook on Development to Achieve the Sustainable 
Development of the Rare Earth Industry” (树立和落实科学发展观 实现稀土工业可持
续发展). Xiong identified major obstacles to sustainable development of the rare earth 
industry as “the overcapacity of production, the lack of environmental protection, low 
resource utilization rate, and the lack of advanced applications and R&D”. Xiong further 
                                                 
248 Xiong Bilin worked alongside Liu Tie’nan in the State Development Reform 
Commission before 2003, and after 2003 in the NDRC and after 2008 in the MIIT. Xiong 
oversaw policymaking in the raw materials industries, in particular the metallurgical 
industries. Xiong was put under “shuanggui” (extra-judiciary secret investigation by the 
CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) in 2013, following the investigation 
and trial of Liu Tie’nan. 
249 The Department of Industry (工业司) at the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) was established after the 2003 transition from State Development 
Planning Commission to the NDRC, and was responsible for formulating and 
implementing policies in key raw material industries, including metallurgical industries. 
The department was dismantled in the 2008 State Council Reform, and its administrative 
duties and staff members were transferred to the corresponding industry departments 
within the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Supervisory duties 
and staff members overseeing the rare earth industry, for instance, were transferred to the 
Department of Raw Materials Industries (原材料工业司) within the MIIT. (China Rare 
Earth Net, 2008; PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2008)  
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identified four priority areas for the central government, among which two were directly 
related to the goal of sustainable development, namely “increasing and improving macro-
level control over the industry production and export” and “promoting resource 
conservation and substitution”. (Xiong, 2004) 
7.2.2 Goals of State’s Reregulation: Industry Upgrading  
Besides the overriding goal of sustainable development (focusing mainly on 
resource and environmental conservation), the other main goal of state reregulation was 
to promote industry upgrading. As the previous chapter shows, in the late 1990s, China’s 
production and export of high-value rare earth products were still small compared to the 
total volume and value of production and export. In addition, in specific high-tech 
applications such as the permanent magnets, China’s production and export were subject 
to further restrictions due to the lack of domestic intellectual property. Thus from an 
economic perspective, in order to ensure long-term higher return for the extraction of 
non-renewable resources, the rare earth industry would need to develop domestic 
innovative technologies, to upgrade high-value production, and to produce and export 
more technologically advanced products that could compete in the global market. In 
terms of party rhetoric, the goal of fostering domestic technology innovation was also 
consistent with the party’s broader strategy of “Indigenous Innovation” in guiding 
China’s S&T development. According to Xiong Bilin’s speech at the 2004 National 
Conference of Rare Earth Office Directors, besides the sustainable development areas of 
work, two other priority areas of work for the central government were“promoting 
industry restructuring and upgrading” and “ promoting advancement in production 
technologies and high-tech applications”. (Xiong, 2004)  
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7.2.3 Dual Emphasis of Market Expansion and State Control 
The state development strategies to realize its reregulation goals continued to 
feature both state-sponsored expansion of the market economy and active state 
intervention in industry production. The continued focus on expansion of the market 
economy was aptly illustrated by President Jiang Zemin’s address during a high-profile 
visit to Baotou in 1999. Jiang said that “in order to turn China’s rare earth resource 
superiority into economic superiority, we must take advantage of the market. We must 
have the concept of the market as we develop socialist market economy. Without the 
market, we cannot develop our technologies, products and industries. We had success 
with the “Two Bombs and One Satellite” in the 1960s due to our concerted strength as a 
socialist country. We still need this kind of concerted strength to promote projects with 
significant strategic importance to China’s comprehensive national power. To develop 
resources such as rare earth materials which have large market demand and can facilitate 
the growth of important industries, the key is to combine the resource advantage of 
China’s rare earths with the market advantage, to develop advanced products with our 
own patented technologies, or to use our advantages to acquire advanced manufacturing 
technologies from abroad.” (把我国的稀土资源优势转化为经济优势，必须结合我
国的市场优势。我们发展社会主义市场经济，一定要有市场的观念。没有市场，技







利用我们的优势从国外获得先进制造技术) (Jiang, 1999)  
At the same time the state continued to use broad five-year plans and specific 
industrial policies to intervene in market and industry growth. In 2000 the State Planning 
Commission released the 10th Five-Year Plan for China’s Rare Earth Industry (中国稀
土工业“十五”发展规划). In this 2001-2005 plan, the central government outlined the 
specific development strategies to achieve reregulation goals. (PRC State Planning 
Commission, 2000)  
1) Promote market expansion and high-tech applications (开拓市场，推广应用): 
the state would promote the application of REEs in both traditional industrial 
sectors as well as in high-tech sectors. In particular, the REE-enabled 
advanced materials including permanent magnets, high-function lighting 
materials, hydrogen storage materials and automobile catalytic converters 
would receive priority in state development plans. 
2) Promote resource conservation and sustainable extraction (保护资源，合理
开采 ): The state would prioritize the development of large-scale mineral 
deposits (the Baiyun-ebo mine in Baotou in North China and ionic-clay 
deposits in Jiangxi and Guangdong in South China). The state would curb 
illegal and over-capacity small-scale production. The state would promote the 




3) Control production and restructure industry supply (控制总量，调整结构): 
The state would control the total production volume and production capacity 
of both mining and smelting, in order to correct the chronic over supply in the 
market. The state would take steps to eliminate small-scale smelting plants, to 
ensure the economic scale of returns on resource extraction. 
4) Plan projects to ensure appropriate distribution of projects at the national level 
(统一规划，合理布局): The state would halt the approval of new mining and 
smelting projects. The state would ban foreign investment in mining, impose 
restrictions on foreign investment in smelting projects. The state would 
encourage foreign investment in projects involving the rare earth applications.  
5) Global strategy and intensive development (全球战略，集约发展): The state 
would promote the export of high-value products, while continuing 
restrictions on the export of primary products. The state would restrict the 
export eligibility to several large-scale rare earth companies, while ensuring 
fair export pricing. 
The subsequent 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) also exhibited the state’s dual 
emphasis on both supporting market expansion and intervening in industry development. 
In drafting the 11th Five-Year Plan for the Rare Earth Industry, Wang Caifeng, Chief of 
the Rare Earth Materials Bureau in the Department of Industry at the NDRC, wrote that 




1) Protect the environment to achieve sustainable utilization (保护资源，实现
可持续利用). The state would increase efforts in environmental protection 
and resource conservation and seek to eradicate illegal mining. 
2) Promote technology innovation for industry upgrading (技术创新，促进产业
升级). The state would continue the support for the development of REE-
enabled high-tech applications. The state would also increase the support for 
downstream high-tech industries using REE-enabled materials as raw 
materials. 
3) Improve state governance to ensure orderly production within the industry (改
善管理，促进行业运行现代化). The state would improve its regulation over 
the industry and improve policy coordination amongst state agencies. The 
state would also seek to improve the coordination of policy formulation and 
implementation with the local governments. 
4) Promote industry self-governance and intensive development (加强自律，促
进集约发展). The state would promote self-regulation within the industry and 
promote structural transformation so that companies would be motivated to 
protect their own corporate interests in alliance with the state goal of 
sustainable development. In particular, the state would promote corporate 
alliances of upstream mining and smelting producers with midstream and 
downstream applications producers, in order to ensure maximized returns on 




7.3 Industry-Specific Regulatory and Policy Changes 
To realize the goals of sustainable development and industry upgrading, the state 
enacted a series of industrial policies in this period to guide the development of the rare 
earth industry. This section surveys major legal regulations, administrative policies and 
state-sponsored initiatives specific to the rare earth industry from 1998 to 2007. The 
analysis of industrial policies are laid out in five areas, including industry production, 
trade and foreign investment, industry upgrading, industry structural consolidation and 
environmental protection. 
7.3.1 Regulation on Industry Production and Domestic Investment 
In order to avoid the overheated development which characterized the industry in 
the most of the 1980s and 1990s and to ensure long-term sustainable development of 
resource extraction, the central government imposed stronger restrictions on project 
approvals and investments related to the rare earth industry in this period. From 1999 
until 2003, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) discontinued issuing new licenses 
for REE mining. (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 1999; PRC Ministry of Land and 
Resources, 2000b) While the ban on licensing new projects was lifted in 2003, MLR 
conducted a 3-year nationwide inspection on mining projects focusing on the prosecution 
of illegal mining (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2003) and published a list of 
eligible producers in 2005. (Rare Earth Office of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2005) In 2006, MLR again implemented a halt on new REE mining 
licenses. (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2010) 
Besides the upstream mining licensing halts and inspections by MLR, the State 
Council also recentralized project approval authority across the industry. In 2004 the 
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State Council released Decisions of the State Council on Reforming the Investment 
System (关于投资体制改革的决定). Specifically, REE mining projects, REE smelting 
projects, and above-100 million-RMB downstream production projects would require 
approval from the corresponding State Council ministries/commissions. Downstream 
production projects worth below 100 million RMB would need to be approved by 
provincial-level governments. (PRC State Council, 2003) This in effect removed the 
authority of local governments below the provincial level to approve new projects across 
the industry production chain. 
The central government also began to use all-encompassing production quotas 
instead of production quota for specific REE products, in an attempt to curb the total 
volume of production. In 2006 MLR started issuing mining quotas for HREEs and 
LREEs to each major producing province. (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2010) 
Also in 2007, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) started 
issuing mandatory national production plans (国家指令性计划) instead of the previously 
used national production guideline plans (国家指导性计划 ) for rare earth primary 
products, namely concentrated ore products and smelting products. (Rare Earth Office of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, 2006) Following the transition of 
industry supervision from the NDRC to the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) in 2008, MIIT began to issue production plans for concentrated ores 
and smelting products to each major producing province. (PRC Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, 2008) 
7.3.2 Regulation on Trade and Foreign Investment 
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While China has pledged to reduce its trade barriers after accession to the WTO in 
2001, and rare earth products were not exempted from China’s compliance with the WTO 
free trade rules, the rare earth industry has still been subject to export regulation by the 
central government. The export quota, export tariff and restrictions on foreign investment 
were imposed by the central government to enhance its control over industry production 
and individual companies, as well as to move China’s export up the industry value chain. 
7.3.2.1 Export planning and quota on rare earth products 
The central government, specifically the State Economic and Trade Commission, 
continued to impose export planning on the rare earth industry. After the dismantling of 
the three trading companies controlled by the central government in 1998250, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission started to allocate export plans to individual companies. 
Producing companies and trading companies needed to apply for the next year’s export 
plan and pay for export licenses every year. (PRC State Economic and Trade 
Commission, 1999) On the other hand, to promote the production and export of the 
value-added products, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
abolished the export plan control for rare earth permanent magnets in 2000. (Rare Earth 
Office of the State Development Planning Commission, 2000) After China joined the 
WTO in 2001, rare earth primary products, along with other strategic commodity 
products including crude oil, petroleum products, coal and coke, were still subject to 
annual export plans allocated to by the State Economic and Trade Commission each 
eligible exporting company. (PRC State Economic and Trade Commission, 2002b) After 
                                                 
250 The next section on political institutional changes provides detailed analysis of the 
institutional changes in state-owned enterprises in the rare earth industry in this period, 
including the state-led dismantling of the three trading giants in 1998. 
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the 2003 State Council reform which shifted trade regulation duties from the defunct 
State Economic and Trade Commission to the newly created Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), MOFCOM started issuing export quota to individual companies. (Chen, 
2003) MOFCOM’s annual evaluation of exporter eligibility and its distribution of export 
quota to each eligible exporter resulted over time in a smaller number of companies 
eligible for export to the global market. In 2006 MOFCOM’s published roster of 
companies eligible for rare earth export was reduced to 44 companies. (PRC Ministry of 
Commerce, 2005a) 
7.3.2.2 Export tariff on rare earth products 
Apart from export quotas, the central government also removed the two-decade-
long export tax rebates and started to impose tariffs on exports of various rare earth 
products. In 2005 the Ministry of Finance (MOF) abolished the export tax rebates for rare 
earth smelting products. (PRC Ministry of Finance & State Administration of Taxation, 
2005) In November 2006 MOF imposed an export tariff of 10% on rare earth smelting 
products, including rare earth oxides, rare earth metals, rare earth chlorides and some 
other rare earth sodium products. (PRC Ministry of Finance, 2006b) In May 2007 an 
adjusted 15% export tariff was imposed on rare earth metals. (PRC Ministry of Finance, 
2007)  
7.3.2.3 Restrictions on foreign investment 
Besides export quota and tariff, the central government also imposed significant 
restrictions on foreign investment in the upstream and midstream of the rare earth 
industry production chain. In 2002 the State Development Planning Commission released 
the Regulations Regarding Foreign Investment in Rare Earth Industry. The regulation 
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removed the local governments’ authority of approving foreign investment in 
downstream application projects that were higher than 30 billion dollars in value. The 
regulation also banned wholly-owned foreign companies from investing in rare earth 
mining and smelting, instead encouraging joint ventures and FDI in manufacturing of 
rare earth materials and downstream applications. (PRC State Development Planning 
Commission, 2002) The state also sought to ban foreign firms from using Chinese 
companies as upstream or intermediate producers supplying rare earth products, which 
would circumvent the government’s export quota control. In 2005 MOFCOM prohibited 
the processing trade251 of rare earth primary ores. (PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2005b) 
In 2007 MOFCOM further banned the processing trade of several rare earth smelting 
products, including rare earth oxides, rare earth metals, rare earth metal alloys and rare 
earth chlorides. (PRC Ministry of Commerce et al, 2007)  
7.3.3 Industry Upgrading and Innovation Promotion 
Besides regulations favoring value-added production and high-tech export that are 
outlined above, the central government also provided institutional support for upgrading 
production and promoting indigenous innovation of domestic rare earth companies. In 
1999 Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) established two centers to facilitate 
the R&D of small- and medium-sized rare earth firms in two major production regions, 
namely the Northern Rare Earth Industry Productivity Improvement Center (attached to 
the BRIRE) in Baotou252 and the Southern Rare Earth Industry Productivity Improvement 
                                                 
251 Processing trade (加工贸易) involves Chinese domestic firms obtaining raw materials 
or intermediate inputs from abroad, processing them locally, and exporting the value-
added goods abroad. 
252 For more information, see the website of the Northern Rare Earth Industry 
Productivity Improvement Center at http://www.nreppc.com/. 
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Center (attached to the Ganzhou Non-ferrous Metallurgical Research Institute) in 
Ganzhou253 . Also in 1999, the State Development Planning Commission approved a 
specialization of “Rare Earth High-tech Commercialization and Application 
Development” in project approval and financing. The State Development Planning 
Commission provided 0.3 billion RMB treasury bonds to the financing of projects. (Rare 
Earth Office of the State Development Planning Commission, 1999) In 2004 Guidelines 
for Priority of Development of High-tech Commercialization Areas jointly released by 
NDRC, MOST and MOFCOM, the large-scale production of advanced rare earth 
materials (including high-performance rare earth permanent magnets) was listed as a 
priority area for development. (PRC National Development and Reform Commission et 
al, 2004) In 2005 Guidelines of Adjustment to Industry Structures released by NDRC, the 
rare earth industry was broken down into the “downstream applications” that were filed 
under the “encouraged” category and the “mining and smelting” that were filed under the 
“restricted” category. (PRC National Development and Reform Commission, 2005)  
It should be noted that unlike the upstream mining which was dominated by state 
capital, most of the downstream applications companies that developed to have sizable 
market share in this period were local companies established by private capital, or 
privatized local SOEs that went through privatization in the SOE reform. Unlike 
upstream mining, Beijing did not actively intervene in the market of rare earth 
applications by setting high bars for market entry or allocating production plans. In 
addition, state-owned companies did not make significant investment in downstream 
                                                 
253 For more information, see the website of the Southern Rare Earth Industry 




applications such as rare earth permanent magnets, as the market for rare earth 
applications was still fairly small. Thus most of the capital that flowed into the rare earth 
downstream applications, such as permanent magnets, was private investment254.  
7.3.4 Structural Consolidation of Rare Earth Companies into National 
Conglomerates 
While the three large state-owned trading groups in the rare earth industry were 
dismantled in the 1998 State Council reform, the central government started planning the 
consolidation of China’s domestic rare earth industry into conglomerates with 
monopolistic/oligopolistic power in the market. The structural consolidation of the entire 
industry into large national corporate conglomerates was first proposed by scientists at 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in the early 1990s. A prominent rare earth 
chemist and CAS fellow Ni Jiazan published in Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences 
in 1994 a well-read article entitled “Current Situation and Strategies for Rare Earth 
Research”. Ni argued that China’s resource advantage was compromised by the lack of 
domestic high-tech downstream applications, excessive small- and median-scale high-
polluting mining production, cheap export of primary products, and the lack of 
centralized policy coordination and large-sized corporations capable of steering the 
market on the grand scale. (Ni, 2005, p. 221) Qian Xuesen, a prominent Chinese scientist 
known as the father of China’s missile and space program, wrote a response letter urging 
the central government to “present a national strategic plan of using the rare earth 
resources, and then establish a monopolistic Chinese Rare Earth Corporation…China 
should become the leader of the rare earth industry in the world, much like the South 
                                                 
254 Author interview with a senior manager at a major private rare earth magnet firm in 
Baotou, Inner Mongolia in August 2013. 
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African’s domination in the diamond industry.” (Ni, 2005, p. 223) Qian’s letter was 
forwarded to then China’s President Jiang Zemin by the former director of Baotou 
Metallurgical Industry Research Institute Li Guang, yet the proposal was not immediately 
acted upon by the central government. (Ni, 2005, p. 224) In 2000 under the directive of 
then Premier Zhu Rongji also heading the State Council, the State Planning Commission, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Land and Resources jointly 
conducted research on macroeconomic regulation over the rare earth industry and 
reported their policy suggestions to the State Council. The recommendations to the State 
Council included propelling the industry onto the path of “new industrialization” and 
“intensive concentrated development” (Rare Earth Office of the State Planning 
Commission, 2000) In 2002 the State Economics and Trade Commission announced the 
plan to establish state-owned rare earth industry conglomerates. (PRC State Economic 
and Trade Commission, 2002c) An official plan of consolidating the industry into two 
conglomerates, one for North China and one for South China was approved by the State 
Council. The establishment of the North China Rare Earth Corporation Group, a 
conglomerate for LREE mining and smelting production, was started in 2002 and led by 
Inner Mongolia Rare Earth Corporation, a subsidiary company set up by Baotou Steel in 
1999 to acquire smaller producers in Inner Mongolia. (Sichuan News, 2005) The 
establishment of South China Rare Earth Corporation Group, a conglomerate for HREE 
mining and smelting production, was started in 2002 and led by CHALCO (Aluminum 
Corporation of China), an SOE controlled by the central government. (Zhao, 2003) After 
the 2003 State Council Reform which dismantled the State Economic and Trade 
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Commission, the responsibility of overseeing the national restructuring of rare earth 
industry was transferred to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
However, the negotiation between the central government, the leading SOEs, the local 
governments and the local rare earth companies over buying out local producers 
stagnated, and the plan was stalled by 2005. (Dai, 2005)  
7.3.5 Environmental Protection and Resource Conservation 
In line with the reregulation goal of sustainable development, the central 
government began to strengthen its environmental regulations in this period besides 
imposing various forms of control over production outlined above. In 2002, the State 
Bureau of Environmental Protection, the predecessor of the current Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, started drafting the standard for pollutant emission specifically 
for the nonferrous metal industries. Then in 2004 a special team was formed by the 
bureau to draft a pollutant emission standard specifically for the rare earth industry. The 
draft was released much later in 2009 and finally implemented in 2011. (PRC Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, 2009; PRC Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2011)  
Expert input and investigative journalism also prompted the state to tighten its 
relaxed control over the environmental impact of the rare earth industry. In April 2005 
the Economy Time, a prominent economics TV program on the China Central Television, 
aired an investigative journalism report on the damage to the water quality of the Yellow 
River from the pollution discharge of the rare earth industry in Baotou. Afterwards, the 
State Bureau of Environmental Protection conducted a joint inspection with the Inner 
Mongolia government over the rare earth companies in Baotou and ordered the over-
polluting companies to temporarily halt production while improving their environmental 
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treatment facilities. Environmental inspection over the rare earth mining and smelting 
companies were also conducted by the environmental protection authorities in the 
provinces of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan and Sichuan. (Rare Earth Office of the PRC 
National Development and Reform Commission, 2005) In November 2005, a group of 
prominent scientists led by Xu Guangxian submitted a letter to the State Council on the 
high environmental casualties to the local environment from the radioactive Thorium 
waste from rare earth mining in the Baiyun-ebo region. The scientists called for 
restrictions on rare earth mining and national stockpiles for both REEs and thorium. The 
proposal suffered pushback from the Baotou Steel unwilling to curb its production; yet 
the National Development and Reform Commission responded after investigation that it 
would conduct studies on long-term stockpiles and extraction of both REEs and thorium 
from the tailings dam instead of new mining areas. (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2005)  
7.4 National-level Institutional Changes 
This section analyzes the key political institutional changes in this period that 
influenced the implementation of state reregulation policies in the rare earth industry. The 
changes in political and legal institutions include weakened central bureaucratic 
institutions governing the SOEs, changes towards a multi-dimensional local cadre 
management system, and the lack of strong legal prosecution rules to prosecute illegal 
behavior under new rules. These political institutional factors contributed to China’s 
sustained dominance in global rare earth production and trade, but also weakened the 
state’s efforts in imposing production and export control over the localities to pursue 
long-term sustainable development. 
7.4.1 State Council Reforms Decreasing Central Bureaucratic Control  
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Since the launching of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, the State 
Council has implemented institutional reforms almost every five years (1982, 1988, 1993, 
1998, 2003, 2008, 2013) adjusting or dissolving old agencies and creating new ones. The 
State Council reform in 1998, under the direction of then Premier Zhu Rongji, was 
widely regarded as the most far-reaching among all six past reforms in changing China’s 
bureaucracy. The following State Council reform in 2003, under the direction of then 
Premier Wen JIabao, also brought significant change to China’s bureaucratic system. 
(PRC State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, 2008)  
As analyzed in the previous chapter, before 1998, the SOEs in the rare earth 
industry were in principle controlled by the central government through four bureaucratic 
authority systems (Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, China National Non-ferrous 
Metals Industry Corporation, China National Nuclear Company and China Minmetals 
Import & Export Company). In practice there was a considerable degree of overlapping 
administrative control over enterprise management between the central and local 
authorities in these four bureaucratic systems. These existing central bureaucratic 
authority systems underwent a whirlwind of significant changes after the State Council 
reforms. What used to be tight-knit bureaucratic authority systems were abolished or re-
organized, weakening direct control capacity from the center. Companies and institutes 
formerly under central supervision were transferred to be supervised by the local 
governments, resulting in the transfer of assets and mining rights from the center to the 
local SOEs. 
7.4.1.1 Abolishment of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
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The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry was abolished in the 1998 State Council 
reform. As the previous chapter shows, until 1998 the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
was the primary industry-specific ministry overseeing China’s metallurgical industries 
(mostly focused on steel instead of non-ferrous metal production). After the abolishment 
of the ministry, the Bureau of Metallurgical Industry within the State Economic and 
Trade Commission temporarily performed regulatory functions between 1998 and 2001 
(when the bureau was also abolished). Between 2001 and 2003 regulatory functions over 
metallurgical industries were carried out by the State Economic and Trade Commission. 
After the abolishment of the State Economic and Trade Commission in the 2003 State 
Council reform, regulatory functions were split between several new ministries, including 
MOFCOM, NDRC and SASAC. 
In the rare earth industry, prior to 1998 the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
directly supervised key state-owned players including Baotou Steel (包头钢铁) and 
China Metallurgical Import & Export Company (CMIEC, 中国冶金进出口总公司). 
Both went through shareholding reforms, and Baotou Steel was transferred to be 
supervised by the Inner Mongolia local government, while CMIEC became part of a 
central SOE. Baotou Steel Rare Earth Company, the rare earth subsidiary of Baotou Steel, 
went through a shareholding reform in 1997 and became a shareholding company named 
Baotou Steel Rare Earth High-tech Company Limited. The notable research institute in 
the rare earth industry, Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths (BRIRE) became a 
subsidiary of this new firm. According to the IPO (Initial Public Offering) Prospectus 
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Report and 1998 Annual Report255, Baotou Steel Rare Earth High-tech Company Limited 
was primarily controlled by three stockholders: The largest shareholder was Baotou Steel, 
which was transferred from the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry to be under local 
government (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government) supervision in 1998. The 
second largest shareholder was Jiaxin Steel, a Hong Kong-based private metal trading 
company owned by Chen Ningning (Diana Chen), a U.S.-educated investor known in 
China as the “Steel Princess” and the granddaughter of Former Minister of Metallurgical 
Industry Lv Dong256. The third largest shareholder was Shanghai Baosteel, a steel SOE 
now directly controlled by the central government through SASAC.  
China Metallurgical Import & Export Company, one of the three trading groups 
approved by the central government to export rare earth products in the 1990s, ended up 
becoming a trading subsidiary of a central SOE. CMIEC became part of Sinosteel 
Trading Company (中钢贸易), an iron ore import company directly controlled by the 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry in 1995. After the abolishment of the Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry in 1998 and the split of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission in 2003, Sinosteel Trading Company went through a shareholding reform 
                                                 
255 The IPO Prospectus Report can be accessed at 
http://stock.jrj.com.cn/share,600111,ggcontent.shtml?discId=00000000000000nu3j. The 
1998 Annual Report can be accessed at 
http://q.stock.sohu.com/cn,gg,600111,363233.shtml. 
256 Although Chen rarely gave media interviews and played down her personal 
connection with her prominent bureaucrat family in Beijing in the official interviews, she 
was well known in China between early 1990s until 2008 as the “Steel Princess”. The 
Hong Kong-based trading company Jiaxin Steel founded by her and her mother (Lv 
Dong’s daughter) in the early 1990s quickly grew to become the largest private iron ore 
trading company in Greater China and was occupying more than 15% of China’s iron ore 
import volume by 2003. Jiaxin Steel suffered significant financial losses in the 2008 
global financial crisis and reportedly filed for bankruptcy in 2013. For more information, 




and became a trading subsidiary of Sino Steel Corporation (中钢股份), a central SOE 
directly controlled by SASAC257.  
7.4.1.2 Split of China Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation and Nationwide 
Corporate Reorganization of Non-ferrous Metals Companies 
As analyzed in the previous chapter, China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry 
Corporation (中国有色金属工业总公司) was established by the State Council in the 
early years of reform and opening up as a national company covering China’s non-
ferrous metals production. It had the same bureaucratic rank with the State Council 
ministries and was directly responsible for managing the non-ferrous metals industry for 
the State Council. China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company, the trading arm 
of the China Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation was one of three eligible exporters 
of rare earth products. In other words, China Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation 
was both a gigantic state-owned enterprise group as well as a policy making and 
implementing bureaucracy.  
This centralized bureaucratic system known to industry professionals as “Non-
ferrous Metals Industry System” (有色金属工业系统) was dismantled in the 1998 State 
Council Reform under then Premier Zhu Rongji’s strategy of “ Separating the 
Bureaucracy and the Enterprise”(政企分开). The administrative part of the Non-ferrous 
Metals Industry System formed a transitory regulatory agency named Bureau of National 
Non-ferrous Metals Industry (国家有色金属工业局) under the State Economic and 
Trade Commission. The State Council further abolished the Bureau of National Non-
                                                 




ferrous Metals Industry in 2001 and transferred its regulatory functions to a newly-
created quasi-governmental industry association named China Association of Non-
ferrous Metal Industry (中国有色金属工业协会). In this way, at least on paper the State 
Council achieved the separation of bureaucracy and the enterprise; instead of directly 
owning and controlling the companies in the non-ferrous metals industry, the ministries 
in the State Council would work with the industry association which served as the 
representative of non-ferrous metals companies. (Wang, 2001) 
In the 1998 State Council reform, the corporate part of the Non-ferrous Metals 
Industry System were split into three central SOE corporate groups in charge of 
businesses in specific nonferrous metals, namely China Copper Lead Zinc Group (中国
铜铅锌集团), China Aluminum Group (中国铝业集团公司) and China Rare Metals and 
Rare Earth Group (中国稀有稀土金属集团公司). (PRC State Council, 1998; PRC State 
Council, 1999b; PRC State Council, 1999c; PRC State Council, 1999d) Then a year later, 
in 2000 the State Council further dismantled the three central SOE groups. China 
Aluminum Group was abolished and most of its subsidiaries became local SOEs, but the 
central office retained the companies in several key production regions and formed a new 
SOE named the Aluminum Corporation of China ( 中国铝业 ), now known as 
CHALCO 258 . China Rare Metals and Rare Earth Group was abolished and all its 
subsidiaries became local SOEs supervised by local governments. (PRC State Council, 
2000b) China Copper Lead Zinc Group was also abolished and all its subsidiary 
companies became local SOEs supervised by local governments. (PRC State Council, 
                                                 
258 CHALCO has remained a central SOE and been directly supervised by the central 
government through SASAC since 2003. 
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2000b) The local trading subsidiaries of China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export 
Company were transferred to become independent trading companies supervised by local 
governments, or joined the local SOE spin-offs of the three defunct central SOE 
corporate groups. The central office and operations of China Non-ferrous Metals Import 
& Export Company was merged into China Minmetals. (PRC State Council, 2000b; PRC 
Ministry of Finance & Generation Administration of Taxation, 2000) 
For the rare earth companies in particular, the State Council reform measures 
from 1998 to 2000 split their bureaucratic umbrella organization of China National Non-
ferrous Metals Industry Corporation into a few new central SOEs and a much larger 
number of local companies. As many local producing and trading subsidiaries were 
transferred to be supervised by local governments, local governments were given the 
right to tax the SOEs that were transferred to be under their control and to retain the 
corporate income tax as local government revenue. The process of state assets transfer 
from the central government and central SOEs to the local government and local-
government-controlled SOEs was not without contentions. Particularly concerning the 
upstream of the industry (mining), because the Ministry of Land and Resources 
discontinued issuing new mining licenses in 1999-2003, existing mining licenses and 
accompanied mining rights became the target assets for grab between the local 
governments eager to capture them and the central SOEs still fighting to retain them. The 
Chinese political institutions operate within a hierarchical system of ranks: administrative 
units at a lower rank have less authority than units at a higher rank. Local provincial 
governors and party secretaries have the same political rank of authority with the 
ministers of ministries in the State Council; local prefecture mayors and party secretaries 
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have the same political rank of authority with the chief of bureaus in State Council 
ministries. Thus central ministries and SOEs were at an even playing ground with the 
local governments. Local provincial governments sought to merge the mining rights and 
the assets previously belonging to central actors into local-government-owned SOEs. 
What emerged were new market actors with complex ownership structures and names 
that may not exactly match their new owners or operations. Below is a breakdown of the 
changes in key market actors in the rare earth industry by province. 
Jiangxi Province: After the split of the China National Non-ferrous Metals 
Industry Corporation, the local provincial and prefecture governments consolidated spin-
off local non-ferrous metal companies and mining rights into local SOEs. Firstly, the 
Ganzhou Prefecture Government declared exclusive mining rights and obtained all rare 
earth mining licenses within the Ganzhou Prefecture, a major production prefecture in 
Jiangxi Province. In 2004 the prefecture government established a prefecture-level SOE 
called Ganzhou Prefecture Rare Earth Mining Company, now known as Ganzhou Rare 
Earths (赣州稀土)259. In actual practice though, mining operations at more than 80 legal 
mining sites in different counties below the prefecture operated almost independently, 
and Jiangxi Rare Earths was described by local businessmen as no more than the “invoice 
biller” for local rare earth mines 260 . Secondly, the Jiangxi Provincial Government 
consolidated the tungsten, tantalum and niobium companies transferred from China 
National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation into a new provincial-level state-
owned shareholding firm named Jiangxi Rare Metals & Tungsten Corporation Group, 
                                                 
259 For more information about the history of the founding of Ganzhou Rare Earths, see 
the company website at http://www.gz-re.com/about/qyjj/about.html. 
260 Author interview with local businessmen in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province in July 2013. 
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now known as Jiangxi Tungsten Group (江钨集团). With bureaucratic support from the 
Jiangxi Provincial Government, this newly formed provincial-level SOE was able to 
consolidate and obtain the rare earth mining licenses in remaining areas of Jiangxi 
Province in 2001. These mining licenses originally belonged to a subsidiary of China 
National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation, Jiangxi Tungsten (confusingly the 
same name) whose assets were first transferred to China Minmetals after the split. In 
other words, China Minmetals lost the mining rights and licenses to Jiangxi Tungsten 
Group which was supported by Jiangxi Provincial Government. (Liu, 2010) Thirdly, the 
Jiangxi Provincial Government consolidated the copper and other major precious metal 
companies transferred from China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation into 
a provincial state-owned shareholding firm named Jiangxi Copper Group (江铜集团). 
Although Jiangxi Copper Group did not obtain rare earth mining licenses/assets in 
Jiangxi, it purchased a rare earth mining license in Sichuan Province and gained the 
mining rights for deposits in Sichuan in 2008. (Wei, 2008) 
Guangdong Province: After the split of the China National Non-ferrous Metals 
Industry Corporation, the Guangdong Provincial Government consolidated most spin-off 
local non-ferrous metal companies into a newly created provincial state-owned 
shareholding firm named Guangdong Rising Non-ferrous Metals Group (广东广晟有色
金属集团)261. The largest shareholder of this provincial SOE was Guangdong Rising 
Assets Management Company (广东省广晟资产经营有限公司), a provincial-level asset 
management SOE wholly owned by the Guangdong Provincial Government. The 
                                                 
261 For more information about the founding of Guangdong Rising Non-ferrous Metals 
Group, see the company website at http://www.gdrising.com.cn/. 
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Guangdong subsidiary of China Non-ferrous Metals Import & Export Company (the 
trading arm of China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation) was also 
consolidated into Guangdong Rising Non-ferrous Metals as its trading subsidiary. In the 
rare earth mining, Guangdong Rising Non-ferrous Metals held 3 of the 4 existing rare 
earth mining licenses in Guangdong Province. (Xiao, 2011) The remaining one rare earth 
mining license was approved for mining in Heyuan Prefecture and was controlled by 
Guyun Rare Earth Mining Company, a local company established by the Heyuan 
Prefecture in 2001.262 
Fujian Province: In Fujian Province, the split of China National Non-ferrous 
Metals Industry Corporation in 1998-2000 produced insignificant change, as the Fuzhou 
subsidiary of China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation (established in 
1984) was a name plate that shared office and staff (一套机构两块牌子) with an already 
existing provincial-level company, Fujian Province Metallurgical Industry Corporation 
(福建省冶金工业总公司). Fujian Province Metallurgical Industry Corporation was set 
up in 1983 as a corporate replacement of the abolished Bureau of Metallurgical Industry 
of the Fujian Provincial Government (福建省冶金厅). The corporation had the same 
bureaucratic rank and authority with other bureaus in the Fujian Provincial Government. 
(Fujian Province Local Chronicle Database, 2002; Fujian Province Local Chronical 
Editorial Commission Office, 2002) Most local non-ferrous metals companies in Fujian 
Province were prefecture-level or county-level companies supervised by Fujian Province 
Metallurgical Industry Corporation. In the rare earth industry, five rare earth mining 
                                                 
262 For more information about the company Guyun Rare Earth Mining Company, see the 
company website at http://www.hyhuada.com/about/?18.html. Guangdong Rising Non-
ferrous Metals would later in 2011 acquire 80% of the total shares of Guyun Rare Earth 
Mining Company and thus acquire all rare earth mining licenses in the province. 
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licenses were granted by Fujian Provincial Government in the 1980s. (PRC Ministry of 
Land and Resources, 2012) Shanghang County in Longyan Prefecture was granted one 
mining license in 1987 and set up a county-level company named Zhaorui Mining to 
conduct mining in the approved area. Liancheng County in Longyan Prefecture was 
granted two mining licenses in 1987 and 1988 and set up two county-level companies, 
Dingcheng Rare Earth and Huangfang Rare Earth to conduct mining for the two mining 
sites. Changting County in Longyan Prefecture was granted one mining license in 1989 to 
conduct mining in the approved area. The central-government-owned SOE, China 
Minmetals acquired control over one rare earth mining license in 1989 through its 
subsidiary Sanming Rare Earth Materials Company, a joint investment with Sanming 
Prefecture. In 2000 Fujian Province Metallurgical Industry Corporation went through a 
shareholding reform and became Fujian Metallurgical Company Ltd. (福建冶金控股有
限公司) wholly owned by the Fujian Provincial Government263. Fujian Metallurgical 
Company continued to leave the direct control over the five rare earth mining licenses to 
prefecture-level and county-level rural companies. In 2003 Changting County sought 
major investment from Qiandong Rare Earth Group (虔东稀土), a local rural private 
cooperative company based in Qiandong County in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province which in 
turn acquired control over this mining license264. 
7.4.1.3 Central SOEs Dropped out of Upstream Mining  
                                                 
263 Fujian Metallurgical Company was granted full or majority share of all provincial-
level metallurgical SOEs, guaranteeing the provincial government continued control over 
them. 




The key central SOEs emerged out of the split of China National Non-ferrous 
Metals Industry Corporation in 1998-2000 included CHALCO (中国铝业 ), China 
Minmetals (中国五矿) and China Non-ferrous Mining Group (中国有色矿业集团). 
Compared to the local SOEs, the central SOEs acquired much fewer upstream mining 
licenses or resources. CHALCO was built in 2000 to focus on aluminum and did not 
obtain new assets in the rare earth industry. As the previous chapter shows, China 
Minmetals began to acquire metal production companies to complement its trading 
business after the 1988 “Reform of the Foreign Trade Institution”. After 2000 China 
Minmetals was able to retain the mining subsidiary in Fujian Province, and it also 
strengthened its trading business through acquiring the head office of the China Non-
ferrous Metals Import & Export Company. Yet China Minmetals lost the mining licenses 
in the crucial province of Jiangxi to Jiangxi Tungsten Group after the bitter battle with 
Jiangxi Provincial Government over mining rights and asset ownership, and as a result it 
had to set up smelting and downstream subsidiaries in Ganzhou in exchange for resources 
with Ganzhou Prefecture Government. (Liu, 2010) China Non-ferrous Mining Group, 
now known for short as China Non-ferrous Metals (中国有色), should not be confused 
with the former system bearing almost the same name: this new China Non-ferrous 
Metals was built from subsidiary units of China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry 
Corporation’s overseas construction operations, and thus it did not have any rare earth 
mining licenses or mining subsidiaries265. China National Nuclear Company, which had 
subsidiaries producing rare earth products along with the coexisting radioactive elements 
                                                 




of Thorium and Uranium, did not control any rare earth mines and significantly 
downsized its rare earth production after 2006 to concentrate on nuclear power266. 
It would come as no surprise that the central government’s later plan of 
restructuring the rare earth industry into two national state-owned conglomerates from 
2002 until 2005 turned out to be an attempt in vain. CHALCO, the chosen central SOE 
leader, had no mining licenses and no bargaining power except the guarantee of 
production quotas and export quotas from the State Council to the local SOEs if they 
became part of a central SOE. Once local SOEs saw no imminent threat to the allocation 
of production and export quotas, CHALCO lost the bargaining chip to convince the local 
companies and their local government backers to join a central-government-owned rare 
earth conglomerate. (Dai, 2005a; Dai, 2005b) 
7.4.1.4 Lack of Coordination among Central Government Agencies 
The 2003 State Council reform led by then Premier Wen Jiabao resulted in further 
fragmentation of supervision over the rare earth industry within the central bureaucracy. 
Earlier in the 1998 State Council reform, the State Planning Commission, formally the 
supreme agency responsible for economic planning and policymaking, was reorganized 
into the State Development Planning Commission, concentrating its administrative duties 
on macroeconomic policy making and market regulation. Then in the 2003 State Council 
reform, the State Development Planning Commission was further reorganized into the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) through a merging with the 
State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System and the State Economic and 
                                                 
266 In 2006 China National Nuclear Company changed the name of the subsidiary China 
Nuclear Industry Rare Earth Company into China Nuclear Power Engineering Company. 




Trade Commission. (Xinhua, 2013) NDRC gradually became the most powerful agency 
in the Wen-led State Council, in charge of formulating and implementing macroeconomic 
policies, setting prices for key commodity resources, and approving large-scale industry 
projects and investments. (U.S. China Business Council, 2014) Besides the supra-agency 
NDRC setting high-level agendas and approving industry projects, a few other central 
government ministries also had supervisory role over part of the rare earth industry: 
MOFCOM was responsible for issuing export licenses and export quota, and General 
Customs was responsible for export inspections; MOF was responsible for taxation on 
production and export as well as funding for government-funded programs; MLR was 
responsible for issuing mining licenses and mining quota and conducting inspections on 
mining activities; MEP was responsible for issuing environmental and occupational 
safety regulations and conducting inspections; SASAC was responsible for directly 
overseeing the state assets and personnel appointment of key central SOEs. The Rare 
Earth Office, the direct supervisory office over the rare earth industry in the 1980s and 
1990s, was transferred to be a division (at the same bureaucratic level with a county) 
within the NDRC, and its responsibility was reduced to the coordination of policy matters 
over the rare earth industry between the central government agencies. The office’s low 
ranking within Chinese political system (two levels below the ministry) meant that its 
coordination authority was weak, if non-existent. There were “frequent instances where 
one ministry’s policy documents or targets trumped another ministry’s policy”. (Fang, 
2010a) For instance, some producing companies complained that MOFCOM’s export 
quota allocated to them was disproportional relative to the production capacity of the 
industry projects already approved by the NDRC. In 2003 MOFCOM allocated more 
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than 50% of total export quota to trading companies and less than 25% of total export 
quota to local rare earth producers. (Chen, 2003) This forced some smelting producers, 
particular local companies with large production capacity and export demand in major 
production provinces of Jiangxi and Inner Mongolia to buy surplus quota from trading 
companies in order to fulfill contracts and export products. (Wei, 2004; Ji, 2004) This 
illegal trading of export eligibility led to the creation of a black market for export quota; 
as a result, trading companies with export quota but no production capacity could make 
great profits selling surplus quota to the producers, creating essentially an added tax over 
the local producers. By 2006, the export quota was traded on the black market at 4000 
RMB per ton. (Xinhua, 2006b) To make things worse, because one of MOFCOM’s 
export quota evaluation criteria was the volume and the revenue of export in past three 
years, those with insufficient export quota were stuck with this disproportional allocation. 
(China Rare Earth Net, 2006)  
7.4.2 Changes in Local Cadre Promotion System 
Addressing the issues of local nepotism, GDP fixation and ineffective supervision 
and auditing which emerged in the previous period, the party leaders implemented 
internal institutional changes in local cadre promotion system after 1998. The changes 
influenced the state-industry relationship and indirectly influenced the development of 
the rare earth industry in this period.  
7.4.2.1 Vertical Management of Local Cadre Appointment in Market and Land 
Regulation 
The party sought to strengthen its power over managing local cadres in key areas 
of the economy through “vertical management”. As the previous chapter shows, the “One 
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Level Downward” cadre management model where the party authorities would only 
appoint and remove cadres at the next lower level has been implemented since 1983 to 
promote administrative efficiency. To curb local nepotism the “dual management” of 
local cadres has been implemented since 1991 to allow for dual control over the local 
cadres by both the local party committee and the higher-level ministry/bureau.  
Between 1998 and 2008 the central leadership sought to expand dual management 
areas subject to “vertical management”, where the central ministry or the provincial-level 
bureau have primary power of appointing and managing personnel at all local bureaus 
instead of the local party committee. The expansion of vertical management areas 
particularly targeted the supervision of local market actors as well as the regulation over 
local land use. This was in response to the rampant local protectionism over local market 
actors ignoring central government regulations in the previous period of the 1980s and 
1990s, when local cadre promotion and appointment were heavily reliant on strong local 
economic growth statistics. (Li, 2012) In 1998 the Central Party Committee and the State 
Council jointly announced that the local Administration for Industry and Commerce (工
商管理机关, AIC) below the provincial level would be subject to “vertical management” 
by the provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce. (PRC State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce, 1999) In 2004 the Ministry of Land and Resources 
announced that land use approval as well as appointment of local MLR officials would be 
subject to “vertical management” by the provincial Bureau of Land and Resource. (Yu, 
2006)  
7.4.2.2 Changes in Local Cadre Evaluation and Promotion Criteria 
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Without fundamental changes in the GDP-fixated criteria for local cadre 
evaluation and promotion, putting local bureaucracy under vertical personnel 
management would be akin to putting a bandage on the issue of local non-compliance 
without treating the cause. Thus changes in the incentive structure in local cadre 
evaluation and promotion would be fundamentally more important. Yet after 1998 local 
cadre promotion still relied heavily on economic measures including GDP growth and 
investment, and the competition between cadres of different regions resembling a 
“promotion tournament” was still vital in most parts of China. (Zhou, 2007) In 2004 the 
State Bureau of Environmental Protection started a project calculating the “Green GDP”, 
measuring local economic growth combined with the environmental record, a metric 
similar to the internationally accepted System of Environmental-Economic Accounting 
(SEEA). However, the project suffered significant pushback in the pilot provinces and 
cities, where government officials were strongly against releasing the data; in Shanxi 
Province for instance, provincial government officials were reportedly “enraged that the 
results showed they barely had any progress”. The “Green GDP” project was halted ever 
since until 2015. (Ye, 2015)  
On the other hand, in local cadre evaluation there was an increasing focus on the 
social welfare and harmony, which corresponded to one of the Communist Party’s new 
goals of “building a socialist harmonious society” after 2004267 (构建社会主义和谐社
会). In particular, the measures of social stability, usually by the number of public 
                                                 
267 At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, the Central Committee declared that “building a socialist harmonious society” 
would be one of the five areas where the Communist Party would improve its governance. 




protests (群体性事件) and by the number of citizen complaints to the higher authority 
(上访), were given more prominence in evaluating the performance of local cadres. (Wu 
& Ma, 2009) 
Thus the labor-intensive, pollution-laden production driven by short-term 
calculation of profits (often illegal under central policies), characteristic of many local 
businesses in the rare earth industry, became a mixed recipe for local cadre promotion. In 
the eyes of the local cadres, the rare earth businesses were not only profit-boosters for 
their record of fostering local economic growth, but also potential scars on their record of 
maintaining social stability. Widespread environmental degradation, health hazards due to 
long-term exposure to toxic and radioactive waste, displacement of local people due to 
the encroachment of farm land, lack of equitable profit distribution (cadres making 
significant cut of the profit), and negligence of labor rights268 were the primary reasons 
for public discontent. (Nanfang Daily, 2005; Huang, 2007; Ruttinger & Feil, 2010; China 
Development Research Foundation, 2011) The temporary high profit of rare earth 
businesses were vital to both career promotion, local government revenue and often 
personal wealth of local county and village cadres. For instance, In Anyuan County, a 
major producing county in Ganzhou Prefecture, buying and owning shares of local rare 
earth businesses was common among local cadres; it was only natural that they wanted 
their slice of the profit pie while offering protection as the local authority269. Local cadres 
were inclined to abuse their power, offering protection (such as armed guard, low land 
rents) to the local rare earth business operations while suppressing publicly displayed 
                                                 
268 Based on author’s fieldwork in Jiangxi Province, it was common practice in the local 
rare earth businesses that workers wear no or minimal protective clothing or mask when 
working with hazardous chemicals, fumes and dust. 
269 This observation was based on author’s field work in Ganzhou Prefecture. 
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discontents of local villagers. In some counties in Guangdong Province and Jiangxi 
Province, local cadres were reportedly involved in organized crimes arresting protestors 
and petitioners and were covering up raids against the protestors by “thugs” hired by 
local businesses or by “gangs” with ties to the local cadres. (Bradsher, 2009; Hilsum, 
2009) Thus contrary to Beijing’s intention of balancing economic growth with social 
welfare, in practice the changes in incentive structure in local cadre promotion led to 
cover up of environmental casualties and social conflicts, and they did little to combat 
local cadre corruption or non-compliance with legal rules and central policies. 
7.4.2.3 Cadre Monitoring and Evaluation 
As the previous chapter shows, the auditing, discipline inspection and supervision 
institutions set up by the central government to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
local governments served as a “last line of defense” against local cadre corruption and 
non-compliance, yet their effectiveness was significantly reduced under the “dual 
management” system. Between 1998 and 2008, the central party authority implemented 
some measures strengthening higher-level control over cadre monitoring and evaluation 
institutions, yet the measures were still far from enough to ensure their effectiveness.  
In terms of the auditing institution, the local auditing bureaus were still subject to 
dual management under both the higher-level auditing authority and the local party 
authority; what was worse, in practice the direct local party official overseeing the 
auditing bureau often ranked lower than the local party official overseeing government 
budgets, making it impossible for local auditing officials to conduct independent auditing. 
(Yang et al, 2008) A survey of the members of the China Auditing Society in 2002 
concluded that 86% of its members rated “lack of independence” as the most significant 
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issue in China’s auditing institution, 76% rated “lack of authoritative data” and 73% rated 
“lack of transparency” as a significant issue. (Yang et al, 2003) As a result of this 
inability to conduct independent and transparent audits, government funding allocated to 
specific projects such as environmental treatment or conservation was often appropriated 
for use in other development projects by local governments with little repercussions. (Ma 
et al, 2001; Economy, 2007; Gang, 2009)  
In terms of discipline inspection and supervision institutions, the lack of 
independence leading to ineffectiveness as manifested in the prior period still persisted 
after 1998. Local discipline inspection and supervision personnel were managed by local 
party committees who controlled their administrative budgets, promotion, salaries and 
retirement benefits, thus continuing the dilemma of “supervising and monitoring their 
own managers”. (Gong, 2009; Guo, 2007) Because local discipline inspection and 
supervision personnel were treated as part of the entire local bureaucracy (the head of the 
local discipline inspection commission also served as a core member of the local party 
committee), inspectors were also often allocated responsibilities as the party committee 
saw fit to other governance areas, ranging from handling resident complaints to 
inspecting local industry production to supervising family planning and birth control. 
(Liu & Li, 2014) In some counties with targets for economic and investment growth, 
local inspectors were also given tasks of bringing in investments and development 
projects. This multitasking led to not only decreased work efficiency, but also created the 
inherent conflict of being “the coach, the athlete and the referee” in local economic 
affairs. (Liao & Li, 2008) The central leadership did step up its efforts using “dispatched 
inspectors” to monitor the work of party cadres in government and state-owned 
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enterprises. (Li, 2015) In 2004, the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
announced that the dispatched inspectors to central ministries by the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection would be under the direct guidance of the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection/Ministry of Supervision. (CPC Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection et al, 2004) Similar changes were implemented at the provincial 
and prefectural level: inspectors dispatched to government bureaus or state-owned 
enterprises at provincial and prefectural levels would be only under the guidance of 
provincial and prefectural discipline inspection commissions. Yet because the dispatched 
inspectors received administrative expenditures, salaries and benefits from the 
bureaus/enterprises they were inspecting on, the dispatched inspectors could not perform 
monitoring or evaluation fully independently. (Guo, 2013)  
7.4.3 Lack of Strong Legal Institutions to Persecute Illegal Activities  
The lack of strong legal rules to persecute against illegal activities (i.e. illegal 
mining, smuggling, illegal trade of quota, etc.) deemed under the new rules imposed by 
the state also made enforcement of state mandates more difficult. Take illegal mining as 
an example: prosecution was ineffective due to miniscule penalty charges and inefficient 
prosecution procedure. MLR suspended new mining license applications from 1999 until 
2003 and again from 2005. MLR also vowed to close all unlicensed operations that 
violated industry and environmental standards during nationwide inspections between 
2003 and 2005. MLR’s efforts led to large areas with rare earth deposits untapped. In 
Guangdong Province and Fujian Province for instance, the existing rare earth mining 
licenses were all released before 2001 and covered a small part of the provincial areas 
with rare earth deposits. With no hope from the MLR on either approving/restoring 
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license applications or the enlargement of mining areas, local businesses and individuals 
pursued mining without valid licenses or flocked to pursue mining in the unapproved 
areas, leading to rampant illegal mining and smuggling.  
According to a local bureau of land resources official in Xingfeng County in 
Jiangxi Province, during inspections local bureau of land resources enforcement officers 
could only “damage the machinery but not arrest illegal mine operators”, and illegal mine 
operators often could flee to another region to continue production or “come back after 
they bribed someone of authority”. Prosecution of illegal mining would only be possible 
“if the mine region was larger than 10 Mu”; however, “by the time the procedures for 
identifying the mining area and evidence were completed, the suspect had already 
extracted rare earth ores using replaced machinery, sold the goods and fled the region”. 
(Li, 2011)  
Even if a suspect was captured by local police and then persecuted in the local 
court, he or she would typically only get less than 3 years of jail time. Compared to the 
potential of windfall profits in good years of market demand (priced at several hundred 
thousand RMB per ton compared to only around 20,000 RMB per ton in set-up cost), 
many local businessmen would gladly choose to break the law and use part of the illegal 
earnings to bribe for protection from local government cadres270. 
7.5 Industry Development Outcomes 
The previous sections analyze the macroeconomic environment, state reregulation 
goals and industry-specific policies and political institutional changes from 1998 to 2007. 
This section analyzes the outcomes of state reregulation in comparison with the state’s 
                                                 
270 Author interviews with local businessmen in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province in July 2013. 
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goals and policy targets. Industry development outcomes are assessed in four areas: 
industry production and consumption, international trade, market structure and 
environmental and social impact. 
7.5.1 Industry Production and Consumption 
7.5.1.1 Mine Production 
In this period between 1998 and 2007, China’s rare earth mining output has 
dominated the global market supply and exceeded the official quota set by the central 
government. As Figure 44 shows, China rare earth concentrate output already accounted 
for about 90% of global output in 1998-2002, and after 2002 more than 96% of global 
output. China’s dominance in global REE mine production was partially aided by the 
closure of Molycorp. In 1998 the U.S. primary producer Molycorp’s production of 
refined rare earth compounds was ceased due to a blocked wastewater pipe and a series 
of wastewater leaks which spilled radioactive wastewater into the Ivanpah Dry Lake. 
(Hedrick, 1999) Decreasing revenues due to strong Chinese competition and the high cost 
of environment remedy projects to clean up the spill made Molycorp’s production costly 
and difficult to maintain. The Mountain Pass mine officially ceased mining production in 
2002, ending the U.S. mining of REEs. (Margonelli, 2009) In terms of production relative 
to global demand, China became the default supplier country for the global market. As 
Figure 45 shows, China’s mining production grew to be almost on par with the global 
demand in 1998, and its mining production remained either on par or larger than the 
global demand by 2007.  
While the Ministry of Land and Resources imposed multiple mining licensing 
halts and inspections in this period and also began to issue production quota in 2006, the 
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result was over-production compared to the state-imposed goals as shown in Figure 46. 
The actual overcapacity of production was likely to be even higher, as the production 
statistics was taken from official sources and could not take into account illegal mining 
output that were also consumed locally and not reported. Thus we can conclude that the 
production restrictions did not work as well as the state intended. 
 
 
Figure 44 Production Volume of Rare Earth Concentrates by China, U.S. and the 
Rest of the World (ROW) in 1998-2007271 
                                                 
271 China statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评) published by the Rare Earth Office from 1998 to 2007. U.S. rare earth 
concentrate production statistics are extracted from the Minerals Yearbooks published by 
the U.S. Geological Survey from 1998 to 2007. Rest of the World rare earth concentrate 
production statistics are calculated by subtracting the volume of China’s production and 
U.S. production from total global production volume of rare earth concentrates. The total 
global rare earth concentrate production volume statistics are extracted from the Minerals 






Figure 45 China's Rare Earth Concentrate Production Relative to Global Demand 
in 1990-2007272 
  
                                                 
272 China statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评) from 1990 to 2007. Global demand statistics are extracted from the 10th 
Edition, 11th Edition and 12th Edition of Rare Earths: Global Industry, Markets & 
Outlook which covered data until 2007 published by Roskill, a leading international 





Figure 46 China's Rare Earth Concentrate Production Relative to MLR Production 
Quota in 2006-2007273 
 
7.5.1.2 Smelting Production 
Besides sustained predominance in upstream mining, China has also risen to 
become the world’s leading producer of rare earth smelting products in this period. In 
terms of absolute volume, as Figure 47 shows, China’s production volume of rare earth 
smelting products in 2007 was more than double from 1997. In terms of relative weight 
in global production, China’s production volume was also ahead of other countries. 
Compared to the other major smelting producer Japan, Japan’s smelting production 
hovered around 5000 tons (REO unit), thus China’s production volume was about 10-15 
                                                 
273 Production statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 
Industry (中国稀土年评) from 2006 to 2007. MLR’s Production Quota statistics are 
extracted from the official quota release documents on the website of the Ministry of 
Land and Resources. MLR started publishing mining production quota volume and 
allocation from 2006, after the passage of the State Council Notice on Comprehensive 
Consolidation and Regulation over Mining Resource Development in 2005. 
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times size of Japan’s production (see Figure 48). U.S. smelting production declined 
significantly to almost zero production as manufacturing migrated overseas: “45 
immediate downstream companies in the U.S. were closed down”274 as a result of intense 
competition with Chinese counterparts. By the late 2000s Japan became the only country 
directly importing rare earth concentrates from China for smelting production. (Su, 2009, 
p. 103)  
China’s strong dominance in smelting production was partially due to its 
predominance in mining output and the state’s failure to enforce production quota 
restrictions, leading to consistent strong supply of rare earth smelting products at low 
prices. It was also partially due to the foreign downstream producers (consumers of rare 
earth smelting products) and further downstream producers moving production facilities 
to China. This was particularly evident in the case of the U.S., where the majority of U.S. 
producers in downstream industries such as magnets, catalysts, lighting and displays, as 
well as further downstream industries such as automobiles, televisions and cell phones, 
shifted production to China or set up joint ventures with Chinese companies in this 
period.275 In other words, China’s sustained dominance in rare earth smelting production 
was accompanied with the broader trend of the migration of global manufacturing supply 
chains to China as China became the “world factory”. On the other hand, this trend of 
migration of supply chain left countries like the U.S. with little production facility in both 
upstream mining, smelting and midstream production. 
 
                                                 
274 Author interview with a magnetics industry analyst in Chicago in May 2012. 
275 Author interviews with a former industry engineer of a U.S. rare earth magnet 




Figure 47 China's Production Volume of Rare Earth Smelting Products (1997-
2007)276 
 
                                                 
276 China statistics are extracted from the China Society of Rare Earths Yearbook 2007 
(中国稀土学会年鉴 2007) and the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中
国稀土年评) from 1997 to 2007. After 1996 rare earth permanent magnets and rare earth 
fluorescent materials were excluded from the category of rare earth smelting products, 
while they were included prior to 1996. To ensure data consistency this graph presents 




Figure 48 Production Volume of Rare Earth Smelting Products by China and Japan 
(1997-2003)277 
 
7.5.1.3 Production of Higher-value Products 
China’s rare earth industry achieved substantial success in technology upgrading 
of industry production in this period. China’s rare earth smelting production had migrated 
away from the model of primarily providing the most basic unrefined form of products 
(mixed rare earth products) in the previous two decades. In 2000, China’s production of 
individual REE products accounted for 48.5% of total smelting production. (Rare Earth 
Office of the State Development Planning Commission, 2000) After 2000, the Annual 
Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry stopped reporting the production volume of 
individual REE products, instead concentrating on reporting “rare earth new materials 
                                                 
277 China statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
(中国稀土年评) from 1997 to 2003. Japan statistics are extracted from Su (2009, p.90), 
which was originally from the China Rare Earth Net database based on data reported by 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan. 
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products”, products that would be favored under the state’s goal of industry upgrading. 
These include materials such as permanent magnets, phosphors, polishing powder and 
hydrogen-storage alloys. As Figure 49 shows, China’s production of REE permanent 
magnets (including Sm-Co permanent magnets and NdFeB permanent magnets) grew 
exponentially in this ten-year period: the production volume of rare earth permanent 
magnets in 2008 (49300 tons) was over ten times the production volume in 1998 (4140 
tons). In comparison with other countries, China also surpassed Japan to become the 
larger producer of sintered NdFeB permanent magnets, accounting for more than 50% of 
global production since 2001 (see Figure 50). Similarly as Figure 51 shows, China’s 
production of rare earth phosphors also grew from 570 tons in 1998 to 8481 tons in 2008, 
an increase of over 14 times in just ten years.  
In terms of consumption, China’s REE consumption in 1998-2007 also showed a 
positive trend towards consumption by higher-value sectors. The Annual Reviews of 
Chinese Rare Earth Industry reports domestic consumption by “traditional sectors” 
(including metallurgy, petroleum and chemicals, glass/ceramics, agriculture, textile) and 
“new material sectors” (including phosphors, permanent magnets, catalytic materials, 
hydrogen storage materials, polishing powders). As Figure 52 shows, the consumption by 
new materials sectors was miniscule compared to traditional sectors prior to 1998. Yet its 
proportion in total domestic consumption grew rapidly in the following ten years, and in 
2007 domestic REE consumption by new materials sectors for the first time was larger 
than domestic REE consumption by traditional sectors. These trends show that the state 




Figure 49 China's Production Volume of REE Permanent Magnets (1998-2007)278 
 
 
Figure 50 Chinese and Global Production Volume of Sintered NdFeB magnets 
(1998-2006)279 
                                                 
278 Statistics are extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry (中
国稀土年评). After 1996, the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry calculates 
production volume of rare earth permanent magnets only in unit of real tons, not tons in 
REO equivalent. Thus this graph presents data in unit of real tons instead of tons in REO 








Figure 52 China's Domestic REE Consumption by Traditional and New Material 
Sectors (1986-2007)281 
                                                                                                                                                 
279 Statistics are extracted from the China NdFeB Industry Net (钕铁硼产业网). 





7.5.1.4 Domestic Consumption Grew to Surpass Export Demand  
Besides the growth of value-added production, another important trend in this 
period that differed from the previous two decades was the significant growth in China’s 
domestic consumption relative to export in consuming its rare earth mining output. As 
Figure 53 shows, from 1998 to 2007 China’s domestic REE consumption grew at a more 
rapid rate relative to export. In 2006, China’s domestic consumption of REE surpassed 
export, meaning that over half of the production of REEs was consumed within the 
Chinese border.  
This trend of domestic consumption catching up and surpassing export is not 
surprising. The global migration of manufacturing facilities to China meant that foreign 
companies who used to import from China now directly produce products using resources 
in the country, thus what used to be counted as export was not counted as domestic 
consumption. The state-imposed export tariffs on various rare earth primary products, on 
top of the abolishment of export rebate, also meant that it would be cheaper to produce 
within China rather than import from China. The rise of the disposable income of 
ordinary people also meant that more domestic Chinese producers were producing 
downstream products such as TVs, automobiles, cell phones and air conditioners, 
increasing the domestic consumption for rare earth products as well. 
                                                                                                                                                 





Figure 53 China's Consumption vs. Export Volume of Rare Earth Products (1998-
2007)282 
 
7.5.2 International Trade 
7.5.2.1 Export Volume and Export Quota 
As the default source of REEs to all the other countries, China’s export of rare 
earth products, when converted into the unit of REO tons to equalize across different 
kinds of rare earth products, stayed relatively stable during this period as shown in Figure 
53. A way to look at the levels of restrictions on export imposed by the export quota 
system was to compare the annual total export quota volume with the reported export 
volume by the end of the year. Since the export quota allocated by MOFCOM to each 
company was in real ton units instead of the unit of metric tons in REO equivalent, a 
direct comparison with export volume would need to employ the statistics of the export 
of rare earth products reported by the PRC General Customs in the unit of real tons. The 
                                                 




result, as Figure 54 shows, is that the total volume of Chinese export subject to quota 
restriction was almost on par with MOFCOM’s total allocated export quota in 2005-2007. 
The export volume reported by the Chinese customs could not have taken into account 
the amount of rare earth products smuggled out of China283. An official at the Association 
of Chinese Rare Earth Industry estimate that “about a third of the total real export volume 
was through smuggling”284. Therefore the actual amount of China’s rare earth product 
export was likely to be higher than the export quota. A breakdown of the MOFCOM-
imposed export quota by companies into two categories, wholly-owned Chinese domestic 
companies and foreign-invested joint ventures (Figure 55) 285 , further shows that 
MOFCOM’s export quota allocation ensured a good proportion (about 25%) of export 
quota allocated to the foreign-invested joint ventures, which often supplied the products 
back to their parent companies in the major importing countries including Japan, the U.S. 
and France. Thus despite of an export quota system in place even after China’s WTO 
accession in 2001, Beijing’s policies did not impose restrictions to the export volume to 
the point that the consumer companies in major importing countries might complain. The 
generous export quota allocation would also explain why despite of the export quota 
system in place for such a long time, major importing countries such as the U.S. or Japan 
did not file for WTO lawsuit: there was no need to do so. 
                                                 
283 Smuggled export would be cheaper than export through the official customs on the 
international market due to no export tariff. 
284 Author interview with an official at the Association of Chinese Rare Earth Industry in 
Beijing in July 2013. 
285 MOFCOM allocated export quota to each company semi-annually, thus export quota 
volume was calculated through combining each company’s allocated quota in the entire 
year. MOFCOM only published publicly the allocation of export quota volume by 




Figure 54 China's REE Export Quota in Comparison with Total Export Volume in 
2005-2007286 
  
                                                 
286 Export quota volume was calculated through combining the allocated quota from the 
semi-annual quota release document by MOFCOM. Export volume in real tons was 
calculated through combining the export volume of rare earth smelting products in the 
PRC General Customs Statistics Database. Since higher-value rare earth permanent 
magnets were not subject to MOFCOM export quota, only the export of rare earth 




Figure 55 China's REE Export Quota Allocation to Chinese Domestic Companies 
and Foreign-invested Joint Ventures in 2005-2007287 
 
7.5.2.2 Export of Higher-value Products 
China’s export in this period upgraded from basic products (rare earth 
concentrates, unseparated rare earth oxides, rare earth carbonate and rare earth chloride) 
to purified individual REE products and midstream products of higher value. After 1998, 
the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry stopped reporting on the export of 
individual REE products, instead focusing on separate reporting of the export of 
permanent magnets and other different kinds of rare earth materials products. As Figure 
56 shows, the value of China’s rare earth product export (including both smelting 
products and new materials products) had an overall strong increase of almost three times 
in the ten year period from 1998 to 2007 when the export volume (shown in Figure 53) 
                                                 
287 Export quota volume was calculated through combining the allocated quota from the 
semi-annual quota release document by MOFCOM. 
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stayed relatively flat. Figure 57 further shows that the annual export volume of rare earth 
permanent magnets more than doubled in this period. 
 
 
Figure 56 China's Export Value of Rare Earth Products (1998-2007)288 
 
 
Figure 57 China's Export Volume of REE Permanent Magnets (2000-2007)289 
                                                 




7.5.3 Market Structure 
Compared to the previous period, the market structure in the mining of REEs in 
this period showed a trend towards regional consolidation at the local 
provincial/prefecture level. As analyzed in the previous section, the split of the three 
central metal SOEs following the 1998 State Council reform resulted in the transfer of 
state assets and mining licenses to the local provincial/prefecture governments. Central 
SOEs like China Minmetals had minor control over mining licenses compared to the 
local SOEs and rural companies. The subsequent state attempt to reconsolidate the rare 
earth companies into two national state-owned conglomerate did not succeed. Thus the 
important players in mining were the local provincial/prefecture SOEs and semi-
independent rural cooperative companies within their jurisdictions. In North China, 
Baotou Steel Rare Earths continued to be the quasi-monopolistic supplier. Baotou Steel’s 
bureaucratic affiliation was transferred to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
Government, and the company acquired more than a dozen local companies to boost its 
smelting production in the region. In South China, major mining companies were 
provincial-level SOEs such as Guangdong Rising and Jiangxi Tungsten, prefecture-level 
SOEs such as Ganzhou Rare Earths and Guyun Rare Earths, and dozens of county-level 
rural cooperative companies. There was not one single company that controlled the 
mining licenses in an entire province. While consolidation was taking shape at the 
regional level, the management of these regional consolidated players was less 
decentralized than it appeared to be. There were reportedly 1197 mining sites in Ganzhou 
Prefecture. (Li & He, 2012) Though Ganzhou Rare Earths had control over all mining 
                                                                                                                                                 
289 Data is extracted from Liu (2011). Liu Yinan is the Vice President of the China 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters. 
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licenses in the prefecture, it acted like an invoice biller for all the semi-independent 
mining sites. 
Compared to mining where the access to market was limited by licensing and 
mining production quota, the market structure in the REE smelting production was much 
more competitive. Though the central government removed the local governments’ 
authority to approve large-scale projects and restricted the development of new smelting 
projects in favor of more high-tech downstream projects, small- and median-scale 
smelting projects often flew under the radar. According to Su Wenqing, Former Director 
of the Management Commission of Baotou Rare Earth High-tech Industrial Development 
Zone, by 2007 there were about 130 rare earth smelting companies and about 80 rare 
earth metal producers in China. (Su, 2009, p. 135) Besides being larger in sheer number 
of companies, the market also showed an issue of chronic over-capacity: the full capacity 
of production of all smelting companies consistently exceeded the actual production 
volume of smelting products by about 30% (Su, 2009, p. 136), meaning that these 
companies were running at below-full-capacity level with very low profit margins. 
Combined with restrictions in the supply of ores due to the MLR-imposed mining quota, 
this resulted in an exacerbated imbalance between the supply of raw materials (ores) and 
the production capacity of rare earth smelting companies. This structural imbalance also 
prompted the smelting companies to seek out illegal sources of raw materials and in turn 
promoted illegal mining, as ores produced by illegal miners were priced at lower prices. 
Due to almost non-existent penalty to buying ores from illegal miners and the often 
strong protection of illegal miners provided by local government cadres, smelting 
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companies could not care less about whether they sourced the ores from legal businesses 
or not. 
7.5.4 Environmental and Social Impact 
Though the central government made sustainable development a top priority in 
reregulation in this period, the environmental record of the rare earth industry in this 
period remained poor. The previous two decades of rapid expansion in mining and 
smelting left pollution legacies that were difficult and often extremely costly to treat. 
With no strong institutional incentive to prioritize environmental protection, local 
governments tended to turn a blind eye towards environmental degradation rather than 
devoting significant funds to treat pollution, improve infrastructure, or forcing companies 
to comply with environmental regulations imposed by Beijing. While the State Bureau of 
Environmental Protection and the local environmental bureaus conducted routine or snap 
environmental inspections, these inspections rarely resulted in the direct closures of 
polluting plants which paid fines to continue production. The prevalence of illegal mining 
activities tolerated by rural government cadres worsened the environment damage. Illegal 
miners would use rudimentary production methods with great environment damage and 
forgo waste treatment because new production technologies and waste discharge facilities 
that complied with environmental standards would incur higher production costs. (Liu, 
2010) 
7.5.4.1 Environmental and Social Impact in North China 
In North China, rare earth mining resulted in grave damage to the local eco-
system and significant casualties. The Baiyun-ebo region has dry climate with low levels 
of rain fall. The“tailings dam” (尾矿坝) first built by Baotou Steel to store the waste 
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water and residue as a lake in the 1950s continued to grow rapidly in size to 
approximately 170 million tons of waste in this period, gradually eating up the outskirts 
of Baiyun-ebo region. The open air exposure combined with dry climate and low rain fall 
resulted in toxic dust and smog covering the entire region on windy days. (Wang, 2003) 
The tailings not only polluted air but also damaged the soil and the underground water. 
Nearby villages were dubbed by the locals as “cancer villages”, as underground water 
and soil were polluted by the toxins leaking from the tailings. In one village named Da La 
Hai, 66 people died from cancer due to exposure to toxic air and water between 1993 and 
2005. Toxic water and air also led to widespread death of crops and livestock, including 
thousands of sheep that were starved to death because of abnormal growth of teeth. (Zhou, 
2006; Li, 2010) Mining also further deprived the local water resource already threatened 
by the dry climate: as Baotou Steel Rare Earths became the global default supplier of 
LREEs, 80%-90% of the water in local rivers were used by the company and the nearby 
chemical plants for production. Without sufficient water for basic living, local farmers 
sometimes resorted to stop the companies from using water from the local rivers. (Wang 
& Liu, 2012) Besides environmental damages, the tailings lake was also a ticking bomb 
of safety hazard. The Yellow River, the primary source of drinking and industrial use 
water for nine provinces in North China is less than ten kilometers away from the tailings 
lake. As large quantities of toxic waste water and residue were dumped inside 
continuously, Baotou Steel had to consistently build higher tailings dams to prevent the 
waste from flowing out to the nearby regions on relatively lower ground. A waste water 




7.5.4.2 Environmental and Social Impact in South China 
In South China, there were similarly widespread environmental destruction in the 
form of soil erosion and degradation, water pollution, and the loss of ground layer of 
vegetation. The rapid expansion of mining through tank leaching in the previous two 
decades left 542 discarded mining sites totaling an area size of more than 70 square 
kilometers just in Ganzhou Prefecture alone. The discarded mining sites, left untreated, 
resulted in tailings polluting the soil, underground water and nearby farm fields. (Li & He, 
2012) As tank leaching incurred large quantities of tailings (1600-3000 tons per 1 ton of 
REO produced) and significant environmental damage to the ground layer of vegetation 
(about 200 square meters of damaged ground layer per 1 ton of REO produced) to the 
extent that mountains were stripped of any plants or trees, the industry promoted 
alternative method of mining in this period. (Peng, 2005) Dump leaching (堆浸)290 
method was used at some mining sites, yet it created larger direct damage to the ground 
surface and vegetation and significant amount of waste residue. In-situ leaching (原地浸
矿), a relatively new way of extraction, was designed to prevent the direct stripping of 
ground level plants and trees (seefor the in-situ leaching procedure). Compared to the two 
other methods, in-situ leaching resulted in much less direct damage to the ground layer of 
vegetation and was promoted to the mining companies by local governments. However, 
digging lots of wells in the mountains greatly increased the risk of landslides, a grave 
danger to the local community. The reagent used in in-situ leaching, ammonium sulfate 
                                                 
290 Dump leaching (堆浸) is similar to tank leaching, only on a larger scale than and 
involving the use of large machinery. In dump leaching, the ore is taken out from the 
ground and then stacked on the leach pad, creating a dump of ores; the dump is then 
irrigated with a solution which dissolves the REEs in the ores; then the solutions are 
recovered for further processing. 
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also left residues in the mountain clay and contaminated the surface water of mountain 
streams and the underground water which in turn contaminated farm land and drinking 
water. (Liu, 2002) Thus whichever the method, the long-term damage to the local 
environment was significant and unavoidable, requiring expensive follow-up 
environment recovery procedures. The Pingyuan County Environmental Monitoring 
Station reported that restoring and maintaining ground vegetation coverage would require 
upfront cost of at least 4500 RMB/hm2. (Chen, 2011) The environmental damage was 
further worsened by the prevalent illegal mining tolerated by rural government cadres. 
Illegal miners operating on a small scale usually used the environmentally destructive 
tank leaching method due to low initial costs to start production; local people described 
the extremely rudimentary way of doing it: strip the plants from the ground layer, dig the 
mud from the ground, mix the mud with chemical fertilizer and salt, and then the formed 
precipitate can be sold to the smelters.  
 
Figure 58 In-Situ Leaching Method Procedure to Extract Rare Earths from Ionic 





This chapter analyzes state reregulation in the period from 1998 to 2007. This ten 
year period saw China becoming a member of the WTO, expanding its marketization 
reform to the state-owned enterprises, privatizing the science and technology institutions, 
and developing its domestic innovation capability. As China became the global default 
supplier of REEs, the state reregulation goals in the rare earth industry changed to focus 
on sustainable development and industry upgrading. The state-imposed reregulation 
measures include mining license control and mining quota, restrictions on foreign 
investment, export quota and tariff on low-end products, funding and project approval 
priority for industry upgrading, attempted consolidation of industry into two national 
SOEs, and environmental treatment and inspections.  
Broader political and legal institutional changes took place but did not all yield 
influence to the rare earth industry in the state’s favor. Successive bureaucratic reforms 
and subsequent infighting amongst different levels of state-affiliated actors eventually 
resulted in weakened central bureaucratic authority over the market actors. Well-intended 
changes were made to improve the local cadre management system, yet did not 
fundamentally change its mantra of economic-growth-based promotion and its inherent 
incompetence in monitoring and evaluating cadre behavior. Weak legal penalty and 
inefficient legal prosecution procedures contributed to the lack of local enforcement of 
central government policies.  
In retrospect, the state achieved a mix of success and failure in reregulation in this 
period. China sustained its leading position in global rare earth supply. With industry 
upgrading and global migration of manufacturing to China, Chinese domestic 
consumption of rare earths climbed up to rival the export. Rare earth production and 
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export both showed significant industry upgrading from primarily low-end unprocessed 
products to many categories of products of higher value, though the production and 
export of high-tech products was still small compared to the total volume. On the other 
hand, Beijing’s direct control over the industry and the local market actors was weak: it 
was not able to strictly enforce mining control, to clamp down on illegal mining and 
smuggling, to recentralize the mining market supply, or to curb the environmental 
destruction from industrial production. In terms of the impact of reregulation on the 
international relations, Beijing’s reregulation did not result in much supply risk for 
downstream consumer companies in the U.S., Japan and the European Union; thus 
although its restrictive measures were in contrary to China’s commitment to free trade, 




CHAPTER 8 MORE STATE REREGULATION TIGHTENING 
CONTROL OVER THE INDUSTRY (2008-PRESENT) 
 
This chapter studies the current Chinese state reregulation over the rare earth 
industry and market since 2008. This chapter first outlines the macroeconomic 
environment for the industry development in this period. The Chinese state faced the dire 
task of lifting the economy from the impact of the global financial crisis, and Beijing 
implemented massive stimulus programs to boost domestic industries. The chapter then 
analyzes the state goals and narratives in guiding the rare earth industry development in 
this period, namely promoting sustainable production, satisfying domestic consumption 
demand, developing downstream value-added industries, and securing access to global 
market of value-added products. The chapter then outlines industry-specific policies in 
this period. The central government implemented a series of new policies to restrict and 
regulate mining and smelting production and export. The chapter then analyzes larger 
political and legal institutional changes that influenced the state’s capacity to impose 
reregulation measures. The chapter further analyzes the outcome of state reregulation in 
comparison with state’s goals and targets in industry production, trade, market structure 
and socio-environmental impact. 
8.1 Macro-level Economic Change: Post-Crisis Development of Market Economy 
This section summarizes the macroeconomic change in 2008-09 that influenced 
China’s industrial policies towards the rare earth industry. A global banking crisis and the 
subsequent economic recession starting at the beginning of 2008 prompted Beijing to 
implement a massive stimulus and credit easing program to increase the Chinese 
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domestic market consumption and government spending to rescue its slowing economy. 
The new State Council under the incumbent Premier Wen Jiabao also continued its 
efforts reforming China’s under-performing SOEs and promoting ingenious innovation as 
the central task for China’s reformed S&T institution. These macroeconomic changes 
spurred further changes in the goals of the state reregulation. 
8.1.1 Post-Crisis Stimulus to Increase Domestic Market Growth 
Although the Chinese economy has maintained double-digit growth for the 
previous decade, the economic growth was primarily driven by investment and export. 
Thus when the financial crisis and the following global economic slowdown unfolded, 
China saw its export growth turn negative and its foreign direct investment turn sluggish, 
threatening its goal to maintain high-speed growth. It was imperative for the central 
government to increase its domestic market demand and the businesses’ access to credit 
to offset weak export. In November 2008, the PRC State Council under the leadership of 
Premier Wen Jiabao announced a major macroeconomic policy shift, a four trillion yuan 
($586 billion) stimulus package and the largest in the country's history. The two-year 
spending plan injected funds into ten sectors, including health care, education, low-
income housing, environmental protection, disaster management and reconstruction, 
technological innovation, transport and other infrastructure projects. The State Council 
also began a reform to the value-added tax system which would provide 120 million 
RMB tax relief to corporations. (Xinhua, 2008) Unlike countries like the U.S. where the 
capital for post-crisis stimulus came primarily from the central or local governments, the 
capital for the Chinese central government stimulus package was provided primarily by 
commercial banks and state-owned enterprises that were encouraged to expand more 
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rapidly. (Barboza, 2008) Commercial banks' credit ceilings were abolished to allow for 
more lending to state-prioritized projects, rural companies and individuals, small- and 
median-scale businesses, technical innovation projects, and to provide capital for 
industrial mergers and acquisitions (M&As). (Xinhua, 2008)  
Following the central government stimulus plan, local governments quickly 
sought to exploit the opportunity to apply for NDRC’s approval of local investment 
projects, which could be directly or indirectly related to the state-prioritized sectors. As 
the funding allocated to the localities by the central government in the form of block 
grants were far from enough to fund all the approved local projects, local governments 
provided matching funds and obtained additional capital through central government 
bond revenues, special long-term bank loans from commercial banks, as well as corporate 
bonds issued by local government asset management platforms (地方政府融资平台). 
(Naughton, 2009)  
The massive fiscal stimulus package has been widely credited as saving the 
Chinese economy from a deep recession. China’s GDP growth in 2008-2013 averaged 
about 9% (see Figure 42), a much better record compared to other major economies hit 
by the global crisis. However, the policy-induced massive expansion also led to 
ballooning increase in local government debt, credit growth, shadow banking and surplus 
production capacity. (World Bank, 2015) 
8.1.2 Structural Adjustment and SOE M&As in SOE Reform 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) stressed the 
importance of “sectoral structural adjustment and SOE consolidation and mergers” (产业
结构调整与重组整合) in key industries of national importance as a major task for the 
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ongoing SOE reform in 2008. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT), NDRC, SASAC and MOF would work together to carry forward the process of 
“facilitating the transfer of state-owned assets towards important industries, key sectors 
and public service sectors vital to national security and economy”. (PRC National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2008) The goal was to consolidate and expand 
the assets held by publicly listed companies in which the central SOEs were the major 
shareholders, and to develop 30-50 internationally competitive super-size corporations. 
(Xinhua, 2009) To promote the M&As (mergers and acquisitions) among central SOEs, 
the State Council provided numerous incentives, including preferential corporate tax 
treatment for SOEs in the M&A process, allocation of special funding for specific 
procedures (worker relocation and compensation, production technology upgrading, 
interest on bank loans) in the M&A process, preferential access to commercial bank loans 
and investment funds, and central-government-backed funding for innovation programs 
and local land rents for SOEs undergoing M&As in key industries. (PRC State Council, 
2010b)  
The global economic slowdown prompted the state to not only speed up its effort 
to consolidate the reformed shareholding SOEs into large-scale corporate groups, but also 
to instruct the central SOEs to acquire local SOEs and private enterprises to expand assets 
and market share. Weak export demand worsened the performance of many Chinese 
SOEs which were going through or underwent the shareholding reform not long before 
and were still suffering from inefficiency and low profit. In the 1st quarter of 2009, the 
central SOEs under the supervision of SASAC suffered a decline of 9.2% in gross 
operating revenue and a decline of 36% in profit, the first major decline in recent years. 
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Local SOEs also suffered a decline of 8.4% in gross operating revenue and a significantly 
worse decline of 58.1% in profit. (Xinhua, 2009) As central SOEs enjoyed the capital 
advantage of state-backed funding over the local SOEs and private companies, SASAC 
encouraged the central SOEs to partner with or acquire local SOEs/private companies and 
expand state assets and achieve larger economy of scale in this manner. (Economic 
Information & Agency, 2009) In the non-ferrous metal industries, central shareholding 
SOEs such as China Minmetals and China Non-ferrous Metals were encouraged to 
acquire local SOEs and private companies to increase the state-owned assets and have 
greater share of the market. (Economic Information & Agency, 2010) 
8.1.3 Promoting Domestic Innovation Focusing on Strategic Emerging Industries 
The Hu Jingtao/Wen Jiabao administration in their second term continued to work 
towards developing a high-tech-driven economy to replace the existing economic model 
of low-skilled low-cost export-oriented manufacturing. In the S&T institution reform, 
promoting domestic technological innovation of Chinese enterprises continued to be the 
central task. Premier Wen announced in his Report on Chinese Government Work in 2008 
that his administration would strengthen China’s S&T infrastructure and support 
technological innovation of enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
(PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, 2008) High-tech industries, such as 
information technology and renewable energy, were given special recognition. The 
central government supported innovation in high-tech industries by combining available 
resources across enterprises, universities, research institutes and governments to provide 
technical service (such as testing service, information service, R&D service, technology 
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transfer service and training) to enterprises. (PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, 
2008)  
In October 2010 the state further identified seven “strategic emerging industries” 
(SEI, 战略性新兴产业) that would receive targeted state support. The goal was to 
support these nascent industries so that they would grow to account for 8% of GDP by 
2015 and 15% of GDP by 2020. In Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries, the State Council identified 
seven SEIs, including energy efficient and environmental technologies, next generation 
information technologies, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, renewable 
energy, new materials and new-energy vehicles. The State Council again stressed that 
R&D and indigenous innovation would be the core drivers of SEI development. (PRC 
State Council, 2010c) Following the State Council decision, most provincial and 
prefectural governments implemented their own policies and funding support designed to 
promote the development of local enterprises in the SEIs in their jurisdictions. (US-China 
Business Council, 2013) 
8.2 Goals and Narratives of the State 
This section analyzes the changing goals of state in the post-2008 current 
reregulation of the rare earth industry. State reregulation in the previous decade led to 
mixed results, prompting the state to adjust its industrial policy. The 2008 global 
financial crisis and Beijing’s post-crisis programs also brought new macroeconomic 




8.2.1 Goals of State Reregulation: Sustainable Production and Environmental 
Protection 
One consistent concern that has not changed in the state reregulation is the fact 
that the REEs are non-renewable minerals; thus once the reserves are depleted, there 
would be no more deposits to mine from. With greater technology innovation since the 
1980s, REEs have been found to be useful in a variety of both civilian and military 
technologies. Thus it would be in the interest of the Chinese state to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of China’s rare earth production so that it would meet the needs for the 
minerals in the future.  
The State Council released the landmark Several Opinions of the State Council on 
Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth Industry, an 
industrial governance guideline in 2011. It is only the third document that has been 
directly released by the State Council over an industry in the non-ferrous metals 
industries to date (the first two being on gold in the 1950s and on coal in the 1960s). It 
has thus generated significant momentum in corresponding new policy campaigns at the 
ministerial level as well as new policies at the local provincial government level291. In the 
document, the State Council acknowledged that “rare earths are an important strategic 
non-renewable resource, and are increasingly widely used in such fields as new energy, 
new materials, energy saving, environmental protection, aeronautics, astronautics, 
electronics and information technology. Effective protection and rational utilization of 
rare earth resources are of great significance in protecting environment, accelerating the 
fostering and development of strategic emerging industries, transforming and upgrading 
                                                 
291 Author interview with a senior manager at a state-owned mining enterprise in 
Guangzhou, Guangdong Province in June 2013. 
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traditional industries and promoting the sustainable and healthy development of the rare 
earth industry.” (PRC State Council, 2011b) 
As the previous chapter analyzes, in the previous decade from 1998 to 2007, due 
to China’s production capacity expansion and the U.S. exit from production, China 
became the default REE supplier to the entire world while its share of the global REE 
reserves remained less than 50%. The mining licensing requirements and quota 
restrictions imposed by the MLR since the early 2000s were ineffective in controlling the 
volume of production. In the views of many Chinese experts who were long involved in 
industry development since the early years of expansion, the long-term consequence for 
China was exhausting its resources at an alarming rate292. In the words of Xu Guangxian, 
the renowned “Father of the Chinese Rare Earth Industry”, “I fear that after twenty to 
thirty years, China as a country will only have little rare earth resources left.” (Hao, 2013) 
Thus curbing production volume through implementing and enforcing stronger state 
regulations would be the logical choice. 
Compounding this fear of the long-term unsustainability of production was the 
low market pricing and low profit that plagued the rare earth industry in the years 
between 2002 and 2007. A widely held belief among experts was that the Chinese rare 
earth industry needed to rein back its production to prop up the unfairly low prices and 
achieve sustainable profit margins293. As the previous chapter analyzes, the chronic over 
capacity of China’s rare earth smelting production relative to both the mining quota and 
the market demand meant that most rare earth companies would be running on razor-thin 
                                                 
292 Author interview with a senior officer at the Chinese Society of Rare Earths in Beijing 
in July 2013. 
293 Author interview with a senior officer at the Chinese Society of Rare Earths in Beijing 
in May 2013. 
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profit margins. Illegal mining and smuggling businesses, without the burdens (such as 
tariffs, quota compliance, environmental treatment or fines) that legal companies had to 
shoulder, further dragged down the market price. China’s monopoly in market share in 
the early 2000s did not result in price increase, but exceedingly low prices across the 
board. The price of major rare earth oxide products almost all declined to historically low 
levels after 2002 (see Figure 59, Figure 60, Figure 61, Figure 62, Figure 63, Figure 64294). 
According to statistics provided by Su Wenqing, then Director of the Management 
Committee of Baotou High-tech Zone, the rare earth companies registered in Baotou 
Prefecture had altogether a net profit/sales revenue ratio of merely 2.85%, 1.60%, 4.19% 
and 4.98% in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. (Su, 2009, p. 196) This low pricing and profit 
lent stronger support to the experts’ consensus that Chinese companies were producing 
too much, creating a “buyer’s market” instead of a “seller’s market”. As an REE-rich 
country China risked “losing the valuable resources through underselling”295. The low 
pricing also prompted some legit rare earth companies to complain to Beijing that the 
state was not acting strong enough to enforce its regulations in all local regions and 
eradicate black markets, and stronger state regulations would help them gain a leveled 
playing field and get better profits296. 
                                                 
294 Pricing data is extracted from China Rare Earth Net (http://www.cre.net). 
295 Author interview with a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
in Beijing in February 2013. 
296 Author interview with a senior official of the Association of China Rare Earth 












Figure 61 Chinese Market Average Price of Dysprosium Oxide in 1994-2007 
 
 




Figure 63 Chinese Market Average Price of Europium Oxide in 1988-2007 
 
 
Figure 64 Chinese Market Average Price of Yttrium Oxide in 1988-2007 
 
Sustainable production not only means that the production needs to meet both the 
current and the future demand; it also includes the notion that the production needs to be 
environmentally friendly. As shown in the previous chapters, rare earth mining and 
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smelting in China are energy-intensive, water-intensive processes that create 
environmental waste and long-term ecological damage. In both North China and South 
China, production in the 1970s to late 1990s was conducted using backward 
environmentally-destructive technologies, leaving significant environmental damage that 
would take years and huge funding for the producers and the local authorities to treat. 
Recent changes in mining technologies, such as the transition from dump leaching to in-
situ leaching, led to improving environmental conditions, but also generated additional 
environmental concerns. Since environmental protection is both a historical and an 
ongoing difficult issue to tackle, curbing environmental damage has continued to be a 
primary concern of the state in the current post-2008 reregulation.  
The necessity and the urgency of the state to enforce environmental change was 
reinforced by its past policy failure in regulating the environmental impact of production. 
Despite of Beijing’s upholding of “sustainable development” as a primary development 
goal in the previous decade, it failed to achieve much progress in curbing the 
environmental damage associated with rare earth production. Local government leaders 
had little institutional incentives and often also not enough financial resource to treat the 
existing heavily-polluted areas. Local government cadres were also inclined to turn a 
blind eye towards businesses not in compliance with state environmental guidelines, but 
kept up local employment and generated tax revenues for the local government. The rare 
earth companies that were running on low or negative profit margins would rather pay 
small fines for environmental violation or install temporary fixes (relocating local 
residents, changing waste dump sites), instead of devoting large amount of funding to 
environmental restoration projects. Furthermore, the prevalent illegal businesses 
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operating outside of state regulations would naturally evade any pollution treatment and 
make the environment damage worse. Because “environmental cost was not added into 
the production cost”, all these problems that worsened environmental degradation also 
indirectly contributed to the over capacity of production and the low market prices, 
thereby “punishing the do-good companies”297. To avoid the industry going down a “race 
to the bottom”, the state would have to enforce stronger environmental regulations. 
8.2.2 Goals of State Reregulation: Technology Upgrading to Fulfill Domestic 
Demand  
Apart from the goal of sustainable production and environmental protection, 
another recurring goal driving the state to implement the post-2008 reregulation was to 
promote rare earth industry upgrading and to facilitate the development of its downstream 
industries. The Hu/Wen administration’s unwavering campaign since 2004 to develop 
China’s “ingenious innovation” continued to feature prominently in its policy towards the 
rare earth industry. 
The post-crisis 4 billion RMB stimulus package enacted by Beijing as well as the 
follow-up packages enacted by many local governments in 2008-09 prompted greater 
projected demand for REE-enabled applications, thus making it necessary for the rare 
earth industry to expand its value-added production. The rapid expansion of infrastructure 
development projects and technology upgrading projects in China following the 2008 
Financial Crisis created higher market demand for REE-enabled applications from 
downstream industries. It also created more resources for companies to fund rare earth 
applications projects. By 2010 China’s production of major rare earth applications, 
                                                 
297 Author interview with a senior manager of a state-owned rare earth smelting company 
in Baotou, Inner Mongolia in August 2013. 
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including permanent magnets, phosphors, polishing powders, hydrogen storage alloys 
and catalytic purifiers had grown by 135%, 66%, 153%, 37% and 81% respectively 
compared to 2005. The 12th Five-Year Technology Plan (2012-2016) set a goal of $300 
billion in clean energy investments. MIIT projected that in the next five years between 
2011 and 2015, the clean energy industry alone would consume at least 40,000 tons of 
rare earth permanent magnets, and the lighting industry would consume at least 50,000 
tons of rare earth phosphors. (PRC MIIT, 2012a; PRC MIIT, 2012b) Thus in order to 
fulfill the state’s ambitious plans of building “ingenious innovation” and a “national 
innovation system”, the rare earth industry would need to go through further production 
technology upgrading to provide more and better value-added products to fulfill the 
projected downstream demand. 
Although China was the global default supplier and the largest smelter of REEs, 
its portion of high-end production was still not enough to meet the demand from its 
domestic downstream industries. As the previous chapter demonstrates, by 2007 the 
entire upstream of the global rare earth production chain had migrated to China. Many 
foreign producers in the downstream industries such as automobiles, cell phones and 
lighting also chose to relocate part of their production to China. Beijing’s measures 
promoting technology upgrading also led to significant domestic expansion in the 
production of REE-enabled applications. As a result, apart from being the largest supplier 
of REEs, China became the world’s largest consumer of rare earth metals and the largest 
producer of major REE-enabled applications in volume. Yet the pace of technology 
upgrading was not enough: Chinese domestic companies in the downstream industries 
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still needed to import high-end REE-enabled applications, such as high-end permanent 
magnets from other countries such as Japan.  
8.2.3 Goals of State Reregulation: Resource Advantage Facilitating Downstream 
SEI Development 
China’s lack of high-tech production grew more acute under Beijing’s new 
campaign of building “strategic emerging industries” (SEIs) in 2010. As Chapter 4 
demonstrates, China was then still lagging far behind other countries such as the U.S. and 
Japan in the development of such crucial downstream SEIs as renewable energy, new 
materials and new-energy vehicles. Thus even if the Chinese rare earth industry could 
produce more and better high-end REE-enabled applications, there would be not enough 
domestic consumers. In order to catch up in production in both high-end REE-enabled 
materials and in downstream industries, Chinese producers needed foreign technologies.  
Though not stated explicitly, both Beijing and the local governments in the rare 
earth production regions hoped that policy changes would prompt more foreign firms to 
partner with domestic downstream firms to develop high-tech products and boost the 
technology upgrading of the rare earth production chain in China. Beijing’s tone was 
more of a nuanced frustration of “being powerless against foreign monopoly on 
technology despite our nameplate monopoly in resource production”298. Many Chinese 
rare earth experts felt that “the full economic benefit of China’s rare earth resource 
endowment would only be realized through high-value-added production, which largely 
remains in the control of foreign firms; it is unfair for foreign firms to complain about 
Beijing regulating its rare earth production and export, as Chinese producers kept 
                                                 
298 Author interview with a senior officer at the Chinese Society of Rare Earths in Beijing 
in May 2013. 
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supplying advanced countries with rare earth products at very cheap prices while leaving 
us the huge environmental pollution that other countries did not bear, and China still 
needed to import downstream products at far more expensive prices” 299 . Local 
governments, more focused on their own local jurisdictions instead of the national level, 
expressed similar frustrations of “providing cheap resources and materials products that 
ultimately would have to be sold to companies elsewhere”300. In a press conference in 
2009, Vice Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region plainly said of the 
intent to use resources to attract the relocation of foreign firms into the local industrial 
parks, "We are not taking the short-term view of just trying to prop up prices. Imposing 
controls and reducing exports aim to attract more factories using rare earth metals from 
home and abroad to Inner Mongolia". (Li & Liu, 2009) 
8.2.4 Goals of State Reregulation: Breaking the Barrier to International Markets 
Beijing’s strengthened reregulation also came at a time of growing conflicts of 
interests between China and Japan. With U.S. companies either exiting PM production or 
migrating production to China in the early 2000s, Japan came to occupy nearly 80% of 
global high-end permanent magnet market share as shown in Chapter 4. Thus unlike the 
U.S. and the European companies which were mainly concentrated in downstream 
industries, Japanese companies were both direct consumers and also direct competitors to 
Chinese companies. Beijing and Tokyo had maintained institutional communications 
over their respective rare earth industrial policies since the late 1980s. In 1987 the P.R.C. 
central government and the Japanese government established the Sino-Japan Rare Earth 
                                                 
299 Author interview with an academician at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
specializing in rare earth industry research in Beijing in June 2013. 
300 Author interview with a senior researcher at MOFCOM in Beijing in January 2013. 
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Communication Framework, aimed at strengthening the Sino-Japan relationship in the 
rare earth global production chain. Through this framework, both countries subsequently 
held the annual Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference around October of 
each year, with locations alternating between China and Japan 301. From 1988 to 1998, the 
conference included participants from the government, the private sector and research 
institutions. From 1998 the conference was changed to be a high-level inter-governmental 
dialogue involving only government-related participants. The Japanese government 
delegation was led by the Office of Mining under the Department of Energy and 
Resources at MITI (later reorganized into METI in 2001) and also included 
representatives from JOGMEC (Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation), 
industry associations (such as New Metals Industry Association) and research institutes 
(such as Japan Metal Economy Research Institute). The Chinese government delegation 
was led by the State Planning Commission (1998-2002) and later the NDRC (2003-2009) 
and also included representatives from other central government ministries and key SOEs 
in rare earth mining and magnets production (such as Baotou Steel, Jiangxi Southern 
Rare Earths, Guangzhou Zhujiang Rare Earths302). The annual meeting agenda primarily 
consisted of briefings from both sides over a range of issues in the previous year303. The 
briefing topics included production, sales, trade conditions, national and international 
market demand, as well as REE-enabled technology applications. The participants from 
                                                 
301The meeting is called 日中レアアース交流会議 in Japanese, 中日稀土交流会议 in 
Chinese. 
302 Guangzhou Zhujiang Rare Earths is a major rare earth smelting plant and a subsidiary 
of Guangdong Rising Non-ferrous Metals. 




China and Japan exchanged information and engaged in discussions and negotiations 
about future market trends and industrial policies. 
However conflicts of interests grew and by 2008 Chinese participants felt it was 
difficult to draw consensus and maintain negotiation on friendly terms and make more 
accommodating policies from Beijing304. A Chinese participant recalled that by the late 
2000s, the communication from both sides grew more tit-for-tat in the way of “if you do 
this, I will respond with this”. At one meeting with Chinese government officials, a 
middle-ranked Japanese government official threatened to block other Japanese export if 
Japan needed to reduce its rare earth import from China, leading to strong suspicion from 
the Chinese participants that policy coordination on the inter-state level would be going 
nowhere305. The last Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference took place in 
2009 and did not resume ever since. Besides the growing distrust and lack of consensus 
between Beijing and Tokyo, bureaucratic changes within the Chinese State Council also 
contributed to the halt of such institutionalized interstate collaboration. The 2008 State 
Council reform split the NDRC’s responsibilities in industrial policy implementation into 
specialized agencies in several ministries (for the rare earth industry, this included the 
MLR, the MEP and the newly formed MIIT), thus there was no longer a “supra-ministry 
                                                 
304 Author interview with a well-known rare earth industry expert and a long-term 
participant of the Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference in Beijing in June 
2013. 
305 Author interview with a well-known rare earth industry expert and a long-term 
participant of the Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference in June 2013. It 
should be noted that while the full context of this message from the Japanese government 
official is unclear (whether it is a credible threat or a tactical message, and whether there 
were similar threats before from either side), this incident and Beijing’s reactions showed 
the growing antagonism in Sino-Japan negotiations. 
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agency” like the former NDRC that could send out officials to lead international 
negotiations on behalf of the entire State Council306.  
A major point of contention in Beijing’s perspective concerns the extent of patent 
validity of the REE-enabled sintered permanent magnets technology. Hitachi Metals 
owns over 600 patents worldwide relating to sintered rare earth magnets, including over 
100 patents in the U.S. alone. Hitachi’s U.S. Patent 5,645,651 (known as the “651” patent) 
filed in 1983 in most major international markets is the basic patent covering the 
composition and key properties of matter for sintered NdFeB magnets. As Chapter 5 
analyzes, Hitachi’s patent filing was rejected by the State Intellectual Property Office in 
1985, thus the patent exclusion does not apply to the Chinese market. Companies not 
licensed by Hitachi/SSMC have still been able to produce and sell sintered NdFeB 
magnets in China, but not abroad. As China gradually became the world’s largest 
producer of NdFeB magnets in volume in the 2000s, the patent exclusions felt like a 
stranglehold on Chinese companies. Chinese companies anticipated that under the most 
common policy of 20-year expiration, the “651” patent would expire in 2003. However, 
Hitachi was able to extend the validity of the “651” patent covering the right to 
manufacturer and sell sintered NdFeB magnets in the U.S., Japan and the European 
Union until July 2014307. Hitachi has also sought to extend the exclusive intellectual 
                                                 
306 Author interview with a well-known rare earth industry expert and a long-term 
participant of the Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference in Beijing in June 
2013. 
307 Patent expiration and extension policy varies from country to country. Article 33 of 
the TRIPs Agreement of the WTO states that "The term of protection available [for 
patents] shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the 
filing date." Most countries follow the expiration policy of 20 years from the earliest 
filing date of the application on which the patent was granted, yet many countries such as 
the U.S. and Japan also have clauses allowing for extension of the expiration date. 
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property right over NdFeB magnet production through the “processing” patents308 in its 
patent portfolio. In other words, even as the “651” composition patent expires, Hitachi 
argues that it would still be able to claim patent protection until the last “process patent” 
expires around 2029. According to the most recent information (see Table 6), by 2014 
Hitachi Metals has licensed only 13 companies to manufacture and sell sintered NdFeB 
magnets under Hitachi Metals’ patents worldwide.  
 
  
                                                 
308 Hitachi has also filed “process patents” that detail the process essential to the 
production of sintered NdFeB magnets. 
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Table 6 Hitachi-licensed NdFeB Permanent Magnet Producers 
Country Producers 
Japan Hitachi;  
Shin-Etsu Chemical;  
TDK Corporation 
U.S. Hitachi U.S. 
Europe Magnetfabrik Schramberg GmbH;  
Neorem Magnets Oy; 
Vacuumschmelze GmbH 
China Advanced Technology & Materials (AT&M);  
Anhui Earth Panda Advanced Magnetic Material Company; 
Beijing Jingci Magnetism Tech. (BJMT);  
Ningbo Yunsheng;  
Ningbo Jinji Strong Magnetic Material Company;  
Thinova Magnets;  
Yantai Zhenghai Magnetic Material Company; 
Zhongke San Huan High-tech Company; 
 
This exclusive and extended protection of a technology that is over thirty years 
old and might extend for another ten to fifteen years has long been disputed by Chinese 
companies, and it has become a major concern for Chinese participants in Sino-Japan 
Rare Earth Communication Conferences. Sun Baoyu, president of Shenyang General 
Magnetic Co and head of a Chinese magnet producer coalition remarked that “what 
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Hitachi Metals has done is to set up trade barriers” that ban most Chinese magnet 
producers from selling abroad. (Du, 2013) Producing companies had to choose between 
paying expensive licensing or contracting fees to access key foreign markets, or sell only 
to limited regions where the patents expired after 20 years with no extensions. Consumer 
companies of permanent magnets had limited choices of Hitachi-licensed suppliers. If 
they just purchased unlicensed magnetic materials as raw materials and then sold final 
products abroad, it would make themselves the prime targets of IPR infringement 
lawsuits309. The fiscal stimulus plans implemented by government around the world after 
the 2008 Financial Crisis prompted the ramping up of production in new high-tech 
industries such as new-energy vehicles and renewable energy. This created short-term 
jumps in demand for permanent magnets. Yet due to patent exclusions, China’s cheaper 
supply of permanent magnets could not access these emerging high-tech consumers (such 
as HEV/EV producers, wind turbine producers) in Japan, Europe and the U.S. There were 
more than 200 Chinese firms producing NdFeB magnets; only five Chinese companies 
became Hitachi licensees eligible to produce magnets for the overseas market by 2010. 
About a quarter of the Chinese producers were able to send their products to be sold 
abroad through contracting with the licensee firms. (Du, 2013) 
 
8.3 Industry-Specific Regulatory and Policy Changes 
                                                 
309 It’s not unusual for patent holders to sue the downstream and down-downstream 
purchasers of unlicensed products for IPR infringement. Hitachi/SSMC sued two 
telephone making companies in 2000 for buying magnetic materials from producers not 
licensed by Hitachi/SSMC and distributing the final products to the U.S. market. 
Similarly, Magnequench sued ten manufacturing companies in the New York state court 
and the Indiana State Court in 2001 for buying CD-ROM and DVD-ROM made using 
magnetic materials made by unlicensed Chinese and Thai producers and distributing the 
final products to the U.S. market. (Shenzhen Business Daily, 2001) 
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Since 2008 the Chinese central government has strengthened its reregulation 
policy campaigns over the rare earth industry. The central government has both 
introduced new rules and initiatives and revised the pre-existing policies. This section 
covers in detail the state reregulation policies in production, market entry, export, 
industry upgrading, industry restructuring, anti-smuggling and pollution control since 
2008.  
8.3.1 Regulatory and Policy Changes on Domestic Production 
8.3.1.1 Regulatory and Policy Changes on Mining Production 
In terms of mining production control, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) 
has continued to issue rare earth mining quota (i.e. the maximum amount allowed to mine) 
to each province, named as “guideline for mining rare earth ores” (稀土开采指标). Since 
2012 MLR has switched from issuing yearly mining quota to two batches of half-year 
quotas allowing for adjustments later in the year. The mining quota allocated to each 
province would be managed by the provincial Bureaus of Land and Resources and 
allocated to each rare earth mining company/site. As shown in Figure 65, the post-2008 
annual quota volume remained stable compared to pre-2008 quota volume, and there was 
in fact a greater allocation of quota to the mining of higher-valued HREEs.  
MLR has also continued the halt of licensing for new mining projects and has 
increased control on the existing local rare earth mines. (PRC Ministry of Land and 
Resources, 2014) In May 2010 MLR issued a nation-wide inspection of rare earth mining 
firms, with emphasis on environmental standards and production quota compliance and 
crackdown on illegal mining and smuggling activities. (PRC Ministry of Land and 
Resources, 2010) In January 2011 MLR issued an announcement that the Ganzhou 
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Prefecture in Jiangxi Province would become the first local rare earth mining district 
under national planning (国家规划矿区). (PRC Ministry of Land and Resources, 2011) 
In 2012, MLR announced that it had conducted a round of inspection of rare earth mines 
and consolidation of mining licenses, resulting in a reduction of the total number of 




Figure 65 China’s Rare Earth Mining Quota (2008-2014)311 
 
Besides volume control of rare earth mining, the state also imposed resource tax 
on rare earth mining. In April 2011 the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of 
Taxation jointly issued a significant raise of the resource tax charged to rare earth mining, 
                                                 
310 The mining license is for active mining projects; it is different from “exploration 
license” which is awarded to companies conducting exploration of mining resources. 
311 The mining quota data is calculated from the official quota release documents issued 
by MLR each year.  
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from 0.5-3 RMB/ton to 60 RMB/ton (for LREE) and 30 RMB/ton (for HREE). (PRC 
State Council, 2011) The real tax rate per extracted tonnage was in fact higher for the 
higher-valued HREEs: LREEs are usually five times more concentrated than HREEs in 
ores, thus producing the same volume of HREEs would incur higher resource tax 
compared to producing LREEs.  
8.3.1.2 Regulatory and Policy Changes on Smelting Production 
A new addition to state reregulation policies after 2008 is the control on rare earth 
smelting production. As the previous chapter shows, compared to the mining market with 
limited players due to restrictions in mining licenses and quota, the rare earth smelting 
market in China was much more competitive and showed chronic low-profit and over-
production. NRDC, the supra-agency overseeing industry development prior to 2008, 
first issued a quota plan for rare earth smelting production in 2007. Then with the State 
Council Reform in 2008, MIIT took over the production planning and started issuing a 
formal “plan for rare earth production” (稀土生产计划) twice a year to each eligible 
central-government-controlled company and each provincial government. The local 
Economic and Information Technology Commission 312  within each provincial 
government would break down the planned volume and determine the quota for each 
eligible local producer. As shown in Figure 66, there was a 22% yearly decrease in 
smelting production plan in 2010, but gradual increase yearly afterwards. The smelting 
production quota for 2014 was 99300 metric tons in REO equivalents, a 16% decrease 
compared to 2008. Interestingly, MIIT, as the ministry overseeing industry-specific 
                                                 
312 Economic and Information Technology Commission was created at each local 
provincial-level government following the 2008 State Council Reform to manage local 
economic affairs corresponding to the jurisdictions of the MIIT. 
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regulations and standards, has also devised and issued an annual “plan for rare earth 
mining” (稀土开采计划) along with the smelting production plan since 2008. This plan 
theoretically has the same function of setting a maximum amount of allowed volume for 
mining production as the MLR-issued mining production guidelines. Yet MIIT 
apparently did not consult or coordinate fully with MLR in the first two years of issuing 
the plan figures. As shown in Figure 67, MIIT’s mining plan was much higher than 
MLR’s in 2008 and 2009. The two plans did not equalize until 2010. This also explains 
the sudden drop of MLR’s smelting production plan in 2010 that is shown in Figure 66.  
 
 
Figure 66 China’s Rare Earth Smelting Production Quota (2008-2014)313 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 67 MLR-issued Rare Earth Mining Quota vs. MIIT-issued Rare Earth 
Mining Plan (2008-2014)314 
 
Besides the smelting production planning, MIIT has imposed new standards for 
rare earth smelting market entry in order to push the small-scale local smelting producers 
out of the market. MIIT released a general Guidelines for Industry Restructuring (2011) 
in 2011 and an industry-specific Entry Criterion for Rare Earth Industry in 2012. 
According to the guidelines, rare earth separating projects with annual production 
capacity lower than 2000 tons (in REO unit), as well as LREE smelting projects with 
annual production capacity lower than 1500 tons (in REO unit) or Faraday efficiency 
lower than 85% or low-current electrolyzers (less than 5000 ampere) would not be 
eligible for market entry. (PRC MIIT, 2011; PRC MIIT, 2012c) Thus small-scale 
smelting producers not meeting the market entry standards, often local private small 
businesses, would be either closed or be merged into large-scale producers.  
                                                 




8.3.2 Regulatory and Policy Changes to Export  
8.3.2.1 Export Quota  
MOFCOM has made a series of changes, including some more restrictive 
measures, to the export of rare earth products. As shown in Figure 68, export quota issued 
by MOFCOM significantly declined in 2008 and again in 2010. More advanced products 
such as permanent magnets have still been excluded from quota, thus only the export of 
low-end smelting products were affected. A further calculation of quota allocation to 
domestic companies and foreign-domestic joint ventures shows that the quota allocation 
has decreased evenly for the two groups. As shown in Figure 69, despite of the quota 
decrease, export quota allocated to foreign-domestic joint ventures accounted consistently 
for about 24-30% of the total export quota. 
 
Figure 68 China's Rare Earth Smelting Product Export Quota (2005-2014)315 
                                                 
315 Export quota data is extracted from the quota release documents by MOFCOM from 
2005 to 2014. The author then calculates the sum of the export quota released during each 
year. China abolished its export quota and tariff on rare earth products in 2015 to comply 
with the WTO ruling on China’s rare earth export restrictions. Thus this figure and all 





Figure 69 China's Rare Earth Smelting Product Export Quota Allocation to 
Domestic Companies and Foreign-Domestic Joint Ventures (2005-2014)316 
 
Besides changes to the export quota volume, MOFCOM also changed the quota 
allocation mechanism and the eligibility criteria for exporting companies. Starting in 
2012 MOFCOM made export quota allocation contingent upon the firm passing 
environmental inspections by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. (PRC Ministry 
of Commerce, 2011) Companies failing the MEP inspections, such as Baotou Steel, 
                                                 
316 Export quota data is extracted from the quota release documents by MOFCOM from 
2005 to 2014. MOFCOM stopped issuing separate quota release documents to domestic 
companies and foreign-domestic joint ventures in 2010, thus the author calculated the 
quota of the sum of each domestic company and each foreign-domestic joint venture 
extracted from the original export quota release documents. 
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received “provisional” export quota. The provisional export quota would become 
“confirmed” when the companies could pass the inspection within the year, or be 
allocated to other companies if they failed to pass the MEP inspection within that year. 
This was meant to incentivize companies to invest in environmental treatment facilities 
and comply with MEP’s inspections.  
Another major change in quota allocation was the separated export quota for 
HREE products and LREE products starting in 2012. Though MLR’s mining quota 
clearly defined HREE and LREE mining, export quota released by MOFCOM prior to 
2012 lumped HREE products and LREE products together. Since the quota only 
controlled the total volume instead of the value of export, exporting 1 ton of lanthanum 
oxide (LREE product historically priced around 40 RMB per kilogram) and exporting 1 
ton of terbium oxide (HREE product historically priced around 2300 RMB per kilogram) 
would exhaust the same amount of quota. This drove export-eligible companies, 
particularly the trading companies, to export as much HREE products as possible. It 
further incentivized the production of specific higher-valued HREEs in South China, and 
it contributed to the prevalent illegal production (without mining license) and excessive 
production (production exceeding MLR mining quota) that the MLR had failed to 
eradicate. The cherry-picking of specific REEs for export by companies also resulted in 
persistent low recovery rates and huge waste (the technology of producing rare earth 
oxides used in southern China would ideally have a recovery rate of 50-70%, but the 
recovery rate in actual production was a low 20-50%). (Fang, 2010b) To curb this 
unsustainable production and export of the higher-valued HREEs, MOFCOM started in 
2012 to allocate separated HREE and LREE product export quota to each export-eligible 
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company. (PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2011) As shown in Figure 70, export quota 




Figure 70 China's Rare Earth Smelting Product Export Quota Allocation to LREE 
and HREE products (2012-2014)317 
 
8.3.2.2 Export Tariff 
The PRC General Customs also significantly raised the export tariff on low-end 
rare earth products. In 2008 tariff on rare earth ferroalloys was raised from zero to 15%, 
                                                 
317 Export quota data is extracted from the quota release documents by MOFCOM from 
2005 to 2014. The author calculated the sum of the export quota for HREE and LREE 
products of each company. 
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on NdFeB alloys from zero to 20%, on rare earth products containing specific higher-
value elements of Yttrium, Europium, Dysprosium and Terbium from 10-15% to 25%. 
(PRC Ministry of Finance, 2008) Table 7 shows General Customs’ designated export 
tariff, rebate and licensing requirement for categories of products that rare earth products 
may fall in. Only the export of rare earth products that are directly used by downstream 
industries, including rare earth powder and compounds for lighting, pyrophoric alloys, 
NdFeB magnetic powder, rare earth alloyed steel powder, permanent magnets and NiMH 
batteries were not taxed. The “new materials products” under the campaign of “strategic 
emerging industries”, such as permanent magnets, still received export tax rebate of 17% 




Table 7 China's Rare Earth Export Tariff and Licensing Regulation effective from 2009 to 2014318 








Rare Earth Metal Ore Concentrates 25309020 Export License 15% N/A 
Rare Earth Metals and Mixed Metals 280530 Export License 25% N/A 
Inorganic or Organic Compounds containing Rare 
Earth Metals or Rare Earth Mixed Metals  
2846*** Export License 15% or 
25%319 
N/A 
Inorganic Compounds for Lighting 32065000 N/A N/A N/A 
Pyrophoric Alloys 36069011, 36069019 N/A N/A N/A 
NdFeB Rapidly Solidified Permanent Magnetic Sheet 72029911 Export License N/A N/A 
NdFeB Permanent Magnetic Powder 72029912 Export License N/A N/A 
Other NdFeB Alloys 72029919 Export License N/A N/A 
Other Rare Earth Ferroalloys 72029999 Export License 20% N/A 
                                                 
318 Data is extracted from General Customs’ guidelines for export of each product category. 
319 Exception: zero tariff for No. 2846901991, phosphor compounds containing rare earth metals used for lighting. 
337 
 
Table 7 (Continued) 
Rare Earth Alloyed Steel Powder 72052100 N/A N/A N/A 
Rare Earth Permanent Magnets 85051110 N/A N/A 17% 




These changes in the export policies should not be viewed as the single moves of 
the Ministry of Commerce or the General Customs. Instead, the rare earth export policies 
were crafted to be synchronized with the other ongoing domestic policy campaigns 
(curbing environmental pollution, curbing the unsustainable rate of production, 
eradicating illegal mining, promoting industry upgrading, etc.) often primarily waged by 
the other ministries (MIIT, MLR, MEP, etc.). While other countries would naturally see 
China’s export restrictions as primarily threats against the interests of their economies or 
national security , Beijing’s view was in fact more inward-looking: “Export policies, such 
as quota, are the quickest and often the easiest government policies to implement in order 
to influence the behavior of enterprises”320. In other words, export policy was a tool and 
often the most convenient tool for Beijing’s industrial governance, instead of an end of 
export restriction in itself. 
8.3.3 Regulatory and Policy Changes on Industry Upgrading 
Beijing has offered numerous funding schemes to rare earth companies for 
industry upgrading: 
The first major form of support are large grants to research institutes, universities 
and companies for basic and applied research projects, allocated from the science and 
technology component of the Five-Year Plan. In the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), the 
science and technology component allocated funding totaling 350 million RMB for 
research projects related to the rare earth research and technologies. (Li, 2012)  
The second major form of support is special fund for major players in the rare 
earth industry supply chain, including local governments, upstream mining and smelting 
                                                 
320 Author interview with a senior researcher at MOFCOM in Beijing in January 2013. 
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companies (both state-owned and private) and midstream and downstream applications 
companies (mostly private). Following the 2011 release of Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth 
Industry, MIIT and MOF jointly established a special fund for the rare earth industry in 
November 2012. The fund provided capital investment, cash bonus and grants to five 
categories of technology upgrading projects: 1. technology upgrading of mining and 
smelting companies for meeting environmental standards, with cash bonus of 500-1500 
RMB per REO ton of production capacity for passing environmental inspection; 2. local 
governments’ technological infrastructure development projects for regulating rare earth 
mining, with cash bonus of maximum 20% of project costs; 3. research and development 
of high-end REE applications and environmentally-friendly production technologies, 
with a maximum of 10 million RMB per project as state grants; 4. commercialization of 
high-end REE applications, with a maximum of 50 million RMB per project as state 
capital investment; 5. development of public technology service platforms, with a 
maximum of 50% of the previous year’s total capital investment as state capital 
investment. (PRC Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, 2012) Following a fund extension in 2014, the MIIT-MOF special fund is 
still now active as “subsidy funding for rare earth industry”. (PRC Ministry of Finance & 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2014)  
Thirdly, the state gives companies producing high-tech applications additional 
support through tax reduction. In 2008 MOST, MOF and State Administration of 
Taxation jointly released Criteria for High-tech Company. Based on a list of criteria 
including patents, product category (which has to fall within the categories listed in the 
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National High-tech Areas under State Priority Support Catalog), percentage of R&D 
spending by sales revenue, percentage of high-tech product revenue in total revenue (at 
least 60%), a company can apply to the local government’s science and technology 
bureau to be recognized as a “high-tech company”. (PRC MOST et al, 2008) Since rare 
earth materials falls into the category of new materials, a company producing high-tech 
applications, for instance high-end permanent magnets or rare earth lighting materials, 
can apply. If it receives the designation, the company would receive a corresponding 
lower tax rate and tax credits321. 
Finally, apart from all the funding support for research and development, the state 
also incentivizes, or in a more accurate word, “pressures” companies in a campaign style 
to invest in intellectual property. The State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) maintains 
a trophy list of “National Intellectual Property Model Enterprise” (国家知识产权示范企
业), in which companies have achieved a score higher than 90 in the SIPO scorecard on 
intellectual property. SIPO also maintains a similar trophy list of lower caliber called 
“National Intellectual Property Excellence Enterprise” (国家知识产权优势企业), in 
which companies have achieved a score higher than 80 in the SIPO scorecard. For local 
governments, having local companies selected into these two lists is an indicator of their 
excellence in governance in pushing forward indigenous innovation in their jurisdictions. 
Thus, the local governments would push local companies, including rare earth materials 
companies, to apply to be included in these two SIPO lists. Local bureau of science and 
technology and the local bureau of intellectual property would work with the targeted 
companies in filing patent applications. If a company is selected as a model/excellent 
                                                 
321 Author interview with a senior manager at a major private rare earth permanent 
magnet company in Anhui Province in March 2013. 
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enterprise in intellectual property, it would receive additional government funding as 
reward; yet in return the company has to satisfy the requirement of submitting a certain 
“quota” number of patents every year322. As a manager of a rare earth materials company 
that the author interviewed put it, “we get money from the government as long as we 
keep applying for patents”.  
Besides providing support for technology upgrading, MIIT has also recently 
started tackling the overcapacity of the industry through closing down low-tech 
production lines. The rare earth industry was listed in MIIT’s designated list of industries 
where companies may be required to abandon or replace production lines using 
“backward technologies”. In August 2014, for the first time MIIT included 28 rare earth 
companies producing rare earth oxides in the list requiring the replacement/abolishment 
of outdated production lines. (PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
2014a) 
8.3.4 Industry Restructuring and M&A focusing on Vertical Integration 
Despite of the failure to consolidate the rare earth industry into two state-owned 
corporations in 2002-2005, the State Council again made the industry restructuring a 
major task of the current reregulation. In the 2011 Several Opinions of the State Council 
on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth Industry, the 
State Council vowed to “in one or two years have the rare earth industry led by large 
enterprises, and the industrial concentration of the top three enterprise groups in the 
ionic-type rare earth industry in south China will reach 80% or higher”. (PRC State 
Council, 2011b) Such restructuring, if successful, would achieve several results in the 
                                                 




rare earth industry that Beijing deemed important. Restructuring would raise the barrier 
to market entry high enough so that small-scale producers would be closed or merged, 
leading to an economy of scale on resource utilization, less production capacity and less 
resource waste. Restructuring would consolidate the industry into only several SOEs as 
major market players. This would make it easier for Beijing to implement and enforce its 
industrial policies through supervising the few SOEs instead of regulating the existing 
few hundreds of companies in the market.323 Thirdly, compared to the current buyer’s 
market with persistent low pricing, an oligopolistic market would be more likely to 
maintain higher prices through price alliances or coordinated supply cut 324 . Finally, 
restructuring would allow central SOEs a larger share of the pie in the industry and the 
access to the entire supply chain. As the previous chapter explains, the central SOEs had 
woefully poor control of the upstream mining resources, particularly in South China 
where the mining rights and licenses of higher-valued HREEs were almost entirely 
controlled by the local provincial/prefectural governments. A restructuring of the industry 
favoring the vertical integration of companies in the different stages in the production 
chain would give the central SOEs an upper hand in the upstream.  
Yet the industry restructuring process had significant pushback from the local 
governments and local companies, and the negotiation among companies for mergers and 
acquisitions took place much more slowly than the State Council planned. As one local 
                                                 
323 Author interview with a professor and long-term researcher of rare earth industry in 
Jiangxi University of Science and Technology in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province in July 2013. 
324 It should be noted that an oligopolistic market does not automatically lead to price 
increase. Oligarchies may choose to maintain low pricing or increase supply in times of 
low market demand to further stimulate the market demand or to slow the adoption of 
substitute products. However, compared to a perfectly competitive market of hundreds of 
players, an oligopolistic market consisting of a few firms would be more likely to 
coordinate a higher price due to less supplier competition. 
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rare earth company manager in Baotou that the author interviewed put it, “a quick 
restructuring pushed forward primarily by the government would only be possible under 
a planned economy”325. The original restructuring plan of the State Council was a vertical 
integration of merging the entire industry upstream, including companies at different 
stages (mining, sorting, smelting and low-end production) into just two or three state-
owned conglomerates by 2012. In reality, chaos ensued, with much fighting amongst 
companies of different ownership structures, between local governments and their local 
SOEs, as well as between the localities and the central government. For the more than 
two hundred small-scale and median-scale local smelting companies, many of which are 
private, industry restructuring means they would very likely be merged into a larger state-
owned company, or be closed down. Thus they have resisted the restructuring mandate, 
bargaining with the local government and local SOEs for survival, fair compensation and 
fair terms of mergers. For the SOEs owned by provincial/prefectural governments, 
industry restructuring has been both a battle for the support of the local government and a 
battle against local SOEs of other provinces/prefectures. Since there would be eventually 
very few local SOEs from one region allowed to be on the State Council’s list of 
conglomerates, support from their own provincial/prefectural government would be 
critical. The central SOEs, with little mining rights of their own, have also waged into the 
fight to get on the coveted list of conglomerates. The central SOEs battled amongst 
themselves and against local SOEs to access the mining licenses and mining rights.  
Thus the restructuring process has been nothing but chaotic and dragged far 
behind the State Council’s original deadline. In 2014 MIIT finally selected 6 companies 
                                                 
325 Author interview with a senior manager of a major private rare earth magnet company 
in Baotou, Inner Mongolia in August 2013. 
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as major rare earth conglomerates to remain in the industry upstream, including 2 central 
SOEs (China Minmetals, CHALCO) and 4 local SOEs (Baotou Steel, Ganzhou Rare 
Earths, Guangdong Rising, Xiamen Tungsten). In 2015 MIIT began to directly issue the 
smelting production plan to the six chosen companies. (PRC MIIT, 2015)  
8.3.5 Campaign against Illegal Mining and Smuggling 
Beijing has declared a war against illegal mining and smuggling, with an inter-
agency special campaign involving inspectors dispatched to the local regions almost 
every year. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of 
Public Security (MOPS), Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP), General Administration of Customs, State 
Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce and State 
Administration of Work Safety jointly conducted a “Special Campaign to Crack Down on 
Violations of Law or Regulation Regarding Rare Earths” lasting half a year in local 
production regions in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. (PRC Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology et al, 2011; PRC Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology et al, 2013; PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology et al, 
2014) These special campaigns from Beijing were commonly referred to in the media and 
among industry professionals as “crackdowns” (打黑). During a crackdown, the State 
Council ministries sent two inter-ministry inspector groups (“查处稀土违法违规行为督
查组”) to North China and South China; each group would visit the major producing 
provinces to monitor the local government campaign against illegal operations, and it 
would conduct spot checks on select rare earth mining, smelting and trading companies. 
To incentivize the public to report illegal activities, starting in 2012 the Association of 
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China Rare Earth Industry sought tips about illegal operations from the public and 
provided cash rewards of 50000 RMB for each correct tip326. At the local level, the 
provincial governments and prefectural governments implemented crackdown campaigns 
corresponding to the state crackdown campaign in local counties. Local county officials 
were required to sign “responsibility letters” in which they pledged “no illegal activities 
within their jurisdictions”, thus if illegal activities were found and reported, local officials 
would be terminated327.  
Modern digital technologies, such as digital surveillance, satellite imaging and 
digital invoice tracking have been employed to aid the campaign against illegal mining 
and smuggling. Because rare earth mining regions in South China are mostly in 
mountainous areas not easily accessible by modern transportation, the Ministry of Land 
and Resources expanded the use of its remote sensing satellite system to detect illegal 
rare earth mining activities with precision to the county level328. To reduce the circulation 
of illegal products, the State Administration of Taxation introduced a special invoice 
system in the rare earth industry that provides tracking of rare earth products through 
invoices. (PRC State Administration of Taxation, 2012) The MIIT-MOF joint special 
fund for the rare earth industry since 2012 has provided funding for local governments to 
install infrastructure necessary for on-the-ground inspections and digital surveillance 
systems. (PRC Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
2012) For instance, in campaign against illegal mining in Baiyun-ebo region, the Baotou 
                                                 
326 Author interview with an officer at the Association of China Rare Earth Industry in 
Beijing in July 2013. 
327 Author interviews with a local county government official in Ganzhou, Guangdong 
Province during the crackdown campaign in July 2013. 
328 Author interview with a local county land and resources bureau official in Guangdong 
Province in June 2013.  
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Prefecture Government installed a digital surveillance platform to complement on-the-
ground law enforcement efforts by the local Baiyun District police. Baotou Steel also 
installed a surveillance system in the mining region, consisting of 2 central stations and 
627 cameras to complement 24-hour inspections by a 190-person patrol team. (PRC 
MIIT, 2013) 
8.3.6 Campaign for Clean Production and Pollution Treatment 
Beijing has waged a much stronger campaign to institutionalize clean production 
and pollution control in the rare earth industry compared to the previous period. After 
much delay, in 2009 the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) finally publicly 
released the draft of Emission Standards of Pollutants from Rare Earth Industry, an 
industry-specific pollutant emission guideline which came into force in 2011. (PRC MEP, 
2009; PRC MEP, 2011a) In 2011 MEP also released Opinions on Strengthening the 
Protection, Treatment and Restoration of the Ecological Environment of Rare Earth 
Mines. This law requires all rare earth mining companies to pay Deposit of Mining 
Environmental Restoration (矿山环境治理恢复保证金), a security deposit managed by 
the local environmental protection bureau. The deposit would be returned to the mining 
companies if they are able to restore the ecological environment of a mining site to 
comply with state environmental standards after finishing the mining operation there. 
(PRC MEP, 2001b) This allows the external cost of environmental restoration to be 
internalized in the cost of production, and it also helps relieve the burden of the local 
government in cleaning up the pollution by shifting the financial responsibility to the 
companies. MEP has also participated in the yearly state crackdown campaigns since 
2011. MEP first required local provincial-level environmental protection bureaus to 
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conduct environmental inspections of rare earth companies in their own jurisdictions. 
Companies failing the inspections would need to pay fines for violation and install 
environmental treatment facilities to reduce their pollution, or get rid of high-polluting 
production lines and replace them with more efficient and environmentally friendly lines. 
For companies that passed local inspections, MEP then dispatched expert inspector teams 
to conduct a second inspection. (PRC MEP, 2011c) The list of companies which 
complied with both inspections was then disclosed on the MEP website and shared with 
other State Council ministries. From 2011 to 2014, MEP has conducted four batches of 
inspections and publicized on its website the names of rare earth mining, smelting, alloy 
making and applications companies (totaling 87 in number) that passed MEP inspections. 
(PRC MEP, 2011d; PRC MEP, 2012a; PRC MEP, 2012b; PRC MEP, 2013) In 2015 
NDRC, MEP and MIIT jointly released Evaluation Indicators System for Clean 
Production for Rare Earth Smelting Industry, providing specific standards for clean 
production in the inspection of rare earth smelting companies (PRC National 
Development and Reform Commission et al, 2015) 
Other State Council ministries have also pitched in to make environmental 
compliance part of their policy measures. Starting in 2012, the MIIT-MOF joint special 
fund for the rare earth industry specifically allocated cash bonus (500-1500 RMB per 
metric ton of REO equivalent of production capacity) to rare earth mining and smelting 
companies for passing the MEP environmental inspection. (PRC Ministry of Finance & 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012) Also starting in 2012, both 
MOFCOM’s export quota and MIIT’s smelting production quota required companies to 
pass the MEP environmental inspections to qualify for application for quota. MIIT’s 
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market entry criteria which came into force in 2012 also included compliance with MEP 
environmental inspection as criteria for market entry. (PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2011; 
PRC Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2012) 
8.4 Examination of Beijing’s Alleged Rare Earth Export Halt to Japan 
This section specifically addresses Beijing’s alleged rare earth export halt to 
Japan in 2010. Although Beijing’s intensified reregulation started in 2008-09, it was not 
until the second half of 2010 that China’s rare earth policies gained worldwide attention. 
The trigger was Beijing’s alleged halt of rare earth export to Japan after the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island incident. This section is specifically devoted to analyzing this 
incident through an analysis of key events and evidence along the timeline surrounding 
the incident in the second half of 2010, as many believed it to be the evidence that China 
was using its rare earth resource as a leverage in international security standoffs against 
its neighbor. 
Beijing’s official stance is that there was no such thing as intended halt of export. 
In the authors’ interviews with industry stakeholders in Beijing, all interviewees also 
refused such a notion of Beijing halting rare earth export. A senior researcher at 
MOFCOM remarked that “there is no way and no sense for China to ban the export of 
rare earths to a major advanced economy”329.  
The issue of China’s rare earth export quota restrictions, notably the significant 
quota decrease, was already a high-level concern among government officials from 
Beijing and Tokyo before the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island incident. As China started 
tightening its REE export quota and increased export tariff in 2008, the issue of rare earth 
                                                 
329 Author interview with a senior researcher at MOFCOM in Beijing in January 2013. 
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export restrictions was put on the agenda of economic issues at the Third Sino-Japan 
High-Level Economic Dialogue set to begin in late August 2010. Just in July 2010, China 
also announced that it would reduce its second-half-year quota (taking effect in August) 
for 2010 to 7976 tons, about 60% reduction compared to the first-half-year quota of 2010. 
Japanese officials at METI expressed serious grievances immediately after the 
announcement, and the parliamentary secretary of METI travelled to Beijing but did not 
succeed in persuading Chinese to keep the export quota at 2009 level. (Hagstrom, 2012) 
During the Sino-Japan High-Level Economic Dialogue meeting, the Minister of METI 
Naoshima Masayuki raised concerns about the rare earth export restrictions. Minister 
Naoshima argued that the export quota decrease would lead to decreased supply and 
significant price increase, which would hurt Japanese manufacturers such as producers of 
computer hard drives, automobiles and clean energy products; Japanese manufactures in 
turn would raise the price of their downstream products, which would indirectly hurt both 
the Chinese consumers and the development of Chinese high-tech industries. (Teng, 2010; 
Ito, 2010) The Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming responded that the export 
quota decrease was part of the larger campaign by Beijing to regulate the industry, driven 
by three major concerns, namely restructuring the industry by weeding out small-scale 
and polluting companies, reducing the environmental damage from mining production, as 
well as ensuring the long-term availability of domestic resources to avoid depletion. 
(Teng, 2010) The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs speaker Satou Satoru remarked in 
a press conference on August 29 that China regarded its rare earth export restrictions as 
“a policy measure that cannot be helped.” (Ito, 2010) The Japan-China Economic 
Association sent a large delegation of more than 160 Japanese business representatives, 
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headed by the Chairman of Toyota, to Beijing on September 5th to discuss the impact of 
China’s rare earth export with the Chinese government officials. At the meeting on 
September 7th, Luo Tiejun, the Vice Chief of the Bureau of Raw Materials Industries at 
MIIT, reiterated that China would not raise the export quota for the second half of 2010. 
Responding to the concern of Japan’s lack of supply, Luo reportedly said that “Canada, 
Australia and the United States all have developed rare earth mines, it is our hope that 
Japan would diversify its supply sources.” Luo also said that “because there are also 
inquiries from other importing countries besides Japan, we would take some 
consideration.”  (J-CAST News, 2010) 
On September 7th 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese coast guard 
vessels in the disputed waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, and the trawler’s captain 
was brought to a local court in the Ishigaki Summary Court in Okinawa Prefecture and 
was detained on “suspicion of deliberately ramming the vessels.” (Nakano, 2011) On 
September 22, the New York Times reported from Hong Kong and Tokyo that China had 
halted its rare earth export to Japan citing industry sources, and the news report linked the 
halt with the ongoing Diaoyu/Senkaku Island incident and Japan’s arrest of the Chinese 
captain. (Bradsher, 2010a) Subsequently major Japanese media reported about the alleged 
export ban and the linkage with the arrest, based on the New York Times report. (see for 
instance Matsuo, 2010; Jiji Press 330 , 2010) The P.R.C. Foreign Ministry denied 
allegations of rare earth embargo and also swiftly denied news that China would further 
                                                 




reduce the rare earth export quota in the coming year331. In early October, METI released 
a poll result from 31 Japanese trading companies with rare earth import businesses and 
reported that there were 13 instances of delay in rare earth export. (METI, 2010) The 
reported reasons for delay were various: 1. time delays in the approval of export license 
for shipments; 2. export price deemed too cheap by the customs inspectors to grant 
approval; 3. besides the usual English-language documents, additional Chinese-language 
documents were required for application for export license and customs clearance; 4. 
time delays in shipment after customs approval; 5. increased customs inspections of the 
products waiting to be shipped after customs approval. (METI, 2010) Though the 
Chinese captain was freed on September 25 as a peaceful end to the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Island incident, Sino-Japan high-level government bilateral exchanges did not resume 
until late October of 2010. Meanwhile, the New York Times reported on November 10 
that China blocked shipments of rare earth minerals to Japan since Sept. 21 and some 
shipments to the United States and Europe since mid-October. (Bradsher, 2010b) The 
alleged embargo of China’s rare earth exports lasting two months led to wide speculation 
that China was using rare earths as a geopolitical weapon in its territorial disputes with 
Japan.  
If there was indeed an embargo, then the Japanese import data would show import 
of rare earths from China decreased to nearly zero. The alleged rare earth export embargo 
was started before September 21 (Bradsher, 2010a) and lasted until at least early 
November. (Bradsher, 2010b) Using official Japanese rare earth import data reported by 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the author charted Japan’s import of several rare earth 
                                                 
331 In fact annual export quota since 2010 until 2014 has been almost constant with slight 
increase (see Figure 68). 
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oxide products from China. Figure 71 shows that the import of cerium oxide, yttrium 
oxide, lanthanum oxide and rare earth metals were all reported consistently from 
September 2010 to November 2010. Compared to the second half of the year 2010, the 
import volume changes were fairly volatile in the first half of the year 2010. Figure 72 
shows the import of cerium oxide, yttrium oxide, lanthanum oxide and rare earth metals 
from China in 2009. The import volume changes in the previous year were even more 
volatile, while there was no claim of an embargo then. Thus the alleged embargo could 
not be substantiated based on the official import data available. 
 
 
Figure 71 Japan's Imports of Cerium Oxide, Yttrium Oxide, Lanthanum Oxide and 
Rare Earth Metals from China by Month in 2010332 
                                                 
332 Data is extracted from the Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics of Japan database at 
http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm. Country code for China is 105. 
Commodity codes for cerium oxide, yttrium oxide, lanthanum oxide and rare earth metals 




Figure 72 Japan's Imports of Cerium Oxide, Yttrium Oxide, Lanthanum Oxide and 
Rare Earth Metals from China by Month in 2009333 
 
The reported “delay” of rare earth exports to Japan reported by the Japanese trading 
sources was likely the result of Beijing’s ongoing domestic policy campaigns over rare 
earth mining which met up against a drastically cut half-year export quota. The rare earth 
export quota was allocated by MOFCOM to individual companies (both domestic 
companies and foreign-domestic joint venture companies) on a half-year basis. For 
Japanese consumer companies, because there was never an international “rare earth metal 
exchange”, buying rare earth products was through company-to-company contracts with 
Chinese export-eligible smelting companies or intermediary traders. When MOFCOM 
announced the export quota decrease in July, other State Council ministries were also 
increasing their inspections over companies in the rare earth business. From June 2010 to 
November 2010, the Ministry of Land and Resources conducted a nationwide crackdown 
                                                 




on illegal operations in rare earth mining, including both mining production without 
licenses and mining production beyond the MLR-allocated quota. Inspector teams were 
sent to each major producing province to conduct spot checks on mining operations. 
(PRC MLR, 2010a) Also in October 2010, it was reported that facing a dismal record of 
catching smugglers in the previous three years, several ports of the Chinese Customs had 
been conducting special anti-smuggling campaigns focusing on the rare earth export, 
increasing the percentage of shipments subject to customs checks and increasing the 
auditing of trading companies. (Zhang, 2010) These inspections, audits and spot checks 
could very likely result in delays in the approval of export licenses or shipments of rare 
earth products from the Chinese ports. It is also possible that the export companies or 
intermediary traders could not complete the shipments with overseas customers in time, 
because their sources of supply involved illegal mines or extra-quota production that 
were cracked down by the MLR inspection. Furthermore, because the MOFCOM export 
quota still did not differentiate between higher-value HREEs and lower-value LREEs in 
2010, it was also very likely that exporting companies or traders would temporarily 
withhold the export of cheaper rare earth products in order to bid up the price, or to make 
room for the export of more expensive rare earth products first. 
After the 2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku Island incident, both Beijing and Tokyo 
governments hoped to resume bilateral dialogue over the rare earth trade issue. At the 
Sino-Japan Economic Forum in September 2011, a meeting involving both Japanese and 
Chinese government officials and business representatives, a close resemblance to the 
early Sino-Japan Rare Earth Communication Conference, was proposed to be held in 
Beijing in April 2012 (2012 marked the 40th anniversary of the normalization of 
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relationships between China and Japan). (Nikkei, 2012) However in April 2012 the 
proposed conference was cancelled. Although no official reason was given, it is possible 
that the cancellation was influenced by the rising tension between Japan and China in 
April 2012, when controversial Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro announced plans to 
purchase three islands at Diaoyu/Senkaku disputed water area in order to claim 
ownership over the territory. (Fang, 2010) Another possibility is that Japan had already 
announced in March 2012 the filing of a joint WTO complaint (DS431) with the U.S. and 
the E.U. against China’s rare earth export restrictions, which might have increased 
tensions between China and Japan over the rare earth trade issue. 
8.5 National-level Institutional Changes 
This section analyzes the key national-level institutional changes in this period 
that influenced the capacity of the state to steer China’s rare earth industry development. 
The increased inter-ministry policy coordination within the State Council, a local cadre 
evaluation system with more balanced incentives and less dual administrative control, 
and cross-regional cooperation in law enforcement have contributed to better 
enforcement of Beijing’s reregulation policies. However, the continued lack of 
independence in local cadre inspection and the lackluster criminal punishment still 
created incentives and rooms for market actors to evade Beijing’s mandates. 
8.5.1 Increased Inter-ministry Policy Coordination within the State Council 
In an attempt to recentralize its bureaucratic control over the industry, the State 
Council has created new institutions for central inter-agency cooperation in devising, 
implementing and enforcing its policy campaigns. The 2008 State Council Reform 
resulted in the partial transfer of responsibility over industrial governance from NDRC to 
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a new ministry, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)334. NDRC 
still remains perhaps the most powerful agency in the current State Council, making 
macro-level economic development and reform policies, approving/vetoing large-scale 
industrial projects and setting price controls affecting all industries335. NDRC also retains 
its Department of High-Tech Sectors (高科技产业司 ) which devises national-level 
development policies focusing on strategic emerging industries and has the authority to 
approve and review large-scale high-tech sector projects. MIIT on the other hand 
primarily manages the details of industrial development, such as devising and 
implementing industry-specific policies, standards and regulations. MIIT’s Bureau of 
Raw Materials industries, which retained staff members from NDRC, oversee the details 
of industrial development in raw materials industries including the rare earth industry. 
The Rare Earth Office, whose bureaucratic authority was reduced to be a lower-level unit 
within NDRC in the 2003 State Council Reform, remained a lower-level unit under the 
Bureau of Raw Materials industries of MIIT.  
In 2009 the State Council approved a new “Rare Metal Management Inter-
Ministry Coordination Regime” (稀有金属管理部际协调机制). This interagency effort 
has been primarily led by MIIT and attended by 12 State Council ministries and 
commissions, including NDRC, MOF, MLR, MEP, MOFCOM, MPS, General Customs 
and State Administration of Taxation. (PRC MIIT, 2009) Since 2009, MIIT has chaired 
                                                 
334 MIIT took over the responsibility of central government oversight over the civilian 
industries from NDRC, as well as the responsibility of oversight over defense industries 
and technologies from COSTIND (abolished in the 2008 State Council Reform). 
335 The Pricing Department at NDRC is nicknamed “Most Powerful Department under 
the Sun” (天下第一司) in China, as it currently controls the pricing of most basic 
industrial and service products including agricultural products, energy and natural 
resources (water, natural gas, electricity, coal, etc.), transportation, information and 
communication, real estate, healthcare services and drugs, and social service. 
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annual meetings of this inter-agency regime convening staff from the relevant offices in 
the 13 ministries and commissions, representatives of major central SOEs, representatives 
of major industry associations and rare earth industry experts. The annual meeting works 
to ensure the coordination in policy formulation and implementation regarding the rare 
metals, including the REEs. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, as the previous 
section explains, several major State Council ministries, including MIIT, MLR, MEP and 
General Customs have jointly conducted annual special operations cracking down illegal 
operations, conducting spot checks on rare earth companies in ten major production 
regions. (PRC MIIT, 2011)  
The State Council still had some incoherence in policies where one ministry’s 
policy trumped another. For instance, as the previous section explains, the mining 
production plan quota between MIIT and MLR was not equal until 2010, and the 
smelting quota released by MIIT was based on the higher MIIT mining plan quota. This 
created confusion and loophole in the quota implementation in local production regions. 
Some local smelting companies which were allocated production quota from MIIT could 
not buy enough rare earth concentrates as raw materials to fulfill their production quota336.  
8.5.2 Changes to Local Cadre Management System  
A few new changes to the monitoring and evaluation of local party cadres after 
2008 have influenced the local enforcement of central policies. Firstly, as the previous 
chapter analyzes, the evaluation of local cadre performance was historically focused on 
economic growth indicators such as GDP. This primary focus on economic growth has 
not seen much change. Until most recently in 2015, a measure of “Green GDP” was out 
                                                 




of the consideration. (Ye, 2015) However, because Beijing and local provincial 
governments have conducted several rounds of crackdowns and inspections in the rare 
earth industry, compliance with central policies in the inspections of local production 
regions has become a key factor in local cadre tenure. For instance, during the author’s 
fieldwork in Ganzhou Prefecture in Jiangxi Province in the summer of 2013, the county 
party secretary and several county party officials of Anyuan County were terminated and 
persecuted following an inspection which uncovered their involvement in illegal mining 
activities in the county. This creates disincentive for the local cadres to evade Beijing’s 
policies, at least during the inspection and crackdown seasons.  
Secondly, the central party authority has implemented new measures 
strengthening higher-level control over cadre monitoring and evaluation institutions. The 
Amendment to the PRC Administration Inspection Law in June 2010 stipulates that 
dispatched inspectors to government agencies and SOEs would no longer be subject to 
“dual management”, and they would only report to the discipline inspection agency337. 
Thus at least the dispatched inspectors have gained a higher degree of independence in 
their work.  
However, greater institutional changes in cadre management system are necessary 
to ensure enforcement of central policies by local cadres. Local discipline inspection and 
supervision officers in local governments have still been under “dual management”, and 
thus they still suffer from a lack of independence from the rest of the local bureaucracy. 
((Liu & Li, 2014) Similarly, local environmental protection bureau officers, as part of the 
                                                 




local bureaucracy, also suffer from a lack of independence. This has led to the relatively 
lax enforcement of Beijing’s pollution discharge regulations in some counties338.  
8.5.3 Changes to Law Enforcement Mechanisms 
8.5.3.1 Increased Collaboration in Law Enforcement across Regions 
As the previous chapter analyzes, the mining rights and licenses have been under 
the control of local provincial/prefecture governments through their local SOEs. For 
Beijing to enforce its reregulation campaign, cross-regional collaboration between local 
authorities would be necessary. Thus the post-2008 State Council has pushed for more 
cross-province collaboration in regulating the local businesses in the rare earth industry.  
So far two regional regulatory regimes have been established covering HREEs 
and LREEs. In 2010, under the coordination of MLR, 15 prefecture governments in five 
provinces (Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan) in South China signed an 
agreement to form a joint regulatory regime to coordinate regulation over heavy rare 
earth production. (PRC MLR, 2010) This 15 Prefecture Rare Earth Development 
Regulation Regional Joint Operation (15 市稀土矿产开发监管区域联合行动) agreed on 
cross-regional regulations on issues including the coordination of mining quota, the 
crackdown of illegal production and smuggling, the management of law enforcement 
personnel in mining operations. In 2011, MLR also coordinated a similar cross-regional 
agreement between 3 prefectures producing light rare earth products, including Baotou in 
Inner Mongolia, Jining in Shandong Province and Liangshan in Sichuan Province. (PRC 
MLR, 2011) This Light Rare Earth Development Regulation Regional Joint Operation 
(轻稀土矿产开发监管区域联合行动) between the three local governments agreed on 
                                                 
338 Author interview with a university researcher in Jiangxi Province in July 2015. 
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cross-regional policy campaigns over a number of issues, including crackdowns on illegal 
mining and smuggling, coordination of production planning, coordination of smelting 
production and sales, law enforcement and coordination of metals stockpiles.  
8.5.3.2 Lack of Strong Legal Rules to Prosecute Illegal Activities  
While Beijing has implemented a series of crackdowns (打黑 ) and special 
operations (专项行动 ) in enforcing regulations and restrictions over the rare earth 
industry, its legal institutions (法规) have not caught up with its whirlwind campaign-
style policies with changes to turn around the lax prosecution. As the previous chapter 
analyzes, prior to 2008 the local prosecution of illegal mining was difficult, and the 
penalty of less than 3 years of jail time was too miniscule to deter businesses from the 
profits they would pocket from illegal operations. While Beijing’s crackdowns and 
special operations since 2008 have made spot checks and thus prosecution easier, the lax 
penalty for illegal operations (illegal as defined by Beijing’s policies) still persists.  
The PRC Mineral Resources Law, last amended in 1997, only contains 
prohibitions against mining without legal licenses. The prosecution of illegal mining, 
under the Mineral Resources Law, would only result in confiscation of revenues and 
administrative fines unless there is persistent illegal activity and significant damage 
which warrants criminal prosecution (刑事犯罪)339. In Guangdong Province for instance, 
the illegal mine operators would only be persecuted in the criminal court if the illegal 
operation results in compromised mineral resources assessed above 50000 RMB. Even 
when an illegal mine operator ends up in the criminal court, according to the PRC 
Criminal Law, illegal mining crime would result in a sentence of just under 3 years, and 
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under the circumstance of extremely significant damage, a sentence of under 7 years. 
Thus in reality, the prospect of illegal miners going to jail for more than a few years is 
highly unlikely. 
Furthermore, the current court system has very little to offer to satisfy Beijing’s 
strong campaigns in regulating the rare earth market actors besides upstream mining. 
Beijing’s restrictions over rare earth mining and smelting, as well as its addition of 
resource taxes, have resulted in a higher pricing of rare earth products legally sourced in 
the market, compared to the illegal rare earth products circulated in local black markets. 
This creates incentive for companies to use illegal products as long as they can avoid 
being caught and prosecuted. Because the Mineral Resources Law only applies to the 
mining of mineral resources, companies involved in the selling and buying of illegal rare 
earth products within China cannot be prosecuted under the Mineral Resources Law340. 
The PRC Criminal Law allows prosecution against “illegal operation crime” (非法经营
罪), which is defined as business activities violating “laws and decisions made by the 
National People’s Congress and administrative laws and regulations released by the State 
Council”341. However, the restrictions over the rare earth market released by the State 
Council have been primarily in the form of “announcements”, “suggestions” or “plans”, 
which opens the legal debate of whether these regulations can be elevated to the status of 
national laws. In practice it is very much up to the local prosecutors and the local court to 
determine the extent of criminal prosecution. Smelting companies which buy rare earth 
ores from illegal miners, or trading companies which trade illegal rare earth products, 
                                                 
340 Companies involved in the smuggling of rare earth products outside of China can be 
persecuted under the “smuggling crime” defined by the Criminal Law of People’s 
Republic of China. 
341 Article 96 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
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therefore may be persecuted with “illegal operation crime”, or may get away with only 
fines and no jail time. The legal cost of evading Beijing’s regulations is small. For 
instance, in August 2013 the local court in Qingliu County, Fujian Province charged a 
rare earth trader buying and selling illegal rare earth ores valued more than a hundred 
thousand RMB with “illegal operation crime” and sentenced the person to 1 year in 
prison342. With little prospect of ending up with jail sentences and more likely just fines 
and confiscation of revenues, it is no wonder that companies and individuals would 
continuously try to evade Beijing’s regulations as soon as a crackdowns or campaign 
wraps up. 
8.6 Industry Development Outcomes 
This section analyzes the outcomes of the rare earth industry development since 
2008 in industry production and consumption, international trade, market structure, and 
environmental and social impact. It compares the development results with state goals 
and mandates in each area. 
8.6.1 Domestic Production and Market 
8.6.1.1 Mine Production 
China continues to be the major supplier of rare earth mine production in the 
world. China’s reregulation has spurred recent development of junior rare earth products 
around the world, most notably the re-entry of Molycorp (U.S.) and Lynas 
(Australia/Malaysia) into the global rare earth mine production. Figure 73 shows the 
mine production volume of China, the U.S. and the rest of the world reported by the 
USGS. In 2013, China’s proportion of annual mine production had declined to about 86% 
                                                 




of global production. Yet with Molycorp filing for chapter 11 protection (bankruptcy) in 
2015, China’s proportion may be increased again in the near future.  
 
 
Figure 73 Production Volume of Rare Earth Concentrates by China, U.S. and the 
Rest of the World (ROW) in 2008-2013343 
 
There is a possibility that the USGS overestimates China’s production, or the 
Chinese official statistics underreports the production volume. As shown in Table 8, the 
official statistics of China’s rare earth mine production, reported by the Chinese Ministry 
of Land and Resources has a large discrepancy compared with the United States 
Geological Survey’s statistics of China’s rare earth mine production. 
 
                                                 
343 Data Source: the Minerals Yearbooks published by the U.S. Geological Survey from 




Table 8 China's Rare Earth Mine Production Reported by MLR (China) and USGS 
(U.S.) (Unit: metric tons of REO equivalent)344 
 China’s mine production 
figure reported by MLR 
China’s mine production 
figure reported by USGS 
2008 125,000 120,000 
2009 129,000 129,000 
2010 89,259 130,000 
2011 84,943 105,000 
2012 76,029 100,000 
2013 80,423 95,000 
 
On official statistics, the MLR mining quota has successfully brought the mining 
production under control. Figure 74 compares the mining production statistics with the 
mining quota released by MLR to assess the effectiveness of the mining quota. The mine 
production volume reported by Chinese official statistics was much higher than the 
MLR’s production quota in 2008 and 2009, but dropped significantly in 2010 to below 
the MLR quota and stayed below the MLR quota since 2010. Yet considering the fact 
that the official production statistics would only count the production volume of mine 
concentrates from companies allocated with the MLR quota, it is very likely that China’s 
actual production volume is larger than the Chinese officially reported volume. If using 
                                                 
344 The data reported by the Ministry of Land and Resources is extracted from the Annual 
Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry from 2008 to 2013, published by the Department 
of Industry Coordination at NDRC. The data reported by the USGS is extracted from the 
Minerals Yearbooks published by the U.S. Geological Survey from 2008 to 2013. 
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the production volume data from the USGS, then China’s production volume was still 
higher than the MLR quota from 2010 to 2013, though the difference between the 
production volume and the quota was substantially reduced over the years.  
 
Figure 74 China's Rare Earth Mine Production Compared with MLR Mining 
Quota (2008-2013)345 
 
8.6.1.2 Smelting Production 
China continues to be the world’s leading producer of rare earth smelting products, 
yet its attempt at controlling the production volume of rare earth smelting products has 
not been successful. As Chapter 4 analyzes, due to the lack of sizable competition in rare 
earth smelting in other countries, even as Molycorp produced rare earth ores from its 
California mine, the concentrates would have to be sent to China for further processing. 
                                                 
345 The mine production and mine quota data reported by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources is extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry from 
2008 to 2013, published by the Department of Industry Coordination at NDRC. The data 
reported by the USGS is extracted from the Minerals Yearbooks published by the U.S. 
Geological Survey from 2008 to 2013. 
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MIIT’s annually released production planning has proven to be ineffective in curbing the 
total volume of production. As Figure 75 shows, China’s rare earth smelting production 
exceeded the MIIT’s production plan in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2014.  
MIIT has primarily blamed the over-plan production on illegal production. 
According to MIIT, 55 illegal rare earth producers and 22 illegal mines were already shut 
down in China between 2011 and 2015. (Chang & Hui, 2015) However, MIIT that illegal 
production still was a big threat to its ability to control production: from September 2014 
to May 2015 alone, an estimate of about 12,400 tons of rare earth smelting products were 
produced illegally (meaning outside of the MIIT plan) in China. (Chang & Hui, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 75 China's Rare Earth Smelting Production Compared with MIIT Smelting 
Production Plan (2008-2014)346 
                                                 
346 The smelting production data is extracted from Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 
Industry from 2008 to 2013, published by the Department of Industry Coordination at 
NDRC. The MIIT smelting production quota data is extracted from relevant quota release 
policy documents by the MIIT. 
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The author has found though that the difference between the plan and the reality 
could be attributed to another additional factor: local provinces in South China had 
considerable leeway in implementing state plans. For instance, theoretically any firm that 
receives production and export quota should have passed the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) requirement on environmental emission and the MIIT requirement on 
industry entry standards. The author conducted a comparison of the list of firms within 
the rare earth production plan released by the Commissions of Economy and Information 
Technology of provincial governments of two southern provinces, Guangdong and 
Jiangxi in 2013, with the list of firms which were eligible under the MEP and MIIT 
requirements. The comparison showed that four firms in Guangdong and three firms in 
Jiangxi did not make to either lists by the central government ministries, yet still got 
production plans from their provincial governments. Bypassing national requirements to 
give local firms permission to produce render the plans made at the center ineffective. 
8.6.1.3 Domestic Market Price Changes 
The market price of rare earth products on the Chinese domestic market has 
reacted strongly to policy changes in the short term. Rare earth prices climbed upward in 
2010, and they hit their peak after the State Council released the Several Opinions of the 
State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth 
Industry in May 2011. This short-term abnormally high pricing was primarily driven by 
the market expectation of stronger state regulations. It was further exacerbated by 
consumers who went into panic buying and stockpiling and producers and traders who 
withheld supply to prop up the price. Such high pricing proved to be unsustainable for the 
domestic downstream users. The market price slowly decreased in 2012 and down to a 
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fairly normal range in 2013. Figure 76 shows the half-yearly data of prices of several 
low-priced light rare earth oxides from 2008 to 2013. The prices of Lanthanum Oxide 
and Cerium Oxide, two rare earth oxides used in the largest quantities, increased to a 
peak price of about 250,000 RMB/ton in June 2011 from a low 10,000-30,000 RMB/ton 
in June 2008. The prices then slowly reverted to the normal and in December 2013 
returned to a low 20,000-30,000 RMB/ton. The prices of Praseodymium Oxide and 
Neodymium Oxide had much higher increase of almost ten times, from around 100,000 
RMB/ton in June 2008 to around 1,000,000-1,200,000 RMB/ton in June 2011. Both 
prices dropped significantly in 2012 and to a lower level of around 300,000 – 600,000 
RMB/ton in 2013. Similar price hikes were also found in higher-priced rare earth oxides. 
Figure 77 shows that the market price of Europium Oxide, Terbium Oxide and 
Dysprosium Oxide had increase of almost 7-10 times from June 2008 to June 2011 and 





Figure 76 Chinese Domestic Market Price of Lanthanum Oxide, Cerium Oxide, 
Praseodymium Oxide and Neodymium Oxide (2008-2013)347 
 
 
Figure 77 Chinese Domestic Market Price of Europium Oxide, Terbium Oxide and 
Dysprosium Oxide (2008-2013)348 
 
8.6.1.4 Production of Higher-value Products 
China’s production of higher-value rare earth products, specifically new materials 
that qualify as part of the strategic and emerging industries (SEI), has increased strongly 
in this period, although at a less than stellar rate compared to the over-10-times growth in 
the previous decade of 1998-2007. Figure 78 shows the Chinese consumption of rare 
earth ores, broken down by consumption by the traditional sectors and consumption by 
the new material sector. While consumption by traditional sectors has mostly stayed flat 
                                                 
347 Price data is extracted from the market price database of a Chinese industrial 
consultancy Baichuan Info. 
348 Price data is extracted from the market price database of a Chinese industrial 
consultancy Baichuan Info. 
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from 2008 to 2013, consumption by the new materials sector has shown a strong increase 
from 35,510 metric tons of REO equivalent to 53,429 metric tons of REO equivalent. 
Among new materials (including permanent magnets, phosphors, hydrogen storage 
materials, catalysts and liquid crystal displays), permanent magnets have continued the 
lead, consuming the largest share of rare earths. As Figure 79 shows, China’s production 
volume of rare earth permanent magnets almost doubled from 2008 to 2013.  
 
 
Figure 78 China's Domestic REE Consumption by Traditional and New Materials 
Sectors349 
 
                                                 
349 Data is extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry from 2008 































































Figure 79 China's Production Volume of Rare Earth Permanent Magnets350 
 
8.6.2 International Trade 
8.6.2.1 Export Volume and Export Quota 
China’s rare earth export quota had a drastic cut in 2010 and stayed almost 
unchanged until 2014. As Figure 80 shows, the reported export volume of rare earth 
smelting products that were subject to quota restrictions exceeded the export quota in 
2008 and 2010, but stayed below the quota in all other years. There are several reasons 
for the quota not being exhausted. The first reason is that the price hike in 2010-2011 
made consumers either delay purchasing from China or use cheaper alternatives, which 
drove down the export demand. The second reason is that some foreign companies set up 
joint ventures with Chinese companies to produce products that were not subject to 
export quota restrictions to be shipped abroad. An example is the South Korean company 
POSCO, the world's fourth-largest steelmaker. POSCO used to directly import rare earth 
smelting products from China, but chose to acquire the majority share of a local rare earth 
                                                 
350 Data is extracted from the Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry from 2008 
to 2013, published by the Department of Industry Coordination at NDRC. 
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company called Yongxin Rare Earths in Baotou in 2010; as a subsidiary of POSCO, 
Yongxin Rare Earths processed the primary rare earth products into materials that would 
not be subject to the quota restrictions for export to South Korea. The third reason is that 
the reported export volume could not account for the amount of smuggled rare earth 
products, which would have put the real export at a higher volume and closer to the quota. 
 
Figure 80 China's Rare Earth Export Volume vs. Export Quota (2008-2013)351 
 
8.6.2.2 WTO Dispute against China’s Rare Earth Trade Restrictions 
The United States, the European Union and Japan brought forward a WTO 
dispute (DS 431) in 2012 to challenge China’s restrictions on exports of rare earths, 
tungsten and molybdenum 352. The WTO panel ruled against China in March 2014. China 
soon appealed the panel reports on all three critical minerals (only on limited aspects of 
                                                 
351 The export volume data is extracted from Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth 
Industry from 2008 to 2013, published by the Department of Industry Coordination at 
NDRC. The export quota data is extracted from relevant quota release policy documents 
by MOFCOM. 




the reasoning of the panel and certain intermediate findings of the panel report). China’s 
argument for the validity of its export restrictions was based on exceptions to the legal 
obligations of imposing no non-tariff barriers as laid out in GATT Article XX: “(b) 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health… (g) relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”353. The WTO ruled 
in August 2014 that it would uphold its rulings against China’s restriction over rare earth 
export. In order to comply with the WTO ruling, China abolished its export quota in 
January 2015 (PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2014) and tariff in May 2015 (PRC Ministry 
of Finance, 2015), however the export of rare earth products would still be limited to 
companies with active export licenses granted by MOFCOM each year. 
When the author conducted the field work in China in 2013, the dispute was still 
under WTO panel review, yet most industry observers that the author had spoken to in 
China had correctly predicted that China would lose the case and would in turn substitute 
its export restrictions with other kinds of control measures. As the previous section on 
industry-specific policies analyzed, export control was viewed as a convenient tool that 
Beijing could utilize to influence company behavior, and export control measures were 
implemented by Beijing along with other domestic policies strengthening the state’s 
control over the market. China previously lost a WTO dispute concerning its export 
restrictions on various raw materials, the DS394 China – Raw Materials case in 2012354, 
                                                 
353 For more information about GATT Article XX and the exceptions to the legal 
obligations (where countries can impose trade restrictions), see 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm 
354 This dispute concerns certain measures imposed by China affecting the exportation of 
certain forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon 
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while claiming validity of the restrictions on the exceptions in GATT Article XX. 
Because of this precedent, both policy makers and industry experts in China were 
prepared for a similar outcome in the rare earth case. In addition, Beijing also saw the 
limit of export quota as an effective constraining tool: as Figure 80 showed, the export 
quota from 2011 exceeded the officially reported export volume every year, thus scraping 
the export quota on paper would not make much difference. 
With the expection that the export quota and tariff would be abolished, the state 
sought to compensate through strengthening measures to control domestic production. 
The Vice Secretary General of the CSRE Zhang Anwen wrote that “we should strengthen 
the two (domestic) production plans to prevent extra-quota mining and smelting; wage 
strong campaigns to target illegal mining and smelting; implement with force the laws 
and regulations on resource conservation, environmental protection and ecological 
restoration; achieve higher concentration in the market structure; aggressively target 
smuggling” (Zhang, 2014) Immediately after China scraped its export quota and tariff to 
comply with WTO ruling, the State Administration of Taxation announced new taxation 
on all rare earth products (not just exports) starting May 2015. The taxation on rare earth 
products was changed from a volume-based resource fee to a gross-sales-based resource 
tax; thus the higher-valued, less-abundant HREEs would be taxed at a much higher rate 
by volume. Beijing introduced 7.5%-11.5% resource tax on the gross sales of light rare 
earth ores and primary products (calculated into ore gross sales) and 27% resource tax on 
the gross sales of the more valuable heavy rare earth ores and primary products 
(calculated into ore gross sales). (PRC Ministry of Finance & State Administration of 
                                                                                                                                                 
metal, yellow phosphorous, and zinc. For more information about the dispute process and 
content, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm 
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Taxation, 2015) This new resource tax essentially offset the gains to foreign buyers of 
rare earth products that would be brought by the abolishment of tariff (15-25%). 
8.6.2.3 Export of Higher-value Products  
China’s export of higher-value rare earth products continued to have strong 
increase in volume. Take permanent magnets as an example, which is the category of 
new materials that consumes the largest volume of rare earth products. As Figure 81 
shows, China’s export of rare earth permanent magnets almost doubled in volume 
between 2008 and 2013. Following the price swings of the rare earth smelting products 
on the domestic market, the export value of the permanent magnets hiked to almost five 
times of 2008 levels in 2011, but gradually reverted to a lower level in 2013 (shown in 
Figure 82). The average price of export of permanent magnets had an increase from 44.98 




Figure 81 China's Export Volume of REE Permanent Magnets (2008-2013)355 
                                                 
355 Data is extracted from extracted from Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 





Figure 82 China's REE Permanent Magnet Export Value (2008-2013)356 
 
In the meantime, intellectual property regarding the permanent magnets, crucial to 
the availability of the export market, has become a battle ground between Hitachi and 
Chinese magnet producers. On August 17, 2012, Hitachi Metals announced a formal 
complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) against 29 
manufacturers and importers of sintered NdFeB magnets and products containing sintered 
NdFeB magnets, including three Chinese manufacturers. Hitachi listed the violation of 
four “processing” patents (6,461,565; 6,491,765; 6,527,874 and 6,537,385) filed in 2001-
02. Hitachi sought exclusion orders prohibiting the entry of magnets and products 
containing those magnets produced by these companies into the U.S. (Hitachi, 2012) The 
complaint ended through a settlement between Hitachi and the accused manufacturers, by 
the latter paying a large sum of money to gain patent licensing. In response to Hitachi’s 
complaint, a dozen Chinese companies sued Hitachi Metals for holding invalid extension 
                                                 
356 Data is extracted from extracted from Annual Reviews of Chinese Rare Earth Industry 
from 2008 to 2013, published by the Department of Industry Coordination at NDRC. 
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of patents, claiming that their manufacturing process uses indigenous technologies that do 
not infringe Hitachi’s processing patents. The lawsuit is currently ongoing, and it will 
likely result in further granting of Hitachi’s licenses to more Chinese manufacturers. 
A further consequence of the dispute over permanent magnet technology 
protection between China and Japan is that proposed Sino-Japan joint ventures involving 
permanent magnets have recently been subject to much stricter scrutiny due to new 
export control measures from METI. There are existing Sino-Japan joint ventures in 
China producing permanent magnets for end production in Japan. For instance, Japanese 
electronics firm Showa Denko has two subsidiaries in China, one in Baotou, Inner 
Mongolia (LREE production region) and one in Jiangxi Province (HREE production 
region). The local Showa Denko subsidiaries have Showa Denko as the majority 
shareholder and Chinese rare earth producers as the minority shareholder, and they 
primarily employ Chinese workers and managers. They buy rare earth products directly 
from local producers, and they produce rare earth materials which are manufactured in 
Japan into electric motors for cars and hard disks. Yet in July 2012 the Japanese Ministry 
of Economy, Technology and Industry (METI) implemented an amendment restricting 
exports of manufacturing facilities and components for products that could have dual use 
applications, including high-performance magnets, the equipment to make them and the 
related components. (Nikkei, 2013) Japanese firms planning to set up joint ventures with 
foreign producers would need to provide proof that the technology being transferred in 
export of manufacturing will not be used for military purposes. This has led to delays in 
several planned Sino-Japan joint venture projects (including a planned joint venture led 
by TDK to produce high-function magnets in China using Chinese rare earth supply for 
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hybrid vehicles). After several rounds of consultation with METI, TDK finally was 
allowed in 2014 to proceed with the plan for a joint venture with Guangdong Rising Non-
ferrous Metals. (Nikkei, 2014) 
8.6.3 Market Structure 
As the previous section shows, Beijing’s restructuring plan to consolidate the rare 
earth industry into 2-3 state-owned supersized conglomerates did not materialize. Major 
Chinese mining companies have engaged in fierce competition for acquiring resources 
and companies. If they are selected as major industry conglomerates in Beijing’s 
restructuring plan, they would be the few companies able to dominate China’s rare earth 
mining and smelting production in the future. The industry restructuring is still an 
ongoing process, as companies have been going through negotiation talks for mergers 
and acquisitions. Most recently in January 2015, Beijing picked six companies as the 
major rare earth companies to be granted the rare earth smelting production quota from 
MIIT. As Figure 83 shows, the selection was a mix of central SOEs and local 
provincial/prefectural SOEs, showing a compromise of center/local government interests 
regarding the control over the industry. Two central SOEs under the supervision of 
SASAC in Beijing, China Minmetals and China Aluminum, were selected into the list. 
As the previous chapter demonstrates, the failure of the industry consolidation in 2002-
2005 was partly due to the central SOEs’ lack of control over upstream mining resources. 
Besides the existing smelting production capabilities, both of the two central SOEs have 
acquired new mining licenses for rare earth projects, thus boosting their control of 
upstream resources. Two other central SOE that were spin-offs from the Big-Three rare 
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earth trading SOEs of the 1990s, China Non-ferrous Mining Group357 and Sino Steel 
Corporation358, were long rumored to be picked by Beijing as would-be conglomerates, 
but ended up not obtaining any mining licenses and not on the list supplied by the MIIT 
in 2015. Four local SOEs were selected, each backed by a local provincial/prefecture 
government. These local SOEs have already gained control over some or all local rare 
earth mining licenses (hence upstream resources) and have acquired additional companies 
or resources for the desired status of supersized conglomerates. Below is the detailed 
description of each major company’s expansion in the rare earth industry, leading to their 
selection by Beijing for industry restructuring.  
 
                                                 
357 As seen in the previous chapter, China Non-ferrous Mining Group, known for short as 
China Non-ferrous Metals, was built after the 1998 State Council Reform from subsidiary 
units of China National Non-ferrous Metals Industry Corporation’s overseas construction 
operations, and thus did not have any rare earth mining licenses or mining subsidiaries. 
358 As seen in the previous chapter, Sino Steel Corporation’s trading subsidiary, Sinosteel 
Trading Company, was originally China Metallurgical Import & Export Company, one of 





Figure 83 Six Major State-owned Enterprises Selected for Rare Earth Industry 
Restructuring in 2015 
 
1) China Minmetals (中国五矿), a central SOE which has its roots in the rare earth 
industry since the early years of China’s economic reform, has emerged as one of 
Beijing’s strongly favored choices. While China Minmetals lost its control over 
mining licenses to Ganzhou Provincial Government in the aftermath of the 1998 State 
Council Reform, it has in the past few years acquired new licenses in other regions. 
China Minmetals currently holds three mining licenses (one in Hunan Province, one 
in Fujian Province and one in Yunnan Province) and one exploration license (in 
Guangdong Province). China Minmetals is also the parent company of eight rare 




2) Aluminum Corporation of China (中国铝业), CHALCO for short, was the central 
SOE that suffered complete defeat in its attempt to consolidate the rare earth industry 
in 2002-2005. Like China Minmetals, CHALCO has also managed a comeback. It 
currently controls five rare earth mining licenses through acquiring six rare earth 
mines around the country and acquiring all rare earth smelting companies in Shaanxi 
Province and Guangxi Province (where rare earth resources have recently been 
identified). China Aluminum is also the majority shareholder of several rare earth 
smelting companies in Jiangsu Province, Shandong Province and Sichuan Province. 
3) Baotou Steel (包钢股份), a provincial SOE whose control was transferred from 
Beijing to the Inner Mongolia government in the 1998 State Council Reform, remains 
the undisputed choice for Beijing to consolidate the rare earth industry in North China. 
Baotou Steel is the parent company of Baotou Steel Rare Earths, which controls the 
Baiyun-ebo Mine. To further expand its control over the industry, Baotou Steel has 
established a rare earth conglomerate subsidiary named North China Rare Earth 
Group （中国北方稀土（集团）高科技股份有限公司） 359 . As the majority 
shareholder of this conglomerate, Baotou Steel has acquired dozens of other 
companies to boost its market share and branch into smelting and downstream 
production. It has signed acquisitions deals with all other rare earth smelting 
companies in Inner Mongolia, as well as with Gansu Rare Earths, a major rare earth 
smelting company in Gansu Province in North China.  
                                                 
359 For a list of companies currently within the conglomerate North China Rare Earth 
Group, see its website at http://www.reht.com/sitefiles/services/cms/page.aspx?s=1&n=9. 
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4) Ganzhou Rare Earths (赣州稀土), a prefectural SOE controlled by the prefecture 
SASAC of Ganzhou Prefecture Government, won the battle against central SOEs and 
other local SOEs to lead industry restructuring in Jiangxi Province. As a local SOE 
championed by the prefectural government, Ganzhou Rare Earths is the holder of 43 
rare earth mining licenses (out of a total of 45 mining licenses) in Ganzhou Prefecture 
and has acquired almost all rare earth smelting companies in the prefecture. In order 
to counter the acquisition efforts of central SOEs, Ganzhou Rare Earths joined forces 
with two other provincial SOEs, Jiangxi Copper (江西铜业) and Jiangxi Tungsten
（江钨集团） to establish a rare earth conglomerate named South China Rare 
Earth Group （中国南方稀土集团有限公司）in 2015. The registered capital of 
South China Rare Earth Group was 1 trillion RMB, of which 60% came from 
Ganzhou Rare Earths, 35% from Jiangxi Copper and 5% from Jiangxi Tungsten. 
(Huang, 2016) Besides its stronghold over the home base of Jiangxi Province, this 
new conglomerate also controls rare earth mining resources in Sichuan Province in 
southwest China. Jiangxi Copper, the minority shareholder, won a high-price bid 
against China Aluminum in landing a deal with the Sichuan Provincial Government 
to jointly develop rare earth resources. Jiangxi Copper has acquired rare earth mining 
licenses in Sichuan Province and acquired most of the local rare earth smelting 
companies in Sichuan Province.  
5) Guangdong Rising Nonferrous Metals Company (广晟有色）, a provincial SOE 
in Guangdong Province, was chosen by Guangdong provincial government as the 
local SOE contender for the restructuring of the rare earth industry. The company’s 
controlling shareholder is Guangdong Rising Assets Management Company, directly 
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controlled by the provincial SASAC of Guangdong Provincial Government. In 2012 
Guangdong Rising Nonferrous Metals Company established a rare earth company 
named Guangdong Rare Earths (广东稀土） with registered capital of 1 trillion 
RMB. Guangdong Rare Earths now controls three rare earth mining licenses in 
Guangdong Province (which has four in total). To boost its market size in the 
midstream and downstream of the supply chain, Guangdong Rare Earths, backed by 
the provincial government, would acquire 12 earth smelting and applications 
producing companies in Guangdong Province, making it the monopolizing company 
for the rare earth industry in Guangdong Province. It also plans to acquire additional 
nine rare earth companies in other provinces in China360.  
6) Xiamen Tungsten (厦门钨业), an SOE in Fujian Province, became the vehicle of 
Fujian Provincial Government to lead the restructuring process. As the previous 
chapter analyzed, apart from one mining license held by the central SOE China 
Minmetals, rare earth mining licenses in Fujian Province were controlled by counties 
in a decentralized manner. As Beijing pushed forward its industry restructuring 
agenda, Fujian Provincial Government sought to consolidate the control over the rare 
earth resources and companies in its own hands. Xiamen Tungsten is the largest 
producer of tungsten in the world. Its two major shareholders before 2011 were 
Fujian Nonferrous Group (33.6%) and China Minmetals (20.58%). Fujian Nonferrous 
Group is a provincial asset management company wholly owned by the Fujian 
Provincial Government to manage state assets in the nonferrous metal industries. As a 
                                                 





newcomer to the rare earth industry, Xiamen Tungsten only started investing in rare 
earth production in 2006. In 2012 Fujian Provincial Government instructed Fujian 
Nonferrous Group to rename one of its subsidiaries to specifically Fujian Rare 
Earth Group (福建稀土集团). Fujian Rare Earth Group got all share owned by its 
parent company through free transfer and bought additional share of Xiamen 
Tungsten to increase its share percentage to 34.28%. Meanwhile China Minmetal’s 
share percentage dropped to 15.58%. Thus Xiamen Tungsten became an SOE that the 
provincial government could exert majority control. By 2014 Xiamen Tungsten has 
acquired all rare earth mining licenses in Fujian Province except the one held by 
China Minmetals. 
8.6.4 Environmental and Social Impact 
Beijing’s campaign to clean up the pollution in the rare earth industry has yielded 
notable progress. Strong institutional incentives to prioritize environmental protection, 
such as requiring environmental compliance in production and export quota allocation 
and funding to local governments for environmental management, have prompted 
companies and local governments to invest in environmental treatment. For instance, the 
Baiyun-ebo mining region was selected into the 40 “Model Bases of Comprehensive 
Utilization of Mining Resources” designated by Beijing. Baotou Steel was awarded by 
both the central and local governments funding totaling more than 6 billion RMB to 
lessen the danger of the “tickling bomb” tailings lake which stores waste including 
radioactive thorium. The funding would be devoted to multiple measures to prevent 
additional damage, including relocating local residents, treating solid waste landfills, 
relocating production lines, treating waste water, restoring grasslands and nearby 
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ecological environment. (Hu, 2013) The rare earth smelting plants of Baotou Steel Rare 
Earths also went through an upgrading of the waste treatment technologies, which 
enabled them to stop dumping new waste water into the tailings lake in 2014. (Fan & 
Qing, 2013) Beijing’s production planning, industry restructuring phasing out small 
producers, as well as crackdowns on illegal mining and smuggling also helped to 
decrease the pollution from illegal operators and companies using backward technologies. 
However, more innovation and adoption of environmentally-friendly production 
technologies is necessary to ensure long-term sustainability of production. In Gannan-
Yuebei region for instance, the in-situ leaching method to mine rare earths from ores, 
which has gradually been adopted over dump leaching and tank leaching methods that 
has led to stripped mountains, still produces damage including waste water, waste 
residues and the possibility of dangerous landslides. Better treatment and improvement to 
existing technology would be needed to decrease the environmental impact. 
The devastation of environment after decades of excessive rare earth mining is 
impossible to treat in a short time. In Baotou in North China, as of July 2013, waste water 
discharge in the city still did not meet the Chinese state standard of waste water 
discharge361. The treatment of the tailings lake has mostly been focusing on lessening the 
danger to local residents and ecological environment rather than completely eradicating 
the waste. Baotou Steel estimates that the discarded ores and waste water dumped into 
the tailings lake since the 1950s now contains REEs and thorium valued around 1 billion 
USD. Thus the company has been faced with the difficult task of both extracting the 
valuable resources and treating the environmental damage associated with them. Baotou 
                                                 
361 Author interview with local businessmen in Baotou Prefecture in July 2013. 
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Steel has missed qualifying for rare earth export quota due to failing environmental 
inspection twice, once for the second batch quota of 2011 and once for the second batch 
quota of 2012. Both times the company was granted supplementary quota later after 
implementing further treatment measures. In 2013 Baotou Steel devoted more than 2 
billion RMB to pollution treatment, but still missed qualifying for the export quota 
allocation for the first batch of 2014. The company was given provisional export quota 
later, yet the treatment of the tailings lake remains, as the head of the BRIRE Yang 
Zhanfeng argues, “a complicated and difficult issue”. (Wang, 2014) Similarly in Ganzhou 
Prefecture in South China, the legacy of environmental degradation is gigantic. An 
estimate conducted by Ganzhou Prefecture required roughly 38 billion RMB to fund the 
restoration of the past mining areas back into an ecologically sustainable landscape, thus 
the treatment of waste and stripped land would require more money than the revenues it 
generates from the industry. Ganzhou Prefecture government further estimated that the 
treatment of existing damage to the ground vegetation due to rare earth mining would 
require at least 70 years, not counting the treatment for new damage to the ground 
vegetation due to continued mining362. It should be noted though that the exact amount of 
funding required for environmental treatment of Ganzhou Prefecture is still open to 
debate among academics in China; some have argued that the local government tends to 
overestimate treatment funding required in order to get more funding from Beijing, and 
the actual cost would likely be less with the upgrading of production technologies363. 
Nevertheless, environmental treatment remains costly and restoration is unlikely to be 
achieved until several decades in the future. 
                                                 
362 Author interview with university researchers in Ganzhou Prefecture in July 2013. 
363 Author interview with an officer of the China Rare Earth Society in May 2013.  
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8.7 Reregulation with Losers 
While international observers tend to look at China as one big entity that stands to 
benefit from its REE export restrictions at the expense of the importing countries, this 
view overlooks the mixed effects Beijing’s campaign has created within the rare earth 
industry in China. A blanket policy campaign covering an entire industry that produces 
many different kinds of products is bound to produce negative effects for some industry 
actors. Through fieldwork visits with businesses, the author has found the following cases 
where Beijing’s regulations led to undesirable effects in implementation.  
1) One private rare earth smelting company in North China complained that the 
local environmental inspections followed a rigid measure of environmental treatment 
facilities. Thus although the company had already installed treatment facilities and 
discharged waste in compliance with the waste discharge regulations, it had to buy 
additional environmental treatment equipment to satisfy local environmental inspections. 
2) Some companies in South China complained about the fixed standard for 
market entry concerning minimum production capacity applied to all producers to phase 
out the smaller companies. MIIT’s minimum production capacity for market entry 
standard is measured in volume of production, without taking into account the value of 
production or the amount of market demand. Thus some companies producing specific 
higher-value products at low volumes would not fit the MIIT standard, and they had to 
work around the rules with the local government to continue production. 
3) One company producing a variety of rare earth applications in South China 
complained that some of its products had been wrongly categorized by the customs, thus 
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its exports had been taxed at an unfairly high tariff rate. The company disputed about the 
unfair categorization and was in the process of working out the corrections.  
4) Several private companies in North China complained of more lenient 
implementation of policies for the SOEs in the same region. State-owned enterprises 
received better tax treatment and more funding compared to private enterprises. State-
owned enterprises were also given opportunities to receive provisional production or 
export quota after failing environmental inspections, and they were able to continue 
receiving production or export quota until meeting market entry standards. 
5) Several domestic private companies complained that joint ventures that foreign 
companies formed with domestic SOEs received unfair advantage over wholly-owned 
domestic companies. Joint ventures, based on their status as foreign-invested entities, 
could receive preferential export tax treatment, lower land rents and various other 
benefits from the local government. Although the local government rhetoric justifying the 
treatment was that the foreign-invested joint ventures could bring in advanced 
technologies, the local domestic companies posit that the joint ventures primarily served 
as tools for foreign companies to circumvent export quota restrictions: they export rare 
earth products that went through very little further processing from primary products, but 
enough to be not categorized among those restricted by the General Customs.  
6) Downstream and down-downstream companies were strongly affected by the 
rare earth price fluctuations between 2010 and 2013. Compared to the upstream mining 
dominated by the central and local SOEs, downstream companies such as permanent 
magnet producers and down-downstream companies such as electric motor producers 
were primarily driven by private capital. Such companies do not have the access to 
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government funding or bank loans as the SOEs do, and they primarily compete by 
offering comparable products with lower costs. The fluctuation of raw materials costs led 
to some companies unable to keep stable cash flow and going bankrupt. 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the current Chinese state reregulation of the rare earth 
industry from 2008. In this post-global-financial-crisis period, the central government has 
continued to steer the national economy on a grand scale through massive stimulus 
package to boost domestic demand, sectoral restructuring to increase SOE consolidation, 
and innovation promotion through promoting strategic and emerging industries. In the 
rare earth industry, Beijing’s reregulation goals are sustainable production and 
environmental protection, technology upgrading to fulfill domestic demand, securing 
resource advantage to facilitate downstream development, and breaking the domestic 
applications’ barrier to international markets. The central government has introduced new 
rules and revised old rules on production quota, taxation and licensing, market entry, 
export quota, tariff and export licensing. Beijing has led numerous funding schemes on 
promoting the upgrading of industry technologies. Beijing’s nationwide campaign of 
industry restructuring, though dragging far behind its original schedule, has narrowed 
down industry consolidation into several major central SOEs and local SOEs. In local 
production regions, Beijing has conducted almost annual campaigns cracking down 
illegal mining and smuggling. Beijing has strengthened its environmental inspections as 
well as its institutional incentives for companies to invest in pollution control and 
environmental compliance.  
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Political institutional changes have also occurred and influenced the state’s ability 
to implement the policies successfully. The increased inter-ministry policy coordination 
within the State Council, cross-regional cooperation in law enforcement, and changes to 
the local cadre evaluation system have contributed to better enforcement of Beijing’s 
reregulation policies. However, greater institutional changes are still needed to empower 
specific local agencies such as environmental protection bureaus to enforce central 
policies, to strengthen the inspection of local cadres independent of the influence of local 
governments, and to uphold the legal penalty for criminal behavior. 
The alleged halt of rare earth export halt to Japan after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island 
incident in the second half of 2010 was an event that drew worldwide attention to China’s 
policy changes. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, the alleged embargo cannot be 
substantiated based on the official Japanese import data available. The reported “delay” 
of rare earth exports to Japan reported by the Japanese trading sources was likely the 
result of Beijing’s ongoing domestic policy campaigns which met up against a drastically 
cut half-year export quota.  
The result of Beijing’s reregulation policies in industry development was a mix of 
successes and failures. In production, China has continued to be the world’s major rare 
earth producer and smelter. Beijing’s efforts to control production volume through quota 
planning has been not so successful, as smelting production was higher than the plan. 
Instead of leading to a more stable market conducive to long-term growth, Beijing’s 
policy campaigns prompted drastic market price changes in 2010-2013, with domestic 
prices peaking in mid-2011 for the different kinds of rare earth oxides at prices roughly 
7-20 times of pre-2010 levels. The price shock not only led to market speculation and 
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instability, but also affected downstream production to the point of inducing bankruptcies. 
In terms of technology upgrading, China’s rare earth consumption by the new materials 
sectors has shown a strong increase compared to the relatively flat consumption by 
traditional sectors, showing a continued strong trend towards upgrading the value chain. 
In export, China’s export volume has stayed below its export quota since 2011, before it 
was required to scrap the quota and tariff restrictions to comply with WTO ruling in 2015. 
China’s export of higher-value rare earth products have continued to increase, yet many 
domestic permanent magnet producers have still been locked in a patent-induced market 
entry battle with Hitachi. METI’s export control on high-value permanent magnets also 
led to delays in planned Sino-Japan joint ventures producing higher-value permanent 
magnets in China. In terms of market structure, Beijing’s original plan to consolidate the 
industry into 2-3 conglomerates in two years suffered significant local pushback, and 
restructuring has dragged on and is still ongoing. The restructuring process has become a 
gruesome battle amongst central SOEs, local SOEs and local private companies for 
survival and the chance to become Beijing’s pick. Control of mining resources through 
mining licenses proved to be crucial in the battle for dominance. Two central SOEs and 
four local SOEs were selected into the MIIT’s tentative list of corporations allowed to 
receive production quota. In environmental protection, Beijing’s funding schemes and 
institutional rewards have resulted in new and larger initiatives by companies and local 
governments to treat existing pollution and upgrading technologies of production. Yet the 
pollution legacy is so gigantic that it is impossible to achieve much progress in ecological 
restoration in the short term. The author has further uncovered instances where the 
implementation of Beijing’s regulations resulted in excessive regulatory requirements, 
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evasion of government control through regulatory loopholes, and unequal treatment of 
companies, thus hurting specific local companies. To summarize, Beijing’s reregulation 
campaign has seen a mix of success and failure; its capacity to promote industrial change 
in the rare earth sector to satisfy its goals has shown to be not so strong as many outside 




CHAPTER 9 EXPLAINING REGIONAL VARIATION IN STATE 
CAPACITY OF REREGULATION  
 
As the previous chapters show, Beijing has long had trouble enforcing its 
reregulation policies at the local level. Local governments and market actors were not all 
pleased to follow the central government development agendas. At the national level, 
political and legal institutional factors in each period have influenced the extent to which 
the state was able to effectively implement its policies and achieve its goals. At the 
subnational level, compared to North China (with Baiyun-ebo as its major mining region), 
South China (with Gannan-Yuebei as its major mining region) has had a more serious 
problem of clashing between the central government and local stakeholders. This chapter 
analyzes the reasons behind the subnational disparity in Beijing’s capacity to enforce its 
campaigns. Why have local stakeholders been pushing back more forcefully against 
Beijing’s policies in South China compared to North China? The answer involves three 
factors related to local contexts, including the geographical concentration of local mining 
deposits, the technology intensity of local mining production and the local market 
concentration of mining licenses. 
9.1 Geographical Concentration of Local Mining Deposits 
First and foremost, geographical concentration of mining deposit is a local-level 
independent variable influencing the state capacity to impose effective rules. Lower 
geographical concentration of mining deposits leads to a greater dispersion of mining 
operations in many lower-level jurisdictions, as well as a greater technical difficulty in 
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implementing effective snap inspections. This leads to lower chance of compliance with 
state mandates.  
The mineral deposits in Baiyun-Ebo region in North China is the largest rare earth 
deposit in volume in the world; such a large deposit is concentrated within the plateau 
mining region on the Ulanqab Prairie close to the city of Baotou and administratively 
falls within the Baiyun-ebo District. On the other hand, the mineral deposits in Gannan-
Yuebei region in South China are fairly dispersed in small volumes throughout the 
mountainous areas spreading across many villages across the borders of three provinces.  
The geographical dispersion of mineral deposits in South China led to a naturally 
greater dispersion of mining sites producing small numbers of primary ores in many 
lower-level juridictions (villages and counties). Over time these grew into many local 
mining operations with close ties to the respective local lower-level governments. As 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 explains, while the mineral resources theoretically belong to the 
Chinese state, the local rural residents have the right to use the forests and the right to use 
the land. As China started embracing the market economy in the 1980s and 
institutionalized incentivized rare earth production and export, mining started booming 
rapidly across many villages in Gannan-Yuebei region. Local village or county cadres, 
who usually would have a final say on land use and forest use, would attract private 
capital from wealthy businessmen in richer provinces, or provide starting money 
themselves or pool money from local businesses. The money would be used to buy out 
the land and forest use rights of the land where mining would take place and pay for 
equipment and operating costs for producing primary ores. Some local villagers were 
then hired by the business investors or village cadres to do the actual work using tank 
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leaching, dump leaching or in-situ leaching method. The products were stamped with 
invoices from the local subsidiary of the central SOEs (before the 1998 State Council 
reform splitting the major central bureaucratic system) or from the local 
provincial/prefecture SOEs (after the 1998 State Council reform and subsequent local 
consolidation of mining assets) and able to be sold on the market. Thus there was a 
considerable degree of local autonomy in the on-the-ground operation. The mining 
operations also have closer ties with the local cadres who would provide regulatory 
permission and oversight for mining but also might depend on mining for providing both 
personal benefits (such as financial returns) and public benefits (such as employment of 
local workers and revenue for the county/village government). While Beijing imposes 
control over rare earth production and export, the local businessmen running the artisanal 
mines could still continue the operation if they could bribe local county or village 
regulators into covering for them. They might also bribe local villagers to prevent them 
from tipping off the operations to the inspectors dispatched from higher-level 
governments. 
The local mountainous geography of the mining region in South China also 
presents a greater difficulty for effective snap inspections. Prior to the adoption of 
satellite imaging and other advanced technologies for digital surveillance, local cadres 
working in mineral resource management bureaus mostly accessed the mining sites by 
foot (see the example of such geography in a mining site in Ganzhou Prefecture in Figure 
84). This made it easier for the illegal mining operators to cover their tracks in 
anticipation of inspections. As one local resident remarked, “once the inspector teams 
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arrived in the county, the miners would get word of inspectors coming and would 
promptly stop the operation and wait for the inspection to pass.”364 
 
 
Figure 84 Photo of a Mining Site in Ganzhou Prefecture 
 
9.2 Technology Intensity of Local Mining Production 
The second local-level variable influencing the state capacity to implement its 
policies concerns the technology intensity of local mining production. The technology 
intensity of mining is related to the geological conditions of the deposit. Lower 
technology intensity of local mining production allows for more extralegal production 
and artisanal mining difficult to control by the state, thus leading to lower enforcement of 
state mandates. 
The rare earth deposits in South China’s Gannan-Yuebei region are ionic 
adsorption clay deposits which occur in a weathered profile and very close to the earth 
                                                 
364 Author interviews with local residents in Ganzhou Prefecture in July 2013. 
397 
 
surface. Therefore, such mineral deposits can be easily extracted from the underground 
without much technical expertise. During fieldwork the author found that the local miners 
could just use fertilizers sold on the market to make solutions to extract primary ores 
from the ground on the mountains, even simply using their backyard or nearby pools. 
This low technology intensity of mining production in South China has created a higher 
propensity for artisanal mining to flourish and operate within grey areas of black markets 
outside of state control. It has also contributed to lower cost of market entry for local 
businesses and has lured investors looking to make some quick cash even while risking 
breaking the rules. As a result, illegal mining and smuggling became more prevalent. 
While the recent crackdown campaigns could temporarily halt the illegal activities, 
artisanal mining would be easier to resume after crackdown campaign dies down.  
On the other hand, the basternite rare earth deposit which coexist with iron and 
radioactive elements including Thorium in Baiyun-ebo region requires relatively higher 
technology intensity of local mining production in North China. This leads to lower 
chances of such short-term, small-scale and artisanal mining to grow and evade Beijing’s 
regulation. The illegal production and smuggling in Baiyun-ebo region has been more in 
the style of “insider jobs”: employees of Baotou Steel would allow extra production to be 
flown into the black market or bought by smelting producers with unfulfilled smelting 
quotas365.  
9.3 Local Market Concentration of Mining Licenses 
The third subnational-level variable of local context influencing the state capacity 
to effectively implement its goals and policies is the market concentration of mining 
                                                 
365 Author interview with local businessmen in the rare earth smelting and applications 
businesses in Baotou in August 2013. 
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licenses among local market actors. A mining license is the prerequisite to control over 
the mineral resource and the upstream primary ore production. High market concentration 
of mining licenses proved to be helpful in negotiating mergers and acquisitions. 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions is a key part of Beijing’s agenda to restructure the 
entire rare earth industry into champion companies (supersized state-owned modern 
conglomerate groups capable of both competing in the international market and 
dominating the domestic market) that would abide Beijing’s policies. Thus higher market 
concentration of mining licenses would facilitate greater state capacity in implementing 
its reregulation policies. 
The Baiyun-ebo mine in North China is owned by Baotou Steel, thus the company 
maintains a monopolistic type of control over the rights to the mineral resources in North 
China. At the same time of the release of the Several Opinions of the State Council on 
Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth Industry in May 
2011, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region provincial government released the 
Consolidation and Abolishment Plan for Rare Earth Upstream Companies. The plan 
called to have all the other smelting producers in the autonomous region, 35 in total, to be 
either shut down or merged into Baotou Steel. Yet these companies, some of which had 
sizable production capacity and private assets, would not simply close down or be 
merged without adequate compensation. As the negotiation process between Baotou Steel 
and all the other companies took longer than expected, to speed up the process, the Inner 
Mongolia government allowed Baotou Steel to withhold primary ore supply to the 
smelting companies. (Xu, 2011) By December 2012, among the 35 companies, 4 were 
abolished with no compensation, 1 changed its production to other industries, 18 were 
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closed down with compensation, and the rest 12 signed contracts with Baotou Steel to 
give 51% of the total share of these companies. (Baotou Steel, 2012)  
On the other hand, mining licenses in South China were far less concentrated 
among market actors, leading to a protracted battle in forming conglomerates. As 
explained in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, in South China, after successive bureaucratic 
reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, rare earth mining licenses were spread out 
amongst a central SOE, a few local provincial-level and prefecture-level SOEs and 
several rural county-level companies. A lower concentration of mining licenses among 
market actors in South China resulted in more primary ore suppliers eligible to become 
the major conglomerate. Thus with more eligible players, there were more competition in 
mergers and acquisitions of mining and smelting companies and at the same time more 
resistence to corporate takeover without adequate compensation or political 
connections366. In particular, several local provincial-level and prefecture-level SOEs 
were looking to hold on to their mining licenses and corresponding mineral resources 
against potential takeover and also to acquire more mining licenses through acquiring 
smaller rural companies with mining licenses. Local companies also competed with each 
other and with central SOEs in acquiring more assets (new mining deposits yet to be 
                                                 
366 Political connection could help facilitate the acquisition of mining licenses and 
mediate potential conflicts of interests. China Aluminimum, a central SOE, was able to 
break into rare earth mining with no prior licenses and consolidate the rare earth resource 
in Guangxi Province through getting the only mining license to explore and mine the rare 
earth deposit in Guangxi Province since 2011. The author learned from interviews with 
some industry insiders that the deal was successful in getting the support of the local 
government, partially because the political connection brought by Guo Shengkun, the 
Party Secretary of the Guangxi Provincial Government in 2007-2012. Previous to his top 
local post in the party leadership at Guangxi Province, Guo was the top leader in China 
Aluminum, serving as the founding CEO, the party secretary and the chairman of the 
board from 2001 to 2004. 
400 
 
explored, or smelting companies, or companies producing mid-stream products) to boost 
their chance of being recognized as prospective “super-sized enterprises”. By controlling 
the mineral resources and acquiring more assets, the local SOEs would gain higher 
chance of being selected as Beijing’s choice of conglomerate. The local 
provincial/prefecture governments that backed the affiliated local SOEs would have 
greater leverage in decision making in the industry after the restructuring is completed. 
The original plan of consolidating the market actors in South China into one 
conglomerate ended up becoming a protracted battle. By 2015 Beijing settled on a 
modified plan of compromise, selecting five enterprises (two central SOEs and three 
local SOEs) to lead the restructuring process in South China. Beijing’s original plan to 
consolidate industry production into a single conglomerate never stood a chance. 
New international market changes would likely sustain the local companies’ 
advantages in control over the mining licenses in South China. The mineral deposit in 
Baiyun-ebo region is high in LREEs, meaning that the major products from North China 
are light rare earth products such as lanthanum oxide and cerium oxide. LREEs have 
historically been priced at much lower price than HREEs due to relatively higher global 
abundance in the earth’s crust. Such light rare earth products can be produced outside of 
China in abundance as well: in fact, the major non-China producers, such as Molycorp in 
the U.S. and Lynas in Australia/Malaysia that have restarted production in their 
respective mines after China tightened its regulations in 2008, are primarily LREE 
suppliers. On the other hand, HREEs have been solely produced from South China’s 
ionic clay deposits for the last two decades, with no viable production source outside of 
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China in the short term. Thus the local mining SOEs in South China would not have to 
worry about potential international competition offering alternatives of mineral supply. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter identifies the three local-level independent variables influencing 
Beijing’s capacity to effectively implement industrial policies to achieve the state’s goals. 
In South China, lower geographical concentration of mineral deposits, lower technology 
intensity of production, and lower market concentration of mining licenses led to more 
failures in policy implementation in the rare earth industry, compared to North China. 
Unfortunately for Beijing, such factors contributing to the messy picture of policy 
enforcement in South China will stay. The geography of mineral deposits and the 
technical method of production required for mining the deposits are naturally determined 
and unlikely to be changed. The concentration of mining licenses among market actors is 
also unlikely to be changed, as it would be highly unlikely for the state to revoke or take 
back the licenses and corresponding mining rights held by local SOEs by force (though 





CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION  
 
Government policy is like the moon. It is different in the middle of the 
month than it is on the first day of the month. Government policy is also 
like the sun. When it shines on you, you flourish. - Chinese proverb 
 
This thesis studies the role of the Chinese state in the development of the rare 
earth industry. China’s rare earth industry has rapidly grown since the late 1970s and 
dominated global production since the late 1990s, producing non-renewable mineral 
resources vital to the manufacturing industries and national defense. Theoretical 
discussions about the role of the state in China’s economic development abound. 
Competing theoretical camps exist: some argue for the state as the deregulator voluntarily 
retreating from the market; some argue for the state as the re-centralizer maintaining 
control over the market actors; some argue for the state as a fragmented authoritarian 
power consisting of different agenda-driving factions; some argue for the state as a 
predatory regime without political accountability. Using the case of the rare earth 
industry, one of the few industries that achieved rapid growth and claimed significant 
share of the global market, this thesis presents the role of the state as primarily engaging 
in “reregulation”. Beijing has long recognized the value of rare earths as strategic 
minerals. In industry liberalization and market development since 1978, Beijing has set 
concrete goals to utilize and preserve the strategic value relevant to the state, and Beijing 
has consistently introduced new policies and regulations and adjusted existing policies 
and regulations. Yet Beijing’s ability to steer industry development to fit its determined 
goals and policy targets has been constrained. This study analyzes the variables 
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influencing the state capacity of enforcing its industrial policies in reregulation of the rare 
earth industry. The study finds that national-level independent variables (State Council’s 
bureaucratic authority systems over market actors, the local cadre management system, 
the introduction and enforcement of specific property rights and criminal laws) and 
subnational level independent variables (the geographical concentration of local mineral 
deposits, the technological intensity of local mining production, the local market 
concentration of mining licenses) influence the state capacity in reregulation of the rare 
earth industry. 
The importance of REEs as critical minerals were well recognized by senior 
Chinese government officials dating back to the early years of the People’s Republic of 
China. In the planned economy era of the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the Chinese state was a 
dominating force in industry development. The state’s primary focus was to develop the 
defense utility of the rare earth industry. Institutional support from Beijing allowed the 
industry to bypass fiscal and technical constraints typical in junior mining project 
development within a short period of time. Though successive political movements in the 
Maoist era, notably the Cultural Revolution, damaged China’s economy and science and 
technology institutions, the rare earth industry suffered relatively less damage due to its 
affiliation with the military and utility for defense applications. 
After China embarked on the marketization and opening up of its economy in 
1978, the state’s focus on the value of the rare earths shifted from their defense utility to 
their economic utility as the raw materials for export. Rare earth export would enable 
China to both gain foreign currencies and develop the backward regions, as well as to 
cement strategic ties with the western advanced economies as China sought to integrate 
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itself into the global market. In this period from 1978 to 1997, the state’s goal was 
achieving global dominance in production and trade while transitioning towards a more 
liberalized market from central planning. The state introduced more industry-specific 
policies, regulations, initiatives to promote as well as regulate the process of 
marketization and industry development. The measures included export promotion and 
tax rebate, production promotion and regulation through high-level state plans, 
restrictions on foreign investment in mining and smelting, production and export control 
on specific primary products, and support for basic research and high-tech development 
zones. At the same time, political and legal institutional changes, not specific to the rare 
earth industry, influenced the state capacity of steering in this industry to its determined 
policy objectives. These institutional variables include the bureaucratic system over 
market actors, the local cadre management system and the property rights legal 
institutions. By 1997 China’s rare earth industry had rapidly grown to near global 
dominance in rare earth production and export, having successfully convinced major 
western consumer companies to source materials from China for the long term. 
As China became the global default supplier of REEs after 1998, the state goals in 
the rare earth industry changed from maximizing the export to the focus on sustainable 
development and domestic industry upgrading to preserve the value of China’s supply of 
such critical minerals. The state-imposed reregulation measures in this period between 
1998 and 2007 included mining license control and mining quota, restrictions on foreign 
investment, export quota and tariff on low-end products, funding and project approval 
priority for industry upgrading, attempted consolidation of industry into two national 
SOEs, and environmental treatment and inspections. National-level institutional changes 
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did not all yield impact to policy implementation in the state’s favor. Successive 
bureaucratic reforms resulted in weakened central bureaucratic authority over the market 
actors. Inefficient legal prosecution procedures contributed to the lack of local 
enforcement of central government policies. Well-intended changes to the local cadre 
management system did not fundamentally change its mantra of economic-growth-based 
promotion and its inherent incompetence in monitoring and evaluating cadre behavior. 
The result of Beijing’s policies was a mix of success and failure. China sustained its 
leading position in global rare earth supply, and with industry upgrading and global 
migration of manufacturing to China its domestic consumption of rare earths climbed up 
to rival the export. Rare earth production and export both showed significant industry 
upgrading from primarily low-end unprocessed products to many categories of products 
of higher value, though the production and export of high-tech products was still small 
compared to the total volume. On the other hand, Beijing was not able to strictly enforce 
mining control and clamp down on illegal mining and smuggling, to restructure the 
market into large conglomerates, or to curb the environmental destruction from industrial 
production. 
The current reregulation since 2008 has seen much more forceful policy campaign 
to reassert control over the rare earth industry from Beijing. At the macroeconomic level 
the Chinese state faced the dire task of lifting the economy from the impact of the 2008 
global financial crisis and implemented massive stimulus programs to boost domestic 
demand and the development of strategic and emerging industries. In the rare earth 
industry, Beijing’s reregulation goals grew to be more multi-facted to utilize and preserve 
the strategic value of the rare earth resources in this new macroeconomic environment. 
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The state’s goals include sustainable production and environmental protection, 
technology upgrading to fulfill domestic demand, securing resource advantage to 
facilitate downstream development of strategic and emerging industries, and breaking the 
barrier to international markets imposed on domestic producers of higher-value 
applications. The central government has introduced and adjusted rules and policies on 
production quota, taxation and licensing, market entry, export quota, tariff and export 
licensing, funding for tech upgrading, environmental treatment and inspections. Beijing 
has led annual crackdown campaigns against illegal mining and smuggling and a new 
restructuring campaign seeking to consolidate the industry into a few mega-sized state-
owned conglomerates. The current period of reregulation has seen changes to the political 
and legal institutions that influence state capacity. The increased coordination within the 
State Council, the strengthened local cadre evaluation and recalibrated cadre promotion 
incentives, and the increased cross-regional collaboration in law enforcement have 
contributed to better enforcement of Beijing’s policies. However, existing lack of 
administrative independence of specific local bureaus and inspectors, as well as lack of 
effective criminal prosecution have continued to allow for and encourage the evasion of 
Beijing’s mandates. 
The current round of reregulation has resulted in a mix of success and failures. 
Beijing’s campaigns have resulted in notable progress in technology upgrading and 
environmental protection. Yet efforts to control production volume and to eradicate 
illegal activities has been not so successful. The original plan to consolidate the industry 
into 2-3 conglomerates in two years suffered significant time lag and local pushback and 
was recently revised to include two central SOEs and four local SOEs. The drastic policy 
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changes prompted market price swings, negatively impacting downstream industries both 
at home and abroad. In some cases, Beijing’s industrial policies created excessive 
regulatory requirements and unequal treatment for domestic companies. In other words, 
the campaign-style policies led by the party from the center still have a long way to go to 
ensure effective enforcement and win full cooperation from the local market actors. 
A natural policy question is what Beijing can do better to enhance its state 
capacity to steer industry development to fit its reregulation goals and policies. This 
thesis shows that at the national level, more fundamental political institutional changes, 
not specific to the rare earth industry, are needed to bring about long-lasting changes 
more than what the current annual crackdowns will do. The local cadre management 
system would need to be improved to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of local 
government performance based on well-rounded metrics that include not only economic 
growth but also other records such as environmental performance. Local discipline 
inspections and auditing officers, who the state relies on to monitor local government 
performance, would need to have greater independence in their work to be shielded from 
unnecessary influence of the local administrations. The legal institutions persecuting 
illegal operations and thus protecting the interests of law-abiding companies needs to be 
strengthened to ensure long-term voluntary compliance with state rules. Instead of a 
campaign-style crackdown almost every year, effective legal prosecution can replace 
central dispatchers to serve as a useful, long-term deterrent against illegal business 
activities and local cadre corruption. At the subnational level, compared to North China 
(with Baiyun-ebo as its major mining region), South China (with Gannan-Yuebei as its 
major mining region) has lower geographical concentration of mineral deposits, lower 
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technology intensity of production, and lower market concentration of mining licenses. 
These factors, shaped either by nature or by long-time institutional changes, 
unfortunately would stay. Beijing would need to accept its agendas have not been a 
smooth ride in the southern provinces and would not run smoothly.  
As the world’s largest rare earth producer (and likely remaining the largest for 
years to come), China’s reregulation has led to strong international concern of Chinese 
state intervention as a potential risk in global supply chain and international politics. This 
thesis shows that on the one hand, because of the strong linkage between China and the 
advanced western economies in global rare earth supply chain, China’s domestic 
industrial policies can have spillover effects on the global market. China’s reregulation 
campaign and significantly price swings in the domestic market has affected the global 
market price and led to overseas companies taking various measures (such as joint 
venture with Chinese smelting companies) to mitigate sourcing risk. Beijing has scraped 
export quota and tariff in 2015 to comply with the WTO ruling, giving more equal 
footing ground to domestic and foreign consumers. Beijing would also likely be very 
cautious in its future policies to avoid causing a price swing similar to the 2011-2013 
period in the future, as the price swing has shown to cause significant damage to 
domestic downstream producers and ran contrary to the state’s interest to develop 
downstream industries. On the other hand, the thesis shows that the potential threat of 
China using its rare earth supply as an effective weapon in international politics is likely 
overblown. The alleged rare earth export halt to Japan after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island 
incident in the second half of 2010 was widely reported as a sign of China using REEs as 
a diplomatic weapon. Yet the analysis shows that the alleged embargo cannot be 
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substantiated based on the official Japanese import data available. In addition, the thesis 
shows that while Beijing’s reregulation has facilitated the industry’s strong growth and its 
dominance in global production so far, Beijing has been limited in its capacity to impose 
rules and policies to fully achieve the goals and policy targets that it envisioned. 
Institutional factors at the national level, as well as geographical, technical and market 
factors at the subnational level, would continue to pose obstacles to Beijing’s progress 
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